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ABSTRACT 
 
Theoretical, empirical, and experiential attempts at disentangling the 
functions of Non-Suicidal Self-Injury (NSSI) have been driven by the desire to 
answer the complex question: Why do people engage in self-injurious behaviours? A 
recently developed behavioural model of NSSI—the Experiential Avoidance Model 
(EAM; Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2006)—proposes that self-injury functions 
primarily as a form of negatively reinforced, experiential avoidance and places 
particular emphasis on emotional avoidance. Experiential avoidance is 
conceptualised as a behavioural process whereby people are unwilling to tolerate 
distressing emotions, thoughts, memories, or physical sensations and engage in 
behaviours to change, avoid, or escape from these aversive, intrapersonal 
experiences (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996).  
Although the results of international studies support the key assumptions of 
this model to varying degrees (Klonsky, 2007; Klonsky & Glenn, 2008; Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004), the EAM has never been empirically evaluated within Aotearoa 
New Zealand. To determine whether experiential avoidance is the primary function 
of NSSI for people living within Aotearoa New Zealand, I designed and conducted 
three studies. For my first study, I interviewed 24 people who had engaged in non-
suicidal self-injurious behaviours in the previous 12 months about the antecedents 
and consequences of their most recent episode of self-injury. The interviews were 
analysed using a framework based on behavioural principles, which I developed for 
the purpose of this research. This method of analysis, which I called Interpretative 
Functional Analysis, allowed me to identify, and then compare, the functions served 
by discrete self-injurious episodes. Results supported the EAM (Chapman et al., 
2006) in that self-injury episodes functioned predominantly as attempts to avoid or 
escape from intense, negative emotional experiences. Cognitive avoidance, however, 
also played a significant role in the self-injury trajectory, which highlighted the 
importance of investigating unwanted thoughts in subsequent studies. 
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The second study involved surveying 198 people across Aotearoa New 
Zealand who had self-injured in the previous 12 months to further test whether the 
key assumptions of the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) apply to a New Zealand-based 
population. Quantitative findings supported the model and were consistent with 
extant international studies in that experientially avoidant, intrapersonal functions 
(i.e., affect regulation and self-punishment) were identified as primary to the 
reinforcement and maintenance of NSSI. Intrapersonal functions, in general, were 
more highly endorsed than interpersonal functions. Finally, both negative affect and 
cognitions decreased following episodes of self-injury, while joviality increased. The 
increase in positive emotions undermines the EAM’s (Chapman et al., 2006) 
exclusive focus on negative reinforcement, suggesting that positive reinforcement 
also has an important role to play in the continued use of NSSI.  
Analyses of the open-ended, survey responses highlighted the impact of 
particular contextual factors (such as interpersonal conflict and community norms) 
on the incidence and maintenance of NSSI. Conducting a thematic analysis of the 
consequences of people’s most recent episode of NSSI allowed me to identify two 
distinct themes within this data corpus. Specifically, through self-injury participants 
assumed two paradoxical roles, that of transgressor and helper.  
For my final study, I surveyed university students across two time-points 
(Time 1 N = 408, Time 2 N = 224) about their general intrapersonal experiences (i.e., 
emotions and thoughts) and dispositional coping styles (e.g., global experiential 
avoidance, thought suppression). Negative intrapersonal experiences and avoidant 
coping styles were found to vary as a function of NSSI history and recency. Negative 
automatic thoughts and guilt at Time 1 also predicted new episodes of self-injury at 
Time 2. Additionally, thought suppression, not global experiential avoidance, was 
identified as a partial mediator of Time 1 relationships between negative 
intrapersonal experiences and NSSI. To conclude, the findings from this thesis are 
situated within a global context, and implications for clinical practice and future 
research studies are discussed.   
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THESIS OVERVIEW  
 
Answering the question of whether Non-Suicidal Self-Injury (NSSI) functions 
primarily as a experientially avoidant behaviour within Aotearoa New Zealand first 
necessitated an extensive review of the extant literature about how NSSI is defined, 
how it functions, and how it is conceptualised within behavioural models of self-
injury. This review comprises the first three chapters of my thesis. In Chapter 1, I 
consider how definitions of self-injurious behaviours are socio-culturally bound, 
focusing in particular on the ways in which what counts as self-injury within 
Western cultures has been shaped by both consumer and professional perspectives. I 
present the evidence in support of NSSI being distinguished from suicide attempts, 
and critique suggestions that NSSI should be classified as a syndrome, rather than 
symptom, of psychopathology. To conclude the chapter, I define the parameters of 
NSSI for the purpose of my thesis. 
My second chapter concentrates on why people self-injure. I review the 
current evidence base about risk factors and correlates of NSSI, including individual, 
psychological, and environmental characteristics. Following this detailed 
examination of the factors that are associated with, or predict, self-injury, I delineate 
the most commonly reported intrapersonal (i.e., emotional, cognitive, and 
physiological) and interpersonal (i.e., support-seeking and avoidance) reasons for 
self-injury. Literature detailing the self-reported antecedents and consequences of 
NSSI is also reviewed, along with laboratory studies about why people self-injure. 
Building on the evidence that I present in Chapter 2, I then move on to discuss 
functional models of NSSI in Chapter 3. Individual reasons, antecedents, and 
consequences of self-injury are typically grouped into an array of single function 
models. I review the literature in support of the eight most common single-function 
models and discuss the limitations of such conceptualisations of NSSI, before 
outlining and critiquing two multi-function models—the Four Functions Model 
(Nock, 2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005) and the Experiential Avoidance Model 
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(EAM; Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2006)—according to well-established epistemic 
values. I close the chapter with a summary of the empirical studies that I conducted 
for the purpose of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 details the first empirical study I conducted to test whether NSSI 
functions primarily as an experientially avoidant behaviour within Aotearoa New 
Zealand. This interview study consisted of four stages: (1) screening potential 
participants for self-injurious behaviours, (2) interviewing participants about the 
antecedents and consequences of their most recent episode of NSSI, (3) following up 
with participants subsequent to the interviews, and (4) distributing a research 
evaluation questionnaire to interview participants. The methods and results of these 
four stages are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. 
My fifth chapter describes the findings of a nation-wide survey I conducted to 
quantitatively test the assumptions of the EAM in a larger sample of people living in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. More specifically, I examined whether affect regulation is 
the primary function of NSSI, whether intrapersonal functions are more highly 
endorsed than interpersonal functions, and whether the valence of people’s 
emotions and the content of their cognitions changes following NSSI. A series of 
open-ended questions, contained within the survey, about the antecedents and 
consequences of participants’ most recent episode of NSSI are also qualitatively 
analysed and discussed. 
In Chapter 6, the final empirical chapter of my thesis, I compare the 
intrapersonal experiences and coping styles of people who have self-injured with 
those who have never engaged in self-injurious behaviour across two time-points. I 
present and discuss a series of analyses conducted to test the following hypotheses: 
(1) people with a history of NSSI will experience more negative emotions and 
thoughts, and evidence a greater tendency towards avoidant coping than people 
without a history of NSSI, (2) NSSI will be predicted by negative emotions and 
thoughts, and (3) avoidance will mediate the relationships between negative 
intrapersonal experiences and NSSI.  
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I conclude my thesis in Chapter 7 by discussing the most pertinent findings 
from my three studies and considering how my research relates to the broader 
conceptual issues outlined in Chapter 1, such as whether NSSI should be classified 
as a mental disorder. Finally, before outlining how future research can build on the 
strengths and limitations of my own studies, I reflect on the clinical implications of 
my research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
What is non-suicidal self-injury? 
 
‚We express our distress through bodily idioms that are both peculiar to distinctive cultural worlds 
and constrained by our shared human condition.‛ (Kleinman, 1988, p. xiii) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 ‚I am a cutter.‛ This deceptively simple phrase is how one of my participants 
described himself at the start of our interview. Sitting across from me with rolled-up 
sleeves to expose his heavily scarred forearms, I wondered how and why cutting 
had become a defining aspect of his identity. What did those scars mean to him and 
what did they communicate to others in his community, given that self-injury exists 
firmly outside of the boundaries of what is deemed to be socially acceptable 
behaviour within Aotearoa New Zealand?   
  Understanding what factors lead to Non-Suicidal Self-Injury (NSSI), why self-
injurious behaviours become entrenched over time, and how people make sense of 
self-injury is complicated because NSSI is a multi-faceted behaviour, that ‚cannot be 
understood without reference to biological, psychological, social, and cultural 
components‛ (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993, p. 138). As a Clinical Psychologist in 
training, my focus in this thesis is on clarifying the psychological factors that trigger, 
reinforce, and maintain self-injurious behaviours in populations from Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Although I touch on biological factors in my discussion of the psychology 
of self-injury, they are, by and large, beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Social and cultural norms, however, while not explicitly investigated in my 
studies do warrant an in-depth discussion at this stage of my thesis because these 
norms determine what counts as NSSI and, as a result, which behaviours I examine 
in this research. Every person who self-injures is situated in a particular socio-
cultural context, which influences the meaning of self-injury to that person and 
others in their community. It is therefore imperative, before I begin to delve into the 
theoretical and empirical research that constitutes my thesis, to consciously reflect on 
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how the socio-cultural norms within Aotearoa New Zealand and other Western 
countries have shaped the way in which the self-injurious behaviours under 
investigation are defined. 
Before focusing on how self-injurious behaviours are currently conceptualised 
in Western societies, I briefly discuss the importance of recognising that definitions 
of self-injury are social constructs, which shift across time and between cultures. 
What counts as self-injury within contemporary, Western socio-cultural contexts has 
been shaped by both professionals and mental health consumers. Two definitional 
questions, in particular, have been extensively debated in the literature on self-
injurious behaviours: (1) Can self-injury be distinguished from suicidal behaviours? 
(2) Should self-injury be categorised as a symptom of mental illness or a separate 
clinical syndrome? (Cresswell, 2005). After discussing the evidence that self-injury 
can be differentiated from suicide attempts and the rationale behind classifying NSSI 
as a syndrome rather than symptom, I conclude this chapter by outlining the 
definition of self-injurious behaviour used in this thesis.  
2. SELF-INJURY DEFINITIONS ARE SOCIO-CULTURALLY BOUND  
 Two ways of exploring how current socio-cultural contexts shape our 
understanding of NSSI are to reflect on how this understanding has shifted over 
time and to compare our Western conceptualisations of self-injury with those of 
other cultures. I concur with Watters (2010) who argues that, ‚Symptoms of mental 
illnesses are the lightning in the zeitgeist, the product of culture and belief in specific 
times and specific places‛ (p. 3). Exploring historical and cross-cultural perspectives 
on NSSI, even though it is not always conceptualised as a symptom of 
psychopathology, can help us to illuminate the underlying assumptions and values 
that currently dominate our thinking about self-injurious behaviours (Watters, 2010).  
2.1 Historical perspectives 
Browsing through journal articles on self-injury, it quickly becomes apparent 
that our knowledge about NSSI in Western cultures has evolved significantly within 
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past decades. For example, it is hard to fathom a journal editor today publishing the 
following strikingly pejorative and reductive description of women who self-injure:  
In summary, the cutter is an attractive, intelligent, unmarried young woman, who is either 
promiscuous or overly afraid of sex, easily addicted, and unable to relate successfully to 
others. She is an older one in a group of siblings with a cold, domineering mother and a 
withdrawn, passive, hypercritical father. She slashes her wrists indiscriminately and 
repeatedly at the slightest provocation, but she does not commit suicide. She feels relief with 
the commission of her act. (Graff & Mallin, 1967, p. 38)     
 
This extract is objectionable for many reasons: the use of blaming, invalidating 
statements (‚slightest provocation‛), the blatant contradictions (‚promiscuous‛ 
versus frigid), the characterisation of parents as villains, the use of stigmatising 
language such as ‚cutter‛ and ‚slashes‛, and the unnecessary attention to physical 
features (‚attractive‛), intelligence, and marital status. Furthermore, the overly 
confident, sweeping assertions made in this description are astounding considering 
that this research was based on only 20 female patients; the authors excluded the one 
male because they ‚felt he was atypical‛ (Graff & Mallin, 1967, p. 36).  
Of course, the socio-cultural context in which such historical accounts were 
produced was vastly different to the environment we currently inhabit. For a start, 
Psychoanalysis was the dominant therapeutic modality; understandings of what self-
injury was and who self-injured were largely governed by this theoretical framework 
(Shaw, 2002). In contrast, the contemporary emphasis on evidence-based treatments 
(i.e., Dialectical Behavioural Therapy [DBT]; Linehan, 1993a) has shaped current 
conceptualisations of NSSI to focus on behavioural functions (Shaw, 2002).   
 Second, research on NSSI began proliferating from the mid-1980s, a trend that 
has since continued unabated (Nock, 2010; Shaw, 2002). With the increase in 
publications on self-injury, the myth of the typical self-injurer (Hodgson, 2004) has 
been dispelled. Current perspectives on NSSI acknowledge the complexity of self-
injurious behaviours, which are carried out by both males and females (Andover, 
Primack, Gibb, & Pepper, 2010; Claes, Houben, Vandereycken, Bijttebier, & 
Muehlenkamp, 2010), manifest across diverse cultures (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010), 
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and associated with an array of risk factors and psychopathological correlates 
(Fliege, Lee, Grimm, & Klapp, 2009; Gratz, 2003; Nock, 2009). 
Third, the mid-1980s witnessed the advent of the psychiatric survivor 
movement whose members actively challenged clinical constructions of self-
injurious behaviours. The role of mental health consumers in defining what NSSI is 
(and what it is not) will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, but it is 
worth noting here that consumer testimonies about self-injury have exerted 
considerable influence in the past three decades on both practitioners’ and the 
general public’s perspectives of NSSI (Cresswell, 2005). 
Finally, recent technological advances have not only altered the way in which 
both lay and academic information about self-injury is disseminated, but also the 
quality and quantity of that information. In particular, the Internet facilitates access 
to support groups for people who self-injure, along with stories, graphic video clips, 
and clinical information about NSSI, all of which can contribute to the normalising 
or ‚narrative reinforcement‛ of these behaviours within certain communities 
(Whitlock, Lader, & Conterio, 2007, p. 1139). Undoubtedly, this interactive, online 
environment, which simply did not exist in the past, has influenced the way in 
which self-injury is understood on an individual and collective level. 
2.2 Cross-cultural perspectives 
Until recently, psychological or psychiatric research with people from non-
Western cultures who self-injure was virtually non-existent. Twentieth century 
academic investigations of NSSI almost exclusively document self-injurious 
behaviours among middle-class, white women (Shaw, 2002); Favazza’s seminal 
work on the interplay between culture and self-injury, which was first published in 
1987, is one of the major exceptions. Examining the relationships between what 
Favazza (2011) terms culturally sanctioned body modification and pathological self-injury, 
brings into clear focus the role of culture in determining not only what types of self-
injury are carried out, but also what meaning is ascribed to these behaviours and 
how that meaning is communicated to others.  
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Both socially acceptable and unacceptable self-injurious behaviours are 
posited to ‚serve an identical purpose, namely, an attempt to correct or prevent a 
pathological, destabilizing condition that threatens the community, the individual, 
or both‛ (Favazza, 1996, p. 222). Self-injury is a preventative or remedial activity that 
allows individuals and communities to create order out of perceived or impending 
chaos and, as such, examples of ritualistic, religious, and mythic self-injury abound 
in both Western and Non-Western cultural practices and narratives (see Favazza, 
2011 for a detailed review).  
Given the importance of culture in demarcating the limits of socially 
acceptable self-injury, the rigorous application of current Western classification 
systems to Non-Western cultures would inevitably pathologise culturally 
appropriate self-injurious behaviours. For example, Australian Aboriginal peoples 
traditionally cut themselves when in mourning (Farrelly & Francis, 2009; Sheldon, 
2001). Such ‚sorry cuts‛ are not only socially accepted but may be expected in 
Aboriginal communities as an expression of grief (Sheldon, 2001, p. 440). These 
behaviours form a marked contrast to socially acceptable grieving practices within 
Western cultures.  
Certainly, it is instructive to contemplate how the treatment of Westerners 
who cut themselves would change if these behaviours were reframed to become 
socially acceptable ‚distress cuts‛. While I am not advocating that this should be the 
case, it is possible that any self-stigma (Ben-Zeev, Young, & Corrigan, 2010) 
engendered by a history of self-injurious behaviours, which could in turn fuel 
subsequent episodes, may be ameliorated if these behaviours were consistently 
viewed as adaptive responses to distress. Indeed, such a reframing is what consumer 
activists have attempted to achieve (Pembroke, 1996a).  
3. WHAT COUNTS AS SELF-INJURY WITHIN WESTERN CULTURES? 
It is clear that socio-cultural norms play a fundamental role in how NSSI is 
defined; however, a shared socio-cultural context does not necessarily imply 
consensus. What counts as NSSI ultimately depends on who is doing the defining: 
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Acts of self-injury can hold specific meanings for particular individuals or sub-
groups who may choose to accept, revise, or challenge hegemonic social and cultural 
understandings.  
In seeking to unpack the complexities and contradictions inherent in how self-
injurious behaviours are defined and classified within Western cultures, I stumbled 
upon the burgeoning study of personal epistemology. Broadly speaking, personal 
epistemology is concerned with how people define, construct, and evaluate 
knowledge in order to make sense of the world around them (Hofer, 2002). 
Although the field of personal epistemology is not without its own controversies 
around what are highly abstract and complex concepts (Schommer-Aikins, 2002), my 
critique, by necessity, is simply informed by this field and does not seek to delve into 
or resolve these debates.  
    Personal epistemologies are extremely relevant to the question of what counts 
as NSSI within Western cultures; how researchers, clinicians, and mental health 
consumers define and categorise self-injury depends on their ways of knowing and 
what forms of knowledge they privilege. The contrast between empirical knowledge, 
favoured by professionals, and experiential knowledge, favoured by consumers, is 
highlighted by Cresswell (2005): ‚‘Official’ knowledge stresses scientific 
classification, professional expertise, and statistical evidence: ‘Survivor’ knowledge, 
by contrast, emphasises individual experience, the traumas of the life-course, and the 
personal testimony of the survivor as itself expert data‛ 1 (p. 1668). By analysing the 
accounts of self-harm survivors published in Self-harm: Perspectives from personal 
experience, Cresswell demonstrates how some people actively resist and reject 
psychiatric hegemony through producing visceral testimonies about survival 
through self-injury. These testimonies function as a form of political practice 
designed to challenge and remediate professional conceptualisations of self-injury 
(Cresswell, 2005).  
                                               
1 Cresswell (2005) uses the word ‚official‛ as a synonym for psychiatric.  
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Given that many of these testimonies are directed at bio-medical approaches 
to NSSI, survivor activists are not necessarily challenging all professional depictions 
of self-injury. Furthermore, many of those who self-injure do not choose to become 
activists or even to align themselves with this movement: ‚People vary in the 
resources available to them to resist or rework the cultural meanings of illness‛ 
(Kleinman, 1988, p. 26). However, those that do choose to challenge ‘official’ 
knowledge production are able to locate themselves within the system as the 
creators, rather than simply the recipients, of knowledge (Clinchy, 2002) and thus 
begin to wield the power to influence collective understandings of NSSI. For the 
remainder of this chapter, I will examine how the interplay between professional 
and consumer epistemologies have shaped the current understanding of NSSI 
within Western cultures, and how discussions about ways to define and classify self-
injury have informed the operationalisation of NSSI for the purpose of this thesis.  
3.1 Definitional debates  
Cutting, self-mutilation, self-wounding, self-abuse, self-injury, deliberate self-
harm (DSH), and self-inflicted violence are just a selection of the terms that have 
been used to denote self-injurious behaviours within academic literature.2 Most 
writers acknowledge the lack of consensus on how self-inflicted, harmful behaviours 
should be defined and commonly present their own definitions. As is evident in 
Table 1, this limits comparability of NSSI research findings because these definitions 
typically draw on idiosyncratic combinations of referents, including: self-inflicted, 
deliberate/purposeful, direct, suicidal intent, lethality, severity, tissue damage, 
function, and social acceptability.  
This inconsistent use of referents has resulted in the same term (e.g., NSSI) 
being defined in multiple ways, while different terms (e.g., NSSI and DSH) are given  
                                               
2 To ensure consistency throughout this thesis, I generally refer to all non-suicidal self-injurious 
behaviours as NSSI even if this is not the term originally used by the author(s). For example, if 
authors use the term deliberate self-harm but their definition is consistent with that of non-suicidal 
self-injury, I refer to the behaviours as NSSI (with the exception of direct quotations). When authors 
have not distinguished between behaviours on the basis of suicidal intent, I refer to this as self-harm.  
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Table 1 
 
Contrasting definitions and referents of the three most commonly used terms for self-injurious behaviours 
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Self-injury           
‚Self-injury is intentional, self-effected, low-lethality bodily harm of a socially unacceptable nature, 
performed to reduce psychological distress‛ (Walsh, 2006, p. 4). 
  
 
      
‚Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is defined as the deliberate destruction of one’s body tissue without 
suicidal intent and for purposes not socially sanctioned‛ (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009, p. 215). 
  
 
      
‚Nonsuicidal self-injury refers to purposeful, non-life-threatening self-inflicted injuries without suicidal 
intent that aim to alleviate emotional distress‛ (Kokaliari & Berzoff, 2008, p. 259). 
  
 
      
Self-harm          
‚Deliberate self-harm may be defined as the deliberate, direct destruction or alteration of body tissue, 
without conscious suicidal intent but resulting in injury severe enough for tissue damage to occur‛ 
(Gratz, 2003, p. 192). 
         
‚Deliberate self-harm includes any intentional act of self-injury or self-poisoning (overdose), irrespective 
of the apparent motivation or intention‛ (Hawton & Rodham, 2006, p. 11).  
         
‚Self-harm can be defined as socially unacceptable, intentional alteration or destruction of body tissue 
without conscious suicidal intent‛ (Croyle & Waltz, 2007, p. 332). 
         
Self-mutilation          
‚Self-mutilation refers to a complex group of behaviours in which there is deliberate destruction or 
alteration of body tissue without conscious suicidal intent‛ (Favazza, 1989, p. 113). 
         
‚Self-mutilative behavior (SMB) refers to the direct and deliberate destruction of one’s own body tissue 
without suicidal intent‛ (Nock & Prinstein, 2005, p. 140). 
         
‚A theoretical definition of self-mutilation is the intentional act of tissue destruction with the purpose of 
shifting overwhelming emotional pain to a more acceptable physical pain‛ (Hicks & Hinck, 2008, p. 412). 
         
Note. This table contains only a small selection of terms, with their accompanying definitions, and is not intended as a representative sample of self-injury terminology. It is 
modelled on the table presented by Claes and Vanderycken (2007) in their comparison of the different classification systems used to define self-injurious behaviour.
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the same or similar definitions. For example, Gratz’s (2003) definition of DSH ‚as the 
deliberate, direct destruction or alteration of body tissue, without conscious suicidal 
intent but resulting in injury severe enough for tissue damage to occur‛ (p. 192) 
essentially describes the same behaviours as Klonsky and Glenn’s (2009) definition 
of NSSI as ‚the deliberate destruction of one’s body tissue without suicidal intent 
and for purposes not socially sanctioned‛ (p. 215).  
It is hardly surprising that, given the disparate use of terminology and 
accompanying referents, varying levels of agreement exist between professionals 
and mental health consumers as to the empirical and experiential validity of self-
injury definitions. Use of certain referents in defining self-injury is undisputed; for 
example, few researchers, clinicians, or consumers would argue against self-injury 
being purposeful and self-inflicted. Including the word deliberate, however, has been 
criticised because it implies ‚premeditation and wilfulness‛ (Pembroke, 1996b, p. 2) 
and insinuates that the person who self-injures is to blame for their behaviour 
(Taylor, 2003). 
Another referent that is seldom disputed in definitions or studies of non-
suicidal self-injurious behaviours is direct. A distinction is typically drawn between 
direct, self-inflicted, purposeful behaviours where the damage is immediate (e.g., 
cutting) and indirect behaviours where the damage accrues over time (e.g., eating 
disorders) (Walsh, 2006). Aside from the temporal qualities of the damage, Walsh 
(2006) asserts that another difference between indirect and direct self-injury is that 
people who engage in indirect self-injury seldom do so with the explicit aim of 
hurting themselves. For example, someone with an eating disorder is more likely to 
report being motivated to restrict food in order to lose weight (Walsh, 2006). In 
contrast, people who engage in direct self-injury do consciously aim to hurt 
themselves (Walsh, 2006). 
Within the category of purposeful, direct self-injury, the most controversial 
referent has been suicidal intent because it is an ephemeral construct that is often 
extremely difficult to quantify (Freedenthal, 2007). One solution is to view self-
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injurious behaviours on a continuum with the following three anchors: NSSI, 
ambivalent or ambiguous suicide attempt, and unambiguous suicide attempt 
(Linehan, Comtois, Brown, Heard, & Wagner, 2006). Although a theoretically 
sensible approach, it can be difficult on a practical level to determine where 
individual acts of self-injury fall on the continuum.   
For instance, if a person burns the back of their hand with a cigarette, it is 
unproblematic to conclude that this behaviour is a type of NSSI, given that cigarette 
burns cannot cause death and it would be extremely unlikely for anyone to believe 
that they could. In comparison, overdosing on prescribed medication or illegal drugs 
is an ambiguous behaviour because it can result in death and is frequently used as a 
means to attempt or complete suicide. The latest available suicide statistics from 
Aotearoa New Zealand show that 11% of people who completed suicide in 2008 
poisoned themselves with solids or liquids, compared with only 2% who cut or 
pierced themselves (Ministry of Health, 2010).3  
Other referents (e.g., lethality, tissue damage, function) included in self-injury 
or self-harm definitions can help to clarify, and support, the parameters of suicidal 
and non-suicidal behaviours, although this is not always the case. In particular, it 
can be difficult to classify self-poisoning as suicidal or non-suicidal on the basis of 
tissue damage and lethality. Tissue damage can result from self-poisoning, but the 
extent of such damage, if it does occur, can be hard to determine. Likewise, lethality 
on its own is not always an accurate indicator of intent as some people may hurt 
themselves with the intent to die but unwittingly use methods that are not 
sufficiently lethal, whereas others may accidentally complete suicide when they 
were only intending to self-injure (Brown, Henriques, Sosdjan, & Beck, 2004; 
Freedenthal, 2007).  
Given the difficulties associated with clarifying suicidal intent specifically in 
cases of self-poisoning, overdosing and the ingestion of toxic substances are more 
                                               
3 All of the percentages reported in this chapter have been rounded to zero decimal places. 
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typically included in studies where the researchers have not discriminated between 
harmful behaviours on the basis of suicidal intent. In these studies, self-harm is used 
as an umbrella term to encompass both self-poisoning and self-injury (e.g., Hawton 
& Rodham, 2006). However, once again, this is not always the case.  
Exceptions to this trend include Gratz’s (2003) definition of DSH discussed 
above, and Nixon, Cloutier, and Jansson’s (2008) use of the term non-suicidal self-
harm as a superordinate of self-injury (e.g., cutting), overdosing on medication, using 
drugs or alcohol, and swallowing non-ingestible items or substances. Behavioural 
measures of NSSI also vary as to whether or not self-poisoning is included; for 
example, self-poisoning is excluded from the Deliberate Self-harm Inventory (DSHI; 
Gratz, 2001), while swallowing chemicals, but not drug overdoses, is  included in the 
Inventory of Statements about Self-injury (ISAS; Klonsky & Olino, 2008).  
Verifying the absence of suicidal intent by assessing suicidality indicators, 
such as lethality and extent of tissue damage (Walsh, 2006), thus clearly has the 
potential to be misleading. In light of these difficulties, the experiential and empirical 
evidence that supports distinguishing between behaviours on the basis of suicidal 
intent warrants further discussion given that I am investigating non-suicidal self-
injurious behaviours in this thesis. In the following section, I will briefly review the 
literature that demonstrates NSSI is a discrete set of behaviours to suicide attempts, 
before examining whether given this distinction it is useful to classify NSSI as either 
a symptom or syndrome of psychopathology.  
3.2 Differentiating non-suicidal self-injury from suicide attempts 
Although the increase of robust empirical research on the differences between 
non-suicidal and suicidal self-injury is fairly recent, distinguishing between these 
behaviours is certainly not a novel endeavour. Writing in 1935, Menninger argued 
that self-injury was a strategy used to avert suicide completion, which ‚represents a 
victory<of the life instinct over the death instinct‛ (p. 466). This corresponds with 
reports from mental health consumers that self-injury provides respite from 
overwhelming thoughts and emotions, thus allowing them to continue functioning 
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(Alexander & Clare, 2004; Harris, 2000; Himber, 1994), and Favazza and Conterio’s 
(1988) contention that self-injury is a form of self-help.  
Consumer perspectives articulated through personal narratives, research 
participation, and consultation appear to have informed professional perspectives 
over time to the point where professional and consumer beliefs about the 
importance of defining self-injury according to intent have become more aligned. 
Certainly, there is now substantial experiential and empirical evidence to support 
distinguishing between NSSI and suicide attempts. 
3.2.1 Consumer perspectives 
 Self-injury as self-preservation is powerfully articulated by Kettlewell (1999) 
in her memoir, Skin Game: 
Somewhere over the course of that winter I started thinking about killing myself, though not 
so much because I wanted to be dead, precisely, as because I yearned for resolution, for 
escape from the scratching distress of now<I needed to kill something in me, this awful 
feeling like worms tunnelling along my nerves. So when I discovered the razor blade, cutting, 
if you’ll believe me, was my gesture of hope. That first time, when I was twelve, was like 
some kind of miracle, a revelation. The blade slipped easily, painlessly through my skin, like 
a hot knife through butter. As swift and pure as a stroke of lightning, it wrought an absolute 
and pristine division between before and after. All the chaos, the sound and fury, the 
uncertainty and confusion and despair—all of it evaporated in an instant, and I was for that 
moment grounded, coherent, whole. Here is the irreducible self. I drew the line in the sand, 
marked my body as mine, its flesh and its blood under my command. (p. 57) 
 
Accessing hope and avoiding suicide through self-injury has similarly been 
documented by other women who have written about the fundamental role that self-
injurious behaviours have played in securing their survival: 
I don’t cut myself in an attempt to die! It’s not the same thing! The feelings behind my scars 
are totally different...I look at these lines and shapes as battle scars—necessary sacrifices for 
the greater good...I really believe had I not cut, I would have died. The feelings I had while 
doing this were so intense that they would have overpowered me. In my mind it was a 
choice. Cut or die. It’s that easy. (Vega, 2007, p. 141)  
 
Self harm is a survival strategy and frequently represents the least possible damage an 
individual can get away with. It is an exercise in extreme restraint.  
Self harm is about self-worth, self-preservation, lack of choices, coping with the 
uncopeable, speaking the unspeakable. Self harm gives a physical face to pain that might 
otherwise extinguish life. If I had not self-injured, I wouldn’t be here today. (Pembroke, 1998, 
p. 20) 
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A harm minimisation philosophy is evident within these extracts in that self-injury, 
when compared to suicide, is presented as the less damaging, and therefore more 
desirable, option.  
In recognition of the paradox that self-injury can sustain life but also cause 
accidental death, the National Self-harm Network (NSHN) in the United Kingdom 
published a book entitled: Cutting the risk: Self-harm, self-care & risk reduction. This 
book provides explicit instructions about how people should injure themselves to 
prevent long-term damage or unintended death. When introducing the book, 
Pembroke (2000) writes that, ‚Professionals frequently equate recovery with the 
cessation of self-harm, but that’s simplistically shallow and unrealistic. If we do less 
damage and feel better about ourselves, take greater care of ourselves, then that’s a 
success‛ (p. 7). Directly challenging professionals who define self-injury as a form of 
suicidal behaviour, the NSHN frames it as ‚a valid method of survival, until survival 
is possible by other means‛ (p. 6). 
3.2.2 Professional perspectives 
Recent empirical findings support the experiential evidence (that self-injury is 
not synonymous with attempted suicide) presented by mental health consumers, 
such as Pembroke (1998), Kettlewell (1999), and Vega (2007). Researchers have 
identified that while non-suicidal and suicidal self-injurious behaviours do share 
certain features, there are sufficient, significant differences to warrant distinguishing 
between these behaviours (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Whitlock & Knox, 2007; 
Wichstrøm, 2009).  
Studies investigating the relationship between suicidal behaviours and NSSI 
routinely demonstrate that not all people who self-injure report past suicidal 
ideation or attempts (Plener, Libal, Keller, Fegert, & Muehlenkamp, 2009; Whitlock, 
Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006). In one study, 66% of university students who had 
self-injured did not report any past suicidal ideation or attempts (Whitlock et al., 
2006), while in another study, 25% of adolescents had self-injured but only 7% had 
attempted suicide (Plener et al., 2009).  
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These prevalence rates, however, differ between community and psychiatric 
samples. Among a group of adolescent inpatients who had self-injured in the 
previous year, 70% also reported having attempted suicide (Nock, Joiner, Gordon, 
Lloyd-Richardson, & Prinstein, 2006). Although this rate is much higher than 
reported in community samples, there were still a substantial minority of 
adolescents (30%) who had self-injured but had never attempted suicide.  
Furthermore, people with a history of self-injury and suicide attempts 
typically report that they have self-injured significantly more times than they have 
attempted suicide (Walsh, 2006). Recent ecological momentary assessment research 
where adolescents and young adults were invited to complete questions, multiple 
times a day, about any self-destructive thoughts or behaviours they experienced 
over a two-week period, showed that out of the 1,262 episodes reported, 27% were 
categorised as NSSI thoughts, 8% as NSSI behaviour, and 2% as suicidal ideation 
(Nock, Prinstein, & Sterba, 2009). Additionally, while 87% of the participants self-
injured without suicidal intent at least once during the course of the study, a 
minority of 33% reported suicidal ideation, and none reported any suicide attempts. 
Among people who self-injure, non-suicidal self-injurious thoughts and 
behaviours are not only more prevalent than suicide ideation and attempts, but also 
are associated with, and predicted by, discrete factors (Wichstrøm, 2009). Prior NSSI 
and becoming sexually active at younger age have been identified as specific risk 
factors for NSSI, while conduct problems and suicidal thoughts have been identified 
as specific risk factors for suicide attempts (Wichstrøm, 2009). Protective factors 
specific to NSSI and suicide attempts were satisfaction with social support and 
parental care respectively (Wichstrøm, 2009).  
Studies have also identified that suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury serve 
different functions (Brown, Comtois & Linehan, 2002; Himber, 1994; Polk & Liss, 
2009), lending further support to distinguishing between these behaviours. Within- 
and between-person analyses showed that women diagnosed with Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) more often endorsed using NSSI, as opposed to suicide 
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attempts, to express anger, reduce dissociation, and distract themselves (Brown et 
al., 2002). In comparison, suicide attempts were more often endorsed as a way to 
improve the lives of others. Self-punishment evidenced a more complicated 
relationship with NSSI and suicide attempts (Brown et al., 2002). While self-
punishment was more likely to be endorsed in the context of NSSI than suicide 
attempts between persons, this difference was not identified within persons, 
suggesting that women with BPD who injure themselves both with and without 
suicidal intent are likely to do so as a form of self-punishment (Brown et al., 2002).  
Although the evidence to date supports the argument that NSSI and suicide 
attempts are phenomenologically different behaviours, researchers have also found 
a number of similarities between these behaviours (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; 
Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2007; Wichstrøm, 2009). For example, Brown and 
colleagues (2002) found that particular functions (e.g., emotion relief, interpersonal 
influence) were similarly endorsed for both NSSI and suicide attempts.  
Certain risk factors have also been identified as common to adolescents with 
history of both NSSI and suicide attempts, and adolescents with a history of NSSI 
only, but these shared factors tend to vary in intensity between the two groups. 
Adolescents who have self-injured and attempted suicide report fewer reasons for 
living, higher rates of suicidal ideation and depressive symptoms, and judge 
themselves more harshly than adolescents who have only self-injured (Brausch & 
Gutierrez, 2010; Dougherty et al., 2009; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2007). However, 
adolescents who have attempted suicide and/or self-injured are at significantly 
greater risk of suicide completion than adolescents who have never engaged in self-
injurious behaviours (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2007).  
3.3 Should self-injury be classified as a symptom or a syndrome? 
While non-suicidal and suicidal self-injurious behaviours share certain 
features, it is clear that they can, and should, be viewed as distinct behaviours. 
Several researchers who support this distinction have debated whether NSSI should 
be classified as a symptom of psychopathology or a psychopathological syndrome 
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(Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Pattison & Kahan, 1983). The 
evolution of this classification debate is especially pertinent in light of the proposed 
addition of Non-Suicidal Self-Injury Disorder to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 
2010). Of course, as the following discussion will emphasise, both personal 
epistemologies and socio-cultural norms once again come into play when defining 
what counts as a symptom of disorder versus a disorder in and of itself. It is 
therefore timely to reflect on the propriety and utility of including a self-injury 
syndrome in the DSM-5, and the impact that such an inclusion may have on non-
Western cultures.       
3.3.1 Self-injury as a symptom 
Traditionally, NSSI among typically developing populations has been 
conceptualised within academic discourse as a symptom of mental disturbance or 
disorder, most notably that of BPD. Unfortunately because self-injury is a DSM-IV-
TR diagnostic criterion for BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), the 
relationship between self-injurious behaviour and BPD can easily become 
tautological; self-injurious behaviour is taken as evidence of a BPD diagnosis, and 
the presence of a BPD diagnosis is then used to explain future episodes of NSSI 
(Cipani & Schock, 2007).  
Reducing self-injury to the status of a BPD symptom has been criticised by 
Babiker and Arnold (1997) who declare their professional understanding of self-
injury to be ‚at odds‛ (p. 11) with the structuralist epistemology that informs 
psychiatric research and practice. Self-injury is perceived as one symptom in a 
‚pathology package‛ (p. 14), which requires immediate intervention and 
eradication. In contrast, they view self-injury as an embodied signifier of distress, 
thus emphasising the sociological and communicative aspects of self-injurious 
behaviour. 
 Conceptualising self-injury as a sign of suffering, rather than 
psychopathology, corresponds with how many people who self-injure articulate the 
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reasons behind their behaviours (Kettlewell, 1999; Pembroke, 1996a; Vega, 2007). The 
juxtaposition between professional and consumer understandings of NSSI is a 
reminder that: ‚The meanings of symptoms are standardized ‚truths‛ in a local 
cultural system, inasmuch as the groups’ categories are projected onto the world, 
then called natural because they are found there‛ (Kleinman, 1988, p. 10). When 
consumers call into question professional conceptualisations of NSSI as indicative of 
pathology they are questioning these ‚truths‛.  
Recent research similarly refutes the primacy of self-injury as a symptom of 
BPD finding that not all people who self-injure meet the criteria for a mental health 
disorder, and those who do meet the criteria for one or more disorders are a 
diagnostically heterogeneous group (Hintikka et al., 2009; Nock et al., 2006). Given 
this heterogeneity, self-injurious behaviours are now more routinely conceptualised 
within academic discourse as a maladaptive coping mechanism, rather than a 
symptom of a specific disorder. 
Through emphasising the coping function of self-injury, professional 
perspectives have become more aligned with those of consumer activists, although 
one important difference remains. Consumer activists tend to dispute the use of the 
qualifier, maladaptive, preferring instead to endorse self-injury as a legitimate and 
adaptive strategy for managing overwhelming, and often life-threatening, distress 
(Pembroke, 1996a). The utility of self-injury thus lies in the functions that these 
behaviours fulfil, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Certainly from a functional perspective, any behaviour can be understood as an 
adaptive response to the environment (Sturmey, Ward-Horner, Marroquin, & Doran, 
2007a), thus making the use of the word maladaptive a misnomer within this 
paradigm.  
One way in which consumers challenge the labelling of NSSI as maladaptive 
is by critiquing the similarities and differences between NSSI and socially acceptable 
forms of self-injury: 
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Socially acceptable forms of self-harm include; excessive smoking, drinking, exercise, 
liposuction, bikini-line waxing, high heels and body piercing<The socially acceptable range 
of self-harm clearly does not include; self-cutting, burning, smashing bones and pouring toxic 
substances over or into our bodies<Some forms of self-harm don’t have the social seal of 
approval. It is denied as an expression of distress. It goes against the pre-occupation with 
maintaining ‘beauty’ and achieving some perceived image of ‘perfection’. (Pembroke, 1996b, 
pp. 2-3)  
 
An examination of the parallels between socially acceptable and unacceptable self-
injury (Turp, 2003) serves to destabilise the legitimacy of dominant academic and 
practitioner conceptualisations of NSSI by focusing on the role of social and cultural 
norms in defining where the boundaries of psychopathology lie.    
3.3.2 Self-injury as a syndrome 
Building on the argument that self-injury is a maladaptive coping mechanism, 
several academics at different times have advocated for non-suicidal self-injurious 
behaviours to be classified as a unique clinical syndrome. Proposed diagnostic labels 
include: deliberate self-harm syndrome (Pattison & Kahan, 1983), repetitive self-
mutilation syndrome (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993), and deliberate self-injury 
syndrome (Muehlenkamp, 2005). The possible inclusion of NSSI disorder in the fifth 
edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2010), due to be published in 
2013, has revived this nosological debate. In the following sections, I discuss the 
proposed diagnostic criteria for a self-injury syndrome or disorder, whether 
classifying NSSI within a psychiatric taxonomy is useful or necessary, and finally 
whether such a classification would impact negatively on non-Western cultures.  
3.3.2.1 Proposed diagnostic criteria 
In 1983, Pattison and Kahan presented the first comprehensive attempt at 
describing a deliberate self-harm syndrome, characterised by direct, low lethality 
self-harmful behaviours. They suggested that the syndrome, which typically begins 
in late adolescence and comprises of multiple self-injury episodes over a number of 
years, should be included in the fourth edition of the DSM as an impulse control 
disorder. Drawing on 56 published case studies, they identified the following six 
psychological symptoms: an irresistible urge to self-injure, feeling overwhelmed and 
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unable to cope, heightened negative emotions, an inability to problem-solve due to 
cognitive constriction, feeling relieved after self-injury, and depression.  
Informed by the work of Pattison and Kahan (1983), Favazza and Rosenthal 
(1993) similarly proposed that self-injury should be included in the DSM as an 
impulse disorder, although they used the label, repetitive self-mutilation syndrome. 
Their suggested diagnostic criteria predominantly focused on the trajectory of self-
injury: (A) a preoccupation with thoughts of self-injury, (B) a persistent inability to 
resist the urge to self-injure, (C) an escalation of tension immediately prior to self-
injury, and (D) a feeling of relief or gratification during self-injury. Criterion E 
differentiated NSSI from injuries carried out with conscious suicidal intent or in the 
context of psychotic experiences or intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, Favazza 
and Rosenthal advised that self-injury be considered a symptom of disorder until it 
becomes ‚an overwhelming preoccupation‛ (p. 136), at which stage it should be 
elevated to the status of a syndrome.  
More recently, Muehlenkamp (2005) advocated for the inclusion of a 
Deliberate Self-Injury Syndrome in the DSM. This syndrome bears close resemblance 
to previous incarnations (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993; Pattison & Kahan, 1983), but 
expands on some of the earlier criteria. For example, Muehlenkamp’s description of 
the emotional precipitants of NSSI are more detailed: ‚Preceding the act of self-
injury, there is a psychological experience of increasing tension, anger, anxiety, 
dysphoria, or general distress, which the person feels he or she cannot escape from 
or control‛ (p. 333).  
As mentioned earlier, the debate about whether self-injury should be 
classified as a syndrome has been revived because of the impending publication of 
the DSM-5. It has been proposed that a diagnosis of NSSI be included in the fifth 
edition under the category ‘Other Disorders’ (American Psychiatric Association, 
2010). Criterion A of the self-injury disorder specifies the location (i.e., on the body 
surface, thus excluding overdoses, ingestion of toxic substances or objects), recency 
(i.e., within the past 12 months), number of episodes (i.e., injured on at least 5 days), 
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and severity (i.e., bleeding, bruising, or pain is probable) of the self-injurious 
behaviour. Lack of suicidal intent is determined through self-report or inferred from 
the regular use of non-lethal means.   
To qualify for the diagnosis, people also need to show evidence of at least two 
of the four precipitating factors described in Criterion B: (1) negative emotions or 
cognitions, (2) a preoccupation with self-injury, (3) recurrent urges to self-injure, and 
(4) anticipation that the self-injury will serve a useful purpose, such as emotional 
relief. Criterion C stipulates that the ‚behaviour and its consequences cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in interpersonal, academic, or other important 
areas of functioning‛, while Criterion D differentiates NSSI from other disorders that 
include self-injurious behaviours.  
3.3.2.2 Is taxonomising self-injury within the DSM useful or necessary?   
Those in favour of a self-injury diagnosis argue that classification is useful to 
ensure a clear, consistent definition of self-injurious behaviours, which in turn will 
facilitate much-needed research on the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of NSSI 
(Muehlenkamp, 2005). As a separate diagnosis, NSSI would no longer be conflated 
with BPD or suicidal behaviours (Muehlenkamp, 2005; Pattison & Kahan, 1983). 
Finally, the clinical utility of a self-injury diagnosis for people without any other 
mental health disorders has been highlighted (Muehlenkamp, 2005).  
Academic opposition to the creation of a self-injury syndrome has centred on 
the limited research available on the causes and course of self-injurious behaviours, 
the link between self-injury and suicide, and the evidence of high psychiatric 
comorbidity in people who injure themselves on purpose (Muehlenkamp, 2005). 
Given the now well-established differences between self-injury and suicide attempts 
discussed above and the fact that comorbidity does not preclude the existence or 
diagnosis of other disorders (Muehlenkamp, 2005), I will briefly speculate about the 
possible consequences of creating a new diagnosis in the absence of sufficient 
research.  
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The paucity of longitudinal research into how self-injurious behaviours 
manifest and change over time (Muehlenkamp, 2005; Prinstein, 2008) is problematic 
as it could result in the unnecessary pathologising of what may be predominantly 
adolescence-limited behaviours (cf. Moffitt, 1993). One unintended consequence 
(Wykes & Callard, 2010) of a self-injury diagnosis could be that young people who 
experiment with self-injury are ‘encouraged’ to adopt the identity of a self-injurer 
through being diagnosed as such. Furthermore, an NSSI diagnosis could constrain 
our developing understanding of how to treat and ultimately prevent more chronic 
self-injurious behaviour (Wykes & Callard, 2010). Of course, the dilemma is that 
there is likely insufficient research to warrant the creation of a self-injury diagnosis, 
but without a fixed definition of NSSI that would accompany a diagnosis, it is more 
difficult to develop a robust evidence base about self-injury (Muehlenkamp, 2005).  
The proposal to classify self-injury within the structuralist bounds of the DSM 
also runs counter to the increasingly functionalist approach taken by self-injury 
researchers. The importance of functionalism in understanding why people self-
injure will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, but it is useful to note here that 
one of the key differences between structuralists and functionalists is that the former 
maintain the causes of behaviour lie within people, whereas the latter maintain the 
causes of behaviour lie within the environment (Sturmey et al., 2007a).  
Diagnoses therefore can be counter-productive in dealing with problem 
behaviours, particularly if they prevent a thorough assessment of the contingencies 
maintaining the behaviour (Cipani & Schock, 2007). This can lead to the tautology 
described earlier in this chapter where certain behaviours are interpreted as 
evidence of a disorder, and the disorder is then used to justify the presence of the 
behaviours (Cipani & Schock, 2007). The resulting danger is that practitioners fail to 
appreciate, or remain cognisant of, the influence of social and cultural norms on 
definitions and manifestations of self-injury.  
   It is imperative to consider the impact that a self-injury diagnosis may have 
on people who self-injure and qualify for the diagnosis, as well as those who self-
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injure but do not qualify for the diagnosis. While it is likely that some consumers 
will find a self-injury diagnosis validating, others may feel stigmatised by being 
labelled with NSSI disorder. Conversely, those people who do not meet the 
threshold required for a diagnosis may be denied access to mental health support or 
feel that their distress has been minimised.  
3.3.2.3 How would a NSSI disorder impact on non-Western cultures? 
Although the DSM is a classification system based on Western 
conceptualisations of mental distress and disorder, it is increasingly being used 
around the world to guide diagnosis and treatment (Watters, 2010; Wykes & Callard, 
2010). Given that socio-cultural norms determine what meanings are ascribed to self-
injurious behaviours, it is important to consider how the proposed addition of NSSI 
disorder to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2010) will shape non-
Western cultures’ understanding and treatment of these behaviours.  
In Crazy like us: The globalization of the American psyche, Watters (2010) argues 
that American constructions of mental illness are not only rapidly changing the way 
in which psychological distress is perceived in non-Western societies, but also the 
way in which this distress is experienced. He contends that mental health 
practitioners who promote the use of DSM criteria in countries that do not subscribe 
to Western models of health and wellbeing unintentionally become vectors for the 
disorders they are attempting to treat.  
To support his argument, Watters (2010) refers to the work of Shorter (1987) 
who maintains that each culture has a ‚symptom pool‛ (p. 69) that changes over 
time; people communicate psychological distress through a restricted set of 
symptoms that are drawn from this pool. Particular behaviours become legitimised 
as culturally appropriate signifiers of disorder through their inclusion in the 
symptom pool (Shorter, 1987). Given the global power exerted by the DSM, the so-
called ‚bible‛ of mental disorders (Watters, 2010, p. 3), a NSSI diagnosis may 
influence the way in which other cultures manifest distress and inadvertently 
increase the prevalence of self-injurious behaviours.      
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4. DEFINING SELF-INJURY FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of considering how both socio-
cultural norms and personal epistemologies shape our understanding of what 
counts as non-suicidal self-injurious behaviours. As a trainee Clinical Psychologist, I 
value structuralist, functionalist, and experiential ways of knowing, and believe that 
all of these epistemologies can, and should, inform research and practice. By using a 
mixed-methods design (interviews and surveys) in this thesis, I have attempted to 
blend these three approaches and balance both experiential and empirical 
knowledge.  
The following definition of self-injury, used in this thesis, is a combination of 
the definitions presented in Table 1 and is informed by the debates discussed earlier 
in this chapter: NSSI is the purposeful, direct, and self-inflicted destruction or 
alteration of one’s body tissue without suicidal intent and for reasons not socially 
sanctioned. It is distinct from major or stereotypic self-injury conducted in the 
context of psychotic or developmental disorders respectively (Favazza, 2011). 
Furthermore, given the difficulties in clarifying suicidal intent in cases of self-
poisoning (see pp. 13-14), overdosing and the ingestion of toxic substances are also 
excluded from my definition of NSSI. Finally, my understanding of self-injury is 
consistent with current clinical guidelines (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 
2004; Penrose-Wall, Farris, & Berkery, 2005); self-injury is a behaviour, not a 
disorder, which fulfils an array of different functions.  
In the following two chapters, I review what leads people to injure themselves 
on purpose in the absence of suicidal intent and why they may become reliant on 
these behaviours to cope with distress, before describing the three studies I 
conducted to investigate whether self-injury functions primarily as an experientially 
avoidant behaviour within Aotearoa New Zealand.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Why do people self-injure? 
 
‚I know why I self-injure. I do it at times of extreme emotion: anger, self-hatred, stress, grief and guilt. 
I do it to punish myself. When I feel I am losing control, I reach for a razor and prove to myself that I 
can, at least, have control over my body.‛ (Ross, 1996, p. 13) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Publications on self-injury have more than tripled within the last decade 
(Nock, 2010), which has contributed to an increased awareness of the incidence and 
prevalence of these behaviours, especially among young people (Ross, Heath, & 
Toste, 2009). The burgeoning evidence base addressing self-injurious behaviours can 
be divided into two broad domains: studies that investigate the risk factors and 
correlates of NSSI (e.g., Gratz, Conrad, & Roemer, 2002; Hankin & Abela, 2011; 
Wichstrøm, 2009), and studies that investigate why people self-injure (e.g., Klonsky 
& Glenn, 2009; Lloyd-Richardson, Perrine, Dierker, & Kelley, 2007; Nock & Prinstein, 
2004). Both streams of research are vital to developing a comprehensive 
understanding of what factors increase the likelihood that people will self-injure, 
and, once they begin self-injuring, how their self-injurious behaviours are reinforced 
and maintained over time.    
 The studies for this thesis fall into the latter domain; my research is concerned 
with why people living in Aotearoa New Zealand self-injure and seeks to further 
clarify the behavioural functions of NSSI. In particular, I am interested in whether 
self-injury, carried out within the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, can be 
understood primarily as a form of experiential avoidance, a behavioural process that 
reflects people’s unwillingness to tolerate aversive, intrapersonal experiences 
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Extant research suggests that 
affect regulation is the primary function of NSSI (e.g., Klonsky, 2007; Klonsky & 
Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004), but the broader, overarching concept of 
experiential avoidance, which includes but is not limited to affect regulation, has 
28 
 
 
seldom been examined in the international literature and has never been empirically 
investigated within Aotearoa New Zealand.  
Although I am not focussing on the risk factors and correlates of NSSI, it 
would be remiss to omit a discussion of these characteristics because they provide 
the context, through specifying who is more likely to self-injure, in which to situate 
my empirical work for this thesis. With this in mind, I review the research conducted 
on the individual, psychological, and environmental factors that predict, or are 
associated with, self-injury, before focusing in more detail on what we currently 
know about why people are motivated to hurt themselves on purpose.4 
2. HOW PREVALENT IS SELF-INJURY? 
Before discussing self-injury correlates, risk factors, and motivations, it is 
essential to briefly summarise how many people self-injure and when they begin 
engaging in these behaviours. Unfortunately, precise prevalence rates of NSSI in 
clinical and community populations are unknown; figures tend to vary considerably 
across studies due to inconsistent operational definitions and modes of 
measurement (Ross et al., 2009). Evidence from population-based surveys suggests 
that 2% to 6% of adults have self-injured without suicidal intent in their lifetimes 
(Bebbington et al., 2010; Briere & Gil, 1998; Klonsky, 2011), although the rate of 
lifetime NSSI was as high as 17% in a random sample of university students 
(Whitlock et al., 2006). The identical prevalence rate of 17% was reported in a 
population-based study of adolescents and young adults (Nixon et al., 2008). Much 
higher prevalence rates of 36% to 63% have been observed among clinical 
populations (Claes, Vandereycken, & Vertommen, 2007; Swenson, Spirito, Dyl, 
Kittler, & Hunt, 2008; Weismoore & Esposito-Smythers, 2010). On average, people 
begin self-injuring between the ages of 11 to 15 (Hankin & Abela, 2011; Nixon, 
Cloutier, & Aggarwal, 2002; Yates, Carlson, & Egeland, 2008). 
                                               
4 It should be noted that my review about why people are motivated to self-injure is similarly 
structured to those presented by other authors (e.g., Klonsky, 2007). 
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3. RISK FACTORS AND CORRELATES OF SELF-INJURY 
The equifinality of NSSI is evident in the wide range of individual, 
psychological, and environmental characteristics that are associated with self-
injurious behaviours. Individual factors that have been implicated in the 
development of NSSI include gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. Psychological factors, 
such as mental health disorders, suicidality, temperament, and alexithymia are also 
thought to play an aetiological role in self-injury, along with environmental 
characteristics, including experiences of maltreatment during childhood and peer 
victimisation.    
3.1 Individual characteristics 
3.1.1 Gender 
 Non-suicidal self-injury traditionally has been considered to be a gendered 
phenomenon, with more females than males engaging in NSSI, until recent evidence 
from community-based studies suggested that this gender ratio may be a sampling 
artefact. Much of the earlier research on self-injury focused on clinical populations, 
which were comprised of a disproportionate number of women (Whitlock et al., 
2006). Within these populations, people diagnosed with BPD have been of specific 
interest to researchers because self-injury is one of the DSM-IV-TR criteria for the 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Since women are purportedly 
three times more likely to be diagnosed with BPD than men (Skodol & Bender, 2003), 
the research focus on self-injury within BPD populations has arguably supported a 
sampling bias in the study of NSSI.  
Preliminary evidence has also shown that there are gender differences in the 
forms of NSSI used by females and males, with females being more likely to cut 
themselves and males being more likely to burn themselves (Andover et al., 2010; 
Whitlock et al., 2006). Studies that have focussed exclusively on particular forms of 
self-injury (e.g., cutting) thus may have drawn premature conclusions about gender 
differences in NSSI, as a result of gendered preferences for certain forms of self-
injury.  
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 Although it is possible that being female is not necessarily a risk factor for 
NSSI, the evidence to support gender equivalency in NSSI prevalence rates is far 
from conclusive. Several cross-sectional studies of community-based adolescents 
and young adults have reported that females are significantly more likely to self-
injure than males (Hoff & Muehlenkamp, 2009; Nixon et al., 2008; Plener et al., 2009; 
Ross & Heath, 2002), while others have failed to find any significant gender 
differences in NSSI prevalence (Andover et al., 2010; Claes, Houben, et al., 2010; 
Gratz et al., 2002; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004). In a prospective study with 
Norwegian adolescents conducted over five years, females were twice as likely to 
self-injure as males and being female was a risk factor for NSSI (Wichstrøm, 2009).   
One of the reasons for these conflicting results could be due to the age group 
being assessed for NSSI, as the ratio of female to male self-injury may vary according 
to stages in the life cycle (Hawton & Harriss, 2008). Data collected on hospital 
presentations for DSH over 10 years showed that overall, females were one and a 
half times more likely than males to present to hospital following an act of DSH, but 
this general ratio masked sizeable differences between age groups. Females were 
eight times more likely to self-harm than males in the 10-14 year old age group and 
approximately three times more likely to self-harm in the 15-19 year old age group. 
This female to male ratio in DSH rates then decreased considerably from the age of 
20 until age 50, when males engaged in higher rates of DSH than women (Hawton & 
Harriss, 2008).  
Although caution is required when extrapolating these results to gender 
differences in NSSI—this study relied exclusively on hospital admissions for self-
harm and did not distinguish between different types of self-harm on the basis of 
intent—it is possible that a similar, age-related trend may be observable in female to 
male ratios of NSSI. An archival study of self-reported, lifetime prevalence rates of 
NSSI among secondary school students over 5 years showed that while there were 
no gender differences in NSSI rates for the first three years of secondary school, self-
injury was more prevalent amongst females than males during the last two years of 
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school (Muehlenkamp, Williams, Gutierrez, & Claes, 2009). Population-based 
research on the prevalence of NSSI throughout the life cycle is needed to determine 
whether self-injurious behaviours are actually more common among females than 
males.  
3.1.2 Ethnicity  
Sampling biases have also precluded a thorough investigation of the role of 
ethnicity in the development of NSSI. Historically, self-injury has been 
conceptualised as a largely Caucasian phenomenon, but this conclusion is based on a 
body of literature where the overwhelming majority of participants are white (Gratz, 
2006; Shaw, 2002). The dearth of evidence into the impact of ethnicity on 
developmental trajectories of NSSI is especially problematic considering that, as I 
discussed in Chapter 1, what counts as pathological self-injury is culturally bound 
(Favazza, 2011).   
 The few studies that have recruited ethnically diverse samples have presented 
conflicting results as to whether Caucasians are more likely than other ethnicities to 
engage in NSSI. No significant differences in the lifetime prevalence of NSSI were 
found in an ethnically diverse sample (i.e., 35% Caucasian, 37% African American, 
16% multi-ethnic etc.) of secondary school students (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010). 
However, in an inpatient sample with approximately even numbers of Caucasian 
and African American adolescents and a small percentage of other ethnicities (e.g., 
Hispanic, Native American), young people from ethnic minorities were less likely to 
have engaged in NSSI, but more likely to have attempted suicide (Boxer, 2010).  
 In Aotearoa New Zealand, young Māori people are two to three times more 
likely to complete suicide than non-Māori youth (Beautrais & Fergusson, 2006), but 
the difference in NSSI prevalence between ethnicities is unclear. More Māori (25%) 
than Pākehā (19%) youth reported DSH in a recent national survey of health and 
wellbeing among young New Zealanders (Fortune et al., 2010), but the survey 
question referred to engaging in self-harm or any actions that may have resulted in 
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injury or death, rendering it impossible to separate out non-suicidal from suicidal 
self-injury.  
 Given the importance of culture in delineating the taxonomical boundaries of 
NSSI, studies conducted by Māori researchers with tangata whaiora5 and 
community-based Māori populations are essential to determine the extent of NSSI 
among Māori people. Utilising questions about self-injury, which are developed 
within a Western paradigm of NSSI, to determine how many Māori self-injure and 
the factors that place Māori at risk of self-injuring, makes it less likely that an in-
depth understanding of this phenomenon among Māori will result. 
Furthermore, significant cross-cultural differences may be overlooked because 
Western-based questions about NSSI do not take into account contextual factors that 
are specific to Māori, or other indigenous peoples and minority groups. For example, 
it has been argued that the higher suicide rate among Māori is a result of the 
enduring consequences of colonisation, such as the loss of cultural identity and 
connectedness to Māori culture (Lawson-Te Aho & Liu, 2010). Any research that 
examines NSSI among Māori needs to take the complex dynamics of post-
colonialism into account (Wilson, 1999). 
Aotearoa New Zealand is also home to a number of other ethnic groups, 
including Pacific peoples and Asians, whose experiences of NSSI are yet to be 
examined. Unique socio-cultural factors will undoubtedly affect NSSI rates in these 
communities. For instance, a recent review found that South Asian women living in 
the United Kingdom are significantly more likely to self-harm than Caucasian 
women, but the authors did not discriminate between suicidal and non-suicidal self-
harm (Husain, Waheed, & Husain, 2006). Factors implicated in the high rates of DSH 
among these women included racism, domestic violence, forced marriage, and the 
pressure to abide by their families’ or communities’ beliefs about izzat, defined as 
                                               
5 Tangata whaiora is the Māori term for mental health consumers. 
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‚family or personal honour/respect, or as status and prestige in the eyes of the 
community‛ (Chew-Graham, Bashir, Chantler, Burman, & Batsleer, 2002, p. 342).  
3.1.3 Sexuality 
Other individual characteristics that have been associated with higher rates of 
NSSI are sexual orientation and same-sex attraction. In one study, university 
students who were uncertain about their sexual orientation or who identified as 
bisexual were more likely to report self-injury than heterosexual students (Whitlock 
et al., 2006). Concerns about sexual orientation were also associated with DSH in a 
community sample of adolescents, but given that the definition of DSH included 
suicide attempts, the specific role of NSSI in this association is unclear (O’Connor, 
Rasmussen, Miles, & Hawton, 2009). In another study that examined the relationship 
between NSSI and sexual orientation, adolescents who identified as homosexual or 
bisexual were significantly more likely to have self-injured than heterosexual 
adolescents (Deliberto & Nock, 2008).  
Within Aotearoa New Zealand, the impact of sexual attraction on self-harm 
has been examined in two research studies. Same-sex attraction or being attracted to 
both sexes placed male and female secondary school students at significantly higher 
risk of engaging in self-harm behaviours (Lucassen et al., 2011). Adult New 
Zealanders who reported same-sex attraction were similarly found to be at risk of 
self-harm (Skegg, Nada-Raja, Dickson, Paul, & Williams, 2003). Unfortunately NSSI 
was conflated with DSH in both of these studies making it impossible to generalise 
these results to people who self-injure without suicidal intent.  
Further research is needed before it can be conclusively determined whether 
non-heterosexual orientation and/or attraction are risk factors for NSSI. Such 
research should take advantage of increasingly sophisticated understandings of 
sexuality. For instance, in their longitudinal study of adolescent health, Savin-
Williams and Ream (2007) assert that sexual orientation should be measured as a 
dimensional, rather than categorical, construct and define sexuality on the basis of 
attraction, behaviour, and identity. 
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3.2 Psychological characteristics 
3.2.1 Mental health disorders 
 Although NSSI is listed as a symptom of BPD in the DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), it has been associated with a range of other mental 
health conditions, including disordered eating (Ross et al., 2009; Whitlock et al., 
2006), depression, and anxiety disorders (Hintikka et al., 2009; Hoff & 
Muehlenkamp, 2009). In a Finnish study, adolescent girls who cut themselves were 
more than three times as likely to have a mental health diagnosis than age-matched 
controls (Hintikka et al., 2009), although given that the study design was cross-
sectional, it is not possible to determine whether the high rate of mental disorders in 
this sample was a causal factor in the development of NSSI. Furthermore, since the 
type of NSSI was limited to cutting, such high rates of mental disorders may not be 
observed among people who use other forms of self-injury. 
 Preliminary support for the suggestion that different forms of NSSI may be 
associated with different types of mental disorders has been provided by Andover, 
Pepper, Ryabchenko, Orrico, and Gibb (2005). University students who had cut 
themselves reported more anxiety than those who used other forms of self-injury, 
but the rates of depressive symptoms were similar in both groups. Further analyses 
by Andover and colleagues identified that although the students who had self-
injured were significantly more likely to report symptoms of depression and anxiety 
compared to a control group, these differences were no longer significant after 
controlling for BPD symptoms even though none of their participants met the 
threshold for a diagnosis of BPD.  
The nature of the relationships between mental health disorders and NSSI, 
however, will most likely differ according to the severity of psychopathology 
experienced by participants. For example, in a prospective research study conducted 
over 10 years, Zanarini, Laudate, Frankenburg, Reich, and Fitzmaurice (2011) found 
that major depression was a significant predictor of NSSI in people diagnosed with 
BPD. Additional studies are needed to tease out the contribution of various forms of 
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psychopathology to NSSI and how comorbid disorders interact to influence the 
manifestation of self-injurious behaviour. 
It is also probable that any interactions between mental disorders and NSSI 
will change over time both within and between individuals. In a study of secondary 
school students using archival data gathered over five years, Muehlenkamp et al. 
(2009) found that as females’ rates of NSSI increased over time, their symptoms of 
depression decreased. Given that NSSI is thought to function primarily as an affect 
regulation strategy (Klonsky, 2009), one possible explanation for this pattern is that 
self-injury was increasingly used to reduce depressive symptoms. It is unclear why 
this pattern was not observed in males, but Muehlenkamp et al. (2009) hypothesise 
their ability to identify statistically significant changes may have been impeded by 
the small number of male participants. 
It is important to keep in mind that although a range of mental health 
disorders have been identified as correlates or predictors of NSSI, the experience of 
psychopathology is not a prerequisite for engaging in self-injurious behaviours. In 
one study, 21% of the adolescents who had cut themselves did not meet the criteria 
for an Axis-I disorder as measured by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-
TR (Hintikka et al., 2009). However, the authors acknowledge that these adolescents 
may meet the criteria for the Axis-II disorder of BPD later in life.  
3.2.2 Suicidality 
Owing to the historical conflation of non-suicidal and suicidal self-injury, 
which I discussed in-depth in Chapter 1 (see pp. 14-18), research on the role of 
suicidality (i.e., suicidal ideation and attempts) in NSSI is limited. In Chapter 1, I 
cited experiential and empirical evidence in support of a distinction between NSSI 
and suicide attempts. In the current section, I review this empirical evidence in more 
detail to further unpack the complex relationship between non-suicidal and suicidal 
self-injury. 
Repetitive DSH, irrespective of suicidal intent, has been identified as a suicide 
risk factor for both females and males (Zahl & Hawton, 2004), but the unique 
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contribution of NSSI to suicide completion is unclear. To address this, researchers 
have started to compare people who have self-injured or attempted suicide, with 
those who have self-injured and attempted suicide, in order to identify correlates and 
risk factors specific to each group. In particular, the impact of suicidal ideation and 
past suicide attempts on NSSI has been examined.  
A comparison of a group of secondary school students who had self-injured 
to a group who had attempted suicide found no difference in suicidal ideation 
between the two groups (Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004). However, when 
secondary school students who had self-injured and attempted suicide were 
compared to those who had only engaged in self-injury, those with a history of NSSI 
and suicide attempt(s) reported significantly higher levels of suicidal ideation than 
those who with a history of NSSI only (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Muehlenkamp & 
Gutierrez, 2007). 
Slightly different results were obtained in a sample of adolescent outpatients 
(Jacobson, Muehlenkamp, Miller, & Turner, 2008). In this study, when adolescents 
with a history of NSSI only were compared to adolescents who had engaged in NSSI 
plus attempted suicide, and adolescents who had only attempted suicide, those who 
had only engaged in self-injury had significantly lower rates of suicidal ideation. The 
group of adolescents who had self-injured and attempted suicide, and the group 
who had only attempted suicide but had not self-injured, did not differ significantly 
from each other on suicidal ideation.  
Evidence in support of a relationship between NSSI and suicide attempts has 
been mixed. No association between NSSI episodes and suicide attempts was found 
in a group of inpatient adolescents (Nock et al., 2006), but in a group of adult 
inpatients, those with a history of NSSI were more likely to have attempted suicide 
than those without a history of NSSI (Andover & Gibb, 2010). Moreover, Andover 
and Gibb (2010) found that suicide attempts were positively associated with NSSI 
frequency. Although there was no difference between current suicidal ideation 
versus NSSI frequency and history in predicting suicide attempts, the number of 
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times people had self-injured was a stronger predictor of suicide attempts than 
hopelessness, depression, and BPD symptoms. Additionally, the presence of an NSSI 
history was a significant predictor of attempted suicide regardless of how many 
times people had self-injured. 
The predictive value of NSSI has been examined not only for suicide attempts 
and ideation, but also for plans and gestures (Whitlock & Knox, 2007). Among 
people who reported NSSI and suicidality, NSSI strongly predicted all forms of 
suicidality (i.e., ideation, plans, gestures, and attempts). However, these results rely 
on the assumption that NSSI precedes or occurs simultaneously with suicidality 
(Whitlock & Knox, 2007), which may not be the case. Evidence from a prospective 
study of Norwegian adolescents showed that while previous suicide attempts 
predicted future NSSI, previous NSSI did not predict future suicide attempts, 
suggesting that NSSI is not a risk factor for suicide attempts but, rather, prior suicide 
attempts place adolescents at risk of engaging in NSSI (Wichstrøm, 2009).  
Given that self-injuring without suicidal intent does appear to place some 
people at risk of attempting suicide, it is important to consider why this may be the 
case. Joiner (2005) argues that one way people acquire the ability to complete suicide 
is through practising self-injury until these behaviours become habitual and 
unthreatening. Cross-sectional studies that have identified a positive association 
between the frequency of NSSI and suicide attempts (Andover & Gibb, 2010; 
Whitlock & Knox, 2007) provide preliminary support for Joiner’s theory, but such 
support is tempered by research that has failed to find evidence of this association 
(Nock et al., 2006).  
If people do become habituated to the prospect of suicide through self-injury, 
what prompts the shift from one to the other? One possibility is that when people 
who use self-injury as a coping strategy surpass a particular threshold of distress, 
which cannot be alleviated by other means (including self-injury), they may attempt 
suicide (Whitlock & Knox, 2007). More specifically, the connection between suicidal 
and non-suicidal self-injury may lie in the shared, unresolved distress that motivates 
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these behaviours (Whitlock et al., 2006). Prospective, longitudinal research is clearly 
needed to test Joiner’s (2005) habituation hypothesis. 
3.2.3 Temperament 
Specific temperament traits, such as impulsivity and emotional reactivity, 
have been identified as individual risk factors for NSSI. As mentioned earlier, 
several researchers have suggested that NSSI be classified as an impulse control 
disorder (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993; Pattison & Kahan, 1983), but findings about the 
relationship between NSSI and impulsivity have been mixed. Utilising child and 
parent reports of temperament dimensions, Baetens, Claes, Willem, Muehlenkamp, 
and Bijttebier (2011) found that lack of effortful control (i.e., a decreased capacity for 
attention and behaviour regulation) was one of the most robust predictors of NSSI in 
a group of secondary school students.  
However, others maintain that there is insufficient evidence to support the 
role of impulsivity in NSSI, in part, because it is a heterogeneous construct that has 
been operationalised and measured differently across studies, resulting in conflicting 
findings (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010a). For example, Herpertz (1995) categorised NSSI 
episodes as impulsive if people evidenced the following three criteria: a lack of 
premeditation and consideration of consequences, acting on the decision to self-
injure within minutes, and an urge to self-injure, whereas other studies have 
assessed the association between impulsivity and self-injury through assorted 
validated measures (e.g., Jutengren, Kerr, & Stattin, 2011; MacLaren & Best, 2010).  
Two studies that utilised multiple methods (e.g., self-report and laboratory-
based tasks) to measure impulsivity sought to clarify whether people who self-injure 
are more impulsive than those who do not self-injure (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010a; Janis 
& Nock, 2009). Both studies found the same pattern of results: people who had self-
injured reported greater impulsivity than people who did not have a history of NSSI, 
but these differences were not evident in performance-based measures of 
impulsivity.  
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One possible explanation for these inconsistencies is that only particular 
negative emotions trigger impulsivity in people who self-injure; such emotions 
would therefore need to be induced in a laboratory setting to capture the 
relationship between NSSI and impulsivity (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010a; Janis & Nock, 
2009). It is also essential to examine this relationship over time in order to 
disentangle whether impulsivity is a cause or effect of NSSI (Janis & Nock, 2009).     
Another temperamental risk factor for self-injury that is garnering increased 
attention from researchers is whether people are predisposed to experience, and 
react to, emotions in specific ways (Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008). This 
focus is congruent with the conceptualisation of NSSI as an emotion regulation 
strategy and draws on research conducted with people diagnosed with BPD 
(Rosenthal et al., 2008). Emotional vulnerability has been proposed as a core 
mechanism underlying the development of BPD; people who are emotionally 
vulnerable are characterised by ‚high sensitivity to emotional stimuli, emotional 
intensity, and slow return to emotional baseline‛ (Linehan, 1993b, p. 43). Emotion 
reactivity is comparable to emotion vulnerability in that it has been theorised to 
include three components: (1) how emotionally sensitive people are to stimuli, (2) 
how intensely they experience emotions, and (3) how long emotions persist for 
following their initiation (Nock et al., 2008).  
 Due to the absence of a comprehensive, self-report measure of emotion 
reactivity, Nock et al. (2008) recently developed the Emotion Reactivity Scale to 
assess emotional sensitivity, arousal/intensity, and persistence. Preliminary evidence 
demonstrated the validity and reliability of the scale, and people who had recently 
self-injured reported themselves as significantly more emotionally reactive 
compared to people who had not self-injured. Moreover, the relationship between 
psychopathology and NSSI was mediated by emotion reactivity. Unfortunately, the 
cross-sectional nature of the data precluded any definitive conclusions about 
whether emotion reactivity drives people with mental health disorders to engage in 
NSSI (Nock et al., 2008).       
40 
 
 
3.2.4 Alexithymia 
 Researchers are not only interested in the way in which people who self-
injure react to emotions, but also how they understand and articulate these 
emotions. Alexithymia, which has been associated with NSSI (Paivio & McCulloch, 
2004; Zlotnick et al., 1996), is a term that encapsulates a set of difficulties with 
identifying and discriminating between various emotions, and with verbally 
communicating those emotions (Kooiman, Spinhoven, & Trijsburg, 2002). Little is 
known about whether alexithymia is causally related to self-injury as the research 
conducted to date has been cross-sectional. Certainly, more work is needed on 
whether specific groups of people who self-injure are more likely to exhibit 
alexithymic tendencies, how the different components of alexithymia contribute to 
the manifestation of self-injury, and whether alexithymia is a causal factor for NSSI. 
 For instance, Oyefeso, Brown, Chiang, and Clancy (2008) found that people 
addicted to opiates who had self-injured reported significantly more difficulty 
identifying their emotions than people addicted to opiates who had not self-injured. 
However, these two groups did not differ on their self-reported ability to describe 
how they were feeling. There is also preliminary evidence to suggest that people 
who have difficulty identifying and expressing their emotions may turn to self-
injury following traumatic experiences. In a cross-sectional study with female 
university students, alexithymia fully mediated the relationship between child 
maltreatment (i.e. physical and emotional abuse and neglect) and self-injurious 
behaviours (Paivio & McCulloch, 2004).   
3.3 Environmental characteristics 
3.3.1 Child maltreatment 
The experience of child maltreatment has been proposed as a causal factor in 
the aetiology of NSSI (Yates, 2004), yet the evidence to support this contention 
remains conflicted. A group of university students who had been abused were 
significantly more likely to have self-injured than those without an abuse history 
(Muehlenkamp, Kerr, Bradley, & Adams Larsen, 2010), but neither childhood 
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physical or sexual abuse was associated with NSSI in a sample of adolescent 
inpatients (Weismoore & Esposito-Smythers, 2010). However, in another adolescent 
sample, self-injuring without suicidal intent in the previous 12 months was 
significantly related to physical neglect, emotional abuse, and sexual abuse 
(Glassman, Weierich, Hooley, Deliberto, & Nock, 2007). Within Aotearoa New 
Zealand, childhood sexual abuse has been identified as a risk factor for self-injury 
among depressed adults (Joyce et al., 2006). 
The type of maltreatment is one factor which may influence the nature of the 
relationship between NSSI and abuse history. Indeed, Yates et al. (2008) reported 
that community-based adults who had been sexually abused as children were almost 
10 times as likely to engage in recurrent self-injury (three or more episodes) but 
those who had been physically abused were more than seven times as likely to 
engage in intermittent self-injury (one to two episodes). The finding that the type of 
abuse experienced may impact on the frequency of NSSI was supported in a study 
by Whitlock et al. (2006). In their sample of university students, single versus 
repeated incidents of NSSI were differentially associated with particular types of 
abuse. When compared to students who had never self-injured, those who had self-
injured once were more likely to report past emotional abuse, while those who had 
self-injured repeatedly were more likely to report past emotional and sexual abuse. 
Child sexual abuse (CSA) has arguably received the most attention in relation 
to NSSI, potentially as a result of the high prevalence of both CSA and self-injury in 
populations with BPD (Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 2004). Indeed, 
CSA was a significant predictor of NSSI in people with BPD in a longitudinal 10-year 
study (Zanarini et al., 2011). However, meta-analytic and review studies have not 
supported such definitive results. 
A recent meta-analysis of 43 studies demonstrated a small relationship 
between CSA and self-injury, with CSA explaining at most 5% of the variance in 
NSSI aetiology (Klonsky & Moyer, 2008). Furthermore, this relationship became 
more tenuous when other psychological and environmental risk factors (e.g., 
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dissociation, family functioning) were controlled for. The authors concluded that (1) 
CSA is either a proxy risk factor for NSSI in that the relationship between CSA and 
NSSI exists because of shared psychological risk factors or (2) CSA may mediate the 
relationship between other risk factors and NSSI. This conclusion is partially 
supported by a review that identified CSA as a non-specific risk factor for engaging 
in self-harm irrespective of suicidal intent (Maniglio, 2011).  
In light of the conflicting evidence regarding the contribution of different 
types of childhood maltreatment to the development of NSSI, it is important for 
researchers to examine factors that may mediate or moderate the relationships 
between types of maltreatment and self-injury to shed light on these relationships. 
For example, when Weierich and Nock (2008) examined the impact of CSA and 
physical and emotional abuse/neglect on adolescent self-injury, they found that NSSI 
was only significantly related to CSA. Further analyses revealed that this 
relationship was fully mediated by Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptom 
clusters of avoidance/numbing and re-experiencing. Shenk, Noll, and Cassarly (2010) 
similarly found that posttraumatic stress symptoms fully mediated the relationship 
between child abuse and NSSI among female adolescents. 
3.3.2 Peer victimisation 
Another factor that has been implicated in the development of NSSI among 
young people is bullying, but it has not been extensively investigated. Research from 
Aotearoa New Zealand showed that reports of bullying were greater among 
secondary school students who had self-harmed than those who had not self-
harmed, but did this study did not distinguish between NSSI and DSH (Garisch & 
Wilson, 2010). Peer victimisation was identified as a risk factor for NSSI in a Swedish 
study where secondary school students were interviewed at two time points, 12 
months apart (Jutengren et al., 2011), but did not predict NSSI among a community 
group of adolescents in the United States (Heilbron & Prinstein, 2010).   
Indeed, the relationship between different types of peer victimisation and 
NSSI appears complex. An investigation of peer-nominated overt (e.g., hitting) and 
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relational (e.g., exclusion, spreading rumours) victimisation in community-based 
adolescents showed that female victims of overt bullying were less likely to report 
having self-injured, while male victims of overt bullying were more likely to report 
having self-injured (Heilbron & Prinstein, 2010). In a sample of female, adolescent 
inpatients, the relationship between peer relational difficulties (i.e., overt 
victimisation, relational victimisation, and negative friendship interactions) and 
NSSI was mediated by emotional dysregulation (Adrian, Zeman, Erdley, Lisa, & 
Sim, 2011). Once again, further research is needed to replicate and clarify these 
findings.  
3.4 Summary and limitations 
Given the diversity of the individual, psychological, and environmental 
correlates and risk factors for self-injurious behaviour, it is worth investigating 
whether there are particular typologies of NSSI. In two recent studies with 
university students, researchers have attempted to clarify whether people who self-
injure can be divided into clinically distinct subgroups (Klonsky & Olino, 2008; 
Whitlock, Muehlenkamp, & Eckenrode, 2008). Utilising latent class analyses, both 
studies provided evidence for distinct typologies of NSSI, which were based on 
factors such as the form, frequency, contextual features, and functions of the self-
injurious behaviour.  
Although identifying clinically relevant distinctions between subgroups of 
people who self-injure is a promising start to unpacking the complexity and 
heterogeneity of NSSI, there are still many unresolved questions that need to be 
addressed. When considered in isolation, the majority of the risk factors that have 
been empirically tested do not only contribute to the aetiology of NSSI, but are 
predictive of numerous psychopathological outcomes (Nock, 2010). Little research 
has been conducted on the interaction of multiple risk factors to determine how 
these interactions influence the development and maintenance of NSSI (Gratz, 2003).  
Furthermore, Fliege et al. (2009) have disputed whether many of the 
characteristics identified in the literature as predictors of NSSI are, in fact, risk 
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factors for self-injury. After reviewing 59 studies on NSSI, they concluded that many 
of the risk factors cannot be characterised as such because NSSI is typically 
investigated cross-sectionally rather than longitudinally, there is insufficient 
evidence that the risk factors were present before the self-injurious behaviour began, 
and none of the studies prospectively investigated new incidents of NSSI. Certainly, 
Glenn and Klonsky (2011) identified that several well-established correlates of NSSI 
failed to prospectively predict self-injurious behaviours.  
In sum, identifying the contribution of varied risk factors and correlates to the 
development of NSSI is essential to create effective prevention programmes, and 
much more work is needed in this area. However, even if a solid, comprehensive 
evidence base about these factors did exist, this information would still be of limited 
treatment utility because the factors that are implicated in the development of 
problem behaviours do not necessarily maintain those behaviours (Cipani & Schock, 
2007). In other words, knowing who is more likely to self-injure does not provide the 
answer to why people self-injure. To understand why people engage in NSSI, it is 
essential to examine how these behaviours are reinforced and maintained over time 
by identifying the reasons or motivations people give for their self-injury, and the 
antecedents and consequences of these behaviours.  
4. SELF-REPORTED REASONS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR SELF-INJURY 
 Reasons for NSSI can be divided into two broad categories: those that are 
motivated by intrapersonal factors and those that are motivated by interpersonal 
factors (Yates, 2004). Intrapersonal reasons are driven by a person’s desire to alter 
their internal state, while interpersonal reasons are driven by a person’s desire to 
communicate with others in their environment (Yates, 2004). In the following 
section, I review the most commonly reported intrapersonal and interpersonal 
reasons for self-injury, across a range of populations, before discussing the 
limitations of these studies. It should be noted that I have followed the precedent set 
by other researchers in using the words ‘reason’ and ‘motivation’ interchangeably to 
refer to the purpose of the self-injurious behaviour (Klonsky, 2007). 
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4.1 Intrapersonal Reasons 
The most common self-reported intrapersonal reasons for NSSI reflect a need 
to decrease, eliminate, or escape from unwanted negative emotions (e.g., anger), 
cognitions (e.g., suicidal ideation, traumatic memories), affect states (e.g., 
dissociation), and physiological conditions (e.g., tension). Additionally, many people 
report self-injuring to punish themselves which, in all likelihood, stems from the 
experience of negative emotions (Chapman et al., 2006) or cognitions as will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
Given my approach of inspecting individual items where possible, I have 
divided the reasons reported in the literature according to whether they fall under 
the categories of emotions/affect, cognitions, or physiological states. Of course, it 
should be noted that these intrapersonal events are all intricately interconnected 
and, as a result, they overlap experientially and conceptually. The complex interplay 
of experiences that results in named emotion is explicated by Barrett, Gendron, and 
Huang (2009) as follows: 
The basic idea is that during emotional experience (‘‘how do I feel?’’) and emotion perception 
(‘‘is the rat afraid?’’; ‘‘is my friend angry?’’; ‘‘is my dog guilty?), representations of internal 
sensations from the body (experienced as affect) and external sensations from the world are 
made meaningful via the process of categorization (just as visual sensation are transformed 
into sight). This categorization uses emotion knowledge that has been learned via prior 
experience. Together, different recipes (the combination and weighting of these three sources 
of information—sensations from the world, sensations from the body, and prior experience) 
create the variety of mental states that represent your own feelings of your experience or 
someone else’s behavior named with emotion words. (p. 431) 
 
Although quantitative explorations of the reasons and motivations for NSSI cannot 
do justice to this complexity, they can provide insight into people’s internal 
experiences and how these experiences contribute to self-injury.  
4.1.1 Emotional reasons 
Emotional motivations for self-injury predominate in measures designed to 
assess why people self-injure, and can be conceptualised along two intersecting 
continua of arousal (i.e., bodily activation) and valence (i.e., pleasantness) (Barrett, 
1998). The conceptualisation of NSSI as a strategy for regulating aversive emotions 
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or mood states has led researchers to primarily focus on the role of negatively, rather 
than positively, valenced emotions in the maintenance of self-injury.  
4.1.1.1 Specific emotions 
 A number of specific emotions, such as anger, frustration, loneliness, and 
excitement have been investigated in studies of why people self-injure; these 
emotions have been differentially endorsed as reasons for NSSI across diverse 
populations of study participants. Reasons for self-injury that describe the 
elimination or expression of anger and frustration, both high arousal, negative 
emotions, have been reported by a majority of the participants in several studies 
(Brown et al., 2002; Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Nixon et al., 2002). It is 
typically unclear whether the anger and frustration experienced by participants is 
directed at themselves or other people as studies seldom differentiate between self- 
and other-directed anger. One of the few studies that did make this distinction found 
that 63% of a community group of adolescents reported self-injuring because they 
were angry with themselves, whereas only 39% reported self-injuring because they 
were angry with others (e.g., parents, friends) (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 
2005). 6  
Low arousal, negative emotions that have been identified as reasons for NSSI 
in both community and psychiatric populations include feeling empty, lonely, and 
helpless (Favazza & Conterio, 1989; Nixon et al., 2002; Oyefeso et al., 2008; Swannell, 
Martin, Scott, Gibbons, & Gifford, 2008). Like high arousal, negative emotions, the 
particular low arousal, negative emotions measured, and the extent to which they 
are endorsed, depends on what questionnaire is used and the population sampled.  
One emotion that has been examined in several NSSI studies is loneliness. In 
the first large-scale survey study to examine the motivations for self-injury, 47% of 
an all female sample reported injuring themselves ‚to feel less lonely‛ (Favazza & 
                                               
6 To maintain consistency, all the percentages in this chapter have been reported without decimal 
places. Where percentages were reported with one or more decimal places in the original source, I 
have rounded these figures to zero decimal places.  
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Conterio, 1989, p. 286). In contrast, 76% of adolescent inpatients reported injuring 
themselves to ‚reduce a feeling of being utterly alone‛ (Swannell et al., 2008, p. 101) 
and 63% of community-based adolescents reported injuring themselves because they 
‚felt all alone‛ (Laye-Ghindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005, p. 452).  
Few positive emotions have been investigated as reasons for NSSI and when 
they are included in questionnaires, the results tend to be variable. For example, self-
injuring for excitement was endorsed by 53% of the adolescent inpatients in one 
study (Swannell et al., 2008), but by only 7% of the adolescent inpatients in another 
study (Nixon et al., 2002). This large discrepancy is surprising considering the items 
were worded very similarly and both study samples consisted of adolescent 
inpatients. The instructions on how to complete the questions may have differed 
between measures, but these instructions were not reported.  
Concluding whether excitement motivates adolescents to self-injure is 
impossible from these studies. It is equally as difficult to determine whether 
excitement is a common motivation for NSSI in adult inpatient or community 
populations because other studies that have examined self-injuring for excitement 
did not report how many of their participants endorsed this reason (Kumar, Pepe, & 
Steer, 2004; Osuch, Noll, & Putnam, 1999). It is likely that self-injuring for excitement 
is motivated by boredom, which may be more common among adolescent and adult 
inpatients in restricted environments, but further research is necessary to determine 
whether this is the case.  
4.1.1.2 Specific affect states 
 The two affect states that are most commonly investigated in studies about 
the reasons and motivations for self-injury are depression and dissociation. Over 
80% of the community-based and inpatient adolescent participants in two separate 
studies endorsed self-injuring because they were depressed or trying to cope with 
depressed mood, making this the most commonly endorsed motivation for NSSI in 
these samples (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Nixon et al., 2002). A lower 
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rate of endorsement (58%) for the item, ‚to feel less depressed‛ (p. 286), was found 
among women in Favazza and Conterio’s (1989) study.  
In general, items about using NSSI to manage dissociation do not appear to 
rate as highly as depression items. Among two adult samples, 38% to 57% of people 
reported self-injuring to end dissociative states (Briere & Gil, 1998, Favazza & 
Conterio, 1989). Similar results were found in a group of hospitalised adolescents 
where just under half reported self-injuring ‚to stop feeling numb or out of touch 
with reality‛ (Nixon et al., 2002, p. 1337). In contrast, 87% of the inpatient 
adolescents in Swannell et al.’s (2008) study endorsed self-injuring to ‚decrease an 
empty feeling‛ (p. 101) making this the second most highly endorsed reason for 
NSSI in this sample.  
Non-suicidal self-injury has not only been reported as an anti-dissociation 
strategy, but also has occasionally been examined as a means of inducing 
dissociation. A substantial proportion of adolescents (30%-82%) have reported 
injuring themselves to induce feelings of numbness, which provided some respite 
from their overwhelming emotions (Laye-Ghindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; 
Swannell et al., 2008). Apart from these two studies, self-injuring to induce, rather 
than reduce, dissociation does not appear to have been widely investigated. 
4.1.1.3 General emotional experiences 
 Some studies included items that lacked specificity and referred to general, 
aversive emotional or affective experiences, such as ‚to stop bad feelings‛ (Lloyd-
Richardson et al., 2007, p. 1189), ‚to cope with emotional pain‛ (Oyefeso et al., 2008, 
p. 230), and ‚to get rid of intolerable emotions‛ (Klonsky, 2009, p. 263). Although 
these items were endorsed by a majority of the participants in these studies, it is 
impossible to isolate the specific emotions they refer to.  
4.1.2 Cognitive reasons 
4.1.2.1 Specific cognitions 
Along with emotional reasons for NSSI, particular cognitions, especially to do 
with suicidal ideation or traumatic memories, have been identified by numerous 
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people as motivations for their self-injurious behaviour. Self-injury, as a strategy to 
prevent suicidal ideation or attempts, has been reported by 41% to 74% of 
community-based and inpatient adolescents (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; 
Nixon et al., 2002; Swannell et al., 2008). Certainly, endorsing self-injury as survival 
is consistent with the consumer perspectives presented in Chapter 1 (see pp. 15-16).   
However, in studies where participants have been asked to rank their reasons 
for NSSI, averting suicidal thoughts has not been rated very highly. Only 7% of 
women with BPD rated ‚to prevent me from acting on suicidal feelings‛ as one of 
their top three reasons for NSSI (Shearer, 1994, p. 525), while 6% of university 
students rated ‚to avoid the impulse to attempt suicide‛ as a primary reason for self-
injury and 18% rated it as a secondary reason (Klonsky, 2009, p. 264).  
A number of people also report using self-injury as a way of distracting 
themselves from traumatic memories. In a clinical sample, in which over 90% of the 
participants had been sexually abused, 58% reported self-injuring as a ‚distraction 
from memories‛ and 39% to ‚stop flashbacks‛ (Briere & Gil, 1998, p. 615). Using self-
injury to avoid or distract oneself from negative memories has also been reported by 
more than half of two inpatient adolescent samples (Nixon et al., 2002; Swannell et 
al., 2008).  
A lower rate was found among a group of women diagnosed with BPD—only 
15% endorsed self-injuring to ‚keep bad memories away‛ (Shearer, 1994, p. 525)—
but caution is required when interpreting these results as the women who 
participated in this study were asked to rank their top three reasons for NSSI. 
Consequently, the results may underestimate the number of women with BPD who 
self-injure to avoid or escape negative memories. Unfortunately, detailed 
information about the content of the memories or flashbacks is not reported in any of 
these studies. 
4.1.2.2 General cognitive states 
As with the general affect items, some researchers have included vague items 
about the cognitive motivations for NSSI in their questionnaires. For example, 72% 
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of the women in Favazza and Conterio’s (1989) sample reported self-injuring ‚to 
control their mind when it is racing‛ (p. 286), but the content of these thoughts is 
unclear. Likewise, 55% of a group of secondary school students recalled self-injuring 
to get their mind off their problems and 20% to prevent themselves from ‚thinking 
bad thoughts‛ (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005, p. 452). Once again, these 
items are too general to provide sufficient information about the specific thoughts or 
problems that motivated these people to injure themselves.   
4.1.3 Physiological reasons 
4.1.3.1 Releasing pressure or tension 
Items that refer to physiological reasons for self-injury often describe NSSI as 
a means through which to release tension. It should be noted that the release of 
tension is closely linked with self-injuring to cope with negative emotions. Indeed, it 
is probable that experiences of tension are triggered by intense emotions (Chapman 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, a number of questionnaire items actually specify the 
release of emotional tension. Eighty-five percent of a group of university students 
reported that their primary motivation for self-injuring was ‚to release emotional 
pressure that builds up inside me‛, while the remaining 15% reported it as their 
secondary motivation for engaging in NSSI (Klonsky, 2009, p. 263). In Briere and 
Gil’s (1998) study, 77% of the participants reportedly self-injured to ‚release pent-up 
feelings‛ (p. 615).  
Measures used in other studies have not specified the release of emotional 
tension per se, but have rather referred to the elimination of tension in general. In 
two studies, one involving women diagnosed with BPD (Kleindienst et al., 2008) and 
one involving adult psychiatric inpatients (Herpertz, 1995), tension release was the 
most frequently reported motivation for NSSI. Similarly high rates of endorsement 
(45%-74%) for the utility of NSSI as a tension release or relaxation strategy have been 
found in other studies (Favazza & Conterio, 1989; Laye-Ghindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 
2005; Nixon et al., 2002).  
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4.1.3.2 Inducing stimulation 
Aside from using self-injury to release tension, people have also reported self-
injuring to produce stimulation, an experience which is often likened to a drug high 
(Kleindienst et al., 2008; Oyefeso et al., 2008; Swannell et al., 2008). For example, 47% 
of a clinical sample of women with BPD endorsed using NSSI to ‚achieve a kick or 
high‛ (Kleindienst et al., 2008, p. 233) and 66% of a clinical sample of adolescents 
endorsed using NSSI ‚to experience a high that feels like a drug high‛ (Swannell et 
al., 2008, p. 101). Inducing stimulation through self-injury can be thought of as 
comparable to self-injuring for excitement, which was discussed earlier.    
Another motivation for self-injury that is rarely investigated and, when it is 
examined, seldom endorsed is using self-injury to induce sexual arousal. In a sample 
of women with BPD, only 5% reported self-injuring ‚to provide a sense of physical 
release that feels much like sexual release‛(Shearer, 1994, p. 525), while 12% of 
another clinical sample purportedly self-injured to experience ‚sexual arousal or 
pleasure‛ (Briere & Gil, 1998, p. 615). 
 The role of pain as a stimulus has also been explicitly investigated in some of 
the measures of the reasons and motivations for self-injury. However, in these items, 
physical pain is presented as a means through which people can gain control over, 
or distract themselves from, unpleasant emotions or affect states. For example, 92% 
of adolescent inpatients reported self-injuring because physical pain distracted them 
from their emotional pain (Swannell et al., 2008). Other items that have been 
endorsed by more than half of the participants in two separate studies include using 
self-injury to ‚produce a pain I can control‛ (Klonsky, 2009, p. 263) and ‚to feel 
something, even if it was pain‛ (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007, p. 1189). In all of these 
items, the primary motivation for NSSI appears to be the control or regulation of 
affect, which is made possible through the distraction provided by experiencing 
pain. 
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4.1.4 Self-punishment  
Self-punishment is often one of the most highly endorsed reasons for self-
injury. In three adult clinical samples, self-punishment received the highest level of 
endorsement of all the reasons provided for NSSI (Briere & Gil, 1998; Brown et al., 
2002; Shearer, 1994). However, it is a construct that defies simple classification 
within the emotional, cognitive, or physiological categories discussed thus far 
because it could feasibly fit within all three of these categories. Some studies have 
demonstrated that the desire to punish oneself through self-injury can be triggered 
by positive and negative experiences or affect states. For example, 50% of 
hospitalised adolescents reported self-injuring to ‚punish self for being bad/bad 
thoughts‛ and 26% reported self-injuring to ‚punish self for feeling good‛ (Nixon et 
al., 2002, p. 1337). In another study of adolescent inpatients, a majority endorsed the 
motivations to ‚punish myself for being bad‛ (84%), to ‚punish myself for positive 
feelings/experiences‛ (68%), and to ‚punish myself for telling secrets‛ (53%) 
(Swannell et al., 2008, p. 101).  
Self-punishment was also primarily driven by negative self-evaluations in a 
sample of women with BPD; 49% endorsed using self-injury ‚to punish myself for 
being ‚bad‛ in some way (e.g., angry, selfish, etc.)‛ (Shearer, 1994, p. 525). In 
Oyefeso and colleagues’ (2008) study, 68% of the participants used NSSI to express 
their self-hatred, while Laye-Gindhu and Schonert-Reichl (2005) found that more 
than 60% of the adolescents in their study were motivated to self-injure because they 
did not like themselves and felt like failures.  
It is hardly surprising that people report injuring themselves as punishment 
for both positive and negative experiences, given that NSSI is associated with low 
self-esteem (Brausch & Gutierrez, 2010; Claes, Houben, et al., 2010). If the desire to 
self-punish is driven by low self-worth, it is plausible that people would blame 
themselves for any negative experiences they have and feel undeserving of positive 
experiences. In such cases, both negative and positive experiences may lead to 
feelings of guilt and shame which, in turn, could trigger self-injurious behaviour. It 
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is thus clear from the examples discussed that self-injury can be used as a form of 
punishment in the context of negative emotions and cognitions about oneself, and 
for experiencing positive emotions.  
4.2 Interpersonal Reasons  
Interpersonal reasons for self-injury, which reflect support-seeking or 
avoidance, have not been investigated as thoroughly in the literature as 
intrapersonal reasons for self-injury, and when they have been included in measures 
assessing why people self-injure, they are seldom endorsed as highly as 
intrapersonal reasons. Concerns about perpetuating damaging stereotypes about 
self-injury as a purely attention-seeking behaviour may have encouraged researchers 
to avoid investigating intrapersonal reasons for NSSI (Nock, 2008). However, some 
people do claim to use self-injury to communicate with those around them or to 
exert control over their interpersonal environment (Nock, 2008; Yates, 2004) and, as a 
result, it is important to examine these motivations.  
4.2.1 Support-seeking 
As is common with all of the research investigating motivations for NSSI that 
I have presented thus far, the number of people who report using self-injury as a 
way of eliciting attention and support from others varies between studies. In one 
adult clinical sample, 40% of the participants endorsed self-injuring to ‚get attention, 
ask for help‛ but only 16% reported injuring themselves to get attention from their 
therapist and 9% to receive medical attention (Briere & Gil, 1998, p. 615). The 
discrepancy in these ratings may indicate that NSSI is used more frequently to elicit 
support and attention from family members or friends, rather than clinicians.  
Indeed, over 50% of a sample of secondary school students were motivated to 
injure themselves to receive more attention from their friends or parents (Lloyd-
Richardson et al., 2007). Similarly, 41% of community-based adolescents reported 
injuring themselves so that others would notice them (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-
Reichl, 2005). Much lower rates of attention-seeking were reported in an adolescent 
inpatient population; only 10% recalled self-injuring to ‚get care or attention from 
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others‛ (Nixon et al., 2002, p. 1337). Among a clinical group of women diagnosed 
with BPD, 17% reported using self-injury as an indirect way of obtaining care and 
support from others because they felt unable to request this support verbally 
(Shearer, 1994).  
The need for support and care often seems to occur in the context of 
distressing, overwhelming emotions. Over 70% of one group of adolescent inpatients 
reported injuring themselves to demonstrate to others how angry and hurt they felt 
(Swannell et al., 2008), whereas approximately one third of two different samples of 
secondary school students were motivated to hurt themselves to show others how 
desperate they were (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Lloyd-Richardson et al., 
2007). Some adolescents have also reported using NSSI as a way to hurt, shock, 
irritate, or get back at people (Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Swannell et al., 
2008), or to feel more connected to a group of peers (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007).  
4.2.2 Avoidance 
Even less commonly investigated interpersonal reasons involve using NSSI to 
avoid having to complete tasks, fulfil responsibilities, or face the consequences of 
particular actions. More than 50% of a group of secondary school students reported 
self-injuring ‚to avoid school, work, or other activities‛ (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 
2007, p. 1189). However, in another sample of secondary school students, only 16% 
endorsed self-injuring because they wanted to avoid certain tasks (Laye-Gindhu & 
Schonert-Reichl, 2005). Further research is necessary to determine whether avoiding 
responsibilities is a common motivation for NSSI across different study populations.  
4.3 Limitations 
The literature on self-reported reasons and motivations for NSSI is limited in 
several ways. First, researchers investigating why people injure themselves on 
purpose typically develop questionnaires based on clinical experience and extant 
publications. As a result, only three self-report measures designed to assess why 
people self-injure have been used in more than one published study: the Functional 
Assessment of Self-mutilation (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007), the Self-injury 
55 
 
 
Motivation Scale (Osuch et al., 1999), and the Inventory of Statements About Self-
injury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009).  
The measures used in each study typically include various numbers of items 
about the same concepts (e.g., managing negative emotions through NSSI), but the 
different wording used in these items makes it difficult to reliably compare study 
results. Not only do some items include specific emotions, affect states, or 
cognitions, while others simply refer in general to negative feelings or thoughts, but 
the verbs used in each item differ. Some of the verbs contained in the items 
discussed include: to get rid of, to cope with, to express, to distract, to control, to 
release, to decrease, to feel, and to produce. These verbs hint at different functional 
mechanisms underlying the motivations for self-injury and, as such, items that 
include the same emotion or cognition word but have different verbs cannot be 
compared directly. For example, someone who endorses self-injuring to get rid of 
unpleasant feelings may not endorse self-injuring to express unpleasant feelings, as 
the latter implies a communicative function.  
Furthermore, each of these questionnaires measures the reasons for NSSI in 
different ways. In some studies, participants rated their reasons for NSSI on likert 
scales (e.g., Kleindienst et al., 2008; Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005); in others, 
they identified their primary and secondary motivations (Klonsky, 2009), ranked 
their top three motivations for self-injury (Shearer, 1994), or simply checked yes or 
no to identify which motivations were relevant to their experience of NSSI (Oyefeso 
et al., 2008). These diverse levels of measurement make it difficult to compare results 
across studies.   
Second, the length of time since the participants’ most recent episode of NSSI 
and their completion of the study measures varies widely both within and between 
studies. In Favazza and Conterio’s (1989) study, 64% of the participants had injured 
themselves in the month prior to the study whereas only 13% of the participants in 
Oyefeso’s et al. (2008) study had self-injured in the previous 12 months. Moreover, 
many authors do not report how much time has elapsed between people’s most 
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recent self-injurious behaviour and their study participation, or even if that 
information was collected (e.g., Herpertz, 1995; Osuch et al., 1999; Swannell et al., 
2008). One study did specify that participants had to have injured themselves within 
the previous two months to be included in the research (Brown et al., 2002), while 
another only included participants who had self-injured every month for the six 
months prior to the study (Nixon et al., 2002). Such specifications, however, are rare 
and the variation in time since last self-injury is a concern given that all of the 
studies reviewed thus far have relied on retrospective self-report and the accuracy of 
participants’ memories are likely to decrease as the length of time since their last 
episode of NSSI increases (Tourangeau, 2000).  
Finally, it is possible that the self-reported reasons for NSSI do not accurately 
reflect people’s motivations for injuring themselves. Rather, people may be 
motivated to provide socially desirable responses (Nock, 2008) or their reasons may 
be post-hoc attributions to help them to make sense of their self-injury (Yates, 2004). 
The way in which people retrospectively appraise and justify their self-injurious 
behaviour, however, may be as clinically relevant as any factors that are truly 
motivating that behaviour: If people recall successfully escaping aversive affect 
states or accessing support through self-injuring, they are more likely to use NSSI in 
the future when they feel similarly distressed and overwhelmed (Chapman & 
Dixon-Gordon, 2007; Kamphuis, Ruyling, & Reijntjies, 2007).   
4.4 Summary 
In spite of the limitations associated with self-report studies of the reasons 
and motivations for self-injury, it is reasonable to conclude from this literature that 
self-injury is used primarily to alleviate or escape from aversive intrapersonal 
experiences, including emotions, cognitions, and physiological states (Klonsky, 2007; 
Nock, 2008). Although interpersonal reasons have been examined in fewer studies, 
where they have been included they are seldom as highly endorsed as intrapersonal 
reasons for NSSI. However, a substantial number of people still report using NSSI to 
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communicate with, or exert influence over, others and, as such, interpersonal 
reasons for NSSI cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.   
Rather, it is apparent that people injure themselves for multiple intrapersonal 
and interpersonal reasons. In studies where the actual number of reasons for NSSI 
has been reported, rates range from a median of four among drug dependent adults 
(Oyefeso et al., 2008) to an average of eight among adolescent inpatients (Nixon et 
al., 2002). However, these figures apply to participants’ general experiences of self-
injury rather than to specific episodes. Only one study, to date, has examined the 
motives given by participants for a single episode of NSSI: Women with BPD 
identified an average of 10 reasons for their most recent self-injury (Brown et al., 
2002). This study demonstrates that multiple reasons or motivations also underlie 
individual episodes of self-injury, at least amongst a sample of women with BPD. 
Further research is necessary to determine whether other populations, such as 
inpatient or community-based adolescents, would similarly report multiple 
motivations for single episodes of NSSI. 
 5. SELF-REPORTED ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SELF-INJURY 
 The literature on self-reported reasons for NSSI demonstrates that people are 
primarily motivated to hurt themselves to reduce, eliminate, or gain control over 
aversive intrapersonal experiences. In particular, there appears to be strongest 
support within these studies for reasons to do with negative emotions or affect 
states. Unfortunately, this research only suggests, but does not explicitly investigate, 
the emotional antecedents for NSSI, and fails to provide evidence that these 
emotions actually do change following acts of self-injury. Rather the process of 
change is typically implied in the way in which items are worded. For example, 
endorsing a reason, such as ‘I self-injure to relieve negative emotions’, assumes 
rather than directly asks whether negative emotions are present before and are 
eliminated after self-injuring. Several researchers therefore have retrospectively or 
prospectively examined specific emotional and physiological antecedents and 
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consequences of self-injurious behaviour; cognitive antecedents and consequences 
have been largely neglected.  
5.1 Retrospective Studies 
Antecedents and consequences of NSSI are usually identified by asking 
research participants to indicate which affect or physiological states they commonly 
experience before and after NSSI. People routinely report decreased negative affect 
and increased positive affect following their engagement in self-injurious behaviour 
(Chapman & Dixon-Gordon, 2007; Kamphuis et al., 2007; Kemperman, Russ, & 
Shearin, 1997; Kleindienst et al., 2008). In one study, women recruited from a self-
injury support group completed a measure of negative and positive mood states, in 
relation to how they felt immediately before, after, and one day following episodes 
of NSSI (Kamphuis et al., 2007). Anger, depression, fatigue, and tension scores 
decreased significantly following self-injurious behaviour, while vigour (e.g., 
energetic, alert) scores showed a significant increase. Significantly more women 
reported a decrease in tension than any other internal state, leading the authors to 
conclude that NSSI functions primarily as a tension reduction strategy.  
Similar results have been obtained in other studies. More than 90% of a 
sample of women diagnosed with BPD reported that the tension and pressure they 
felt prior to injuring themselves was significantly reduced after NSSI, while their 
ratings of positive affect items (e.g., ‚relaxed‛, ‚euphoria‛) were significantly higher 
after NSSI (Kleindienst et al., 2008). Analyses of change scores (i.e., rates of change 
from before to after NSSI) for university students showed that the high arousal, 
negative affect state—overwhelmed—decreased the most while low arousal, positive 
affect states—relief, calmness, satisfaction, and relaxation—increased the most 
(Klonsky, 2009).  
However, not all people experience a decrease in negative emotion following 
NSSI. Almost half of a group of female inmates reported that the main emotional 
consequence of their most recent episode of NSSI was negative (e.g., sadness, guilt) 
(Chapman & Dixon-Gordon, 2007). Other researchers have similarly found that self-
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conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, are reported to increase following 
engagement in self-injurious behaviour (Kemperman et al., 1997; Laye-Gindhu & 
Schonert-Reichl, 2005). It thus appears that while NSSI is an adaptive strategy to 
reduce overwhelming tension and certain aversive emotions, the act of self-injuring 
can also evoke other negative emotions (e.g., guilt). Given that the experience of 
aversive emotions precipitates NSSI, negative feelings consequent to self-injury have 
the potential to trigger future self-injurious behaviour, leading to a vicious cycle.  
5.2 Prospective Studies 
 The application of prospective methodologies, such as ecological momentary 
assessment (EMA), to the study of NSSI is a recent empirical development. To date, 
only two studies have used EMA to examine the antecedents and consequences of 
NSSI. In one of these studies, women diagnosed with Bulimia Nervosa used palmtop 
computers to report their emotions, stressors, and any self-injurious behaviours or 
Bulimic symptoms at six, semi-random times a day for two weeks (Muehlenkamp et 
al., 2009). They were also asked to complete an additional set of questions each time 
they engaged in one or more of a set of pre-identified behaviours, including self-
injury. Analyses of the NSSI episodes showed a significant increase in negative affect 
and decrease in positive affect in the lead-up to the self-injurious behaviour. While 
positive affect increased significantly following NSSI, there was no significant 
reduction in negative affect.  
The authors speculate that the lack of a significant decrease in negative affect 
may be an artefact of their small sample size and cannot be generalised to people 
without Bulimia who self-injure (Muehlenkamp et al., 2009). Given a larger sample, 
it may have been useful to examine the trajectories of particular affect states that 
precede and follow NSSI episodes. By analysing global positive and negative affect 
scores, significant decreases in specific negative emotions or affect states may have 
been overlooked. As previously discussed, evidence from retrospective self-report 
studies of the emotional antecedents and consequences of NSSI suggests that some 
60 
 
 
negative emotions (e.g., anger) typically decrease following self-injury while other 
emotions (e.g., shame) may increase. 
 Ecological momentary assessment was also utilised by Nock and colleagues 
(2009) to investigate the antecedents and consequences of self-injurious thoughts and 
behaviours. Over two weeks, participants completed a set of questions twice a day 
and following any self-injurious thoughts or behaviours. Analyses showed that 
experiencing self- and other-directed anger, self-hatred, rejection, and numbness 
predicted NSSI episodes, while contrary to expectations, feeling sad or worthless 
decreased the likelihood of self-injury.   
5.3 Summary and limitations 
 As was evident in studies of self-reported motivations for NSSI, one of the 
major limitations of the literature on the antecedents and consequences of self-injury 
is once again the failure of researchers to use standardised measures. Only two 
studies used a validated measure of emotion words (Kamphuis et al., 2007; 
Muehlenkamp et al., 2009); all others simply examined a range of emotions and 
affect states, presumably drawn from the NSSI literature. For example, Chapman 
and Dixon-Gordon (2007) report that they used a ‚standard list of nine emotions‛ (p. 
546) but it is unclear where this list is derived from or why the emotions are 
considered standard. This use of disparate emotions and affect states makes it 
difficult to compare results across studies.  
 Although prospective investigations of the antecedents and consequences of 
NSSI involve real-time assessments of emotional states and are thus an improvement 
on retrospective studies, they nonetheless rely on participants being able to identify 
and accurately report on their emotional experience (Muehlenkamp et al., 2009) 
There is also the potential for such studies to have an iatrogenic effect in that people 
may be more likely to think about, and engage in, self-injury because they are 
participating in a daily study about NSSI.  
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6. LABORATORY STUDIES 
While phenomenological research of NSSI provides useful information about 
how the process of self-injury is perceived by those who engage in these behaviours, 
one of the drawbacks of most of these studies is their reliance on the single method 
of retrospective self-report. To address this limitation, some researchers have used 
self-injury proxies to try to simulate the psychophysiological experience of NSSI 
within a laboratory setting, while concurrently assessing self-reported affect states. 
While the external validity of such proxies is debatable (Klonsky, 2007), these studies 
nonetheless provide further evidence in support of the hypotheses that self-injury 
serves to reduce negative affect states and aversive psychophysiological arousal.  
 Both the cold pressor test (Russ et al., 1992) and guided imagery (Haines, 
Williams, Brain, & Wilson, 1995; Welch, Linehan, Sylvers, Chittams, & Rizvi, 2008) 
have been used to simulate NSSI within laboratory settings. In one study, 
participants completed the cold pressor test by immersing their left hands into a 
10°C cold-water bath for four minutes, once a day, for three consecutive days. 
Analyses of averaged mood ratings before and after the cold pressor test showed 
that women who experienced no pain during NSSI reported significantly lower 
depression, anxiety, anger, and confusion scores, and significantly higher vigour 
scores after administration of the test (Russ et al., 1992). In contrast, women who 
experienced pain during NSSI did not report any significant differences in emotion. 
The only significant result for the control group was reduced anxiety.  
 These results lend support to the notion that NSSI functions as an affect 
regulation strategy although it is unclear why this was not the case for women who 
experienced pain during self-injury. It is possible that the cold pressor test was an 
inadequate self-injury proxy for these women, who may rely on reaching a certain 
threshold of pain during NSSI before they experience an alteration in mood (Russ et 
al., 1992).  
 Guided imagery has also been used in attempts to reproduce, within a 
controlled laboratory environment, the psychophysiological arousal patterns 
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associated with NSSI, thus allowing researchers to examine whether NSSI serves a 
tension reduction function (Haines et al., 1995; Welch et al., 2008). In one study, 
individualised self-injury scripts were developed for men based on their 
descriptions of their most recent or salient episode of NSSI (Haines et al., 1995). Each 
script contained four discrete phases: setting the context, the lead-up to the event, 
the actual event, and the consequences of the event.  
The men were instructed to visualise the events described in each script while 
their levels of psychophysiological arousal (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance 
response) were recorded. Psychophysiological arousal was found to increase in the 
lead-up to the recalled NSSI episode, decrease during the description of the actual 
self-injury, and remain low subsequent to the episode. This same pattern of arousal 
was not observed for scripts detailing neutral, aggressive, or accidental injury 
events. Self-reported ratings of negative emotions were also significantly lower in 
the final stage of the self-injury scripts when participants visualised the 
consequences of their self-injurious behaviour (Haines et al., 1995).  
Welch and colleagues (2008) replicated the guided imagery procedure 
conducted by Haines et al. (1995) with a sample of people diagnosed with BPD. 
Similarly to Haines et al. (1995), participants’ negative emotion and urge to self-
injure ratings, along with their skin conductance response rates, were significantly 
lower following the imagined NSSI episode, thus supporting the conceptualisation 
of NSSI as a negatively reinforced, emotion regulation strategy (Welch et al., 2008). 
Laboratory-based studies lend support to the arguments that NSSI serves as 
both an emotion regulation and tension reduction strategy, but the external validity 
of self-injury proxies remain questionable (Klonsky, 2007). It is evident from the 
research reviewed thus far that NSSI is a complex, multi-determined behaviour 
(Suyemoto, 1998), making it very difficult to reliably recreate the experience of self-
injury and any accompanying contextual features within an experimental context.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 People endorse both intrapersonal and interpersonal motivations for NSSI, 
but it appears that intrapersonal reasons, particularly those pertaining to emotion 
regulation, are reported most frequently across a range of study populations. 
Indeed, conceptualising NSSI as an emotion regulation strategy is so pervasive that 
some authors even include this function within their definitions of the behaviour 
(e.g., Walsh, 2006). However, it is premature to define NSSI solely in terms of 
emotion regulation because of the limited research that has been conducted both on 
the role of cognitions in self-injurious behaviours and interpersonal reasons for 
NSSI.  
Although cognitive precipitants for NSSI (e.g., suicidal ideation, traumatic 
memories) are not as highly or consistently endorsed as emotional ones, the impact 
of certain types of cognitions, such as negative automatic thoughts, has not been 
investigated. Of course as I discussed earlier, the experience of cognitions and 
emotions are intricately linked (Barrett et al., 2009). Indeed, it is probable that any 
cognitive motivations for self-injury are underpinned by the experience of aversive 
affect (Chapman et al., 2006). However, it is still necessary to analyse the extent to 
which different negative thoughts precipitate engagement in self-injury. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to determine whether particular thoughts evoke 
negative emotional responses that people with a history of self-injury find difficult to 
manage, or whether the experience of particular emotions triggers intrusive, 
negative thoughts. It is likely that a threshold is reached through the combination of 
sufficiently intense negative emotions, thoughts, and physiological arousal.  
Interpersonal factors have been similarly neglected in studies of why people 
self-injure (Klonsky, 2007). As a result, caution is required before drawing definitive 
conclusions about the limited role of interpersonal factors in NSSI. Studies that do 
examine interpersonal reasons for self-injury need to take into account that people 
may not endorse these reasons for fear they will be perceived as manipulative or 
attention-seeking, although social desirability is unlikely to influence responses 
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when questionnaires are completed anonymously (Klonsky, 2007; Nock, 2008). 
People also may lack insight into interpersonal motivations for their self-injurious 
behaviour or may not completely understand why they self-injure (Klonsky, 2007). It 
is also possible that intrapersonal reasons for NSSI are more salient and therefore 
easier to recall than interpersonal ones. 
Furthermore, while the evidence to date suggests the most common 
interpersonal motivation for NSSI is communicating one’s distress to others to 
receive attention and support, avoidance has seldom been investigated. However, 
future studies may find that a strict delineation between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal factors is not warranted. For instance, it has been suggested that 
certain interpersonal reasons for NSSI may indirectly serve an affect regulation 
function (Nock, 2008). People who are unable to effectively regulate their own 
emotions may look to others for help in managing their emotional well-being; NSSI 
is the strategy they use to communicate that such help is needed (Nock, 2008). 
 Extant research on why people are motivated to hurt themselves is also 
limited in that the majority of studies have relied on retrospective self-reports from 
convenience samples of predominantly Caucasian women. These results may not be 
generalisable to other populations. For example, studies involving secondary school 
and university students have demonstrated that some motivations for self-injuring 
differ according to gender (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Laye-Ghindhu & Schonert-
Reichl, 2005; Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007). In one study, males were more likely 
than females to report injuring themselves to provoke anger in others, whereas 
females were more likely than males to report injuring themselves as a form of self-
punishment (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007).  
 In the next chapter, I will discuss how the literature on the reasons for NSSI, 
and the antecedents and consequences of these behaviours, has been used to inform 
the development of both single- and multi-function models of self-injury. These 
models provide frameworks for organising the diverse reasons people give for self-
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injuring and have been instrumental in further developing our understanding of 
why people choose to hurt themselves on purpose.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The functions of self-injury: Theoretical conceptualisations 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Successful treatment of self-injurious behaviours necessitates a sophisticated 
understanding of how these behaviours are reinforced and maintained over time. 
Various functional models of NSSI, each drawing on different psychological 
theories, have been proposed to account for why people injure themselves on 
purpose (Klonsky, 2007; Messer & Fremouw, 2008; Suyemoto, 1998; Yates, 2004). 
Evidence for these models was originally derived from case studies and clinical 
experience (e.g., Menninger, 1935); more recently, the phenomenological and 
psychophysiological studies reviewed in Chapter 2 have been used to support the 
empirical and clinical validity of functional models of self-injurious behaviour. 
In many cases, the development of what I shall call single-function models 
has simply been a matter of reframing people’s self-reported motivations for self-
injury into specific NSSI models. Single-function models therefore can be 
conceptualised as being one step up from the reasons and motivations for NSSI that I 
reviewed in the previous chapter, in that they provide functional categories into 
which related reasons for self-injury can be grouped; in other words, the single-
function models subsume individual reasons, motivations, antecedents, and 
consequences. For example, emotional reasons, antecedents, or consequences can be 
grouped within the overarching functional model of affect regulation; people who 
report self-injuring to release anger or manage feelings of depression are understood 
to self-injure to regulate negative affect. 
 Individual single-function models, however, cannot adequately account for 
why people are motivated to hurt themselves on purpose because NSSI, as an 
overdetermined behaviour, fulfils multiple functions at the same time (Klonsky & 
Muehlenkamp, 2007; Suyemoto, 1998). To understand why any one person is 
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engaging in NSSI, single-function models thus need to be considered concurrently. 
Without an overarching theoretical framework to connect these models, any attempt 
to integrate them is bound to be haphazard and, potentially, of limited clinical 
utility. Furthermore, I would argue that since little is known about the underlying 
mechanisms of these models, it is difficult to arrive at a parsimonious solution about 
which models should be grouped together.  
Fortunately, several theory-driven, rather than data-driven, models have been 
proposed more recently, which I will refer to as multi-function models because they 
subsume individual single-function models. Some of these models have focused on 
specific populations, such as people with BPD (Crowell, Beauchaine, & Linehan, 
2009) or those with a history of trauma (Yates, 2004), or particular forms of self-
injury, such as cutting (Yip, 2005), and thus have limited applicability for my thesis 
because I am interested in how NSSI functions across different populations and 
multiple forms of self-injury.  
Two multi-function models, however, that are applicable across populations 
and forms of NSSI are the Four Functions Model (FFM; Nock, 2008; Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004, 2005) and the Experiential Avoidance Model (EAM; Chapman et al., 
2006). These models have been proposed in an attempt to draw together the 
miscellaneous single-function theories of self-injury and, ultimately, to clarify the 
functions of NSSI. Unlike the disparate and often under-theorised single-function 
models, both the FFM and the EAM define function in accordance with social 
learning and behavioural perspectives (Chapman et al., 2006; Nock, 2008) and, as 
such, identifying the functions of self-injury requires simultaneously analysing the 
antecedents and consequences that cause or maintain self-injurious behaviours 
(Nock, 2008). In this way, functions of NSSI are conceptualised as temporal 
processes, rather than as categories of particular reasons or motivations. Defining the 
functions of self-injury in terms of the features which control the behaviour is 
thought to be fundamental to developing sophisticated treatment and prevention 
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programmes that have the capacity to respond to individual characteristics (Nock, 
2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). 
 In this chapter, I briefly describe the basic premise of each of the single-
function models, the evidence in support of the hypothesised functions, and the 
proposed causal mechanisms underlying these functions. I then examine the 
assumptions and empirical evidence in support of the EAM and FFM, before 
evaluating these two models within an epistemic values framework.       
2. SINGLE-FUNCTION MODELS OF SELF-INJURY 
 According to recent reviews, the following eight single-function models have 
been repeatedly discussed within the literature on self-injurious behaviours: affect 
regulation, anti-dissociation, anti-suicide, self-punishment, sexual, interpersonal 
boundaries, interpersonal influence, and sensation-seeking (Klonsky, 2007; Messer & 
Fremouw, 2008; Suyemoto, 1998). Although not an exhaustive list, I have chosen to 
concentrate my discussion on these single-function models because they have 
regularly featured in the NSSI literature as explanations for why people self-injure.  
2.1 Affect regulation 
 The affect regulation model proposes that people self-injure to reduce or 
eliminate intense, negative emotions or affective arousal (Chapman et al., 2006; 
Klonsky, 2007). Evidence in support of this model is primarily derived from the self-
report studies of reasons for NSSI and the laboratory studies that I reviewed in 
Chapter 2. These studies have typically found that self-injury functions as an 
adaptive strategy to manage aversive affect and arousal, making affect regulation 
the most empirically supported, single-function model of NSSI (Klonsky, 2007).  
 Only one measure—the Inventory of Statements About Self-injury (ISAS)—
has been developed specifically to assess the single-function models of NSSI by 
grouping empirically supported reasons and motivations for NSSI into 13 functional 
subscales (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009). 7  Using the ISAS with a group of university 
                                               
7 In developing the ISAS, Klonsky and Glenn (2009) aimed to include all the functions identified 
within the NSSI literature, as well as additional functions identified by researchers, clinicians, and 
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students, Klonsky and Glenn (2009) found that affect regulation was the most highly 
endorsed function for self-injury.  
Despite the compelling evidence from these studies that NSSI functions as an 
affect regulation strategy, there is limited understanding of how self-injuring 
actually enables people to regulate their emotional experiences. Both psychological 
and biological explanations have been proposed to account for this effect (Klonsky, 
2007). Psychological explanations have focused on the sense of control that may be 
gained through expressing overwhelming emotions (Suyemoto, 1998) or engaging in 
self-care (Klonsky, 2007). People who struggle to cope with psychological distress 
may be more adept at attending to their physical wounds, thus providing them with 
a sense of mastery over their distress (Klonsky, 2007).  
Biological explanations have focused on pain reduction and mood elevation 
following the release of endogenous opiods (see Sher & Stanley, 2008 for a review), 
or the role of physical stimulation in triggering an attentional shift (Niedtfeld et al., 
2010). In a brain imaging study, Niedtfeld and colleagues (2010) identified that 
thermal stimulation (warmth or painful heat), experienced in the context of 
hyperarousal elicited by negative images, was followed by reduced limbic activity in 
both controls and participants diagnosed with BPD. They hypothesise that sensory 
stimulation causes an attentional shift and although both groups demonstrated this 
shift, it may be that the intense affective arousal experienced by people with BPD 
when distressed necessitates that they use more painful methods of self-stimulation 
(e.g., cutting) in order to sufficiently shift their attention (Niedtfeld et al., 2010). 
The hypothesis that self-injuring causes an attentional shift is consistent with 
reports from people that the physical sensation of NSSI distracts them from the 
emotional distress they are experiencing (Himber, 1994; Polk & Liss, 2009). 
Additionally, it is possible that seeing blood prompts a shift of attention from 
aversive, internal experiences to the site of the physical injury (Glenn & Klonsky, 
                                                                                                                                                  
mental health consumers. This comprehensive approach resulted in the inclusion of 13 functions in 
the ISAS.  
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2010b), which may be particularly useful for people who do not feel pain during 
NSSI. Caring for the wounds might then serve to maintain this focus on the physical 
body, rather than on emotional distress.  
Indeed, the sight of blood has been identified as an important component of 
the ritual of self-injury for some people as it is associated with calmness and tension 
relief (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010b). Although the mechanism through which blood 
exerts this effect is unknown, it is possible that seeing blood either results in heart 
rate deceleration or heightened activation of the sympathetic nervous system, which 
is then followed by an intense parasympathetic reaction because there is no 
immediate danger (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010b). Both of these physiological 
processes—heart rate deceleration and parasympathetic rebound—would result in 
the suppression of negative emotions (Glenn & Klonsky, 2010b). 
2.2 Self-punishment 
Self-injury is thought to function as self-punishment by providing a means 
through which people can denigrate themselves or communicate how angry they are 
at themselves (Klonsky, 2007). Self-punishment was the second most highly 
endorsed function of NSSI, after affect regulation, in a population of university 
students (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) and, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2 (see pp. 52-
53), self-punishment is one of the most commonly reported reasons for NSSI. More 
specifically, studies where people have explicitly reported self-injuring to punish 
themselves (e.g., Nixon et al., 2002; Shearer, 1994), to regulate self-directed anger 
(e.g., Laye-Gindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005), or to express self-hatred (e.g., Nock et 
al., 2009; Oyefeso et al., 2008) can all be interpreted as support for the self-
punishment model.  
Beyond this phenomenological research, the role of self-punishment in the 
development and maintenance of NSSI is not well understood. Given that self-
injuring to alleviate anger or guilt, or to express self-hatred is emotionally driven, it 
is possible that self-punishment is a sub-category of the affect regulation model 
(Chapman et al., 2006). This is seemingly consistent with Klonsky’s (2009) finding 
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that although affect regulation and self-punishment items were the most commonly 
endorsed motivations for NSSI among university students, affect-regulation 
motivations were typically reported as primary while self-punishment motivations 
were reported as secondary. Self-punishment therefore may be one specific type of 
affect regulation. 
A number of specific psychological mechanisms have been proposed to 
underlie the self-punishment function of NSSI. Drawing on self-verification theory 
(Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990) and cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1978), Chapman et al. (2006) propose that when the disconfirmation of 
core self-beliefs or cognitive dissonance leads to aversive affect, people may self-
injure as a form of punishment. Getting the punishment they ‘deserve’ (i.e., self-
injury) validates their negative self-beliefs and restores cognitive balance, which in 
turn reduces aversive affect. In this way, ‚self-injury may be experienced as familiar, 
ego-syntonic, or self-soothing in the face of distress‛ (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 
2007, p. 1050). 
Social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) also provides a possible explanation 
for why people punish themselves through self-injury (Chapman et al., 2006). 
Socially conditioned relationships between other-inflicted punishment and 
subsequent relief may generalise to self-punishment for any perceived or actual 
transgressions. People may also self-injure as a form of pre-emptive self-punishment 
to minimise or avert punishment by others.  
If self-punishment can be subsumed within the affect regulation model, then 
the physiological mechanisms proposed to underlie affect regulation (e.g., 
attentional shift as a result of pain or the sight of blood) should be applicable to self-
punishment. Furthermore, self-injuring as a form of punishment can result in a sense 
of satisfaction (Nock, 2010), which may be related to the release of endorphins.  
2.3 Anti-dissociation 
Anti-dissociation, like self-punishment, has also been categorised as a type of 
affect regulation (Suyemoto, 1998). According to this model, self-injuring terminates 
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depersonalisation or dissociation through the generation of feeling (Klonsky, 2007). 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (see pp. 47-48), empirical evidence in support of the anti-
dissociation model has been mixed (Klonsky, 2007); 38% to 87% of adolescents and 
adults who self-injure report doing so to end dissociation or feelings of emptiness 
(Briere & Gil, 1998, Favazza & Conterio, 1989; Nixon et al., 2002; Swannell et al., 
2008).    
Once again, it is likely that self-injury fulfils an anti-dissociative function 
because the physical sensation and/or the sight of blood trigger certain physiological 
reactions (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007; Polk & Liss, 2009; Schoppmann, Schröck, 
Schnepp, & Büscher, 2007). One such reaction may be the orienting response 
(Pavlov, 1927), which is the increased cortical activity that occurs in response to 
novel stimulation (Chapman et al., 2006). Although the role of the orienting response 
in NSSI is yet to be empirically examined, Chapman et al. (2006) propose that an 
orienting response to physical pain or the sight of blood may be sufficient to end 
dissociation, although the intensity of this response should decrease over time as 
people become habituated to experiencing pain or seeing blood when self-injuring.     
Identifying the mechanisms through which NSSI functions as an anti-
dissociation strategy becomes more complicated when taking into account evidence 
that self-injury not only ends dissociative episodes, but also has been reported to 
induce dissociation by providing an escape from overwhelming, internal experiences 
(Himber, 1994; Laye-Ghindhu & Schonert-Reichl, 2005; Swannell et al., 2008). In one 
study, retrospective, self-reported levels of dissociation peaked during episodes of 
NSSI in a group of female inpatients diagnosed with BPD, regardless of whether or 
not they experienced pain while self-injuring (Kemperman et al., 1997). It appears 
that NSSI fulfils an antithetical function to anti-dissociation in such cases.  
2.4 Anti-suicide 
Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, NSSI is conceptualised within the anti-
suicide model as a compromise between the urges to live and die; in other words, 
self-injury is a form of temporary self-destruction that serves as a substitute for 
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suicide (Firestone & Seiden, 1990; Menninger, 1935; Suyemoto, 1998). This notion of 
using NSSI to avert suicidal impulses or to manage suicidal ideation, discussed in 
both Chapters 1 (see pp. 15-16) and 2 (see pp. 48-49), has been supported in a 
number of self-report studies (Klonsky, 2007).   
It is probable that the act of physical injury distracts people from ruminating 
about taking their own life through the attentional shift process described above 
and/or improves their mood, at least temporarily, perhaps through the release of 
endorphins, so that suicide is no longer as salient as the best or only option for 
dealing with their distress. In this way, self-injuring to avert suicide could also be 
subsumed under the general framework of affect regulation in that the act of injury 
may decrease intense, negative feelings associated with suicidal urges or cognitions 
(Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007).    
2.5 Sexual 
The sexual model of self-injury is also informed by psychoanalytic theory and 
contends that people self-injure for sexual satisfaction, to exert control over their 
sexual development, or to avoid or punish themselves for sexual behaviours or 
feelings (Suyemoto, 1998). Although a historically prevalent explanation for why 
people self-injure, the sexual model has rarely been empirically investigated and, 
when it has been, it has received negligible support (Briere & Gil, 1998; Kemperman 
et al., 1997; Shearer, 1994).  
That this model holds little weight in contemporary understandings of the 
functions of NSSI is evident in the fact that the ISAS does not include a subscale 
addressing the purported sexual functions of self-injury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) 
and self-injurious behaviours linked to sexual arousal were explicitly excluded from 
one study (Polk & Liss, 2007), perhaps because including such motivations would 
have blurred the distinction between NSSI and sadomasochism. For the few people 
who do report being sexually gratified through self-injury (e.g., Briere & Gil, 1998), it 
is likely that this is associated with the release of endorphins.   
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2.6 Sensation-seeking 
Self-injuring to produce exhilaration or excitement falls within the sensation-
seeking model of NSSI and in studies where such reasons for NSSI have been 
examined, they have typically been endorsed by a low percentage of participants 
(Klonsky, 2007). Once again, it is likely that any heightened arousal following NSSI, 
which is sometimes likened to a drug high (Swannell et al., 2008), results from the 
release of endorphins.  
It is possible that sensation-seeking lies on the opposite side of the same coin 
to anti-dissociation, in that the desire to seek positive emotional arousal through self-
injury may stem from feelings of dissociation. If sensation-seeking was simply 
another descriptor for anti-dissociation, both functions should be similarly endorsed. 
However, this does not appear to be the case as anti-dissociation is more frequently 
reported than sensation-seeking (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009).  
2.7 Interpersonal boundaries 
The interpersonal boundaries model of self-injury, which has rarely been 
empirically examined perhaps owing to its psychoanalytic roots, is based on object-
relations theory and proposes that people self-injure in order to distinguish 
themselves from others and to assert their autonomy (Klonsky, 2007). The action of 
marking the body may engender a sense of control because such marks physically 
delineate the boundaries between self, other, and the environment (Klonsky, 2007; 
Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007).  
2.8 Interpersonal influence 
Self-injuring to influence others tends to be perceived as the most contentious 
single-function model of NSSI in light of pejorative depictions of people who self-
injure as attention-seeking or manipulative (Nock, 2008). Although self-injuring to 
access support or care seems to be fairly common (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007), 
interpersonal functions for NSSI are less frequently endorsed than intrapersonal 
functions (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004). However, it is possible 
that these functions are not reported as often because they are considered to be 
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socially undesirable (Claes, Klonsky, Muehlenkamp, Kuppens, & Vandereycken, 
2010). 
The interpersonal influence model draws on behavioural theory in that the 
person’s self-injury is thought to signal to others that support is needed, and when 
support is provided, the self-injurious behaviour is reinforced (Klonsky, 2007). 
Arguably, using self-injury as support-seeking strategy could be conceptualised as 
affect regulation by proxy; people who struggle to regulate their own affective 
arousal and negative emotions may need the help of others to cope (Nock, 2008). 
Although the causal mechanism underlying this model is interpersonal 
reinforcement, people who self-injure to influence others may not be cognisant that 
their behaviour is being reinforced by others’ responses, which would also influence 
how frequently they endorsed interpersonal functions (Klonsky, 2007). 
2.9 Summary and limitations 
A range of single-function models, which subsume the reasons, antecedents, 
and consequences of NSSI discussed in detail in Chapter 2, have been proposed to 
account for why people self-injure in the absence of suicidal intent. On the surface, 
some of these models appear to have little in common, but once they are considered 
in more depth, it becomes apparent that many of the models can be incorporated 
within an affect regulation framework and, in all likelihood, share the same or 
similar underlying mechanisms.  
Furthermore, as an overdetermined behaviour (Suyemoto, 1998), self-injury is 
thought to serve multiple functions at the same time which makes it necessary to 
integrate the single-function models into a cohesive, clinically useful paradigm. One 
of the most promising ways to achieve this integration has been through the use of 
behavioural theory as an overarching framework. Behavioural models successfully 
capture the commonalities and differences of the diverse single-function models 
because they define the function of a behaviour by identifying both the antecedents 
and consequences of that behaviour (Nock & Prinstein, 2004). The result is a paring 
down of the functions of NSSI into four, simple contingencies: intrapersonal and 
76 
 
 
interpersonal consequences that are either negatively or positively reinforced (Nock, 
2010).  
3. MULTI-FUNCTION MODELS OF SELF-INJURY 
 The FFM (Nock, 2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005) and EAM (Chapman et 
al., 2006) are two promising behavioural models of NSSI that are garnering varying 
degrees of empirical support (e.g., Anderson, 2009; Armey & Crowther, 2008; 
Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007). In the following section, I will 
examine the assumptions and research evidence in support of each of these models, 
before evaluating them according to well-established epistemic values.  
3.1 The Four Functions Model 
3.1.1 Assumptions of the FFM 
The FFM (Nock, 2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005) proposes that self-injury 
can be categorised according to whether it serves an automatic (i.e., intrapersonal) or 
social (i.e., interpersonal) purpose, which, in turn, is either positively or negatively 
reinforced. These two dimensions intersect to form four primary functions of NSSI: 
automatic negative reinforcement (i.e., to eradicate or escape from negative thoughts 
or affective states), automatic positive reinforcement (i.e., to induce positive, 
physiological states), social negative reinforcement (i.e., to escape interpersonal 
events or demands), and social positive reinforcement (i.e., to get attention or 
desired objects) (Nock, 2008; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). The term automatic in 
the context of the FFM refers to self-imposed reinforcement rather than actions that 
are carried out without conscious awareness (Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). In a later 
publication, Nock (2010) revised the FFM terminology to refer instead to automatic 
consequences as intrapersonal and social consequences as interpersonal. This is 
consistent with the language used by other NSSI researchers and, as such, the terms 
intrapersonal and interpersonal are used in this thesis. 
In light of the limited empirical support for interpersonal functions, Nock 
(2008) presented an expanded version of the FFM, which includes hypotheses about 
the potential mechanisms underlying the social functions of NSSI (see Figure 1). The 
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expanded model explains why people may use NSSI as a way to communicate with 
others. Drawing on theories of animal behaviour and anthropological studies, Nock 
(2008) suggests that self-injury may be used as a signal to convey strength and 
fitness or distress. People may begin to self-injure because less costly and less severe 
communication strategies have not produced desired results.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The elaborated FFM. Reproduced from ‚Actions speak louder than words: 
An elaborated theoretical model of the social functions of self-injury and other 
harmful behaviours,‛ by M. Nock, 2008, Applied and Preventive Psychology, 12, p. 164.  
 
For example, if a person seeks comfort from others and comfort is not 
provided, they may resort to NSSI as a way to gain attention and validation (i.e., 
self-injury is a signal of distress). If this strategy is successful, they may be more 
likely to use it in the future when similarly distressed. Likewise, someone may use 
self-injury to avoid or escape from fulfilling interpersonal obligations when less 
extreme behaviours (e.g., acting out) have failed. Alternatively, people may injure 
themselves to prevent victimisation by others or to demonstrate their connectedness 
with a particular social group (i.e., as a signal of strength or fitness). Once again, if 
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self-injury proves to be an effective means of displaying one’s strength or fitness to 
others, it is likely to be reinforced (Nock, 2008). 
3.1.2 Empirical support for the FFM 
To test the hypothesised four functions of self-injury, adolescent inpatients 
completed the Functional Assessment of Self-mutilation (FASM; Lloyd, Kelley, & 
Hope, 1997, cited in Nock & Prinstein, 2004), which includes a list of 22 reasons for 
engaging in self-injury (e.g., ‚to stop bad feelings‛, ‚to punish yourself‛). 
Participants were able to endorse multiple reasons. The majority of the participants 
had injured themselves at least once in the past year, while almost half reported 
injuring themselves more than 10 times.  
After categorising the FASM reasons for self-injury into the four hypothesised 
functional domains of negatively or positively reinforced intrapersonal and 
interpersonal consequences, Nock and Prinstein (2004) conducted a factor analysis 
which confirmed their model’s goodness-of-fit with the data. Further analyses 
provided evidence that the four functions represented associated, but distinct 
paradigms. 
Although this study supported the four function conceptualisation of NSSI, 
not all functions were equally endorsed (Nock & Prinstein, 2004). Negatively 
reinforced, intrapersonal scores were significantly higher than the scores for the 
other three functions, while the scores for the positively reinforced, intrapersonal 
function were significantly higher than both the negatively and positively reinforced 
interpersonal functions. Additionally, 24% to 53% of the participants endorsed 
intrapersonal items, but only 6% to 24% of participants endorsed interpersonal 
items, suggesting that while adolescent inpatients self-injure for multiple reasons, 
the primary function of their self-injury is intrapersonal emotion regulation (Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004).  
Research with community-based adolescents provided further support for the 
structural validity of the FFM, although in contrast to Nock and Prinstein’s (2004) 
findings, interpersonal functions received similar levels of endorsement in this 
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sample as intrapersonal functions (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
endorsement of the different functions of NSSI varied according to the severity of 
the adolescents’ self-injurious behaviour. Minor NSSI (i.e., hitting, pulling out hair, 
inserting objects, biting, or excoriation) was only significantly associated with 
intrapersonal functions, while moderate/severe NSSI (i.e., cutting, carving, burning, 
self-tattooing, scraping or erasing skin) was significantly associated with both 
intrapersonal and interpersonal functions. Adolescents within the moderate/severe 
category also used more types of NSSI and injured themselves more often than those 
in the minor NSSI category.  
It thus appears that adolescents who have a more chronic history of NSSI are 
more likely to endorse multiple functions of self-injury. Furthermore, it is possible 
that people who are experiencing particular forms of psychopathology may be more 
likely to endorse certain functions of NSSI. Unfortunately, research efforts to identify 
clinical correlates of specific functions have yielded discrepant results. For example, 
past suicide attempts and current suicide ideation were significantly associated with 
all four functions among community-based adolescents (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 
2007), whereas suicide attempts and hopelessness were only associated with 
intrapersonal, negative reinforcement among adolescent inpatients (Nock & 
Prinstein, 2005).  
Depressive symptoms have been associated with both intrapersonal (Hilt, 
Cha, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2008; Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007) and interpersonal 
reinforcement (Nock & Prinstein, 2005). Although it seems counter-intuitive that 
depressive symptoms and suicidal ideation would be significantly correlated with 
social functions, people may be using NSSI as a way to communicate to others that 
they are depressed and in need of support (i.e., social positive reinforcement) (Nock 
& Prinstein, 2005), or to avoid obligations that they feel unable to fulfil because of 
their depressive symptoms.  
In sum, there is evidence to support four behavioural functions of NSSI, but it 
appears that intrapersonal consequences, particularly those that are negatively 
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reinforced, are more commonly endorsed than interpersonal functions. However, 
social desirability (Claes, Klonsky, et al., 2010) or a lack of awareness about how the 
behaviours are functioning may lead to the underreporting of interpersonal 
functions (Klonsky, 2007). Further research needs to be conducted to determine 
whether certain individual risk factors, diagnostic categories, or socio-cultural 
environments are more commonly associated with specific functions.      
3.2 The Experiential Avoidance Model  
3.2.1 Assumptions of the EAM 
Non-suicidal self-injury is conceptualised within the EAM (Chapman et al., 
2006) as a form of experiential avoidance, a functional diagnostic dimension defined 
as:  
the phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with particular 
private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, behavioral 
predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these events and the 
contexts that occasion them. (Hayes et al., 1996, p. 1154) 
 
Avoidance is thus broadly conceptualised by Hayes and colleagues (1996) to include 
all escape and avoidant behaviours, which serve to change intrapersonal events and 
the environmental factors that cause such events to occur.   
Given that experiential avoidance is a functional diagnostic dimension, Hayes 
et al. (1996) argue that numerous mental disorders can be reframed as forms of 
experiential avoidance for particular client subgroups, thus facilitating the 
integration of diverse theoretical approaches and promoting research on specific 
behaviours across traditionally demarcated fields. Clinical syndromes such as 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, BPD, and Substance Use can be classified as 
experiential avoidance because they all involve clients experiencing aversive, 
intrapersonal events and then using unhelpful coping strategies in an attempt to 
avoid these experiences (Hayes et al., 1996).  
In developing the EAM, Chapman and colleagues (2006) have followed Hayes 
et al.’s (1996) lead by reconceptualising self-injurious behaviour as a form of 
experiential avoidance. The EAM proposes that people experience an unwanted, 
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negative emotional response (e.g., anger or frustration) to a particular stimulus (e.g., 
a fight with their partner) that they are unable to tolerate or manage. As a result, 
they feel an urge to escape from the undesirable state of arousal. To reduce or 
eliminate the distress that they are feeling, they injure themselves which provides 
them with a sense of relief. However, this relief is temporary, necessitating the 
continued use of self-injury to regulate their emotions and, as a result, the behaviour 
becomes an automatic way of responding to negative, emotional arousal (see Figure 
2).  
  
 
 
Figure 2. The Experiential Avoidance Model. Reproduced from ‚Solving the puzzle 
of deliberate self-harm: The experiential avoidance model,‛ by A.L. Chapman et al., 
2006, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44, p. 373. 
 
There are three key assumptions underlying the EAM. First, Chapman, and 
colleagues (2006) maintain that NSSI functions primarily as a behaviour of emotional 
avoidance although they do not discount the possibility that individuals may also 
utilise self-injury to escape from, or avoid, other unwanted internal experiences such 
as thoughts, memories, and bodily sensations. Second, NSSI is negatively reinforced 
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because the reduction or elimination of unwanted internal states (particularly 
aversive emotions) is a direct consequence of the self-injurious behaviour. Third, the 
model suggests that experiential avoidance is a functional response class and, as a 
result, people who self-injure will also use other experientially avoidant strategies 
(e.g., thought suppression, substance use).  
By drawing on diverse psychological literatures to explain (a) why 
individuals who self-injure may have heightened experiential avoidance response 
tendencies, (b) what mechanisms could underlie the function of experiential 
avoidance in people who self-injure and (c) why NSSI persists over time, Chapman 
et al. (2006) construct a comprehensive, functional model of self-injury. Although 
they briefly consider how innate temperamental factors, such as impulsivity, may 
contribute to heightened experiential avoidance response tendencies, they focus 
predominantly on the way in which people experience and regulate their emotions.  
More specifically, the model proposes that if people who self-injure 
experience their emotions very intensely, they may find it difficult to control their 
heightened arousal levels, which in turn may increase their susceptibility to using 
NSSI as an experiential avoidance strategy. Alternatively, people who self-injure 
may not experience emotions more intensely, but rather may be unable to tolerate 
emotional distress. Low distress tolerance may be more extreme when experiencing 
emotions that typically induce a desire to escape or avoid (e.g., shame). The authors 
also suggest that emotion regulation skills could be a key factor in determining 
whether individuals are likely to utilise experientially avoidant behaviours. People 
who are unable to regulate their emotions effectively, either through the lack of skills 
or a failure to employ skills when highly aroused, may be at risk of attempting to 
avoid or escape aversive emotions through the use of NSSI (Chapman et al., 2006). 
Although these hypotheses—that people may be susceptible to self-injury 
because they experience emotions more intensely than others, have low distress 
tolerance, and/or are unable to regulate their emotions effectively—are useful in 
identifying people at risk of engaging in NSSI, they do not account for why self-
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injury is a form of avoidance. Three underlying mechanisms are hypothesised to 
support the theory that NSSI functions primarily as behaviour of emotional 
avoidance: The act of self-injuring causes the release of endogenous opiates which 
provide a sense of analgesic relief; the physical pain of self-injury distracts from 
emotional pain; and/or self-injury is used as a form of punishment for perceived 
wrongdoing, or to avert actual punishment, and once sufficiently punished, 
emotional arousal decreases (Chapman et al., 2006). Of course, these are consistent 
with the proposed mechanisms for the single-function models discussed earlier in 
this chapter but, as I have already discussed, empirical evidence in support of these 
hypotheses is lacking (Chapman et al., 2006).  
If NSSI does function as a form of avoidance, it becomes necessary to 
determine how the avoidance is maintained over time. According to the EAM, the 
repetitive nature of NSSI is potentially related to four factors (Chapman et al., 2006). 
First, it is more likely that aversive emotions will recur with an increased intensity 
and frequency if a person attempts to avoid or escape from these emotions by 
engaging in NSSI. Future attempts to regulate these emotions establish a cyclical 
pattern of repeated self-injury. Second, people who are unwilling to fully experience 
their aversive emotions may never learn that such emotions can be tolerated and, as 
a result, may come to see NSSI as the only or best solution for emotional regulation. 
Third, people who adopt a verbal rule equating NSSI with emotional release may 
never give themselves the opportunity to learn alternative ways of coping or may 
fail to learn from the negative effects of self-injury. Finally, people may simply 
habituate to the characteristics and negative consequences of NSSI over time, which 
makes it less likely that they will cease engaging in the behaviour.  
3.2.2 Empirical support for the EAM  
The three key assumptions of the EAM—that NSSI is primarily an 
emotionally avoidant behaviour, that it is negatively reinforced, and that people 
who self-injure will also engage in other avoidant behaviours—have been 
empirically investigated to varying degrees albeit not within Aotearoa New Zealand. 
84 
 
 
Evidence that NSSI is an emotionally avoidant, negatively reinforced behaviour is 
primarily drawn from the self-report, laboratory, and ecological momentary 
assessment studies reviewed in Chapter 2 (see pp. 44-62). Additionally, research on 
the functions of NSSI discussed earlier in this chapter overwhelmingly supports the 
primacy of intrapersonal, negative reinforcement (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004).  
The hypothesis that self-injury is a negatively reinforced, avoidant behaviour 
has also been examined by testing the relationship between the frequency of 
people’s self-injurious behaviours and their intrapersonal experiences. Aversive self-
awareness (i.e., the experience of negative thoughts and feelings about oneself) 
predicted engagement in NSSI among university students (Armey & Crowther, 
2008), providing further support for the experiential avoidance function of self-
injury. However, this study concentrated on antecedents that predicted NSSI, rather 
than on the consequences that may have reinforced and maintained the self-
injurious behaviours over time.  
Studies that have examined whether the frequency of NSSI is related to 
negatively reinforced consequences have yielded mixed results. Decreases in 
negatively valenced, high arousal affect states and increases in positively valenced, 
low arousal affect states following NSSI, predicted lifetime cutting rates among 
university students, partially supporting the negative reinforcement hypothesis of 
NSSI (Klonsky, 2009). Among female inpatients with eating disorders, self-injury 
frequency was similarly related to increases in positive affect subsequent to NSSI, 
although this relationship did not reach statistical significance (Claes, Klonsky, et al., 
2010). Decreases in negative affect and increases in positive affect following self-
injury suggest that NSSI may be both negatively and positively reinforced.  
The final assumption of the EAM, that people who self-injure will engage in 
other avoidant behaviours (i.e., that NSSI fits within an avoidant response class), has 
received some support. Undergraduate students with a history of NSSI, who were 
matched to controls on psychological distress levels, reported significantly higher 
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rates of avoidant coping (Andover, Pepper, & Gibb, 2007). Another study of young 
adults similarly found significantly higher levels of avoidant coping among people 
with a history of self-injury when compared to those who had never self-injured 
(Hasking, Momeni, Swannell, & Chia, 2008). Moreover, in the latter study, as the 
severity of self-injurious behaviours increased, so did avoidant coping, which 
suggests that self-injury may belong in a response class of avoidant coping 
strategies. 
However, it is not clear whether these avoidant coping strategies or 
behaviours (e.g., thought suppression, substance use) mediate, moderate, or simply 
co-occur with NSSI. Recently, Najmi, Wegner, and Nock (2007) proposed that people 
who self-injure and are highly reactive to emotions will try to suppress their 
negative thoughts as a way of gaining control over their distress. However, unless 
thought suppression is used to focus on one particular distracter, it typically 
increases the frequency of the thoughts (Najmi at al., 2007) because ‚the intention to 
suppress a thought instigates a monitoring process that ironically increases the 
cognitive accessibility of the unwanted thought‛ (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994, p. 616). 
Following this paradoxical increase in aversive thoughts and emotions, Najmi and 
colleagues hypothesised that people will graduate to self-injury because it serves as a 
focused distracter.  
They found that the association between emotional reactivity and rates of self-
injurious behaviour was partially mediated by thought suppression, which suggests 
that in some incidents, self-injury may be utilised following an unsuccessful attempt 
to suppress distressing thoughts (Najmi et al., 2007). However, these cross-sectional 
results would need to be replicated longitudinally before reaching any definitive 
conclusions about the temporal sequencing of thought suppression and NSSI. 
Further research is needed to identify the exact nature of the relationships between 
NSSI and other forms of avoidance. 
Finally, NSSI is associated with a number of clinical syndromes, such as 
Bulimia and Substance Use Disorders (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007), that are 
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similarly thought to function as forms of experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 1996; 
Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). This lends support to the hypothesis that NSSI 
belongs in a functional response class of behaviours primarily aimed at escaping or 
avoiding negative internal states.  
3.3 Evaluating the FFM and the EAM 
Both the EAM and the FFM rely on operant conditioning principles to explain 
why people are motivated to injure themselves, and how this behaviour is reinforced 
and maintained over time. While the FFM includes intrapersonal and interpersonal 
functions which are either positively or negatively reinforced, the EAM focuses 
exclusively on the negatively reinforced, intrapersonal function of experiential 
avoidance. Epistemic values provide an evaluative framework, which can be used to 
identify the strengths and limitations of each of these models. Although I utilise this 
framework for my critique, it should be noted that epistemic values are not objective, 
definitive criteria, but rather subjective, multi-faceted constructs (Rooney, 1992). 
Nonetheless, they provide a useful starting point for comparing and contrasting 
theoretical models. Drawing on the work of Kuhn (1977) and McMullin (1983), 
Howard (1985) identifies and defines six epistemic values: predictive accuracy, 
internal coherence, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, and simplicity; 
values which I use to compare the EAM with the FFM.   
3.3.1 Predictive accuracy 
Arguably, the key criterion in determining the validity of a theoretical model 
is whether that model accurately predicts its hypothesised outcomes (Howard, 
1985). To determine whether the EAM and the FFM have adequate predictive 
accuracy, it is first necessary to revisit the basic assumptions of each model. The FFM 
proposes that NSSI will serve four primary functions: intrapersonal negative and 
positive reinforcement, and interpersonal negative and positive reinforcement. In 
contrast, the EAM predicts that NSSI will serve one primary, intrapersonal function 
of experiential avoidance. Additionally, the EAM posits that individuals who self-
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injure to avoid or escape unwanted internal experiences will also use other 
experientially avoidant coping strategies (e.g., binge eating). 
Both the EAM and FFM propose, in line with the principles of operant 
conditioning, that understanding the function of a behaviour involves identifying 
the antecedents and consequences of that behaviour. Furthermore, a consequence of 
self-injury would only be considered to reinforce self-injurious behaviour if it 
increased the likelihood of the person engaging in subsequent episodes of self-injury 
(Cipani & Schock, 2007). However, establishing a direct, temporal relationship 
between consequences and future episodes of self-injury is extremely difficult. 
Someone may experience a particular consequence (e.g., increased attention from 
loved ones) following an episode of self-injury, but this does not mean that they 
injured themselves to elicit that consequence or that they will injure themselves to 
elicit the same consequence in the future (Nock, 2008). 
Although the evidence to date supports the contention that there are four 
functions of NSSI, people routinely endorse intrapersonal, negative reinforcement as 
primary to the maintenance of their self-injurious behaviour. The EAM thus 
surpasses the FFM in terms of predictive accuracy as it is far more likely that a 
person will report engaging in NSSI to escape or avoid negative intrapersonal 
experiences, than any of the other three hypothesised functions of NSSI.  
However, the predictive utility of the EAM and the FFM ultimately needs to 
be determined through prospectively and longitudinally assessing the antecedents 
and consequences of self-injurious behaviours; a challenging task in light of the 
necessary ethical constraints that accompany any NSSI research (Prinstein, 2008). It 
is likely that ecological momentary assessment and longitudinal survey methods 
will prove to be essential in testing and supporting the reinforcement hypotheses of 
the FFM and EAM (see Muehlenkamp et al., 2009; Nock et al., 2009).  
3.3.2 Internal coherence 
An internally coherent, theoretical model needs to be logically consistent; that 
is, all the elements of the model should fit together (Howard, 1985). The EAM 
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provides a comprehensive overview of how the cycle of self-injury is triggered, 
reinforced, and maintained over time. As such, it reflects its premise that 
understanding the function of a behaviour requires identifying both the antecedents 
and consequences of that behaviour. The only potentially incongruent aspect of the 
EAM is that the experience of relief following NSSI is hypothesised to negatively 
reinforce self-injury. If relief is viewed as a positive affect state, then experiencing 
relief after self-injury would positively reinforce the behaviour (Klonsky, 2009). 
However, if relief is defined as an absence of distress (Watson & Tellegen, 1985), 
then conceptualising it as a negatively reinforced consequence of NSSI is no longer 
anomalous (Klonsky, 2009).  
In contrast to the EAM, the FFM lacks internal coherence because the 
conceptualisation of the model is inconsistent with the definition of function 
proposed by Nock and Prinstein (2004). In their paper, they define function as the 
antecedents and consequences that cause and maintain a behaviour, but they fail to 
include any antecedents in their model, which focuses exclusively on how self-
injurious behaviour is reinforced. The researchers acknowledge this shortcoming 
and attempt to address it in a subsequent paper (Nock & Prinstein, 2005), yet instead 
of investigating specific antecedents, they focus on clinical correlates (e.g., suicide 
attempts) and contextual features (e.g., experience of pain while self-injuring). The 
cross-sectional nature of their data prohibits them from demonstrating whether 
these correlates and contextual factors actually trigger episodes of self-injury.  
Furthermore, although Nock and Prinstein (2004) hypothesised four primary 
functions of NSSI, they found significantly more support for the intrapersonal 
negative reinforcement function over the other three functions. This begs the 
question whether a four functions model, where each of the functions is viewed as 
primary to the cause and maintenance of self-injury, is conceptually valid. It may be 
more prudent to consider the automatic negative reinforcement function as primary, 
with the other functions as secondary. It should be noted, however, that the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal functions of NSSI were similarly endorsed in one of 
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the only other confirmatory factor analyses of the FFM (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 
2007).  
3.3.3 External consistency 
Theoretical models that are consistent with established theories from the same 
or similar disciplines meet the criterion of external consistency (Howard, 1985). As 
previously discussed, well-established behavioural principles of operant 
conditioning are fundamental to both the EAM and the FFM. The multi-function 
structure of the FFM is also consistent with the extensive evidence base on 
stereotypical self-injury in developmentally disabled populations (Nock & Prinstein, 
2004, 2005). Furthermore, in his elaboration of the social functions of the FFM, Nock 
(2008) draws on evidence from both anthropology and theories of animal behaviour 
(see section 3.1.1). 
Through arguing that NSSI functions as an experientially avoidant behaviour, 
Chapman et al. (2006) rely on the burgeoning evidence base that suggests 
experiential avoidance is the key to understanding a range of psychological 
disorders. This literature forms the theoretical foundation of the EAM and was 
discussed in detail earlier in this chapter (see section 3.2.1). 
3.3.4 Unifying power 
 Unifying power refers to a theoretical model’s capacity to draw together 
diverse strands of knowledge into a cohesive whole (Howard, 1985). Both the FFM 
and EAM draw various single-function models of self-injury into more 
comprehensive models of NSSI. The FFM is an exhaustive multi-function model in 
that every single-function model presented in the literature could feasibly be 
categorised according to whether the purpose for self-injuring reflects an attempt to 
alter one’s intrapersonal or interpersonal environment, and whether it is positively 
or negatively reinforced.  
In contrast, Chapman and colleagues (2006) argue that many of the single-
function models of NSSI propose that self-injury enables people to avoid, or escape 
from, unwanted internal experiences, although the emphasis on what the person 
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who self-injures is trying to escape from or avoid varies between models. Given this 
commonality, they propose that the overarching construct of experiential avoidance 
subsumes the hypotheses put forward by many single-function models. Both the 
FFM and the EAM thus have the capacity to account for the multiple reasons, 
reviewed in Chapter 2, which people give for self-injuring.  
3.3.5 Fertility 
A model is considered fertile if it generates new directions for future research 
on the topic (Howard, 1985). Beyond proposing that NSSI serves four functions, 
Nock and Prinstein (2004) do not provide any hypotheses about why NSSI may 
serve different functions for different people, how these functions relate to one 
another, and what mechanisms underlie each of the four functions. While Nock 
(2008) did elaborate on the FFM in a subsequent paper, he focussed exclusively on 
the interpersonal functions of NSSI and, as a result, the intrapersonal functions 
remain under-theorised.  
In comparison, the EAM proposes a gamut of testable hypotheses about why 
people who self-injure may have heightened experiential avoidance response 
tendencies, what mechanisms underlie the function of experiential avoidance in 
people who self-injure, and why NSSI becomes a habitual behaviour (see section 
3.2.1). 
3.3.6 Simplicity 
 The EAM meets the criteria of simplicity in its depiction of self-injury as a 
negatively reinforced, cyclical process carried out to avoid or escape from aversive 
internal states. It could be considered a limitation that the EAM to fails include 
positive reinforcement contingencies and does not account for any interpersonal 
functions of NSSI, given the evidence that people do use self-injury to communicate 
with, and influence, others (e.g., Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007; Nock & Prinstein, 
2004). However, Chapman et al. (2006) acknowledge that NSSI likely serves multiple 
functions but are explicit in their assertion that the primary function of NSSI is 
emotional (experiential) avoidance.    
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In comparison, the FFM has a broader scope with its emphasis on four 
primary functions of NSSI. The four functions of the FFM complement each other to 
cover a range of contingencies and on the surface the FFM appears to be a simple, 
falsifiable model. But the difficulty arises when, as discussed earlier, one attempts to 
determine how the functions relate to one another, whether the model proposes that 
people who self-injure are likely to endorse all four functions within and/or between 
episodes, or whether the functions served by self-injury will depend on contextual 
features and/or psychopathological symptoms. The manner in which the FFM is 
conceptualised provides no hypotheses for these questions and, as such, it could be 
thought of as an under-theorised model that is complicated by its over-inclusivity.  
4. THE CURRENT THESIS 
Although several single-function models have been proposed for why people 
self-injure, research has shown that NSSI serves multiple functions and, as such, 
individual single-function models are unable to account for the full range of NSSI 
functions. In contrast, multi-function models, particularly those conceptualised 
within a behavioural paradigm such as the FFM and the EAM, succeed at integrating 
diverse single-function models to present more comprehensive perspectives on self-
injurious behaviour.  
Both the FFM and the EAM are empirically supported when compared on the 
basis of adherence to common epistemic values (Howard, 1985), but the EAM is a 
more internally coherent, fertile, and parsimonious theoretical model of why people 
hurt themselves on purpose. Additionally, the evidence to date suggests that people 
primarily injure themselves to regulate their emotional experiences and to punish 
themselves (Klonsky, 2007), which is consistent with the emphasis placed by 
Chapman and colleagues (2006) on emotional avoidance. Indeed, as discussed earlier 
in this chapter, all of the most empirically supported single-function models (e.g., 
affect regulation, self-punishment, anti-suicide, and anti-dissociation) can be unified 
under the rubric of experiential avoidance.     
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In light of this evidence, my overarching research question for this thesis is: 
Does NSSI function primarily as an experientially avoidant behaviour within 
Aotearoa New Zealand? This is an important topic to investigate because this 
question has not been asked of populations living in Aotearoa New Zealand. As 
such, our current understanding of why people in this country self-injure is mostly 
limited to anecdotal reports and evidence gleaned from international studies, which 
have focused primarily on testing single- rather than multi-function models. This 
focus has resulted in particular forms of experiential avoidance, such as affect 
regulation, being extensively investigated, while other forms of experiential 
avoidance, such as cognitive avoidance, have been largely neglected. Given that 
developing a sophisticated understanding of the functions of NSSI is essential to 
effectively treat these behaviours, it is imperative that we do not simply assume that 
the functions of self-injury within Aotearoa New Zealand are comparable to those 
endorsed overseas, but rather that we investigate why people living here self-injure 
in order to establish a New Zealand-specific evidence base about NSSI.  
That being said, my general hypothesis is that NSSI will primarily function as 
a way for people living in Aotearoa New Zealand to escape from or avoid aversive 
emotional experiences. Therefore, I did not expect to find that the functions of my 
participants’ self-injurious behaviours would differ significantly from those 
endorsed by people living in other developed Western countries. If the EAM is a 
valid, explanatory framework for NSSI in Aotearoa New Zealand, this may have 
important clinical implications. In particular, it may warrant the investigation of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) as a treatment for self-injurious 
behaviours because the central goal of ACT is to decrease experiential avoidance by 
enhancing psychological flexibility (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).  
To determine whether NSSI functions primarily as an experientially avoidant 
behaviour within Aotearoa New Zealand, I designed and conducted three studies. 
For my first study, I interviewed people who had self-injured without suicidal intent 
in the previous 12 months to elucidate the temporal process of their most recent 
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episode of self-injury. By asking about the situational, emotional, and cognitive 
antecedents and consequences of their self-injurious behaviour, I was able to 
functionally assess each episode of NSSI to determine whether the majority of these 
episodes fulfilled an experientially avoidant function as predicted by the EAM 
(Chapman et al., 2006). 
In my second study, an online survey of people across Aotearoa New Zealand 
who had self-injured in the past 12 months, I examined three primary hypotheses, all 
of which were informed by the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006), extant literature on the 
functions of NSSI (e.g., Klonsky, 2007), and the results from my first study. First, I 
hypothesised that participants would endorse affect regulation as the primary 
function of NSSI both in relation to their most recent and general episodes of NSSI. 
Second, I expected participants to endorse intrapersonal functions of NSSI more 
strongly than interpersonal functions, both in regards to their most recent and 
general episodes of NSSI. Third, I hypothesised that participants would report a 
decrease in negative affect/emotion and an increase in positive affect/emotion 
following their most recent episode of self-injury. Although any increases in positive 
affect would oppose the exclusive focus on negative reinforcement in the EAM, the 
findings from my first study and other empirical evidence to date suggested that this 
possibility should not be excluded.  
My final study involved comparing university students, with a history of 
NSSI, to those who had never self-injured, in order to determine whether people 
who have self-injured experience higher levels of negative emotions and/or 
thoughts, and use more avoidant coping strategies in general. Additionally, I was 
interested in investigating whether the experience of negative emotions and/or 
thoughts predicts the frequency of NSSI, and, if this is the case, whether these 
relationships are mediated by people’s propensity to avoid aversive intrapersonal 
experiences. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
An Interpretative Functional Analysis of self-injury 
 
‚Behavior analysis is based on a pragmatic philosophy: what is true is what works. Behavior is 
understood in terms of its function, not its form, and function is always understood in relation to a 
context.‛ (Hayes & Bissett, 2000, p. 239) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most studies examining why people hurt themselves on purpose have relied 
exclusively on self-report methodologies, but few of these have qualitatively 
examined people’s descriptions of their motivations for self-injury. As highlighted in 
Chapters 2 and 3, phenomenological research on NSSI has predominantly involved 
participants completing survey measures, many of which have been developed from 
the extant literature specifically for each study. People are typically presented with a 
predetermined set of reasons or motivations for NSSI and asked to endorse the items 
that reflect their experiences of self-injury.  
Although the uniformity and brevity of surveys are an advantage—
quantitative methods are used to examine the functions of NSSI later in this thesis—
the information that can be extracted from such measures is limited in scope and 
depth. Quantitative and qualitative methodologies complement one another, and 
both are needed to clarify the functions of self-injury; quantitative research provides 
explanations of phenomena while qualitative research promotes understanding of 
those phenomena (Hjelmeland & Knizek, 2010). Indeed, one of the research 
recommendations in the self-harm guidelines developed by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (2004) is to utilise qualitative designs to investigate 
why people hurt themselves on purpose.  
Despite being limited in number, qualitative studies on NSSI to date have 
addressed diverse topics, including understanding the phenomenological 
experiences of men who self-injure (Russell, Moss, & Miller, 2010), the role of parents 
in triggering adolescent self-injury (Kam-shing, Mei-yuk, & Lam, 2003), and the 
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‚hostile care‛ received by women who seek help for self-injury from Accident and 
Emergency Departments (Harris, 2000, p. 167). However, elucidating the functions 
of self-injury has seldom been the focus of this research. Rather, the reasons or 
motivations for NSSI presented in these studies have emerged from discussions or 
written accounts of self-injurious behaviours in general.  
These reasons, however, have been largely consistent with those reported in 
quantitative studies; for example, self-injury has been described as a way to regulate 
affect, self-punish, express emotions, and gain control (Harris, 2000; Kam-shing et 
al., 2003; Rissanen, Kylmä, & Laukkanen, 2008; Russell et al., 2010). Unfortunately, 
none of these studies—qualitative or quantitative—about why people self-injure 
have been carried out in Aotearoa New Zealand. Furthermore, to my knowledge, in 
the majority of research on self-injurious behaviours within populations from 
Aotearoa New Zealand, these behaviours have been operationalised as DSH not 
NSSI (see for example Fortune, 2006; Garisch & Wilson, 2010; Hatcher, Sharon, & 
Collins, 2009; Skegg et al., 2003). Non-suicidal self-injury among New Zealanders 
thus remains a largely unexplored phenomenon.8 
The striking absence of both qualitative and quantitative research on NSSI in 
Aotearoa New Zealand informed the methodology for my first study; I decided that 
it was important to ground my empirical work for this thesis in stories of self-injury 
told by people who have experiential knowledge of these behaviours. More 
specifically, I was interested in clarifying the functions of NSSI through learning 
about the temporal process of discrete self-injurious episodes. Gathering information 
about single episodes of NSSI to functionally analyse the behaviour is a technique 
that is used in DBT (Linehan, 1993a), but I have not found any research studies that 
have employed this method of analysis with typically developing populations who 
self-injure.  
                                               
8 There are a few notable exceptions. For examples, see Curtis (2003) and Garisch (2010). 
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In DBT, therapists complete chain analyses with clients to elucidate the 
specific events that lead to problem behaviours (including self-injury), along with 
the consequences that reinforce and maintain those behaviours (Linehan, 1993a; 
Lynch, Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo, & Linehan, 2006). A chain analysis is a precise, 
highly detailed form of behaviour analysis whereby individuals identify the 
momentary changes that occurred in a particular behaviour chain (Linehan, 1993b; 
Lynch et al., 2006). Identifying the behavioural trajectory of a single episode of self-
injury is necessary for two reasons. First, to formulate hypotheses about the 
functions of a problem behaviour, one needs to focus on specific episodes as 
particular behaviours, such as cutting, can serve multiple functions for the same 
person in different contexts (Cone, 1997). Second, the functions fulfilled by a 
particular behaviour may change over time (Cipani & Schock, 2007; Dougher & 
Hayes, 2000). For example, an adolescent may initially self-injure in a group context 
to access peer approval, but continue to self-injure privately to escape 
overwhelming, negative emotions.  
In the current study, I concentrated on single episodes of self-injury because I 
wanted to elicit rich, detailed narratives about the process of self-injurious 
behaviours, rather than a description of the antecedents and consequences of 
people’s amalgamated experiences of NSSI. To achieve this, I interviewed people 
about their most recent episode of NSSI, focusing specifically on what led up to these 
episodes and the consequences that followed. Identifying the antecedents and 
consequences of NSSI enabled me to analyse whether people’s descriptions of the 
temporal process of self-injury were congruent with the trajectory depicted in the 
EAM and international studies, and to hypothesise about how many of these 
episodes fulfilled an experientially avoidant function.  
2. STUDY OVERVIEW 
Ethics approval for the current study was granted by the Multi-region Ethics 
Committee, a New Zealand Health and Disability Ethics Committee administered by 
the Ministry of Health. Gaining ethics approval involved extensive consultation with 
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individuals and teams within the mental health services at the Capital and Coast 
District Health Board (CCDHB) and the Hutt Valley District Health Board 
(HVDHB), as well as with the Student Counselling Service at Victoria University. 
Despite the inevitable delays that occurred during this consultation, the process was 
immensely beneficial in that it enabled me to refine and develop my research 
method in response to the questions and concerns posed by experienced consumer 
advocates and clinicians. Additionally, it prompted me to consider thoroughly the 
impact that my research may have on participants who identified as Māori given 
that consultation with Māori was a critical component of this ethical review process.  
The current study was conducted in four stages. First, people who expressed 
interest in participating in the study were screened using the DSHI (Gratz, 2001), a 
self-report questionnaire designed to assess the form, frequency, and severity of non-
suicidal self-injurious behaviours. Second, if people indicated that they had injured 
themselves on purpose in the previous 12 months, they were invited to participate in 
an interview. Third, following each interview, I emailed or telephoned the 
participants to ask whether there was anything else they had thought of that they 
wanted to share. Finally, I sent each participant a questionnaire asking for feedback 
on their experiences of taking part in the study. To preserve the structure and flow of 
the original research process, I have chosen to present the method and results for 
each stage separately, before discussing whether the findings of this study are 
consistent with the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) and international research on the 
functions of NSSI.   
3.  STAGE ONE: SCREENING FOR SELF-INJURIOUS BEHAVIOURS 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Recruitment strategy 
In an attempt to interview a diverse group of people for this study, I recruited 
participants through mental health services and from the community. Recruiting 
participants from the community was vital to ensure that people who had not 
actively sought help for NSSI, who had not been referred to mental health services, 
98 
 
 
or who were no longer engaged with such services were given the opportunity to 
participate. It also became apparent when consulting with consumer advocates and 
clinicians that restricting my recruitment efforts to mental health services may limit 
participation to people that clinicians considered ‘well enough’ to take part. One 
consumer advocate suggested that by granting clinicians power as the gatekeepers 
of study participation, I was privileging their authority over the autonomy of mental 
health consumers. Furthermore, recruiting participants from the community ensured 
that I was not relying solely on clinicians remembering to pass study information on 
to their clients. 
To obtain ethics approval to recruit participants from the local mental health 
services, I had to submit locality assessments for each service that participated in the 
study. This involved first meeting with the heads of the CCDHB mental health 
service, the HVDHB mental health service, and the Student Counselling Service, and 
then consulting with consumer representatives, Psychology Advisors, and mental 
health clinicians from teams within these services. I was also required to consult 
with Māori representatives or organisations within each service to ensure that my 
study was culturally appropriate. Following email contact with team leaders and my 
attendance at team meetings, participant information sheets (see Appendix A) were 
given to a range of mental health teams.  
The following CCDHB teams agreed to hand out my information sheets to 
clients who met the study inclusion criteria and might be interested in taking part: 
Youth Speciality Service, Community Alcohol and Drug Services, Regional 
Rangatahi Adolescent Inpatient Services, General Adult Mental Health Services, 
Team for Assertive Community Treatment, and Pember House Community Mental 
Health Team. Within the HVDHB, the adult community mental health teams, the 
Youth Speciality Service, and the Central Region Eating Disorders Service all agreed 
to distribute information sheets. Additionally, clinicians from the Student 
Counselling Service at Victoria University of Wellington agreed to distribute 
information sheets on my behalf. The information sheet invited people to contact me 
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if they wanted more information about the research or if they wanted to participate 
in the study.  
To recruit community-based participants, I advertised the study in four local 
community newspapers and placed posters about the study in relevant community 
venues (e.g., Evolve, which is a youth health service; the offices of the Wellington 
Mental Health Consumers Union; the Wellington People’s Centre) and at various 
locations around Victoria University’s Kelburn campus. The information about my 
study was also disseminated through a local youth mental health consumer network 
and to the members of a community public health organisation.  
3.1.2 Participants and procedure 
Adolescents and young adults between the ages of 16 to 34 years who had 
engaged in at least one type of non-suicidal, self-injurious behaviour within the past 
12 months were invited to participate. This age range was selected because research 
has shown that deliberate self-harm (i.e., non-suicidal self-injury and suicide 
attempts) is most prevalent among females between the ages of 15 to 24 years and 
males between the ages of 25 to 34 years of age (Schmidtke et al., 1996). The lower 
age limit of 16 was selected because within Aotearoa New Zealand, people need to 
be at least 16 years of age to participate in research without parental consent. 
Additionally, only people who could speak English fluently were invited to 
participate. Other exclusion criteria listed on the information sheet were Intellectual 
Disability, engaging in NSSI exclusively during episodes of mania or psychosis, or 
current evidence of mania or psychosis. Although these criteria were not formally 
assessed, it was clear during the interviews that none of the participants met these 
criteria.  
Potential participants were provided with a copy of the information sheet, in 
which they were assured of their right to withdraw from the study at any time 
without having to explain their reason(s) for withdrawal. Of the 34 people who 
contacted me to enquire about the study, one male and one female did not meet the 
inclusion criteria because they were older than 34 years of age. The 32 people (28 
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female, 4 male) who consented via email or telephone to complete the screening 
survey were posted a copy of the survey, which included basic demographic 
questions and the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) (see Appendix B), along with a list of support 
organisations (see Appendix C) they could contact if they found answering the 
questions distressing. This list contained the contact details of six different support 
organisations including LifeLine, Youthline, and Warmline (i.e., a helpline run by 
people who have experienced mental illness). A total of 31 people completed the 
survey; one female self-excluded after reading the questions because she engaged 
primarily in indirect forms of self-injury such as disordered eating, rather than direct 
forms such as cutting. As a result, she decided that her experiences were not relevant 
to the current study. Each person received a movie voucher for completing the 
survey.9  
3.1.3 The Deliberate Self-harm Inventory 
As mentioned in the study overview, the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) is designed to 
measure the form, frequency, and severity of people's engagement in non-suicidal 
self-injurious behaviours. It was chosen for this study because the content best 
reflected the definition of self-injury used in this thesis (see p. 26). The DSHI contains 
17 index questions about different types of NSSI (e.g., ‚Have you ever intentionally 
(i.e., on purpose) cut your wrist, arms, or other area(s) of your body (without 
intending to kill yourself)?‛) and if people endorse a behaviour, they are asked to 
respond to a further five questions about the age of onset, frequency, recency, 
duration, and severity of that particular type of NSSI. The final index question gives 
people the opportunity to list any other self-injurious behaviours that they have 
engaged in and then answer further questions about those behaviours.  
Responses on the DSHI can be used to derive a continuous variable by adding 
the frequencies of NSSI types to give a total score or a dichotomous variable by 
categorising participants on the basis of whether or not they endorse having self-
                                               
9 One participant received a $10 voucher for the Warehouse instead of a movie voucher because she 
had hearing difficulties.  
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injured (Gratz, 2001). Although the validity and reliability of the DSHI has not been 
extensively assessed, psychometric analyses to date have found adequate construct 
validity, good internal consistency (α = .79 - .82), and high test-retest reliability for 
the rates of NSSI reported across two administrations (r = .91 - .92) (Fliege et al., 2006; 
Gratz, 2001; Gratz et al., 2011). For the purposes of this study, I modified question 10 
of the DSHI (i.e., ‚Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) used bleach, comet, 
or oven cleaner to scrub your skin?‛) to exclude the word ‚comet‛ because it is an 
American product that is not sold in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Demographic and diagnostic information 
Twenty-seven (87.1%) of the 31 people who completed the DSHI were female. 
Participants ranged in age from 16 to 33 years (M = 21.65, SD = 3.99) and 27 (87.1%) 
identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European. The remaining four participants 
identified as New Zealand/Samoan (N = 1), Indian (N = 1), Asian (N = 1), and 
Chinese (N = 1). Twenty-five (80.6%) participants reported that they had received at 
least one mental health diagnosis; the mean age of first diagnosis was 17.48 years  
(N = 23, SD = 4.14). The modal number of reported diagnoses per participant was one 
(range: 0-5). Twenty-one (67.7%) people reported having been diagnosed with 
depression, nine (29.0%) with an anxiety disorder, four (12.9%) with an eating 
disorder, three (9.7%) with a personality disorder, two (6.5%) with Bipolar Disorder, 
one with Schizophrenia (3.2%), and three (9.7%) with other diagnoses (e.g., Gender 
Dysphoria, Cyclothymia with psychosis).10    
3.2.2 Prevalence of different types of self-injury   
Interpreting the responses on the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) proved challenging, as 
many people seemed unable to accurately recall the information required to answer 
the questions. As a result, 30 participants responded to some or all of the frequency 
                                               
10 Although some participants had experienced psychotic episodes in the past, they were still included 
in the study as the majority of their NSSI, including their most recent episodes, had not occurred in 
the context of psychosis. 
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questions (e.g., ‚How many times have you done this?‛) with estimates (e.g., ‚100-
150?‛, ‚unsure—3-5‛, ‚approx. 10‛) or written explanations (e.g., ‚countless‛, ‚too 
many times to remember‛, ‚don't know‛). Similar responses were obtained for some 
of the other questions, such as those requiring people to identify when they last 
engaged in a particular form of self-injury (e.g., ‚sometime this year‛, ‚no idea, 
months back‛) and the number of years that they had used a particular form of self-
injury (e.g., ‚1-2 years (occasionally)‛, ‚on and off but not a regular occurrence‛).  
Given the difficulties of analysing this data, I emailed Kim Gratz to ask 
whether she had received similar responses and, if so, how she quantified these. She 
replied that since modifying the DSHI, she seldom receives qualitative answers 
(personal communication, August 22, 2008). The revised version of the DSHI 
instructs people to ‚Please write an actual number (e.g., 1, 5, or 15 NOT some, many, 
or few)‛ when reporting the number of times they have engaged in a form of NSSI 
and to ‚Please write the actual number of years you engaged in this behavior‛ when 
reporting the number of years that they have self-injured in a particular way. 
If I had used the revised questionnaire11, I may have received fewer written 
explanations but, in all likelihood, the frequencies reported by participants would 
still have been estimates. Unless people had kept a detailed record of their self-
injurious behaviours, it is unlikely they would have been able to quantify how many 
times they had injured themselves in a particular way, or when these injuries 
occurred. The following comments, written at the end of two separate DSHI’s, 
illustrate these difficulties: ‚Some of the ‚last time you did this‛ are guestimated due 
to not keeping any record of these events. Sorry.‛ and ‚These are all approximate! 
To the best of my recollection.‛ During one of the interviews, one participant who 
was reflecting on the process of filling in the DSHI commented that being asked to 
remember how many times you have self-injured was analogous to being asked how 
                                               
11 I did not use the revised questionnaire because I was unaware that it had been developed. 
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many times you have worn high-heeled shoes; an impossible task considering you 
do not make a note of every time you wear a particular type of shoe.  
An additional concern raised by asking people to recall the exact number of 
times they had injured themselves was highlighted by another person during an 
interview who said she had considered counting her scars to determine how many 
times she had injured herself. However, she had realised that this would still be 
inaccurate as some of the injuries had not left scars or the scars had faded over time. 
Knowing that people may feel compelled to count their scars for the purposes of a 
research study appalled me and, as a result, I modified the wording of the DSHI for 
my subsequent two studies.   
However, I still had to somehow make sense of the DSHI data I had obtained 
for this study. I was primarily interested in extracting the following information 
from the DSHI: the different types of NSSI people had used, the number of times 
they had engaged in each type of behaviour, and the recency of those behaviours. As 
is evident in Table 2, I followed the precedent set by other researchers (e.g., Lundh, 
Karim, & Quilisch, 2007; Whitlock et al., 2006) in choosing to categorise both the 
frequency and recency data.  
Cutting was the most commonly endorsed type of NSSI with 96.8% of the 
participants reporting that they had cut themselves in their lifetimes, followed by 
severe scratching (83.9%), and preventing wounds from healing (80.6%). Use of at 
least one other type of NSSI was reported by 12 (38.7%) participants, including 
grazing one’s skin by rubbing a key back and forth, pouring boiling water over one’s 
skin, and self-flagellation. On average, people reported having engaged in 8.03 types 
of NSSI in their lifetimes (SD = 2.69, range: 3-13).  
As noted earlier, the most difficult information to analyse from the DSHI was 
the frequencies of NSSI because of people’s tendency to report estimates or provide  
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Table 2 
 
Frequencies and recency of different types of NSSI 
 
NSSI type 
N (%) 
reporting 
NSSI type 
 
N (%) reporting frequency of engagement in NSSI types  N (%) reporting recency of NSSI types 
Never 1 time 
2-10 
times 
11-50 
times 
>50 times  
Within past 
week 
Within past 
month 
Within past 
6 months 
Within past 
12 months 
>12 months 
ago 
Cutting wrists, arms, or other 
areas of body 
30 (96.8)  1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 8 (25.8) 4 (12.9) 7 (22.6)  6 (19.4) 7 (22.6) 8 (25.8) 4 (12.9) 5 (16.1) 
Severe scratching to extent of 
bleeding/scarring 
26 (83.9)  5 (16.1) 2 (6.5) 15 (48.4) 1 (3.2) 1 (3.2)  2 (6.5) 4 (12.9) 1 (3.2) 6 (19.4) 11 (35.5) 
Preventing wounds from healing 25 (80.6)  6 (19.4) 2 (6.5) 5 (16.1) 2 (6.5) 2 (6.5)  4 (12.9) 4 (12.9) 4 (12.9) 4 (12.9) 7 (22.6) 
Sticking sharp objects into skin 22 (71.0)  9 (29.0) 1 (3.2) 4 (12.9) 7 (22.6) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 4 (12.9) 5 (16.1) 6 (19.4) 6 (19.4) 
Carving words into skin 19 (61.3)  12 (38.7) 2 (6.5) 13 (41.9) 2 (6.5) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 2 (6.5) 1 (3.2) 3 (9.7) 13 (41.9) 
Carving pictures/designs/marks 
into skin 
18 (58.1)  13 (41.9) 4 (12.9) 11 (35.5) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0)  1 (3.2) 2 (6.5) 3 (9.7) 1 (3.2) 11 (35.5) 
Burning with lighter/match 18 (58.1)  13 (41.9) 1 (3.2) 8 (25.8) 5 (16.1) 0 (0.0)  1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 3 (9.7) 4 (12.9) 9 (29.0) 
Punching to extent of bruising 17 (54.8)  14 (45.2) 1 (3.2) 10 (32.3) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0)  1 (3.2) 1 (3.2) 6 (19.4) 1 (3.2) 8 (25.8) 
Banging head to extent of bruising 15 (48.4)  16 (51.6) 0 (0.0) 5 (16.1) 4 (12.9) 0 (0.0)  2 (6.5) 1 (3.2) 3 (9.7) 2 (6.5) 7 (22.6) 
Burning with cigarette 13 (41.9)  18 (58.1) 1 (3.2) 5 (16.1) 4 (12.9) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 3 (9.7) 8 (25.8) 
Biting to extent of breaking skin 13 (41.9)  18 (58.1) 6 (19.4) 4 (12.9) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0)  1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.2) 4 (12.9) 6 (19.4) 
Rubbing glass into skin 7 (22.6)  24 (77.4) 3 (9.7) 1 (3.2) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (6.5) 1 (3.2) 4 (12.9) 
Rubbing sandpaper on body 5 (16.1)  26 (83.9) 4 (12.9) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.2) 1 (3.2) 3 (9.7) 
Dripping acid onto skin 2 (6.5)  29 (93.5) 1 (3.2) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.2) 1 (3.2) 
Using bleach/oven cleaner to scrub 
skin 
2 (6.5)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (6.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (6.5) 
Breaking own bones 1 (3.2)  30 (96.8) 1 (3.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.2) 
 
Note. N reporting NSSI type may not equal frequencies as some participants endorsed type of NSSI, but did not report frequency.  
Frequencies may not add up to 100% because of missing data.  104 
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written explanations. When I calculated NSSI frequencies, I only included 
participants who had provided numerical data.12 For example, 30 people reported 
having cut themselves but only 19 provided numerical responses when asked how 
many times they had cut themselves. 
4. STAGE TWO: THE INTERVIEWS 
4.1 Participants and procedure 
All 31 people who completed the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) were invited to take part 
in one or more interviews. Each person was sent a copy of the interview questions 
(see Appendix D), as advised by a Clinical Psychologist, because of the sensitive  
nature of the topic. Receiving a copy of the questions enabled potential participants 
to make a fully informed decision as to whether they would like to take part. The 
questions were prefaced by the following paragraph:  
Please read the following questions carefully. The purpose of this study is to understand how 
you experience self-harm13 from your perspective, while at the same time addressing the 
research questions listed below. As a result, Robyn cannot guarantee that she will ask you all 
of these questions or that these will be the only questions she will ask you during the 
interview(s). The questions do, however, provide you with an idea about what kinds of topics 
will be discussed during the interview. Please consider carefully if you would be comfortable 
answering these questions before you decide whether you would like to participate in an 
interview. 
 
Additionally, reviewing the questions beforehand gave participants who consented 
to be interviewed the opportunity to prepare themselves for the interview process. 
The benefits to participants afforded by this procedure were considered to outweigh 
the drawbacks that may have occurred from participants over-preparing answers 
(e.g., to make them more socially desirable).  
The interview schedule was developed for this study and was informed by 
the research literature on the behavioural functions of self-injury. As discussed 
                                               
12 Whenever participants estimated NSSI frequencies, I chose to include the most conservative value. 
For example, if a person reported that they had cut themselves 150-200 times, I took 150 as the 
frequency of cutting. If someone wrote thousands of times, I used 1,000 as the frequency. 
13 In my initial study, I referred to non-suicidal self-injurious behaviours as self-harm because this is 
the term that is most commonly used in Aotearoa New Zealand to describe these behaviours. 
However, in light of the terminological discrepancies between self-harm and self-injury, which I 
discussed in Chapter 1, I decided to use the term NSSI for my subsequent studies. 
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earlier in this chapter, I was interested in asking people to recall, and reflect on, their 
most recent episode of NSSI to enable me to hypothesise about the functions of these 
episodes. Identifying the functions of the NSSI episodes would then allow me to 
determine whether these descriptions were consistent with the behavioural process 
of self-injury outlined in the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006).  
The questions primarily focused on asking participants to describe what 
situational, emotional, and cognitive factors had led to their most recent episode of 
NSSI, how they felt and what they thought about while they were injuring 
themselves, and whether they had experienced any consequences as a result of the 
self-injurious behaviour. Participants were also asked about whether they 
considered their most recent episode of NSSI to be typical of their general pattern of 
self-injurious behaviour.  
Retrospective bias is a limitation of the majority of studies on NSSI but given 
that I was asking detailed questions about a specific behaviour, I did not want to 
interview people who had last self-injured years before. In the absence of a definitive 
boundary of what constitutes current versus historical self-injurious behaviour, I 
followed the precedent set by other researchers (Brown, Williams, & Collins, 2007; 
Whitlock et al., 2008) and invited only those people who had self-injured within the 
past twelve months to be interviewed.  
After being sent the interview questions, two people did not respond to 
follow-up emails, four people emailed to say that they had decided not to take part 
in an interview, and 25 people agreed to be interviewed. Unfortunately, due to the 
small sample size, I was unable to conduct any analyses to determine whether there 
were significant differences in the types, frequencies, or recency of NSSI between the 
people who consented and those who declined to take part in an interview.  
If people who agreed to be interviewed were engaged in a therapeutic 
relationship with a mental health clinician, they were to asked to sign a consent form 
(see Appendix E) giving me permission to inform their clinician about their 
participation in the study. This requirement was introduced following consultation 
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with clinicians who indicated that they would want to know if any of their clients 
chose to take part. Fifteen people (14 female) reported that they were currently 
seeing a mental health clinician or that they received mental health support from 
another professional (i.e., GP, support worker). Out of the 14 people who consented 
to me contacting their clinician or other support person; one person nominated her 
GP as her contact person since she was currently engaged in group, not individual, 
therapy, while another person requested that I contact her support worker. One 
woman who was engaged in therapy and agreed to take part in an interview did not 
return her clinician consent form and was not interviewed as a result. The remaining 
10 participants were not engaged in therapy or counselling, and, as such, were not 
required to complete the clinician consent form. 
A total of 24 people (20 female, 4 male) took part in the interview stage of the 
study which was conducted over a period of approximately six months. People were 
invited to bring a support person (e.g., their clinician, a friend, or a family member) 
with them to the interview; one young woman chose to bring her mother with her. 
None of the other participants brought a support person to the interview. 
Additionally, people were given the choice of being interviewed at Victoria 
University or the mental health service they attended (if applicable). Twenty-two 
interviews were conducted in a comfortable, private office in the Psychology 
Department at Victoria University, one interview was conducted at a mental health 
service attended by the participant, and one interview was conducted at a health 
service where the participant worked.  
Prior to commencing each interview, I reiterated that although I had specific 
questions to ask, I was interested in learning about any of the person’s experiences of 
NSSI that they wanted to share. That is, the goal of the interview was to understand 
each person’s individual experience of self-injury, while at the same time addressing 
the research aims. I emphasised that my role as a researcher was to listen to their 
experiences of self-injurious behaviours; it was not my role to intervene 
therapeutically unless, as per the standard limits of confidentiality, they were in 
108 
 
 
danger of harming themselves or someone else following the interview. Each 
participant was informed that while I expected the interview to take approximately 
an hour, we could schedule a second interview if they felt that there was more they 
wanted to discuss.14 Participants were also informed that they could take a break or 
stop the interview at any time.  
I acknowledged that talking about self-injurious behaviours may be 
distressing and asked whether there was anything I could do to support them if they 
did become distressed during the interview, or whether they could think of any 
helpful strategies (e.g., having a cup of tea, taking a cigarette break) to use if they felt 
upset.15 Each person was asked to read through the consent form (see Appendix F) 
before signing it and given the opportunity to ask questions about the research. On 
the consent form, people were invited to tick whether they wanted to receive a copy 
of their interview transcript and/or whether they would like a brief summary of the 
study results. The majority (70.8%) of the participants requested a copy of their 
transcript and all but one (95.8%) requested the results summary.  
To begin each interview, I asked the person if there was anything that they 
wanted to talk about first in relation to their self-injurious behaviours or whether 
they would rather start with the questions I had sent them. This was done in an 
attempt to give people the space and time to talk about any experiences or issues 
they felt were relevant to their history of NSSI, rather than immediately focusing on 
what I wanted to know. The majority of participants opted to begin the interview 
with the research questions. All of the interviews were audiotaped (Mtime = 63 
minutes; range: 29-92 minutes) using a digital audio recorder, the audio files were 
then uploaded on to a computer, and the original file on the recorder was deleted. 
The files were stored on a password-protected drive. Using Transcription Buddy 
V4.0, I transcribed the interviews according to a basic, orthographic notation system, 
                                               
14 No second interviews were scheduled. 
15 This approach was adapted from the University of Washington Risk Assessment Protocol 
developed by Marsha Linehan and colleagues (Reynolds, Lindenboim, Comtois, Murray, & Linehan, 
2006). 
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which included all verbal utterances (including repeated and cut-off words) and 
notable non-verbal utterances (e.g., laughter).16 The transcripts, which totalled more 
than 700 pages, were then checked against the original recordings to ensure 
accuracy.  
At the end of the interview, participants were reimbursed with a Farmers, 
Warehouse, or Motor Trade Association voucher to the value of $30 for taking part 
and given a list of support organisations (see Appendix C) to contact if they felt 
distressed. Participants were also invited to contact their clinician (if they had one) 
or me if they had any concerns. Participants who did not have mental health 
clinicians, and one participant who was dissatisfied with his clinician, were offered 
the option of a referral to the Psychology Clinic, which is located in the Department 
of Psychology at Victoria University. This is a teaching clinic, staffed by two 
experienced Clinical Psychologists, which is free to students at Victoria and charges 
up to $40 for clients who are not students. Fees were waived for study participants. 
Participants who declined to accept referrals were informed that they could contact 
me in the future if they changed their minds. Two male participants requested 
referrals following their interviews and one female participant emailed me 
approximately two months after being interviewed to request a referral. 
4.2 Analysing the interview transcripts 
Initially, I attempted to analyse the interview transcripts thematically (Braun 
& Clark, 2006), but found that identifying group-level themes across the data corpus 
precluded an individual-level analysis of the temporal process of each person’s most 
recent episode of NSSI. Rather I needed an analytic method that would allow me to 
examine how each episode had unfolded over time. Drawing on the behaviour 
analysis literature, I developed a qualitative method called Interpretative Functional 
Analysis. Before outlining the rationale, epistemological assumptions, and steps of 
                                               
16 My choice of transcription conventions reflects my interest in what participants said rather than how 
they said it, which precluded the need to transcribe linguistic details such as the timing of pauses and 
syllable lengths. Words in single brackets signify my best interpretation of the word(s). The word 
unclear in single brackets signifies my inability to interpret what was said.  
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this method in detail, it is first necessary to discuss the theoretical underpinnings 
and practical limitations of conducting functional analyses with typically developing 
populations. 
4.2.1 What is a functional analysis? 
As an idiographic approach to the assessment and treatment of problem 
behaviours, a functional analysis involves examining how a person’s behaviour 
varies according to their unique learning history and environment (Farmer & Latner, 
2007). The aim of a functional analysis is to establish which contingencies are 
maintaining a person’s problem behaviour so that the associated antecedents and 
consequences can be targeted to decrease the behaviour (Hanley, Iwata, & McCord, 
2003). Accordingly, the three phases of a functional analysis involve: (1) gathering 
information about the problem behaviour and variables that may impact on that 
behaviour, (2) hypothesising about what contextual variables cause and maintain the 
behaviour to determine the function of the behaviour, and (3) manipulating particular 
variables (i.e., antecedents and consequences) in an attempt to alter the behaviour 
(Cone, 1997).  
4.2.2 Utilising functional analyses with typically developing populations  
Functional analyses have been the mainstay of therapeutic assessment and 
intervention with developmentally disabled populations since the 1960s, but this 
approach has only more recently been applied to typically developing populations 
with the advent of Clinical Behaviour Analysis (Anderson, 2007; Dougher & Hayes, 
2000). Originating in the 1990s, Clinical Behaviour Analysis can be understood, in 
part, as a reaction against the structuralist system used to assess, diagnose, and treat 
mental illness (Dougher & Hayes, 2000).  
From a structuralist perspective, problem behaviour is perceived as an 
indicator of underlying pathology; as such, causes of behaviour can be found within 
people (Follette, Naugle, & Linnerooth, 2000; Sturmey et al., 2007a). In contrast, 
functionalists maintain that behaviour is an adaptive response to the environmental 
context and, as such, causes of behaviour lie within the environment (Sturmey et al., 
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2007a). Clinicians working within a behavioural paradigm view functional 
approaches as non-pathologising compared to structuralist approaches, because the 
target for change is the environment rather than the person (Sturmey et al., 2007a).  
Structuralism, however, is privileged over functionalism within the domain of 
mental health research and clinical practice because of the hegemony of the DSM 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Classifying problem behaviours on the 
basis of shared topographical features has advantages: it provides a shared, common 
language for clinicians; indicates which behaviours are likely to covary; and points 
to possible interventions (Nelson-Gray & Farmer, 1999).  
However, structural approaches to psychopathology also have a number of 
disadvantages. As a syndromal classification system, the DSM-IV-TR (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) provides insight into what a person has but not how 
they interact with the environment and failing to identify the functions of problem 
behaviours makes it more difficult to alter these behaviours (Cipani & Schock, 2007; 
Cone, 1997). Given that one behaviour can serve many functions and a single 
function (e.g., escape) can maintain a range of topographically dissimilar behaviours, 
functional classification systems (see Cipani & Schock, 2007) arguably have more 
utility than syndromal classification systems when it comes to understanding 
problem behaviours (Cone, 1997).  
Clinical Behaviour Analysis (CBA) is informed by Applied Behaviour 
Analysis (ABA) in that it involves ‚the application of the assumptions, principles 
and methods of modern functional contextual behavior analysis‛ to mental 
disorders (Dougher, & Hayes, 2000, p. 11), but it also has three key differences: 
(1) ABA focuses on external stimuli that can be observed (Kohlenberg, Tsai, & 
Dougher, 1993); CBA focuses on intrapersonal stimuli (e.g., thoughts, 
emotions) because these internal processes17 are extremely relevant to the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2006).  
                                               
17 Within the field of radical behaviourism, private events such as thoughts, emotions, and somatic 
sensations qualify as behaviours that can be functionally assessed (Cuper, Merwin, & Lynch, 2007).  
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(2) To gather information about problem behaviours, applied behaviour analysts 
typically depend on direct observations (Hanley et al., 2003). In contrast, 
clinical behaviour analysts working within mental health settings are seldom 
able to observe problem behaviours because they are internal processes or 
they occur outside of therapy (Farmer & Latner, 2007; Miltenberger, 2005). 
Consequently, self-report is an important source of information utilised by 
clinical behaviour analysts (Miltenberger, 2005).  
(3) Applied behaviour analysts manipulate specific variables to test whether or 
not they reinforce the problem behaviour (Kohlenberg et al., 1993), whereas 
clinical behaviour analysts are typically unable to manipulate variables that 
may reinforce problem behaviours as these are often internal (Miltenberger, 
2005).  
4.2.3 Interpretative Functional Analysis 
4.2.3.1 Rationale 
Given that the overarching research question in this thesis is whether NSSI 
functions primarily as an experientially avoidant behaviour within Aotearoa New 
Zealand, it was necessary for me to assess whether the descriptions of specific self-
injury episodes aligned with the operant process described in the EAM (Chapman et 
al., 2006). My interview questions were designed to elicit the antecedents and 
consequences of each person’s most recent episode of self-injurious behaviour and, 
as such, assessing these descriptions in order to hypothesise the function(s) of the 
behaviours appeared to be the most appropriate form of analysis.  
To analyse the interviews, I developed a method called Interpretative 
Functional Analysis which was informed by the principles of CBA. Although I have 
named this method Interpretative Functional Analysis18, it does not meet the 
                                               
18
 Although I functionally assessed, rather than analysed, each episode of NSSI, I chose to call my 
method Interpretative Functional Analysis, not Interpretative Functional Assessment, because I went 
beyond the realm of individual assessment to then compare the antecedents and consequences of 
NSSI episodes both within and between functions.  
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requirements for a full functional analysis as defined within CBA because I was 
unable to work therapeutically with people to bring about changes in their 
behaviours. As discussed earlier, a functional analysis consists of three phases: 
gathering information about a problem behaviour, developing a hypothesis about 
the function(s) of that behaviour, and manipulating relevant variables in an attempt 
to decrease or eliminate the behaviour (Cone, 1997). I only conducted one interview 
with each person in a research rather than therapeutic context; accordingly, I did not 
complete the treatment phase of a functional analysis.  
Instead, I focused on the first two phases of information gathering and 
hypothesis formulation, collectively called a functional assessment (Cipani & Schock, 
2007; Cone, 1997), the outcome of which is a ‚hypothesis statement identifying 
environmental variables that likely evoke and maintain the behavior of concern‛ 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 459). Assessing the context in which the self-injury occurred 
(e.g., the antecedents) in conjunction with the consequences that followed the 
behaviour, allowed me to hypothesise about the functions of participants’ NSSI 
(Cone, 1997).  
Once I had formulated a set of hypotheses about the functions of each self-
injury episode, I compared the hypothesised functions across the group of 
participants to identify similarities and differences between antecedents and 
consequences both within the same function and across different functions. In sum, 
the aims of conducting an Interpretative Functional Analysis were to: (1) assess each 
person’s most recent episode of NSSI to derive a hypothesis statement about the 
function(s) of their behaviour and (2) compare the antecedents and consequences of 
the self-injurious behaviours both within and between the different functions.  
Functionally assessing discrete episodes of self-injury to compare behavioural 
functions across a group of research participants is unorthodox. Certainly, functional 
analyses of problem behaviours within typically developing populations have been 
published as case studies (e.g., Farmer & Latner, 2007) and within treatment 
manuals (e.g., Linehan, 1993a), but I have been unable to identify any studies where 
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these individual analyses were then compared at a group level. However, I believe 
that the form of analysis I developed for this study was the most appropriate 
method to answer my research question.   
4.2.3.2 Epistemological assumptions 
I included the word ‘interpretative’ when labelling my method as an explicit 
recognition of the impact of my values and perspectives when writing the interview 
questions, interviewing the participants, transcribing the data, formulating 
hypotheses about the functions of the behaviours, and writing up the results. Each of 
these phases involved differing levels of interpretation, all of which were informed 
by my own personal epistemologies, values, and understanding of the self-injury 
literature. I concur with Angen (2000) that:   
Truth, from an interpretive perspective, is no longer based on a one-to-one correspondence to 
objective reality. It is acknowledged that what we can know of reality is socially constructed 
through our intersubjective experiences within the lived world, which results in a form of 
truth that is negotiated through dialogue. (p. 386) 
 
Additionally, the absence of a treatment phase in the functional analyses I conducted 
prevented me from testing my hypotheses, which instead remained as functional 
interpretations.  
 Arguably the most important epistemological assumption underlying 
Interpretative Functional Analysis, which I touched on when comparing ABA to 
CBA, is that CBA considers self-report to be a valid form of data. While applied 
behaviour analysts privilege independent observation and dismiss self-report as an 
unreliable and invalid approach to assessing behaviour (Cipani & Schock, 2007), 
clinical behaviour analysts maintain that it is possible to identify reinforcers through 
self-report while remaining cognisant of the limitations associated with this method 
(Sturmey, Ward-Horner, Marroquin, & Doran, 2007b).  
4.2.3.3 Coding system 
The three term contingency of antecedent-behaviour-consequence formed the 
basis of my coding system, but I also took into account relevant historical 
antecedents that provided insight into each person’s current episode of NSSI. 
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Behaviours were then categorised according to whether they served an 
escape/avoidant or access function (Cipani & Schock, 2007).  
4.2.3.3.1 Relevant learning history 
Historical variables are relevant to completing a functional assessment if they 
impact on, or point to, significant, contemporary antecedents that are amenable to 
change (Farmer & Latner, 2007; Follette et al., 2000). Since historical events (e.g., 
trauma) can have an impact on current behaviour and each person’s learning history 
determines which behaviours are maintained over time (Sturmey et al., 2007b), I 
extracted historical information from the interview transcripts that I interpreted as 
relevant to participants’ most recent episode of NSSI. However, it should be noted 
that it is often difficult to determine the extent to which these antecedents impact on 
current behaviour, especially when the information about how the behaviour 
functions is gathered through retrospective self-report. 
4.2.3.3.2 Antecedents 
Identical behaviours can fulfill different functions depending on the 
antecedents of those behaviours (Cipani & Schock, 2007); consequently, it is possible 
to infer the functions of a behaviour by identifying the antecedents (Stickney & 
Miltenberger, 1999). Temporally remote antecedents can function as setting events 
which then have an effect on more immediate antecedents (Stickney & Miltenberger, 
1999). For example, receiving a low grade for a report might lead someone to 
question their academic abilities and subsequent thoughts of inadequacy and failure 
then lead to an episode of NSSI.    
Two types of antecedents were identified in the interview transcripts: 
Establishing Operations (EO) and Discriminative Stimuli (SD). Establishing 
operations are conditions (e.g., deprivation, aversive stimulation) that establish 
particular consequences as reinforcers (Dougher & Hackbert, 2000; Follette et al., 
2000); people are motivated to engage in specific behaviours because of EOs (Follette 
et al., 2000; Miltenberger, 2005). To identify an EO, a useful question to ask is: ‚Why 
does the person ‚want‛ this consequence?‛ (McGill, 1999, p. 399). When a person 
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engages in self-injury to gain the consequence of relief, it is likely that they wanted 
that relief because they were experiencing aversive internal stimulation (e.g., 
anxiety, negative thoughts). In this instance, the aversive internal stimulation would 
be classified as an EO because it establishes the relief as a reinforcer for self-injury. 
Establishing operations have a value-altering effect in that they determine how 
effective or potent a particular reinforcer will be in a specific situation (Laraway, 
Snycerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003; Michael, 1993; Miltenberger, 2004). A reinforcer’s 
value thus shifts along a continuum depending on the intensity of the EO (Laraway 
et al., 2003). For example, food deprivation is an EO but people can be more or less 
food-deprived. The more hungry a person is, the more likely it is that food will be an 
effective reinforcer. Establishing operations also have a behaviour-altering effect in that 
they increase the likelihood of the person engaging in behaviours that are typically 
followed by that reinforcer (Laraway et al., 2003; Michael, 1993; Miltenberger, 2004).  
The second type of antecedents, SD’s, signal the likelihood that a behaviour 
will elicit a particular consequence because the stimulus has typically been present 
when that behaviour was reinforced in the past (Farmer & Latner, 2007; Kearney, 
2008). The presence of a SD (e.g., NSSI implements) therefore signals to the person 
that there is an opportunity for reinforcement or, in other words, the likelihood that 
a particular reinforcer is available (Miltenberger, 2005).  
Since a specific behaviour can be triggered by a number of different SD’s 
(Cuper, Merwin, & Lynch, 2007), the capacity of stimuli to function as reinforcers 
depends on the EOs. Discriminative stimuli therefore work in conjunction with EOs 
to bring about particular behaviours. An SD will only impact on behaviour when an 
EO is present because a person has to want a particular consequence in order to be to 
be influenced by the opportunity to experience that consequence (Laraway et al., 
2003). For example, a razor blade may have been established as an SD in that it 
signals the opportunity for the release of intense anger following cutting behaviour. 
If the EO of intense anger is absent, it is unlikely that the person will use the razor 
blade to cut themselves because they will not be motivated to seek relief.  
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4.2.3.3.3 Target behaviour 
Since the focus of my analysis was the functions of people’s self-injury, not 
the topographical features of these behaviours, I did not purposefully seek specific 
details beyond asking how they had hurt themselves and, occasionally, how many 
times they had hurt themselves during their most recent episode. Some participants 
did chose to volunteer detailed information about how they had injured themselves 
and the implements they had used for this purpose, while others provided little 
information about the actual self-injurious behaviour. 
4.2.3.3.4 Consequences 
Particular behaviours are selected for through operant conditioning; that is, 
behaviours impact on the environment to produce consequences and are 
subsequently more or less likely in particular contexts because of those consequences 
(Cipani & Schock, 2007; Sturmey et al., 2007b). The likelihood of a behaviour re-
occurring depends on whether an individual views the particular consequences of 
that behaviour as positive or aversive. Positive consequences maintain or increase 
behaviour, whereas aversive consequences temporarily or permanently suppress 
behaviour (Goldfried & Sprafkin, 1976).  
There are four general categories of consequences—positive reinforcement, 
negative reinforcement, positive punishment, and negative punishment (Sturmey et 
al., 2007b)—all of which can be intrapersonally or interpersonally mediated. As a 
result, I coded for four categories of reinforcement: intrapersonal negative 
reinforcement, intrapersonal positive reinforcement, interpersonal negative 
reinforcement, and interpersonal positive reinforcement. I coded aversive 
consequences (i.e., punishers) more generally because when considering clinical 
behaviour problems (e.g., substance abuse), the aversive consequences are usually 
delayed and so do not function to suppress the behaviour (Goldfried & Sprafkin, 
1976). For example, aversive consequences following NSSI, such as others’ reactions 
to scarring, are typically delayed compared to positive consequences, such as an 
adrenalin rush or relief of emotional distress, which are immediate.  
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4.2.3.3.5 Escape or access: Functions of the target behaviour 
The function of a behaviour refers to the way in which that behaviour impacts 
on the environment (Hanley et al., 2003). As summarised by Cipani and Schock 
(2007), behaviour serves two overarching functions: to escape or avoid negative 
events and to access positive events. Escape or avoidance behaviours are maintained 
via negative reinforcement, while access behaviours are maintained via positive 
reinforcement (Cipani & Schock, 2007). Furthermore, behaviours can be 
intrapersonally or interpersonally mediated (Cipani & Schock, 2007). Each episode of 
self-injury therefore was coded according to whether it functioned as intrapersonal 
or interpersonal escape/avoidance or access. 
4.2.3.4 Steps in the Interpretative Functional Analysis 
In order to complete the Interpretative Functional Analysis, I followed the 
seven steps outlined below: 
(1) I read through all of the interview transcripts to identify any extracts that 
could be relevant to each person’s most recent episode, including their 
learning history, any experiences that motivated them to self-injure, the 
antecedent events or circumstances that occurred before they self-injured,  
descriptions of the target behaviour, and the consequences that followed that 
behaviour. I also identified any information related to whether they 
considered their most recent episode to be typical of their general pattern of 
self-injury. 
(2) The relevant extracts from each interview transcript were then cut and pasted 
into a word document for each person under the following headings: relevant 
learning history, establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, target 
behaviour, consequences, and typicality of episode. Any surrounding, 
contextual information that was important in order to understand and 
interpret the extract was retained, including any of my questions or comments 
that led to particular explanations or elaborations from participants.  
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(3) Once tabulated, I read through the selected extracts for each person and 
summarised any information from the extracts that I deemed relevant to a 
functional assessment of each person’s most recent episode of NSSI.  
I then completed schematic representations (c.f., Braun & Clarke, 2006) of the 
behavioural process of each person’s most recent episode of self-injury (see 
Figure 3 for an example). The structure of these diagrams was adapted from 
those presented in Follette et al. (2000) and Farmer and Latner (2007). The 
black circle represents the probability that the discriminative stimuli and 
establishing operations evoked the target behaviour in the context of the 
relevant learning history. 
(5) An iterative and reflexive process was followed whereby I re-read the extracts 
to check that I had summarised all of the information that was relevant to 
completing a functional assessment of each episode and that I had included 
all of this information in the diagrams. I also re-read the original transcripts to 
ensure that extracts and the diagrams represented each person’s most recent 
episode as they had described it and that I had not inadvertently left out 
pertinent information. 
(6) Based on the information depicted in the schematic representations, I formed 
a hypothesis as to the primary function of each person’s most recent episode 
of self-injurious behaviour in the context of their relevant learning history. For 
example, I hypothesised that Melanie’s19 most recent episode of NSSI (see 
Figure 3) functioned as an escape from aversive thoughts and emotions.   
(7) The hypothesised functions were then compared across participants to 
identify any similarities or differences in the antecedents and consequences of 
the NSSI episodes within the same function, and to identify any similarities or 
differences between functions.  
                                               
19 All of the participants were given pseudonyms to protect their identities. 
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Figure 3. Functional schematic of Melanie’s most recent episode of NSSI.
Relevant Learning History 
 Long history  of NSSI since age 12; NSSI escalated over time 
 Self-injures in stages 
 Gets into an NSSI mindset 
 NSSI is a coping mechanism 
 Uses NSSI for tension release and to punish self 
 Self-injures when stressed and upset 
 Negative events triggers NSSI ideation 
 Negative thoughts trigger NSSI 
 Different tools serve different purposes 
 Grazing calms her down; cutting makes her feel relieved and in control 
 NSSI helps her to sleep 
 Uses NSSI to stop mind racing and to settle herself down 
 NSSI is like an addiction; if in NSSI mindset, difficult to prevent it 
 Had Bulimia 
 
 Cut deeper than usual which 
scared her 
 Felt almost ashamed, had to 
cover up cuts 
 Angry with ex-boyfriend for 
telling mother 
 Mother was very upset 
 
Intrapersonal Negative Reinforcers 
 Felt calmer, more settled 
 Thoughts stopped racing 
Interpersonal Negative Reinforcers  
 None identified 
 
Interpersonal Positive Reinforcers  
 None identified 
 
Intrapersonal Positive Reinforcers  
 None identified 
 
 
 
Aversive 
Consequences 
Reinforcing 
Consequences 
Discriminative Stimuli 
 Thought that NSSI would help 
 Implement 
 
Establishing Operations 
 Had a fight with her new boyfriend 
 Felt really anxious 
 Mind was racing 
 Felt upset, jittery, and could not settle down 
 Had thoughts of not being good enough 
 Blamed self, everything was her fault 
 Wanted to settle herself down 
 
Target Behaviour 
Cut self on the arm 
multiple times, 
approximately two 
months prior to the 
interview 
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4.3 Interview results 
Of the 24 people who were interviewed, one participant provided too little 
information about their most recent episode for a functional assessment and three 
participants did not identify experiencing any form of reinforcement following their 
self-injurious behaviour. As a result, only 20 episodes of self-injury are included in 
the following analysis. Figure 4 shows which participants’ episodes were 
hypothesised to fulfil each function. The colour purple is used to specify participants 
whose episode was hypothesised to only fulfil one function, blue specifies 
participants whose episode fulfilled two functions, and green specifies participants 
whose episode fulfilled three functions.  
 
 Escape/Avoidance  
Intrapersonal 
 
Natalie 
Karen 
Jenny 
Nora 
Melanie 
Lucy 
Ella 
Luke 
 
Angela 
Nicola 
Josh 
Emily 
Tara 
Paula 
Sophia 
 
Owen 
Matt 
Maria 
 
 
 
  
Interpersonal 
Belinda 
 
Angela 
Nicola 
Josh 
Emily 
Tara 
 
Owen 
Matt 
Maria 
 
 
 
Debra 
 
 
 
Paula 
Sophia 
 
 
Owen 
Matt 
Maria 
 
 Access  
 
Figure 4. Functions fulfilled by each participant’s most recent episode of NSSI.  
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Although the most commonly identified function was intrapersonal 
escape/avoidance, many episodes appeared to serve multiple functions. Of the 
episodes that only served one function, eight were categorised as intrapersonal 
escape/avoidance, one was categorised as intrapersonal access, and one as 
interpersonal access. Furthermore, as is evident from Figure 4, no episodes were 
hypothesised to serve an interpersonal escape/avoidant function. 
In the following sections, I present the detailed findings of my Interpretative 
Functional Analysis, using relevant interview extracts to illustrate my arguments. 
The EOs, SD’s, and reinforcing consequences identified within the transcripts for 
each of the three functions—intrapersonal escape/avoidance, intrapersonal access, 
and interpersonal access—are discussed. I also briefly examine two historical 
examples (i.e., not the most recent episode) where self-injury functioned as a form of 
interpersonal escape/avoidance. Finally, I discuss the aversive consequences 
described by participants, which may have functioned to punish their most recent 
episode of self-injurious behaviour.      
 4.3.1 Intrapersonal escape/avoidance 
When I considered the antecedents and consequences of the NSSI episodes 
within the context of each person’s learning history, I hypothesised that the majority 
of these episodes (N = 18) had functioned as a form of escape from aversive emotions 
and thoughts. People described an array of both distal and proximal negative events 
which, along with negative intrapersonal experiences, had established the 
motivation for them to engage in NSSI. They also identified a variety of stimuli that 
had signalled to them the potential for negative reinforcement following self-
injurious behaviour. All of these participants reported that their episode of self-
injury was followed by the reduction or elimination of unwanted emotions and/or 
thoughts. 
Although it is difficult to be certain that the distal events reported did have an 
effect on people’s most recent episode of self-injury, in some cases it is likely that 
these events partly established the conditions for self-injury to function as a form of 
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escape or avoidance. For example, one participant reported experiencing flashbacks 
before self-injuring and two participants mentioned traumatic events that they had 
not fully come to terms with. It is probable that the consequences of these events 
influenced their most recent episode of NSSI.  
4.3.1.1 Establishing Operations  
Emily first cut herself on purpose at the age of 11 and had since self-injured in 
stages, while concurrently struggling with depression. Her self-injury, however, got 
‚a lot worse‛ after her marriage ended; she attributed this escalation and her most 
recent episode of NSSI to the stressful transition she was going through at the time:  
Emily: I think the type of stress I was experiencing was different<um it was a it wasn’t stress 
and anxiety directly related to to you know a um a clinical depression it was<it was 
related to n- to a trauma in my life you know<to to my husband leaving me<my life was 
((laughing)) cha- it was changing massively<um you know during that especially that six 
months<I felt like it was changing for the better<um but it didn’t make the the transition 
((laughing)) ((laugh)) easy you know20 
 
Maria had similarly experienced traumatic loss and her grief, following the 
unexpected and untimely death of a friend, most likely served as a distal EO for her 
most recent episode of NSSI. Although she recalled self-injuring between the ages of 
approximately 11 to 14 by banging her head against things and scratching herself, 
she had not continued to self-injure through her later adolescence. Indeed, she had 
only begun hurting herself again after her friend’s death.   
At the time of her most recent episode of NSSI, Maria was also supporting her 
flatmate who had been the victim of a rape and attempting to focus on a very 
difficult year of university studies. Although these stressors, from what she 
described as ‚the year from hell‛, combined to establish the conditions where she 
began self-injuring again, it is likely that only the loss of her friend functioned as a 
distal EO for her most recent episode of cutting because her grief remained 
unresolved: 
Maria: I think it started out of my frustration with my friend and not<just with her but with the 
                                               
20 The ellipses in this and all following interview extracts signify deleted text. Text was deleted when 
it was considered extraneous to the points being discussed. Standalone minimal encouragers (e.g., 
mhmm, yeah) were deleted as these disrupt the readability of extracts. 
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situation she was in<but I think what it really was for me<was the the grief of my friend 
dying<I think that was that was the huge thing ‘cos it was such a hard thing to grasp 
 
Although the effect of these distal EOs on both Emily and Maria’s subsequent 
episodes of NSSI cannot be conclusively determined, these events did appear to 
exert at least some influence over their engagement in their most recent episode of 
self-injurious behaviour.  
Along with distal events, participants talked about how specific proximal 
events or ongoing stressors, followed by the experience of negative emotions and 
thoughts, had motivated them to seek relief or release through self-injury. The 
events and conditions that served as EOs were typically unique to each person and 
included: fighting, or breaking up, with a boyfriend; being left alone at home 
without family for two weeks; experiencing an upsetting therapy session; moving 
back to Wellington; failing at university; ongoing physical and mental health issues; 
and changing to a different anti-psychotic medication.  
Each of these EOs was typically accompanied by intense, negative emotions 
and thoughts which culminated in self-injury. The accumulating impact of aversive 
intrapersonal experiences was summed up by Owen who described what led to his 
most recent episode of self-injurious behaviour, where he burnt himself on the hand 
multiple times, as follows: 
Owen: the reason I did it recently was because um was because I thought I was getting ill 
again<I thought I was getting unwell um I was on a med change and it wasn’t going 
particularly well<and um I just didn’t wanna um go through that again and and I felt 
like I was yeah useless and this was going to be the end of my life ra ra rarara ((sniffs)) 
um and so I um yeah so I just I d- I I just completely broke down really<and um just 
started to to do that 
 
When I asked Owen what indications he had that he was becoming unwell again, he 
identified that he thought he had heard a voice and had experienced ‚raw anxiety 
that is just really paralysing.‛ One of the reasons becoming unwell again was so 
frightening for him was because of his previous psychotic episodes which he 
described as an ‚open wound‛:  
Owen: if I refer to it people think ah why is he still talking about that why does it what does it 
matter<it was years ago you move on blah blah blah blah they don’t understand that it 
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was such a big trauma  
 
Potentially hearing a voice in the context of a medication change reminded Owen of 
the trauma of his previous two psychotic episodes. These memories were 
accompanied by intense anger at the unfairness of the situation, self-hatred, and self-
blame because Owen thought he had partly caused his Schizophrenia by smoking 
marijuana and partying too hard during adolescence: 
Owen: it it just didn’t seem fair<and I just hated myself because because for a lot of like it also 
links into the fact that I think um to a degree that I was a player in my illness<I dunno if I 
caused it but I definitely made it worse um so there was that feeling that because it’s been 
a real tough four or five years and so it’s the realisation that the uh you know the feeling 
that this is going to be like this for the rest of my life<um and that I’ve done it to myself  
 
Given his past learning history, it is understandable that Owen chose to burn himself 
in the context of such intense, negative emotions, self-recrimination, and 
catastrophising about what the future held for him. After all, a long, established 
pattern of self-injury since the age of 13 years old had reinforced for him that self-
injury was ‚the answer‛ to his self-hatred and depression: 
Owen: when you hate yourself that much or when you’re that messed up and you’re that 
down<the feeling of pain like just associated with with um the way you’re feeling seems 
it seems justifiable and it seems the way to do it<it seems the answer<it just feels like 
sort of what you deserve as well<it’s kind of weird but it feels like it’s what you what 
you um what you what what would feel the best for you at that time is to feel in pain 
 
Although some of the EOs experienced by Owen were unique to him and motivated 
him to self-injure because of his particular learning history (i.e., the possibility that 
he had heard a voice was especially anxiety-provoking because of the trauma 
associated with his previous psychotic episodes), other EOs, such as the negative 
emotions and self-denigrating thoughts that he experienced, were similarly 
described by many of the participants.  
 Anger, frustration, self-hatred, and self-blame were some of the most 
common emotions discussed in the interviews as EOs for the self-injury episodes 
and, more often than not, were accompanied by a range of self-critical thoughts: 
Ella: I was just feeling really frustrated and really really overwhelmed and really angry at my 
body<for um not working the way ((laugh)) it’s meant to I guess 
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Nora: I think the biggest thing was I was um angry with who I was<and I didn’t feel like I fit 
anywhere<in that I didn’t really have a place in the world<I just didn’t really like 
anything about myself or the situation that I was in<um and just thinking about um if 
people really actually did like me or if it was all fake<um and if my parents loved me  
 
Lucy: 
 
 
Robyn: 
Lucy: 
  
I was just really upset and decided everyone hated me and stuff like that<the stuff that 
triggered it was all just to do with kind of rejection and stuff like that<I was angry at the 
fact that what seemed like little insignificant things were still affecting me  
mhmm so when you’re feeling like that what kind of thoughts run through your head 
((laugh)) not very nice ones ((laughing))<useless worthless just stuff along those lines 
((laugh)) 
 
Tara:  I was kinda frustrated with myself because<I’m not normal and I just wanted to kind of 
be better and fine and that was all and so I dunno it was like a well it kind of was a way of 
getting over that anger and frustration at myself by doing that<I think it was quite a 
hateful thing to do to myself 
 
Josh:  I guess the main thing that really sort of triggered off me actually um cutting was uh it’s 
kind of a sort of disgusted at my own thoughts at the time<about how I was um sort of 
reacting to things at the moment<as far as uni went and um like that I’m not actually 
really trying at ((laugh))<at anything ((laughing))<I was just sort of uh trying to figure 
out why I was doing that which led onto thinking back to all sorts of ((clears throat)) past 
instances where I’ve been doing something and then kind of given up and then<um yeah 
sort of got quite angry at myself for that and um yeah just kind of got a bit disgusted with 
the fact that I was ((laughing)) doing it um which sort of turned into thoughts about being 
sort of useless<and uh not actually sticking anything through 
 
Paula:  um I think the main thoughts that were going through my head were um the areas that 
um have triggered my eating disorder for instance<um neglect from parents 
(unclear)<um disruptive childhood and um certain events that have happened<to me 
like um abuse and stuff like that and so those sort of things replay in my mind and<um 
then like the the thoughts of how much I hate myself 
 
Sophia: 
 
Robyn: 
  
Sophia: 
I think I probably just felt quite exhausted<um and um frustrated at feeling like I wasn’t 
coping<I think I felt angry...um directed at myself um yeah and  
when you feel angry like that about yourself<um what kind of thoughts would go 
through your head in relation to to that anger< 
<I feel frustrated that well it feels like to me that little things are affecting me<and I feel 
frustrated that I that even though I don’t want them to that they do<um and I think that 
probably leads to me thinking that in general I don’t cope very well<um as a person and 
that you know and and doubting whether how competent I am as a mum<um and how 
supportive I am as a wife and it it yeah it just I think it just brings into question lots of 
those things that I um put my self value on  
 
The combined pressure of intense, high arousal emotions such as anger and 
frustration, along with thoughts about being useless and worthless, led to people 
feeling overwhelmed and desperate to alleviate their distress. Ella captures how 
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intensely she felt prior to self-injuring in the following description of her reaction to 
ongoing health problems: 
Ella: I was quite indignant like how dare you ((laughing))<you know how dare you put me 
through this shit and<and why aren’t you doing what you’re ‘sposed to and why won’t 
you work and w- what the fuck is wrong with you kind of<so it was very um yeah it was 
al- almost as if I had taken kind of every shit experience in my entire life and 
compounded it into like hatred at this one particular area 
 
Another participant specifically linked her episode of self-injury to the 
intensity of her anxiety which manifested itself both psychologically and physically:  
Robyn: 
Melanie: 
 
Robyn: 
Melanie: 
mm ok um so er can you describe how you were feeling before you cut yourself  
um really anxious my mind was racing like it would take tiny little ideas<and just run off 
with them absolutely no reason<and yeah 
yeah yuh so you’re feeling really anxious what else were you feeling  
well I was quite upset considering<everything that was going on and<I think I was 
crying quite a bit and just really jittery and couldn’t settle myself down at all 
 
When I asked Melanie about the content of her racing thoughts, self-blame and 
worthlessness comparable to that experienced by other participants appeared to 
dominate: 
Melanie: that I wasn’t good enough I don’t know it was just my mind was racing so much I don’t 
really know what I was thinking<I was just all over the place all sorts of thoughts about 
not being good enough and<that everything was my fault sort of<jumping into my head 
((laughing)) 
  
Melanie explained that in the years that she has been hurting herself, self-injury has 
developed into a coping mechanism which she uses to regulate her emotions. Thus 
in describing her motivation for her most recent episode of cutting she simply said: 
‚I wanted to settle myself down‛. 
 All of the emotional EOs (e.g., anger, frustration) discussed so far could be 
categorised as negatively valenced, high arousal emotions. These emotions were 
typically self-referential and accompanied by negative, self-castigating thoughts. In 
addition to these high arousal emotions, some people also described experiencing 
negatively valenced, low arousal emotions (e.g., feeling down or hopeless) prior to 
their episode of NSSI, while others exclusively identified experiencing low arousal, 
negative emotions:  
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Ella: I was feeling really just self-destructive and just overwhelmed an- and really really 
hopeless 
 
Karen: I just got more and more overwhelmed and depressed<I was feeling really useless<I've 
just come back down to Wellington to see all my friends and they’re all really successful 
and have good jobs now and I've come back and I'm just a bum and I'm not doing 
anything and I'm stressing out ‘cos I can't pay my bond and ((laughs))<just um it seemed 
like everybody was on top of everything and I was just slowly drowning in it all 
((laughing)) 
 
Nicola: I think it was just like even just a day that I was just feeling like real<kind of empty<like 
just a day that I was feeling useless pretty much 
 
Paula: I remember how I was feeling and stuff like that<so I think that was just me so in-depth 
with being overwhelmed by being so depressed and stuff that I<I sort of felt dead<like I 
couldn’t feel anything  
 
Emily: it was still one of those things of those moments of getting stressed out and um feeling 
really down and and and fragile 
 
Natalie: I was feeling really really low<I was just alone for two weeks<I dunno it kinda just got 
overwhelming<I kind of felt like everyone had abandoned me ((laugh))<I kind of 
thought that I dunno maybe it was my fault they had gone away and I kind of blow things 
up in my head ((laughs))<it’s very annoying<so everyone was gone and then I was like 
ah it must be my fault<I guess it made me sad<that everyone was gone and then when I 
get sad I kind of withdrawal into myself withdraw<whatever the word is ((laughs)) and I 
kind of just feel like I’m an empty shell walking around 
 
Additionally, two participants, who were depressed at the time of their most 
recent episode of NSSI, acknowledged thinking about suicide prior to cutting 
themselves. Angela who described herself as having been in a ‚really bad episode of 
depression for a long time‛ and largely house-bound because of her intense social 
anxiety, explained how her suicidal ideation was linked to feelings of hopelessness 
and self-stigmatising thoughts: 
Angela: I didn’t self-harm intending to kill myself but I um had been thinking about suicide and 
things like that<so um with those yeah just all of that sort of going round in my mind 
that I wouldn’t be able to um live a a normal um normal life sort of have have a job do 
all<of the normal things sort of having the um thought that I’m not doing the things that 
most eighteen year olds should be doing<um and yeah just feeling very hopeless and uh 
not really seeing an end an end to it 
 
For the participants who identified thinking about suicide prior to self-injuring, it is 
possible that suicidal ideation was one of the EOs they were motivated to escape 
from through hurting themselves.  
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From people’s descriptions of what led up to their most recent episode of 
NSSI, it is clear that they had to contend with multiple EOs. None of the participants 
identified only a single event, emotion, or thought as the trigger for their self-injury 
but rather explained how numerous aversive experiences, what Luke described as 
‚layers of stress‛, established the conditions for their self-injurious behaviour to 
function as a form of escape/avoidance. Sophia summed up the emotional and 
cognitive maelstrom that preceded her episode of NSSI as follows:  
Sophia: my head’s just going so fast and<just knowing that I’m getting stressed or angry at you 
know but that my emotions are out of control and not<and not f- feeling like I can um 
rein them in<having that sense of um yeah yeah kind of a desperateness because you just 
feel like it’s just never gonna stop<like I just wanna go to sleep I’ve got you know I’ve got 
enough to do tomorrow as it is and you know there’s all this stuff and I should j- not even 
be thinking about it but uh it’s just gonna it’s just gonna get out of hand 
 
Her perception that the pressure would keep building up resonated with a metaphor 
used by two of the participants in relation to their general experiences of self-injury 
(i.e., not their most recent episode). They explained how one aversive experience 
would snowball into other negative thoughts and emotions, growing in size until the 
magnitude of the situation became overwhelming.   
Ella had a different way of explaining the mounting pressure of her 
frustration, stress, and anger; to her, it was analogous to leaving a lid on a pot of 
boiling liquid:  
Ella: I use the boiling pot analogy where if you leave the lid on a pot<and it just boils up and 
then<it just if you don’t let a bit of steam out it explodes and shit hits all over the kitchen 
you know 
 
Before her most recent episode of self-injury, Ella described herself as wracking her 
brain to come up with a solution to prevent the impending explosion:   
Ella: I was almost kind of desperately thinking you know I just need to do something and if I 
do something<it I’ll feel better 
 
In her self-described quest for ‚something to kind of take the edge off‛, she 
considered smoking (even though she had given up approximately a year and half 
before), overdosing on a bottle of sleeping pills, or drinking a bottle of bourbon, but 
finally settled on self-injury.  
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 Although Ella was the only participant who reported actively weighing up 
alternatives to self-injury, she was not the only one who tried problem-solving 
strategies. Nicola attempted to talk herself out of self-injury while Lucy went for a 
run to try to calm down. Unfortunately, neither of these participants was able to 
prevent themselves from engaging in self-injury. When I asked Lucy if going for a 
run usually helps, she replied: ‚Sometimes<but ((laugh)) it’s more just kind of 
preventing the inevitable ((laughing))‛. 
 The perception that self-injury was inevitable when people surpassed a 
particular threshold of distress was reported by several participants. Once the 
negative emotions and thoughts became overwhelming, a type of cognitive 
constriction (Schneidman, 1996) occurred where self-injury was judged by the 
participants to be the only solution that would result in relief: 
Nora: I did wanna stop but I knew that it was all I had at that time 
 
Lucy: I was just really upset mm I dunno once it’s in my head that that’s how I’m gonna deal 
with it I kind of can’t stop it 
 
Emily: I kind of get to this point and I know that I was gonna do that<you know and that doing 
that would mean that I could go to sleep afterwards...even though I know there’s gonna 
be a fall-out from it over the next few days over the next week but I felt like I was getting 
better ((sighs)) you know so I felt like well I’ll be able to deal with it by then but right now 
I can’t<and I need I need to do this 
 
This constricted cognition was exemplified by what two participants referred to as 
their self-injury mindset. When Owen was in the mindset, self-injury became 
compulsive and the ‚right thing to do‛:  
Owen: I would self-harm with whatever um by whatever means<um if I was in that state of 
mind<you’re in that mindset that it’s the only thing to do<and and that that um you 
deserve it and that you think of all the bad things that have happened and that you think 
you’ve been the cause of all these bad things<and so it seems like the the right thing to do 
 
Owen’s belief that self-injuring was the ‚only thing to do‛ was echoed by Melanie 
who described that she would get into the ‚mindset of thinking that every time 
something went wrong‛, the solution was to cut herself.  
Similarly, Nora attributed her inability to prevent her most recent episode of 
self-injury to the ‚headspace‛ she was in:   
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Nora: and I I was kind of like looking back on like you didn’t need to make such a big deal out 
of it but I know at the time it was just the headspace I was in and that was all I could do 
to<kind of get through<I knew that it would make me feel better at least for a little bit it 
would make all of that stuff go away like it would stand still for a little while 
 
The inability to think of alternative solutions when emotionally overwhelmed was 
also described by Sophia: 
Sophia: I guess it feels quite a desperate situation even though in reality it’s not<um and you 
know i- if I could be objective would be able to see other options<at the time it feels really 
really like it just feels like the emotion and the frustration or the stress whatever it is is just 
gonna just keep getting bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger and just it feels like I’ll 
self-destruct um and I feel like I need to stop that and um cutting although it doesn’t make 
me feel better um like its it it does s- stop that sense of it getting bigger and bigger and 
bigger<um but maybe it feels like I have had a bit of control of it 
 
Even Ella who was able to weigh up alternative solutions only considered harmful 
options, such as taking an overdose or becoming intoxicated, which potentially 
would have served the same escape/avoidant function as self-injury. 
4.3.1.2 Discriminative Stimuli 
 One of the reasons why people might have experienced constricted cognition 
is because of their verbal rules about NSSI. Verbal rules are SD’s that specify a 
particular relationship between a behaviour and consequence (Farmer & Latner, 
2007; Miltenberger, 2004; Sturmey, Ward-Horner, Marroquin, & Doran, 2007c). The 
rule becomes a SD because its presence makes it more likely that a certain behaviour 
will occur; that is, the verbal rule allows a person to discriminate when there is 
opportunity for reinforcement (Sturmey et al., 2007c). An example of a verbal rule is: 
If I cut myself, I will feel better. The rule serves as a signal to the person that relief 
(i.e., a negatively reinforced consequence) is more likely to be available if the person 
self-injures than if they do not self-injure. Several people provided examples of these 
rules in their descriptions of their most recent episode of NSSI, although the rules 
were rarely stated in cause and effect terms (i.e., if I do this, then this will happen). 
 Instead, I typically extrapolated from what people had said to identify rules 
that, in all likelihood, served as SD’s for their self-injury. People often talked about 
deciding to self-injure because they knew it would help. Ella commented that she 
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had let the situation build up to a point where she ‚needed to do something quite 
drastic‛ to calm herself down. To her, cutting seemed to be the most appropriate 
action at the time and it is likely that the thought that cutting would help her calm 
down signalled an opportunity, as it had in the past, for relief following the 
behaviour. Similarly, cutting seemed ‚like the best option‛ to Sophia because, as she 
stated, when she had used it in the past it had worked to help her release negative 
emotions.  
Four participants, however, provided more explicit examples of verbal rules: 
Nicola: I think it was just like even just a day that I was just feeling like real<kind of 
empty<and<I was just like ah uh uh a- that’ll help uh ((laughing)) 
 
Nora: it just progressed and then I got to the stage when I knew that it was the only way I was 
gonna make myself feel better was to cut myself so I did 
 
Tara: the idea just came of<of course that’s what I’ll do to make myself feel better 
 
Melanie: um I guess over the years I’ve sort of developed it as a means to cope when I do get like 
that<(mean) to settle myself down um<so yeah ((laughs)) I wanted to settle myself 
down ((laughing)) 
 
These extracts can all be interpreted as versions of the same verbal rule: If I want to 
feel better, then I need to hurt myself. These SD’s would have worked in conjunction 
with the EOs in that the participants were motivated to gain relief from their 
overwhelming emotions and thoughts, and the verbal rules signalled to them that 
this relief was accessible through NSSI, as it had been in the past. 
  A more detailed example of how particular SD’s and EOs interact to influence 
behaviour is evident in the effect that Emily’s inability to sleep had on her. In the 
past, she had found sleep to be ‚a real escape‛ but as she began recovering from 
depression, she found it more and more difficult to get to sleep:  
Emily: I think when when when you feel that releafs release and relief from from cutting usually 
what I’d find is that it would be uh so euphoric that it would tire me out<I found that 
that as I was getting healthier and as I was getting recovering from being quite so 
depressed<um if I was tired and stressed out and wanted to sleep I wasn’t I wasn’t g- 
able to do it so easily 
 
Emily’s desire for sleep was one of the motivating factors behind her episode of self-
injury: 
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Emily: it was still one of those things of those moments of getting stressed out and um feeling 
really down and and and fragile um where it was kind of like you know I kind of get to 
this point and I know that I was gonna do that<you know and that doing that would 
mean that I could go to sleep afterwards 
 
In Emily’s case the verbal rule appeared to be: If I cut myself, then I will be able to 
sleep. As such, the verbal rule (SD) and difficulty getting to sleep (EO) interacted to 
precipitate Emily’s self-injurious behaviour. 
 Other SD’s mentioned by participants were being alone; having access to 
implements to injure themselves with, or, as Angela phrased it, a ‚weapon of 
choice‛; and the time of day. Tara talked about how once the thought that self-injury 
would make her feel better had popped into her head the search for something to 
hurt herself with became all consuming:  
Tara: the idea just came of<of course that’s what I’ll do to make myself feel better and I think 
even as soon as that comes in I actually forget that I’m frustrated and it’s just like that’s 
the goal is of the feeling<is to then go and do that and so I then have to find a way it’s 
like this little weird mission of my brain’s that I’m on ((laughing)) that I’ve gotta find a 
way to then do that 
 
For her most recent episode of NSSI, Tara found a piece of glass which she then used 
to cut herself: 
Tara: I can’t trust myself when I get stressed out to not break the really expensive razor open 
and do something so at the time I didn’t have anything like that around and I think I 
found a piece of glass or something like that<and used that 
 
Although the SD (i.e., the razor), which had been present in the past when Tara had 
self-injured, was not available, she had also previously used glass to cut herself 
when she did not have access to other implements: 
Robyn: 
Tara: 
 
yuh so do you remember that time where you found the glass like the (unclear) 
yeah I think I was actively looking for it ‘cos I think I’d actually found I’d done that before 
when I had<no other options 
 
Pieces of glass had thus acquired discriminative status. Tara acknowledged that 
despite having practised other coping strategies, she became fixated on cutting as the 
solution, another example of constricted cognition prior to self-injuring:   
Tara: 
 
 
I can look at it and go I could’ve stopped myself from even going and looking for that but 
I just kind of was so set on the idea that once I’d done that I’d be o- like that I could then 
get over it and be fine<I didn’t really want to do it either because I’d been doing well at 
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trying to<I guess use other ways to cope and I was actively like practising those but I 
guess this time it was just ((laughs))<was a bit much<um and that was for some reason 
why I decided ((laughing)) that this time I needed to for that reason 
 
The power of specific SD’s to influence behaviour was particularly highlighted 
by two participants. Karen described how she was unpacking her belongings after 
moving back to Wellington when she found a ‚little box of cutty things‛ which, in 
the context of her feeling depressed and overwhelmed, signalled the opportunity for 
relief following self-injury:    
Karen: I found this little box that I've kept a lot of like razor blades and glass and things in and 
automatically it triggered me wanting to cut so um yeah I sat down on my bed cranked 
my music right up and I just started to cut 
 
When I asked her if she still had the box, she replied:  
Karen: yeah I do I don't know why I keep it um it’s almost like a memento of times past <and I 
mean I wouldn't use half the things in there ((laugh))<‘cos half of them are like gross and 
old ((laughs))<um but yeah that reminds me of it and I don't have the heart to throw it 
away 
 
 Jenny had a very different attitude to one of the objects that she had 
repeatedly used to injure herself. After her most recent episode where she had 
stapled herself in the hand, Jenny had made the decision not to use staplers at all 
anymore: 
Jenny: 
 
 
I made an informed decision after that that I’m not going to use that particular tool 
anymore<I call it a tool ‘cos it’s been it’s become such a threat to me<I don’t go near it at 
all<just just to be sure that I don’t do anything you know 
 
Sophia also reported trying to restrict her access to implements that she could use to 
hurt herself. The night before her most recent episode of NSSI, she had cut herself 
and had put the razor blades that she had used in a safe that only her husband could 
open. The next night when she wanted to injure herself again, she did not have 
access to the blades. However, she did have a small glass with her which she broke 
and then used to cut herself. It was not clear whether she had done this before. She 
had gone to bed early and being alone at the time may also have signalled to her that 
reinforcement would be available following NSSI.  
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 Certainly, being alone functioned as an SD for Paula’s most recent episode as 
she was able to buy razor blades and go to the beach where she cut herself. Usually, 
she was carefully monitored by her caregiver: 
Paula: the opportunity I got was when um my caregiver was at work ‘cos she’s quite the Nazi 
woman ((laughing)) [[Robyn laugh]] so she ((laughing)) she keeps an eye on me and she 
she’s usually really good on picking up on um when I’m out of control as such and I don’t 
have to say anything she can just tell<but yeah she was at work and so I saw I just took 
that opportunity and just I went on a walk and all of sudden the voice21 was just so much 
stronger and I was just so aching to feel that I went and brought blades and<I just sat at 
the beach and I tried everything to cry because I felt like I just needed to like all the pain I 
was holding was like I n- I needed like I I thought I should’ve been just sitting there 
exploding in tears and<I just couldn’t there was just nothing nothing was happening and 
so I just sat there and I just kept dragging it across my like my wrist and my arm and then 
I just yeah just let rip and did it really quite badly really deeply and stuff 
 
It is clear that particular SD‘s (e.g., being alone, blades) allowed participants to 
discriminate when reinforcement was likely following self-injury, but that this 
reinforcement was only desired because of the EOs (e.g., feeling numb). Nicola 
encapsulated this interaction between the SD of a craft knife and the EO of feeling 
down in a matter-of-fact way, when describing the lead up to her most recent 
episode: 
Nicola: 
 
 
I just broke up with my ex like<back then and it’s like always emotional you know like 
((laughing)) but um yeah and so I was down a l- ((laughing)) and I had a craft knife 
((laughing))<and its I cut my leg 
 
For Nicola, having access to a craft knife while feeling down led her to cut her leg 
multiple times, a behaviour that functioned as an escape from her negative 
intrapersonal experiences because it was followed by a sense of relief. 
4.3.1.3 Consequences 
 All of the 18 participants whose episodes of NSSI functioned as escape or 
avoidance from negative intrapersonal experiences reported a reduction in, or the 
elimination of, negative emotions and/or thoughts during or following their self-
injurious behaviour. After cutting herself, Tara described feeling almost as though 
she had ‚a whole new start to the day as if the rest of the day hadn’t gone so bad 
                                               
21 The voice that Paula is referring to is her negative mindset which she called her ‚Anorexic voice‛. 
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and<nothing else had really happened‛. The most common words used by 
participants to depict these negatively reinforced consequences of NSSI were ‚relief‛ 
and ‚release‛:  
Natalie: I guess it’s sort of like a relief a it kind of lifts my spirits a little bit 
 
Paula: just a massive amount of release 
 
Nora: um I think I was feeling relief 
 
Ella: I think um you know because of adrenalins and endorphins and stuff that you do get 
some sense of release from it 
 
Emily: I think it was the usual kind of just relieved and tired 
 
Maria: there is kind of a sense of relief I guess 
 
For Josh, the sense of relief that followed cutting was analogous to taking off a really 
tight hat: 
Josh: then when I do cut it’s kind of uh a release it’s like it’s as strange it might be ((laughing)) 
to describe it it’s like wearing a really really tight hat and then<taking it off and just 
going like ah<sweet you know sort of ((laughing)) yeah sub- it it kind of feels like 
that<um sort of yeah as a emotionally and it can feel like that physically as well 
((laughing)) 
 
In their descriptions of the consequences of self-injury, participants 
articulated several, possible underlying mechanisms of self-injurious behaviours. 
Some people reported that self-injury distracted them from aversive internal 
stimulation, thus providing respite from their intense emotions and thoughts. For 
instance, Nicola talked about how focusing on the act of cutting, to ensure she did 
not hurt herself too severely, was distracting: 
Nicola: I guess it’s just like takes my mind off everything ‘cos its like…I don’t wanna like hurt 
myself like really badly or anything<it’s like kind of like I guess your mind is on 
something q- quite intently you know<whereas and if if you’re finding it if like if I’m 
finding it really hard to focus on everything you know<and then I finally find something 
that I can like focus on 
 
Lucy similarly described being distracted from her thoughts and feelings while 
cutting: 
Robyn: 
 
 
mm so in terms of um keeping on those sort of same lines about talking about the feelings 
and thoughts when you had finished cutting<can you describe whether those thoughts 
and feelings say that led up to it change 
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Lucy: 
 
not really they always end up coming back but just like for a while it gives me something 
else to focus on 
 
The degree of respite experienced by Lucy depended on the severity of her self-
injury and how much pain she experienced: 
Robyn: 
Lucy: 
 
so how quickly do they usually come back 
depends how bad I’ve cut really ((laughing)) like<if it’s not bad they come back pretty 
quickly but if it’s bad sometimes it kind of take a couple of hours<‘cos I’m sort of 
focussing on stopping myself ((laughing)) bleeding and focussing on the pain 
 
While Luke also commented on the interrelationship between the severity of 
his cutting and the relief he experienced, he additionally described how for him the 
letting of blood was a cleansing ritual:  
Luke: I cut good and proper like<because I knew that I would feel relief and I did like it’s 
almost from the moment you hit a point it may be one cut or four or five and usually for 
me it’s about five<when there’s enough blood coming and and I can feel the sting of the 
razor and that it’s just like a it washes everything away<when nothing matters right at 
that time nothing<matters at all it even sort of afterwards and as I’m healing 
 
Like Luke, Josh also cut himself multiple times to achieve a release. He described 
how one of his techniques was to cut in the same place over and over as he found 
that the continuous pain provided him with a more powerful distraction. For his 
most recent episode, he had cut himself in three different locations, but had also cut 
seven to eight times in each of those sites. For these participants, distraction from 
emotional pain was achieved through the physical experiences of pain, witnessing 
blood, and wound-care. 
 Other participants specified that they felt emotionally numb during cutting, 
which provided them with relief from the chaos of their overwhelming thoughts and 
feelings: 
Karen: 
 
 
Robyn: 
 
Karen: 
 
Robyn: 
Karen: 
  
I was just feeling just numb and it was so much better than feeling ((laughing)) 
overwhelmed<and it was just yeah it was like a release just to feel numb just to get the 
headache out of my head kind of thing ((laughing))  
mm yeah so when you were f- you say you were feeling numb was that while you were 
actually cutting you felt numb 
yeah it was<and it was like I was able to think more rationally and everyth- all the 
problems seemed to go away  
ah ok so is that during the cutting or afterwards  
yuh that was during<it made me think what am I so stressed about you know 
((laughing))<all these things can be fixed 
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Robyn: 
Nora: 
mhmm so you kinda you said that you go numb<in what ways 
um I think ((sighs)) ((laugh)) it’s weird ‘cos I kind of find with cutting myself it numbs me 
but it kind of wakes me up as well<like it works in two different ways and yeah I think 
just the feelings that I got when I cut myself would enable me to just it just feels like 
nothing else matters and my head that was all cloudy and stuff<is just silenced and all 
the thoughts aren’t there for like a few moments<um yeah and it just numbs all the 
feelings that I had inside to one level that I don’t have to deal with at that time<um it just 
puts them into one thing<so I can not think about them 
 
For both Karen and Nora, the relief of having a break from their thoughts seemed to 
indirectly enable problem-solving. Cutting appeared to help Karen put her problems 
in perspective and as she said, ‚all the problems seemed to go away‛. In 
comparison, Nora still experienced similar thoughts following her episode of NSSI, 
but felt she was more able to deal with them because she was no longer 
overwhelmed by her emotions:  
Robyn: 
 
Nora: 
Robyn: 
Nora: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robyn: 
 
Nora: 
did you find that um your thoughts changed [[Nora coughs]] like once you had cut 
yourself 
um not really ((laughing)) 
not really 
no they were kind of yeah they were kind of still there<um definitely still there but I 
guess I felt like I could deal with them in a little bit more depth<um after I had cut 
myself<um it kind of I felt like it enabled me to get more of a clear headspace in terms of 
dealing with that and um not feeling so overwhelmed by everything that I was feeling at 
the time<yuh and just get clarity and try and pull out what emotion I was feeling and 
then be able to deal with that instead of it all being one big thing<and feeling like I 
couldn’t deal with it ‘cos it was so big and so hard um so yeah the thoughts were still 
there but I didn’t feel as if they were so big 
ok<so it sounds like the thoughts stay stayed pretty much the same but the just the 
emotions become more manageable 
mm yuh yuh um yeah and that enables me to kind of think about the thoughts more 
clearly and um what I can do what I could do to try and make them easier or better 
 
Melanie described a similar experience of being able to problem-solve once 
she was feeling less emotionally aroused and her thoughts had stopped racing. 
While she was cutting, she began to feel a bit calmer, and more settled and in control 
of what was going on. Following her episode of self-injury, she reported being able 
to think more clearly, and, although the negative thoughts of self-blame and 
inadequacy were still present, she did not believe them as much: 
Melanie: um and but you know I was able to think more clearly<about everything so you know I 
rang my boyfriend up and got him to come back so we could talk and sort things out like I 
was able to think<so it felt better<after ((laughing)) 
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While the majority of participants reported feeling distracted during or after 
injuring themselves, two people described being distracted from their thoughts and 
emotions following their decision to cut and before they had actually injured 
themselves. As detailed earlier in this chapter, Tara acknowledged that once she had 
thought of self-injury as the solution, she became so focused on finding something to 
injure herself with that she forgot about how intensely frustrated she had been 
feeling. Similarly, making the decision to cut impacted on Lucy’s mood:   
Robyn: 
Lucy: 
 
 
Robyn: 
Lucy: 
so what happens to those thoughts and feelings once you decide that you’re going to cut  
it differs sometimes they go away sometimes they don’t sometimes they get stronger and 
then kind of affects how bad my cutting is if they go away and I just kind of stop feeling 
it’s not as bad 
so this episode last night<did they go away or did they get worse 
no they went away 
 
In the past when the thoughts had remained present, she acknowledged that she 
needed to force herself to stop cutting. 
4.3.1.4 Summary 
 The majority of the self-injury episodes analysed appeared to serve an 
escape/avoidant function. Intense, negative emotions and thoughts, associated with 
both distal and recent events, established the motivation for self-injury, while 
specific stimuli (e.g., being alone, implements) signalled an opportunity for relief or 
release following self-injury. Participants’ ability to problem-solve and think of 
alternative solutions to their distress often became constricted, and verbal rules 
about needing to self-injure in order to gain relief predominated.     
4.3.2 Interpersonal Escape/Avoidance  
None of the participants’ most recent episodes of NSSI appeared to function 
as a way to avoid, or escape from, interpersonal obligations or responsibilities. 
However, two participants did acknowledge that they had been motivated to self-
injure in the past for this purpose:   
Karen: that's another way of self-harm for me is that I can actually make my potassium that low if 
I want to but um and I've done that in the past year I've just been so<miserable and I've 
wanted to hurt myself so I've done that I haven't done it deliberately to want to kill 
myself<I've done it make myself sick so I go to hospital<just to get myself out of 
situations ((laugh)) 
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Sophia: I have taken medications at other times and um taken too much medication<um and 
that’s often seems like quite a easy option because um one it it’s accessible and m- most of 
the medications that I have are s- sleep-inducing<um so it really is an escape in that 
sense<and it means that I’m also kinda out of play so if I’m feeling like I can’t cope with 
things that’s kind of a legitimate question-mark legitimate but le- uh uh in my head it can 
feel like that’s a legiti- you know I l- like I am like being actually physically sick<‘cos if I 
you know if I take a whole lot of um drugs that I’m not meant to take in that amount then 
it has a real physical effect on me<and I can’t actually you know like if if I’m awake I 
can’t actually function that well so I can’t be responsible for the kids so you know it kind 
of has that a follow-on effect 
 
Overdosing on medication as a legitimate form of escape had resulted in Sophia 
being hospitalised on numerous occasions. She described being in hospital as ‚a 
good break‛:  
Sophia: 
 
 
Robyn: 
 
Sophia: 
 
 
 
 
 
Robyn: 
Sophia: 
often just want to be um in hospital for a couple of days or you know something like that 
where the expectations like my own and what I think other people have on me I’ve got a it 
seems to then give a yeah give a legitimate reason why they they can’t be met< 
so have you been to hospital a few times<(from) medication and taking too much 
medication  
yuh yuh<yuh over the years it’s been quite a few times and um and although you know 
it’s never a very pleasant experience um it does mean that things stop <you know it does 
it does interject in your life and um uh you know often you’re constrained by what the 
medical staff you know what whether you know like like where they i- they’ll discharge 
you or not and so<there you know there’s those things that you kinda have to just go 
along with um<which are quite good ((laughing)) um yuh yeah  
kind of removes that pressure of decision-making  
yuh yuh<yuh it takes the responsibility away 
 
 Although both Karen and Sophia had purposefully hurt themselves in the 
past to escape or avoid interpersonal demands, they had self-injured using types of 
self-harm that would result in hospitalisation and which are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, it is worthwhile noting that they felt they needed to resort to 
hospitalisation to gain sufficient respite and, in Sophia’s case, to a type of self-harm 
that would render her physically incapable of carrying out her responsibilities as a 
wife and mother.    
4.3.3 Intrapersonal access 
Intrapersonal, positively reinforcing consequences (e.g., an adrenalin rush) 
were described by eight people following their episodes of NSSI, leading me to 
hypothesise that these episodes functioned as a form of intrapersonal access. It is 
important to emphasise that only one of these eight episodes functioned exclusively 
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as intrapersonal access; most of the episodes in this functional category also featured 
in the intrapersonal escape category.  
4.3.3.1 Establishing operations and discriminative stimuli  
The types of EOs reported by Belinda, the one participant whose self-injury 
episode functioned exclusively as intrapersonal access, were comparable to those 
reported by participants whose episodes of NSSI functioned as forms of 
intrapersonal escape. Although Belinda had an extensive history of NSSI—she 
reported that at one stage she was self-injuring up to thirty times a day by cutting or 
hitting her head against hard surfaces—she conceptualised her most recent episode 
of NSSI as a relapse. In the months preceding her episode of NSSI, she had 
experienced several miscarriages, which had served as distal EOs for her self-injury:  
Belinda: what led up to it was I was trying to have a baby and I had had two or no three 
miscarriages in a period of um like an- nine months<and they couldn’t find any reason 
why and I was really stressed<and I felt really it was just something for me to blame 
myself for I thought ah it must be me I’m I must<just be really stuffed up and wrong and 
um I think yeah I was internalising a lot of a lot of blame<f- for whatever was happening 
 
Belinda went on to describe more proximal EOs that motivated her to injure herself. 
She was preparing a salad for Christmas lunch when she burnt the sunflower seeds: 
Belinda: suddenly it just kind of all compac- compounded on me and I was going ah you’re so 
stupid you know you’re such an idiot and you know now you’ve burnt the sunflower 
seeds which is like a small thing but it was just like the last straw<and I just found myself 
on the floor of the kitchen basically smashing my head against the um kitchen floor<and 
it was just like really it was quite sudden ((laugh))<then I was was like ah it really hurt 
 
Apart from Belinda, all of the participants whose most recent episode was 
hypothesised to function as intrapersonal access endorsed experiencing relief or 
release from aversive intrapersonal experiences following their self-injury. The same 
EOs that I discussed in the intrapersonal escape section thus established the 
conditions for NSSI to function as an adrenalin rush. That is, participants were 
motivated to engage in self-injury while experiencing negative emotions and 
thoughts because past self-injury had been followed by desired intrapersonal 
consequences. Similarly, the objects or occasions that functioned as SD‘s (e.g., being 
alone, implements) for these particular participants, described in section 4.3.1.2, 
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would have signalled to them the opportunity for positive reinforcement following 
self-injury. 
4.3.3.2 Consequences 
In the context of Belinda’s learning history, I hypothesised that the pain of 
smashing her head on the kitchen floor was a positively reinforced consequence. 
When discussing her self-injurious behaviour, Belinda repeatedly described using 
self-injury as a way to punish herself:  
Belinda: when I have self-harmed it’s like yeah good you deserved that you<deserved this 
punishment and I really think that it’s been quite closely linked for me to um well right 
back to to being a kid but probably ((clears throat)) early adolescence<where um I had 
some pretty full-on experiences around abusive relationships an- and being told I was 
really useful and hopeless and crap<I kind of started you know internalising a lot of 
messages that I heard<um and repeating them and kind of becoming my own worst 
enemy and self-harm was a way of actually feeling that I had been sufficiently punished 
for being innately bad<or useless or stupid or<fat or whatever the hell it was that I I was 
deciding to pick on myself for at that time 
 
Belinda explained how the severity of her self-injury depended on how intense her 
negative thoughts were at the time:  
Belinda: the words are screaming in my head<um different phrases like um you’re st- you know 
you’re fat and ugly you’re stupid you’re an idiot so it’s a whole lot of words that actually 
screaming in my head while I’m doing it<so I’m not even really concentrating on what 
I’m doing<actually there’s just words screaming in my head telling me this and the 
louder they scream the more I would they’re not external they’re in my own head<but 
um the more I would the deeper I would cut or the harder I would hit my head 
 
Eventually, the cutting or hitting would alleviate her distress: 
Belinda: there’s a point where endorphin pain endorphin kicks in<and um you actually are at 
yeah you feel ok sufficiently punished<so you’re like ok well yeah it’s like this this this 
feeling of release<so if its yeah it’s this big huge tension release a bit of a endorphin 
high<you feel relaxed 
 
Belinda thus appeared to experience release through pain, which she stated ‚feels 
kind of good as well as painful‛. 
 Given that Belinda began hitting her head on the kitchen floor in the context 
of experiencing thoughts about being stupid and an idiot, the pain she then 
experienced, in all likelihood, would have positively reinforced her self-injury as it 
had in the past when she punished herself. Although she did not state that she 
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experienced release following her most recent episode, this may have been because 
her self-injury was interrupted by her husband who came running into the kitchen. 
Historically, she had only experienced release when she felt sufficiently punished for 
her perceived failings. If she had stated that she had experienced tension release, her 
episode of self-injury would have then functioned as both a form of intrapersonal 
escape and access. 
 Two other participants also discussed pain as a positive consequence 
following their most recent episode of self-injury. As I discussed in the previous 
section on intrapersonal escape, Owen burned himself most recently in the context of 
self-blame, self-directed anger, and the fear of becoming psychotic again. Self-injury 
provided Owen with a sense of release from his negative emotions and thoughts, a 
release he seemed to attribute to the pain he experienced while burning himself:   
Owen: yeah I was actually feeling quite quite good ((laugh))<I was feeling a bit of release<a bit 
um ((sigh)) yeah it just it felt right when it’s when it was when I was doing it<and so I 
kept on doing it and it felt it felt like um it felt like it was justified<as well like you know 
this was this is what I want this is what I wanna feel<it’s just what you wanna feel<you 
just wanna feel that pain 
 
In the context of his intense negative emotions, the pain felt good because Owen was 
motivated to punish himself. He noted how he would have reacted differently to the 
pain, had he not been experiencing self-hatred and self-blame:  
Owen: it’s weird because I couldn’t do it now<like if I tried to do it now I couldn’t hold it there 
that long<but when I’m feeling like that hatred or that intensity of emotion it’s feels 
good<it feels I can hold it there 
  
The EOs he experienced therefore had a direct impact on the value of the pain and 
because the consequence of pain was positively reinforcing, he was able to burn 
himself for longer.  
Self-punishment was also a recurring theme in my interview with Tara. She 
described sometimes using self-injury to teach herself a lesson, and that her self-
injury would increase in severity over time as punishment for not learning her 
lesson from past self-injury. When I asked what kind of lesson she was trying to  
teach herself, she replied: 
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Tara: hmm to be more like in control and more perfect and like ((laughing)) perfect’s a really 
bad word to use but I do realise that I quite often think that I should be perfect<um be 
yeah more in control of and better at things than perhaps I am<which is kind of an issue 
that I know I have ((laughs)) is trying to be really great at everything  
 
In regards to her most recent episode of self-injury, she acknowledged that pain was 
an important part of learning her lesson: 
Tara: straight afterwards I kind of was just sort of checking to see a couple of minutes 
afterwards it’s like that’s when I it does start to hurt and so I was like well is that gonna 
hurt yeah ok and I kind<of almost feel like I need that afterwards just to remind myself I 
guess still part of that teaching myself a lesson thing 
 
For Tara, it is likely that pain served as a positively reinforced consequence because 
it was evidence for her that she had punished herself sufficiently. 
Apart from pain, other intrapersonal positive reinforcers identified by 
participants as having occurred during, or following, their episode of self-injury, 
were experiencing an adrenalin rush, feeling alive, or sublime: 
Angela: you just feel a bit more alive when you’re doing something like that 
 
Nicola: uh it’s really bad I I quite I enjoy it like it<it is like it’s weird but it’s like kind of almost 
fun ((laugh))<I guess I probably feel like better A for adrenalin and what not 
 
Josh: (unclear) it’s sort of sublime  
 
Matt: I know how to get myself in into sort of the right state of mind where I can do it quite 
calmly<and just get the adrenalin rush<and then I burn myself and then I’m only 
focussing on that nothing else I’m just focussing on that pain and so I feel kind of calm 
and kind of high 
 
Maria: it felt quite exhilarating like<I mean I I think you know all the adrenalin and 
everything<as well you physically feel quite hyped up but then afterwards I’d feel really 
exhausted it was like but during it it w- uh um yeah it felt very exhilarating and yeah I 
just felt very I ‘spose alive 
 
Based on these descriptions, it is likely that these episodes of self-injurious behaviour 
would have been reinforced by the positive, internal stimulation experienced by 
participants.  
4.3.3.3 Summary 
 For a number of participants, positive reinforcers, such as experiencing an 
adrenalin rush following self-injury, appeared to go hand-in-hand with negative 
reinforcers, such as experiencing a sense of relief. In these cases, it seems that 
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negative emotions dissipated to be replaced with positive emotions. Pain was also 
identified as positively reinforcing for those participants who were motivated to 
punish themselves through self-injury. 
4.3.4 Interpersonal access 
Several participants identified that they had accessed attention, care, and 
support from other people following their most recent episode of NSSI; however, 
only two participants mentioned that they had been motivated to seek support prior 
to hurting themselves. Debra, who was the only person whose episode of self-injury 
appeared to function exclusively as a form of interpersonal access, had been visiting 
her ex-boyfriend when she became really upset. She left his apartment because she 
did not want to ‚make a scene‛ in front of his flatmate and sat around the corner of 
his building where she then hit her head repeatedly on the concrete in front of her. 
4.3.4.1 Establishing Operations 
 The EOs that Debra described were comparable to those identified by other 
participants whose NSSI episodes had fulfilled intrapersonal escape and access 
functions: 
Debra: I just I got really kind of upset I was with him in his room and I was just you know I was 
sort of thinking about what would be to come in the break-up like<and I knew how hard 
my previous break-ups had been so I was just thinking about how sort of difficult I was 
expecting it to be and I just got really upset 
 
When I asked Debra what else she was thinking, she noted her inability to problem-
solve when she is feeling upset: 
Debra: when I’m upset sort of my ability to to rationalise things<sort of just goes and and um I 
dunno like things that are that are sort of seem like little problems just suddenly seem 
really big and so I I dunno I would guess I’d say I wasn’t really thinking very 
straight<and I just I wasn’t thinking about what I was doing and I just yeah I was just 
thinking about how bad things were 
 
Although she struggled to remember exactly what she had been thinking, she 
guessed that it would have been: 
Debra: just everything is hopeless and I’ve just fucked everything up and like yeah I sort of felt 
like er uh he’d broken up with me because he wanted to be single<and so he said you 
know this is nothing to do with you<but I just sort of felt like I’d screwed up everything 
and I had no idea what to do about it and and that I was just that I was just totally useless 
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Self-blame and thoughts of being useless, which were antecedents commonly 
identified by other participants, thus also preceded Debra’s episode of NSSI. 
However, one of the differences about the episode Debra described was that 
she was motivated to self-injure in order to access support from her ex-boyfriend: 
Debra: I was just you know I was really upset that he didn’t wanna be together anymore 
and<and I dunno I mean I guess I sort of wanted to to show him how upset I was maybe 
but I also sort of just felt like like I didn’t really have any options I mean I mean he’d 
broken up with me I couldn’t you know it was sort of out of my control 
 
Other participants described accessing support as a result of their self-injury, which 
may have reinforced their behaviour, but they did not report self-injuring in order to 
access support.  
Another participant, whose self-injury was more likely to have been 
reinforced by the attention he received rather than by the concurrent negatively 
reinforced consequence he reported of feeling calm, was Matt. He was the only 
participant who had injured himself most recently in front of another person. His 
self-injury occurred in the context of feeling ‚deflated‛ because he had applied for 
two jobs and had been turned down for both: 
Matt: I was really I was sort of annoyed I was like so the journalistic world doesn’t want me and 
the government doesn’t want me and I guess my reaction was well fuck it I may as well 
just keep doing what I do it’s like this was gonna be excuse to straighten myself out 
to<act properly and I was like obviously I just don’t fit into that world I may as well just 
keep being weird and I was just like fuck it I’ll just burn myself again 
 
When he declared to his flatmate and her friend that he was going to burn himself, 
the flatmate’s friend requested his permission to watch: 
Matt: my flatmate was like ah I don’t wanna watch and her friend was like was like wow cool 
can I watch and I was like yeah sure um and so I put my knives on and I did like like three 
lines across my arm 
 
The phrase ‚I put my knives on‛ refers to what Matt called his ‚favourite way‛ of 
self-injuring; he would put two bread knives on a stove element to heat them up and 
then burn himself with the thin edge of the knives. 
Matt was atypical in that he had regularly self-injured in front of other 
people; Debra was the only other participant who identified that she had 
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occasionally hurt herself when others were present. Whether Matt self-injured alone 
or front of others depended on the types of EOs (e.g., frustration versus a desire to 
be the centre of attention) he was experiencing:  
Matt: I was more likely to be on my own when I was cutting<that I would be sitting in my 
room I’d be kind of frustrated or in a bad mood and I would just pick up my craft knife 
and I’d try and cut myself whereas the burning is more likely when I’d been drinking and 
there were like other people around<and it was kind of a show-offy kinda thing  
 
His assertion that NSSI could be a ‚show-offy kinda thing‛ was congruent with his 
declaration that when he was younger, he had viewed his self-injurious behaviour as 
a form of ‚performance art‛; a belief that had manifested in him posting a self-injury 
video on YouTube:  
Matt: I discovered YouTube and I thought it would be cool to like video myself doing it and 
putting it on the Internet and because I didn’t like I had two dots on my arm and I didn’t 
like them so I decided<to cover them over with a line erm and that was more just a 
performance thing I think 
 
Subsequent to his video posting, he had engaged in discussions with people who 
had left comments about his video and he had also told people about his posting. 
4.3.4.2 Discriminative stimuli 
It was also evident from the discussion I had with Debra about her history of 
NSSI that she had developed the verbal rule that if she hurts herself, then people will 
understand how distressed she is. She believed that she was a fairly unstable person 
and because she got upset often, she asserted that people were unable to distinguish 
between her varying levels of distress: 
Debra: I guess for other people it’s kind of hard to tell the times I’m really really upset from the 
times I’m just quite upset or whatever<and so  I dunno it’s sort of a like a way of 
showing people how upset I am 
 
This verbal rule, apparent prior to Debra’s most recent episode of NSSI in her 
acknowledgment that she wanted to show her ex-boyfriend how upset and sad she 
was feeling, would have served as a cue to Debra that there was the opportunity for 
her to access support following self-injury.  
Owen was the only other participant who explicitly reported that he had self-
injured most recently as a way of communicating his distress to others: 
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Owen: I mean maybe maybe if the probably the least likely but a little bit of attention<um 
because I was voicing that I wasn’t feeling very good and wasn’t very well for five days 
before I did it<and that I thought no-one was listening and the here I am getting unwell 
again and all the rest of it um so it was a little bit of that<in this time when previously it 
was it was none of that it was more just hate 
 
However, as acknowledged by Owen, support-seeking was not his primary 
motivation for self-injuring and therefore may not have reinforced his behaviour. 
4.3.4.3 Consequences 
 After hitting her head, Debra texted her ex-boyfriend to ask him to meet her: 
Debra: he came down and was hugging me making sure I was ok<he was there and that made 
me<feel better 
 
It is likely that his comforting response was positively reinforcing. Later on, when 
her head was hurting, she told him what had happened: 
Debra: I was like ah it was really stupid and yeah he was just like yeah I thought that you might 
have been doing that mm just sort of gave me a hug  
 
Compared with other participants, Debra did not identify pain as a positive 
consequence. Instead, she commented that the headache, which follows her head 
hitting, reminds her that it is ‚a dumb thing to do‛.    
Owen similarly received support following his episode of self-injury when he 
told his case manager what had happened. This consequence, however, was 
temporally distant from his self-injurious behaviour when compared with the other 
consequences (e.g., release of negative emotions) he experienced. Temporally distant 
consequences are less likely to act as reinforcers (Anderson, 2007) and, as such, it is 
more likely that the negatively reinforced, intrapersonal consequence of emotional 
release would have reinforced his behaviour, rather than positively reinforced, 
interpersonal consequence of accessing support. 
 In contrast, Paula identified experiencing a ‚massive amount of release‛ after 
cutting herself, but still felt dissociated, and as though her self-injury was not 
enough, until her caregiver came home and comforted her: 
Paula: she realised what I’d done and stuff and she cleaned it up and all that and she did make it 
feel a lot better<and just um was comforting me for the rest of the afternoon and evening  
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It is therefore more likely that her cutting functioned as a form of intrapersonal 
access rather than escape, even though the care and support she received from her 
caregiver was more temporally distant from the self-injury than the release she 
experienced.  
 Attention, rather than support, in all likelihood reinforced Matt’s self-
injurious behaviour. It was evident that he had received substantial attention over 
the years for self-injuring, which had partially served to maintain his behaviour. 
Given that he had been feeling rejected and deflated prior to burning himself most 
recently, the attention from his flatmate’s friend, who he asserted was really 
impressed by his ability to burn himself without flinching, most likely served as 
further positive, interpersonal reinforcement: 
Matt: she was really impressed ‘cos she was like wow you didn’t even flinch that was amazing 
but then I was like but that was kinda lame because I was kinda gonna do it anyway but 
the fact that she thought this was cool and wanted to watch kind of< encouraged me it 
was like yeah I’ve got an audience now I’m like performing<and then like her reaction 
like yeah that was really cool you didn’t even flinch I was just like yeah I’m tough 
  
Other participants similarly received attention from family, friends, or 
clinicians following their self-injury but in most cases it was not clear whether this 
attention was a reinforcing consequence, especially since these participants had not 
explicitly identified feeling unsupported or neglected prior to their NSSI episode. 
For some of the episodes, attention from others seemed to occur by chance, such as 
when Belinda received comfort from her husband when he interrupted her banging 
her head on the kitchen floor. In these instances, the person inadvertently 
communicated their distress to others but the goal of the behaviour was not 
necessarily to access support. However, the support that was received may still have 
served as a positive reinforcer for future self-injurious behaviour.  
 A few participants actively sought out support by telling people what had 
happened (e.g., Owen who told his case manager about the episode) and the 
attention they received may have reinforced their behaviour. However, in some 
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cases, the attention was deemed to be an aversive consequence when the people they 
confided in were judgemental and critical of their behaviour. 
4.3.4.4 Summary 
 Although some participants were motivated to seek attention through self-
injuring, for the most part they appeared to want to communicate their need for 
support. Matt was the only participant who self-injured specifically for attention 
rather than support. In some cases, the temporal delay between the self-injurious 
behaviour and the support received by participants made it difficult to assess the 
likelihood that these behaviours functioned as forms of interpersonal access. 
4.3.5 Aversive Consequences 
As I mentioned earlier, the aversive consequences of clinical behaviour 
problems are usually delayed (Goldfried & Sprafkin, 1976), which makes it difficult 
to ascertain whether they function as punishers. Despite this limitation, it is still 
useful to present the consequences that may have served as punishers for the 
participants in the current study because they provide insight into why people may 
stop self-injuring. Additionally, I will briefly review the aversive consequences 
experienced by the three participants who did not report any reinforcing 
consequences as it is likely that their self-injury was punished rather than reinforced.   
The majority of the aversive consequences22 that followed participants’ most 
recent episode of NSSI represented four themes: negative intrapersonal experiences, 
the wound and scarring, restricted clothing choices, and unhelpful reactions from 
others. Since my intention in this chapter was to focus on the consequences that 
potentially reinforced and maintained participants’ self-injurious behaviours, I will 
only briefly discuss the consequences that may have punished the behaviour.  
4.3.5.1 Negative emotions and thoughts 
Many people identified experiencing negative emotions and/or thoughts 
following their episode of self-injury. These included disappointment, anger, and 
                                               
22 Four participants did not report any aversive consequences.  
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guilt at having self-injured again: 
Karen:  I always feel really horrible afterwards like I feel like I've let everybody down ((laughs)) I 
feel like I've let myself down<and I think I should've I should’ve been better I should've 
waited I should've held on longer I should've done this I should've done that ((laughing)) 
<why have I done this you know I'll start reflecting and I always feel really guilty<I was 
so pissed off at myself when I did it a month ago I was like dammit it's almost been a year 
you know ((laugh)) I've just gone<and done it again dammit  
 
Natalie:  it’s more disappointment at myself<because I gave in<I guess<I get really angry at 
myself because<it’s not something I enjoy doing ((laugh)) 
 
Owen: the consequences really are<the realisation that you’ve done it yourself<that’s the stuff 
that’s really hard to deal with because you’re you’re you’re attacking the person that you 
should care the most about<and that’s that’s quite detrimental< also it made me think 
that I was going backwards in my recovery<which was quite damaging 
 
Nora: I think the most of would’ve just been with myself and<um feeling bad that I’d done it 
again and um yeah ‘cos I did wanna stop but I knew that it was all I had at that time<um 
yeah I think that was probably the biggest consequence was my own self 
 
All of these participants judged themselves negatively for their perceived failure to 
resist self-injuring. Moreover, Karen stated that her episode of self-injury ‚kinda 
opened a can of worms‛ and, as a result, she believed that she would self-injure 
again before the year’s end. 
 Aversive emotional consequences not only appeared to stem from 
participants being unable to meet their own expectations, but also from the inability 
to meet societal expectations. Tara, in particular, reported feeling ashamed that she 
had transgressed the social boundaries of what is considered normal, a transgression 
which then impacted on how she perceived herself: 
Tara: I mean at the time it’s kind of dealing with my feelings but then I have to afterwards deal 
with the shame that I’ve done something that’s not really<considered normal to myself 
and admit that to other people and<admit that even though at that time I did have other 
options available to myself because I had been trying other ways of coping I had for some 
reason I didn’t use that<and so it kind of in some ways it was kind of hard ‘cos it 
reinforces my whole thoughts of I’m not normal I don’t do things normally I should do 
things normally kind of<a little bit of a merry-go-round that I go on 
 
 In contrast, Ella was not ashamed of, or disappointed in, self-injuring, but 
rather was frustrated that it did not have the same effect that it used to: 
Ella: I guess you kind of you you go back to your old coping strategies<or your old comforts 
um habitually and so I thought I think I thought that it would do more than what it did 
<I think rationally um I kind of yeah I kind of thought well that was a waste of time um 
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<‘cos it it didn’t yeah I mean I ((sighs)) it helped a little but uh I don’t know maybe I’d 
talked myself into thinking it was gonna like magically<make me feel wonderful 
<which of course it’s not gonna do 
 
A couple of the other participants similarly commented that their most recent 
episode of self-injury had failed to live up to their expectations, which in Josh’s case 
led to him feeling as though he needed to self-injure again to get the desired effect:  
Josh:  the sort of main I guess problem with last week was um having done drugs<as well as 
um self-harm so it’s kind of um I didn’t get as much of the sort of sublime<feeling um as 
I normally would’ve<I just more s- sort of had like a uh sort of awkward feeling really 
((laughing))<normally I wouldn’t actually continually think about you know um it 
afterwards I’d just kind of ((clears throat)) go with the fl- go with it basically<whereas 
um yeah with with the drugs I was still kind of aware of<the reason why I was doing 
that which kind of made me feel like I needed to do it again  
 
Josh’s expectations of how he would feel following cutting were unfulfilled because 
of the dampening effect of drugs, whereas Nora’s expectations were unfulfilled 
because self-injuring did not solve her problems: 
Nora:   I felt quite bad because I knew that it hadn’t solved anything like<this problems that 
were there before it were still there<um yeah kind of disillusioned that they hadn’t gone 
<um and that it hadn’t just disappeared when I cut myself<that all the feelings hadn’t 
just gone<out of me  
 
4.3.5.2 The wound and scarring 
 Physical wounds and scarring were identified by participants as both short- 
and long-term negative, consequences of their most recent episode of self-injury. For 
some participants, the short-term consequences focused on the discomfort associated 
with the wound: 
Ella: it’s quite uncomfortable while y- you know you’re healing and stuff 
 
Debra: I guess yeah the times I hit my head my head is sore and I’m kind of just like well that was 
stupid this now I have a headache well that was a dumb thing to do 
 
However for Luke, the location of the wounds was distressing because they were 
difficult to conceal: 
Luke:  and yeah so this time<it was kind of disappointment<like ah too too many too visual I I 
got really upset with myself because they were too close to my sleeve line  
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The difficulties with having to conceal wounds were also associated with the 
aversive, long-term consequence of scarring. Angela considered scarring to be 
sufficiently adverse for it to deter her from engaging in NSSI more frequently:  
Angela: afterwards I um I don’t feel sad about doing it or anything like that because I think with 
depression well with mine anyway um there’s that feeling that you’re just you’re worth 
nothing basically so it’s not really that I feel sad about having cut myself but I k- I just 
worry about scarring and things like that<if that wasn’t a worry in my mind I think I 
would do it more often 
 
In contrast, scarring did not appear to be a deterrent for Karen but she did regret the 
permanence of her ‚marks‛: 
Karen : I think what have I done to myself these marks are gonna be here forever ‘cos I scar quite 
dark 
 
Of course, the potential for scarring was not a protective factor against future self-
injury for all participants; Nicola mentioned that the scar from her most recent 
episode had ‚pretty much gone now‛ so she did not rate it as a negative 
consequence.  
4.3.5.3 Restricted clothing choices  
Another set of possibly punishing consequences revolved around how the 
location of the wounds and the extent of scarring restricted participants’ clothing 
choices:   
Karen: and then of course it’s like ah no I'm gonna have to hide it now and gonna have to 
bandage it up and gonna have to wear long sleeves for however long< but of course if 
I've just cut ((laugh)) I'm not gonna walk around with a blatant bandage on my arm 
((laughing)) ‘cos that just makes it obvious and like<I don't want everyone to know so 
 
Tara: and I guess also um another consequence of it is that I think it was well it was just coming 
up to winter so it wasn’t so bad<but it means that I’d had to wear long sleeve tops for a 
long time 
 
Luke: I can’t wear a t-shirt for another three months<thank god it’s winter you know like<like 
I mean they seem really sort of surface but that that becomes a big issue<when you’re 
thinking about what you’ve done is ah god here we go<like no t-shirt again for three 
months like<that can be quite sad 
 
Lucy: the main problem’s just covering it up 
 
It was difficult to determine exactly why people covered up; multiple reasons could 
have motivated participants to hide the evidence of their self-injury, including a 
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desire to keep their behaviour a secret in order to retain control over it or to avoid 
being judged by others.  
4.3.5.4 Reactions from others 
Indeed, the anticipation of being negatively evaluated by others was one of 
the reasons Debra gave for not having cut herself more often:   
Debra: the times I’ve cut myself I sort of its it left a scar that stayed for f- three or four months but 
now<its sort of gone<which I am pretty glad about ‘cos I dunno I mean like I mean I’ll 
tell my close friends about it but I don’t want just random people<thinking I’m that kind 
of person<a couple of times when I’ve thought of cutting myself the fact that it would 
scar has been a factor in me not doing it because<I I mean people will really judge you 
about that kind of thing 
 
When Debra anticipates being judged as ‚that kind of person‛, it is unclear what 
type of person she is referring to. Other participants, however, did report incidents 
where they were judged for their most recent episode of NSSI; judgements that were 
often at odds with how they perceived themselves.  
  Both Karen and Ella were frustrated with how they were evaluated as 
unstable and mentally unwell by medical and mental health professionals:   
Karen: I was um in hospital um just after I’d done them like two weeks after I’d done them for 
something ah what did I go in for ah it was some kind of health check thing anyway um 
they the scars only just healed<so they were still a little bit new and um the guy was like 
I was like ah they’re two weeks old man you know and he‘s no they’re not and I’m like 
yes they are ((laugh)) no we need the CAT team now and it was like nah oo they ah for 
god’s sake you know ((laughing)) so frustrating like no they’re old I you know they’ve 
healed<so that kind of thing really frustrates me it’s like ask me first and take my opinion 
seriously ((laughs)) 
 
Ella:  when I said I actually feel like I’m ok and<you know I I did this yuh I I did this once and 
for me I feel like it was a slip-up and I feel like I’ve got past it and my psychiatrist went 
yeah but you’ve said that before and I was just like ah what the hel- like and it was almost 
like I was written off completely<and I was back to being that you know really small 
little crazy mental patient in the corner um just like that over one decision I’d 
made<which I was ok with ((laughs))<and then they couldn’t understand why I got 
angry ((laughing)) 
 
It was clear that being made to feel like ‚a small little crazy mental patient‛ or 
someone who cannot be trusted was an extremely disempowering experience for 
Ella and Karen, both of whom felt unfairly judged by clinicians. 
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 Owen was similarly judged solely on the basis of his self-injury when, after 
his most recent episode, he was questioned as to whether he was a ‚burner‛: 
Owen: my most recent episode I um burnt myself and then walking around and and everyone 
going what happened what happened<are you a burner are you wh- what’s going on just 
all that stuff made it me think nah this is really you know this stuff really isn’t what I 
wanna be about 
 
Having his identity reduced to one particular behaviour choice may have had some 
punishing value for Owen as he cites this as a reason for stopping self-injury. 
 Conversely, when Melanie was judged negatively for cutting herself, her 
reaction was to justify her use of self-injury as a coping mechanism. She had texted 
her ex-boyfriend to tell him what had happened and he subsequently informed her 
mother that she had self-injured:   
Melanie: ((laugh)) had a bit to deal with there when she came home ((laughing))<mm she doesn’t 
really understand it at all so<she was very upset said she thought I had got past all that 
and<that it wasn’t a good way to deal with things and ((laughing))<I sort of had to tell 
her yes I know that but ((laughing)) it’s a way to deal with things ((laughing)) 
 
The manner in which Melanie dealt with this altercation makes it seem unlikely that 
her mother’s reaction would have punished her self-injurious behaviour. What 
seems more likely is that her mother’s reaction would have acted as a punisher for 
her contacting her ex-boyfriend following any future episodes of self-injury.  
 For Jenny, other people’s reactions to her self-injury did not appear to concern 
her as much as God’s reaction:  
Jenny:  the only consequence really after that last one was I was afraid of how God might see 
me<because I kept asking him to heal me and<but I kept doing what I did and I’d done 
it the last time I was thinking I wonder what he’s thinking looking down at me thinking 
there you are I tried to make you better but y- what are you doing you’re still going back 
to it<and I felt an immense sense of responsibility for that that he might perceive me as 
being a very um I dunno arrogant in some way uncooperative maybe<just taking  
advantage of him<that was almost enough as a consequence for me that he might you 
know send something down on me or<punish me or in some way or be very unhappy 
with me  
 
What is particularly striking about Jenny’s admission is her palpable sense of self-
blame and belief that it was her fault for not being healed.  
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 Matt was the only person to experience an admiring reaction to his self-injury 
as a possibly punishing consequence. Self-injuring in front of his flatmate’s friend 
resulted in him feeling lame and immature:  
Matt: I felt immature<like that’s probably the same thing as b- feeling lame I just felt like I was 
doing I was doing it because it’s what I used to do and I had no other better reason and 
that eh and I felt kind of bad about the fact that I was like showing off to this person and 
not setting a good example<I guess the person who was watching me is a little bit 
unstable herself um she has her own way of dealing with things usually by getting drunk 
and you know I think the fact that she was like thought it was really interesting when I 
was doing it was like an extra reason it was like cool I have an audience<but I realised 
pretty much immediately afterwards that that wasn’t necessarily good for her and so I 
didn’t feel particularly guilty about it but again<I was just like ah that’s a bit silly that’s a 
bit stupid of me 
 
Matt’s realisation that he self-injured more out of habit than need and that he has a 
responsibility to set an example to those younger than him, may deter him from 
harming himself in similar situations in the future. 
4.3.5.5 Exclusive experience of punishing consequences   
As I mentioned earlier, three participants identified experiencing exclusively 
punishing consequences following their most recent episode of NSSI, which 
included feelings of shame, disappointment for giving in to the urge to self-injure, 
and concerns about the wound getting infected. These consequences were not 
substantively different from the punishing consequences reported by participants 
who had also experienced reinforcing consequences following their episode of NSSI.  
4.3.5.6 Summary 
 The aversive consequences identified by the participants reflected the 
following four themes: negative emotions and thoughts, physical effects of the 
wound and concerns about scarring, needing to restrict their clothing choices to hide 
the evidence of their self-injury from others, and experiencing unhelpful and 
stigmatising reactions from others. As such, the majority of these consequences 
stemmed from the impact of their self-injury on the way in which they viewed 
themselves, how they anticipated being perceived by others, and, in some cases, the 
way in which they actually were judged by others.  
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4.3.6 Summary of Interpretative Functional Analysis results 
Overall, the most frequently identified function was intrapersonal 
escape/avoidance, but many of the participants’ self-injury episodes were 
hypothesised to serve more than one function. Interpersonal functions were far less 
common than intrapersonal functions, with only a few episodes hypothesised to 
function as a form of interpersonal access and none as interpersonal 
escape/avoidance. Many of the EOs and SD’s did not appear to differ according to the 
function of the behaviour, but rather were the same across functions. For example, 
negative emotions and thoughts commonly precipitated NSSI episodes that served 
intrapersonal or interpersonal functions, highlighting the importance of individual 
learning histories in maintaining self-injurious behaviours.  
5. STAGE THREE: EMAIL OR TELEPHONE FOLLOW-UP 
Approximately two days after each interview, I contacted the participants by 
email or phone to once again thank them for taking part in the study and to ask them 
whether they had thought of anything else that they wanted to share with me. This 
was recommended by one of the consumer advocates I consulted as a way of 
checking in with, rather than checking up on, participants. I also hoped that by 
initiating contact with participants after the interviews, they would be more likely to 
contact me if they had any concerns or questions about the study.  
 Some participants responded to my email enquiry by sending follow-up 
thoughts on diverse issues such as their reasons for self-injuring, other people’s 
misconceptions and assumptions about NSSI, and the link between direct and non-
direct forms of NSSI. One woman emailed me the diary entry she wrote the night of 
the interview noting that she did not realise how much more she wanted to say. In 
her diary entry, she reflected on why she cut (e.g., ‚Cutting allowed me to escape‛) 
and the effect that it had on her:  
 I let cutting become such a big part of me, and lost my emotions, and sense of who I was, and 
any control I had over that. My body felt numb and empty, but my head was full, and cloudy, 
and heavy. Kind of like the air when it's about to rain. Cutting enabled me to let some of the 
cloudyness go, and left me feel fresh, kind of like the air after it's rained. 
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Other participants emailed to comment on their experience of taking part in the 
study: 
 Just glad to be a part of something that will help others. 
 
 I just wanted to say, thanks for the opportunity to tell my story. As nervous as I was, after the 
experience I felt very liberated and a bit less alien than before I started. 
 
I didn't think of anything else yet, that's probably the most I've ever talked about self harm in 
one go anyway! I felt good afterwards though, I think it was a good opportunity to process 
some stuff and reflect on it for myself. 
 
6. STAGE FOUR: FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE 
6.1 Participants and procedure  
Approximately two weeks after being interviewed, participants were sent a 
questionnaire (see Appendix G) to provide anonymous feedback about their 
experiences of taking part in the study, which they were asked to complete and 
return within two weeks. Twenty-three people (95.8%) completed their 
questionnaires; the one person who did not return their questionnaire later wrote to 
apologise that he had been away at the time. Unfortunately, I was unable to calculate 
the average number of days between the interview participation and questionnaire 
completion because the questionnaires were anonymous. Each person was posted a 
movie voucher for completing the questionnaire.23 
6.2 Measure 
 As I was unable to locate a previously published questionnaire that related 
specifically to how people had responded to taking part in a study about self-injury, 
I adapted the Reactions to Research Participation Questionnaire for Parents (RRPQ-P; 
Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002, 2005) for the purposes of the current study. The 
RRPQ-R consists of 12 items rated on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree and has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency scores of .78 to .80 
(Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2002, 2005).    
                                               
23 One participant received a $10 voucher for the Warehouse instead of a movie voucher because she 
had hearing difficulties.  
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 Nine of the 12 items in the RRPQ-P (Kassam-Adams & Newman, 2005) were 
included in the research evaluation measure used in this study. Of these nine items, 
two were taken verbatim from the RRPQ-P, one was split into two items, and seven 
were modified (e.g., ‚I am sorry I was in this study‛ was rewritten to read, ‚I regret 
participating in this study‛). A further seven questions were added to the measure 
(e.g., ‚The study was explained thoroughly to me before I took part‛).  
This resulted in a total of 17 items in the revised measure; participants were 
asked to respond to the first 15 items on a 5-point likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree). These 15 items focused on issues of informed consent, rapport, 
emotional reactions to the interview, and beliefs about study participation. The final 
two items were open-ended and asked whether participants had any suggestions 
about how to improve future research studies on NSSI and whether they had any 
other comments to add about their experiences of being in the study.  
6.3 Results 
 The results of the research evaluation questionnaire are presented in Table 3. 
All of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that they had given informed 
consent to participate in the study and that they knew they could skip questions or 
take a break from the interview whenever they wanted to. Only one participant was 
not sure that they could stop being in the study at any time. The participants 
reported feeling comfortable and respected during the interview. People were more 
likely to endorse feeling sad or upset, rather than distressed, as a result of 
participating in the study. Almost half of the participants agreed that being in the 
study had made them feel good about themselves and all but one of the participants 
believed that their involvement in the study was helpful to other people who self-
injure. Despite some people reporting that they felt sad or upset because of their 
participation in the study, 22 people did not regret taking part and all 23 participants 
agreed or strongly agreed that with the benefit of hindsight and knowing what it 
was like to take part in the study, they would still choose to participate. 
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Table 3  
 
Number of participants (N = 23) who endorsed each statement 
 
Item 
Strongly disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Not sure 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly agree 
N (%) 
The study was explained thoroughly to me before I took part. 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  2 (8.7)  21 (91.3)  
It was my choice to take part in the study (i.e., I could have said 
no even if other people wanted me to say yes). 
0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.3)  22 (95.7)  
I knew I could skip questions or parts of the study if I wanted to. 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  4 (17.4)  19 (82.6)  
I knew I could stop being in the study at any time. 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.3)  1 (4.3)  21 (91.3)  
During the interview, I knew that I could ask to take a break 
whenever I wanted. 
0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.3)  22 (95.7)  
The interviewer made me feel comfortable during the interview. 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.3)  22 (95.7)  
The interviewer showed respect for my feelings and experiences 
during the interview. 
0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  2 (8.7)  21 (91.3)  
I am glad that I took part in this study. 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  10 (43.5)  13 (56.5)  
Being in this study made me feel distressed. 4 (17.4)  13 (56.5)  6 (26.1)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  
Being in this study made me feel upset. 3 (13.0)  14 (60.9)  3 (13.0)  2 (8.7)  1 (4.3)  
Being in this study made me feel good about myself. 0 (0.0)  3 (13.0)  9 (39.1)  10 (43.5)  1 (4.3)  
I regret participating in this study. 17 ( 73.9)  5 (21.7)  1 (4.3)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  
Being in this study made me feel sad. 2 (8.7)  10 (43.5)  3 (13.0)  7 (30.4)  1 (4.3)  
I believe that by being in the study I am helping other people who 
self-harm. 
0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  1 (4.3)  12 (52.2)  10 (43.5)  
Knowing what I know now about participating in the study, I 
would still choose to take part in this research. 
0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  3 (13.0)  20 (87.0) 
 
160 
161 
 
 
Reasons as to why participants valued participating in the study can be 
gleaned from their responses to the open-ended questions:  
It was fantastic to partake in such an important study. Hopefully it will help ascertain and 
clarify what is going on in the minds of many young people who self harm, and what steps 
can be taken to actually support people who do. Self harm is a societal taboo in many ways, 
hopefully studies as these help to dispel the myths that even the medical profession 
sometimes adheres to still. We need to move away from the belief that asking people about 
their self harm is ‚dangerous‛ and will cause people to self harm more. There is no evidence 
to support these assumptions. Many people who self harm would probably rather people 
asked than made misguided assumptions.  
 
I’m really glad I participated. I haven’t had the opportunity to talk about these issues or 
process it for myself before. I felt ready to reflect on it and very safe and respected in this 
process. I hope the research is well received and helpful to others.  
 
I found that I felt quite relieved after the study as I’ve never really spoken about my self 
harming. It was good to get it off my chest and I felt like I was helping other self harmers out 
there. I actually really liked being in this study. It felt really good to be able to talk freely and 
openly about self harm, in an environment that felt safe and non-judgemental<Although at 
times, I felt a little bit sad and distressed, it was only slightly, mostly because of taking myself 
back to my experiences with self-harm, but I liked the fact that I felt that somehow my 
experiences may eventually be able to help others< 
 
I did not find taking part in this research to be at all distressing or triggering, and actually 
found it quite positive—helped me process. 
 
It was easier to talk about self harm in a research participation situation because it was more 
about being able to possibly help someone else, which bypasses the natural instincts to avoid 
talking because of feelings of no or low self worth or self importance. 
 
Taking part in the study thus appeared to be a positive experience for participants 
because they were able to discuss and reflect on their experiences of self-injury 
without feeling judged and, at the same time, they felt as though their experiences 
may help others in the future who are struggling with similar issues.   
7. DISCUSSION 
7.1 Forms and frequencies of NSSI behaviours 
The majority of the people who participated in the current study had an 
extensive history of NSSI and, on average, had used eight different types of self-
injury in their lifetimes. The extent of NSSI in this sample was unsurprising given 
that several participants were recruited through mental health services and a mental 
health consumer network, and the prevalence of self-injury is substantially higher in 
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psychiatric compared to community populations (Bebbington et al., 2010; Briere & 
Gil, 1998; Claes, Klonsky, et al., 2010). A number of university students similarly 
reported high rates of NSSI in the current study, but most of these students were 
currently receiving mental health support, or at least, had received such support in 
the past.  
Several participants reported types of self-injury that did not meet the 
definition of NSSI used in this thesis. Two examples of other forms of self-injury, in 
particular, warrant further discussion. To gain admission into hospital, Sophia 
acknowledged overdosing on medication several times; while Karen, who had been 
diagnosed with Bulimia, had ensured that her potassium levels were dangerously 
low (see section 4.3.2). Both of these participants were motivated to be hospitalised 
to escape from, or avoid, interpersonal responsibilities and, as such, it is likely that 
these episodes functioned as forms of interpersonal escape/avoidance.  
These examples suggest that restricting the types of NSSI to exclude 
behaviours such as overdosing may have decreased the likelihood of observing 
certain functions. Indeed, none of the participants reported self-injuring most 
recently as a form of interpersonal escape/avoidance. Further research is necessary to 
determine whether particular types of NSSI are aligned with specific functions.  
7.2 Is self-injury primarily an experientially avoidant behaviour within Aotearoa 
New Zealand?  
Functionally analysing participants’ most recent episode of NSSI enabled me 
to identify considerable homogeneity among complex, seemingly heterogeneous 
incidents of self-injury. The majority of the self-injury episodes were hypothesised to 
fulfil an intrapersonal escape/avoidance function, which is synonymous with 
experiential avoidance. In contrast, no episodes were hypothesised to serve an 
interpersonal escape/avoidance function.  
Access functions commonly occurred in conjunction with escape/avoidance 
functions. Only one episode functioned exclusively as a form of interpersonal access, 
while one other episode functioned exclusively as a form of intrapersonal access. For 
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the latter episode, the participant was interrupted by her husband while she was 
hitting her head on the kitchen floor. The behaviour may have fulfilled an 
escape/avoidant function, as it had numerous times in the past, if she had not been 
interrupted.  
While the findings from my Interpretative Functional Analysis are broadly 
consistent with the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) in that the majority of episodes 
functioned as a form of escape from aversive thoughts and emotions, they also 
provide insight into the ways in which self-injurious behaviours function that are 
undervalued within, or excluded from, the contingencies depicted in the EAM 
(Chapman et al., 2006). These insights include the importance of cognitions and 
clarifying the role of positive reinforcement in maintaining NSSI.  
7.2.1 The role of cognitions  
 Cognitions are not completely dismissed within the EAM, but Chapman and 
colleagues (2006) do maintain that self-injury is predominantly an emotionally 
avoidant behaviour. Additionally, they suggest that emotional avoidance may 
underlie attempts to escape from negative cognitions; in other words, it is the 
emotions connected to negative cognitions that motivate people to engage in 
avoidant behaviours. An explicit focus on the emotional precipitants of NSSI makes 
for a more parsimonious model, but has far-reaching research and clinical 
implications.   
 To date, researchers have largely neglected the role of cognitions in NSSI, 
preferring instead to concentrate on explaining how self-injury is used to regulate 
emotions (e.g., Adrian et al., 2011; Kamphuis et al., 2007). Models, such as the EAM 
(Chapman et al., 2006), may perpetuate this limited focus through deemphasising 
the influence of unwanted cognitions on self-injurious behaviours. In the current 
study, cognitions featured heavily in participants’ accounts of their most recent 
episode of self-injury. More research is needed to decipher whether specific types of 
cognitions and/or particular cognitive processes commonly precipitate NSSI.       
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 During the interviews, one of the most frequently mentioned cognitive 
processes to occur prior to self-injury was that of constriction. Cognitive constriction 
is typically associated with suicidal behaviours (Leenaars, De Wilde, Wenckstern, & 
Kral, 2001; O’Connor, Sheehy, & O’Connor, 1999) and is defined by Schneidman 
(1996) as: ‚a tunneling or a focusing or narrowing of the range of options usually 
available to that individual’s consciousness when the mind is not panicked into 
dichotomous (either-or) thinking‛ (p. 134). An example of constricted thinking in the 
context of a suicidal crisis is: ‚If this disease is incurable, I will end it all‛ (Walsh, 
2006, p. 13).   
This conditional, if-then formula is identical to that of the verbal rules 
discussed earlier in this chapter (see section 4.3.1.2), which suggests that cognitive 
constriction may be a key component of NSSI. Although Pattison and Kahan (1983) 
listed cognitive constriction as one of the symptoms of their deliberate self-harm 
syndrome, it has been largely overlooked in empirical investigations of NSSI. On the 
contrary, Walsh (2006) recommends differentiating between suicidal and non-
suicidal self-injurious behaviours on the basis of cognitive constriction. 
According to Walsh (2006), people who engage in NSSI typically demonstrate 
disorganised, not dichotomous, thought patterns, and consider NSSI as one of a 
number of coping strategies they could use. Participants in the current study did 
indeed perceive that they had various options available to them but these 
perceptions usually occurred in hindsight, after they had engaged in NSSI. When 
discussing their thought processes prior to self-injuring, many participants reflected 
on how it seemed that NSSI was the only option they had at the time to effectively 
cope with distress. More research is needed on how people reach the point where 
their cognition becomes constricted. For participants in the current study, this 
process seemed to occur when they surpassed a certain threshold of emotional 
arousal, which then interfered with their ability to problem-solve alternative 
solutions. Decreasing their emotional arousal through self-injury then facilitated 
future problem-solving and provided them with a sense of agency. 
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Understanding more about the role of verbal rules (as a form of cognitive 
constriction) in precipitating NSSI episodes thus has important clinical implications. 
As SD’s, verbal rules signal to people when reinforcement is likely to be available 
following self-injury and therefore help to maintain self-injurious behaviours 
(Sturmey et al., 2007c). Clinicians therefore may need to explicitly identify and target 
verbal rules in treatment.   
7.2.2 What about positive reinforcement? 
Several self-injury episodes appeared to facilitate access to positive 
intrapersonal experiences or support, highlighting the role of positive reinforcement 
in the maintenance of self-injury. As discussed earlier in this thesis, a number of 
researchers have investigated whether NSSI is a positively reinforced behaviour 
(e.g., Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2007; Nock & Prinstein, 2004) and results are consistent 
with the findings of this study, which suggest that positive reinforcement is 
important for some people. 
However, it is notable that positive reinforcement schedules were seldom 
evident in the absence of negative reinforcement. This suggests that co-existing 
reinforcement schedules operate for some people who self-injure, making it 
potentially more difficult to extinguish the behaviour. These results are consistent 
with Brown et al.’s (2002) study where participants reported multiple reasons for 
single self-injury episodes. Certainly, Sturmey et al. (2007b) contend that focusing on 
single antecedents and consequences of operant behaviour is simplistic as 
concurrent reinforcement schedules are the norm.  
Another important finding is that very few people engaged in self-injury to 
access attention, which is contrary to anecdotal perceptions of NSSI as an attention-
seeking behaviour. More typically, when people did report receiving attention as a 
direct result of self-injuring, it was perceived to be an aversive consequence. Only 
two people acknowledged being motivated to engage in self-injury to gain attention 
from others, although it is possible that some participants may not have reported 
such motivations if they perceived them to be socially undesirable (Nock, 2008). 
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Intrapersonal positive reinforcement, however, was more common. For example, 
experiencing pain in the context of a desire to punish oneself for perceived 
wrongdoings potentially functions to positively reinforce self-injurious behaviour.       
7.3 Strengths of Interpretative Functional Analysis 
The detailed functional assessments undertaken for this study provided 
valuable insights into specific antecedents (e.g., verbal rules) and consequences (e.g., 
attention) of self-injurious behaviours, which have been largely ignored, or at times 
misrepresented, in the literature. To my knowledge, no other researchers have 
distinguished between EOs and SD’s when examining the role of antecedents in 
precipitating self-injurious behaviours among typically developing populations, or 
conducted a group-level comparison of functional assessments of NSSI. 
Furthermore, interviewing 24 people enabled me to access a wide range of self-
injury experiences. 
7.4 Limitations of Interpretative Functional Analysis 
Conducting idiographic assessments allowed me to hypothesise about which 
consequences may reinforce participants’ self-injurious behaviours, but to qualify as 
a reinforcer these consequences would have had to increase the frequency of 
participants’ self-injurious behaviour (Dougher & Hayes, 2000). Since each 
participant was only interviewed once, I cannot confirm whether the hypothesised 
reinforcers actually did reinforce participants’ self-injurious behaviour because I do 
not know whether they self-injured again.  
Furthermore, several of the participants had self-injured months before the 
interview and the extent to which their accounts of their most recent episode were 
influenced by retrospective biases is unclear. The length of time between the 
episodes and interviews also precluded a more detailed behaviour chain analysis, 
similar to those conducted as part of DBT (Lynch et al., 2006).  
However, chain analyses are likely inappropriate for one-off research 
participation given that people frequently experience these as arduous; it has even 
been suggested that they may function to punish NSSI (Lynch et al., 2006). If I had 
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been able to elicit more detailed information from participants, it would have still 
been difficult to achieve absolute certainty about the functions of the behaviours due 
to the complexity of concurrent reinforcement schedules (Sturmey et al., 2007b) and 
the inability to manipulate specific variables. 
Finally, many more women than men participated in the current study, which 
is common in much self-injury research (Russell et al., 2010). In light of recent studies 
that suggest there are no significant gender difference in the prevalence of NSSI (e.g., 
Andover et al., 2010; Claes, Houben, et al., 2010), it is unclear why so few men 
participated. One possibility is that males may have felt more uncomfortable 
disclosing stories about their self-injurious behaviour in a socio-cultural context 
where NSSI is still viewed as a largely female phenomenon.    
On the surface, the process and functions of the self-injury episodes described 
by the male participants in this study did not appear different to those described by 
the female participants. Although the only participant to self-injure regularly in front 
of others was male, it is unknown whether self-injury as performance for others is a 
gendered phenomenon. One of the few studies to investigate whether self-injury 
functions differ according to gender found that men were significantly more likely to 
report sensation-seeking (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009); self-injury as performance could 
be a manifestation of this function. Further research is necessary to ascertain whether 
this is typical of males who self-injure. 
7.5 Is participating in a study about self-injury harmful? 
One of the difficulties of researching NSSI is the iatrogenic potential of 
questions about self-injury. Talking about self-injury is no doubt distressing for 
some people, and given that self-injury is used to cope with distress, it is a concern 
that people may self-injure following research participation. Although there is little 
or no evidence to suggest this is the case, assumptions about the harmfulness of self-
injury research are commonplace and, at times, are even perpetuated by researchers 
themselves: 
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Given the sensitive nature of the topic and the way the field has been dominated by 
quantitative approaches, it seemed clear that face-to-face interviews would be difficult to 
arrange and harrowing [emphasis added] for all participants. (Harris, 2000, p. 165)  
 
This perspective is antithetical to how the participants in the current study evaluated 
their research participation (see section 6.3); certainly, none of their responses 
indicated that the process was the least bit harrowing. 
While some of the participants did report feeling sad and upset as a result of 
taking part in this study, none regretted their participation. Instead, they stated that 
the research provided them with the opportunity to process their history of self-
injury in greater depth, as well as potentially help others who are experiencing 
similar difficulties. These reactions are consistent with a comprehensive review of 46 
studies conducted by Jorm, Kelly, and Morgan (2007) who found that participants in 
mental health-related research were more likely to view their experience as positive, 
than negative. Furthermore, positive reactions to research participation were largely 
independent of distress, which provides evidence that people may rate research 
participation as positive even if they do experience some distress (Jorm et al., 2007).  
However, participating in research specifically about self-injury may be 
distressing and, if so, the question remains whether that distress leads people to hurt 
themselves. Results from a recent study that examined the impact of screening 
questions about deliberate self-harm and suicidal thoughts on male secondary 
school students, showed that such questions did not significantly increase distress 
(Robinson et al., 2011). Only 9% of students reported that these questions were 
moderately or very distressing, with at-risk students reporting higher distress levels 
(Robinson et al., 2011).  
Aside from my research, only one other study to my knowledge has 
specifically examined whether questions about NSSI upset people who have self-
injured (Hanly, Pietrusza, Gluck, & Whitlock, 2011). University students with a 
history of NSSI were twice as likely as students who had never self-injured to report 
that completing a survey, which included questions on NSSI, was difficult but that it 
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encouraged them to reflect on their experiences (Hanly et al., 2011). Students with a 
history of NSSI were also almost three times as likely as those without such a history 
to report that completing the survey was a negative experience.  
In both of these studies, some participants did experience distress as a result 
of answering questions about self-harm or self-injury, but neither study tracked 
participants over time. As such, it is impossible to determine whether students 
coped with their distress by self-injuring. Further research is needed to ascertain 
whether research about NSSI has an iatrogenic effect and, if so, whether this effect 
differs according to the research methodology (e.g., anonymous self-report survey 
versus in-depth interview) or the extent of NSSI questions. Certainly, the few 
negative comments received about the current study were primarily in regards to 
the DSHI (Gratz, 2001), which participants found overly detailed.       
7.6 Conclusion 
Based on the results of this study, the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) is a useful 
theoretical framework for research and treatment purposes. In the majority of cases, 
it appeared that NSSI episodes did indeed serve an experientially avoidant function. 
However, more consideration of the role of positive reinforcement in maintaining 
self-injury is warranted. Furthermore, researchers and clinicians need to assess the 
interrelationships between cognitions (in particular, verbal rules) and emotions, to 
clarify the role of specific thought patterns in the reinforcement and maintenance of 
NSSI. 
In the following chapter, I report the results of a national survey conducted to 
examine whether people with a recent history of NSSI endorse affect regulation as 
the primary function of self-injury and whether intrapersonal functions of NSSI are 
more commonly endorsed than interpersonal functions. Additionally, I investigate 
whether participants report a change in their affect or cognitions following 
engagement in NSSI.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Quantifying the functions of self-injury  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Interpretative Functional Analysis presented in the previous chapter 
highlights the difficulty in functionally assessing individual episodes of NSSI. 
Despite this complexity, it is evident that self-injury did primarily fulfil an 
experientially avoidant function for the participants in my first study, thus 
supporting the overarching premise of the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) and 
providing preliminary evidence for the utility of this model within Aotearoa New 
Zealand. However, both aversive emotions and cognitions served to establish NSSI 
as a form of escape or avoidance. Furthermore, several participants described 
experiencing positively reinforcing, intrapersonal consequences of NSSI (e.g., an 
adrenalin rush) in addition to negatively reinforcing, intrapersonal consequences 
(e.g., relief), which is consistent with previous research (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; 
Nock & Prinstein, 2004). 
Both negatively and positively reinforced intrapersonal consequences 
dominated participants’ narratives about their most recent episode of self-injury; 
interpersonal consequences seldom featured. When interpersonal consequences 
were described, participants typically reported that these consequences occurred 
subsequent to intrapersonal ones. The time lapse between the self-injurious 
behaviour and the experience of interpersonal consequences makes it less likely that 
these consequences served as reinforcers for self-injurious behaviour (Anderson, 
2007).   
 To build on the findings of the Interpretative Functional Analysis, I 
investigated whether similar functional processes could be identified in the self-
injurious episodes of a larger sample of people living in Aotearoa New Zealand. For 
the remaining two studies of my thesis, I therefore chose to focus on quantitatively 
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testing the key assumptions of the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006), which are that NSSI 
functions as a negatively reinforced, experientially avoidant behaviour and that it 
belongs in a functional response class with other experientially avoidant behaviours 
(e.g., substance use). 
 For the current study, I first hypothesised that participants would endorse 
affect regulation as the primary function of NSSI (Klonsky, 2009; Klonsky & Glenn, 
2009). Second, I proposed that participants would endorse intrapersonal functions of 
NSSI more strongly than interpersonal functions (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004). My third hypothesis was that participants would report decreased 
negative affect and increased positive affect following NSSI (Klonsky, 2009). Finally, 
given the important role of self-referent cognitions in precipitating the self-injurious 
episodes I analysed in Chapter 4, I wanted to identify whether participants in the 
current study would report that the content of their cognitions had changed 
following their engagement in NSSI. Given that this has never been explicitly tested 
using quantitative measures, I had no a priori hypotheses as to whether shifts in 
cognitions would occur. 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Procedure 
2.1.1 Recruitment strategy 
Potential participants were invited to take part in a survey24 designed to 
investigate the thoughts, feelings, and events that lead people to intentionally injure 
themselves. I approached a number of community and mental health organisations 
and networks to ask them to post information about the study on their websites, 
weblogs, on notice boards in their offices or meeting rooms, and/or to include study 
information in their newsletters. The following organisations agreed to advertise or 
disseminate information about my study online, in print, and/or by placing posters 
on their notice boards: the Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand; Supporting 
                                               
24 Participants were informed that they could request a paper version of the survey if they did not 
want to complete it online.  
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Families in Mental Illness (Auckland); Supporting Families Wairarapa; Supporting 
Families Otago; Supporting Families Taranaki; Male Survivors of Sexual Abuse 
Trust; Balance NZ; North Shore Women’s Centre; Canterbury Men's Centre; 
Psychiatric Consumer Trust (Christchurch); Awareness (consumer group); Warmline 
(peer support organisation); Bipolar Support Canterbury; Regional Consumer 
Network (Auckland); Connect Supporting Recovery; Werry Centre; Eating 
Awareness Team (Christchurch); Auckland Sexual Abuse HELP; Kapiti Women's 
Centre; the Problem Gambling Foundation of New Zealand; West Coast Well 
Women’s Centre; Rainbow Youth; and the Youth One Stop Shop (Palmerston 
North). Participants from my interview study who consented to be contacted about 
future research were also invited to complete the survey if they met the inclusion 
criteria.  
I also recruited Psychology students from universities across Aotearoa New 
Zealand and gifted them each a $25 prezzy card25 to put up posters about my study 
around their campuses. Posters were placed at the Albany and Palmerston North 
campuses of Massey University, Auckland University, Auckland University of 
Technology, Waikato University, Canterbury University, and Otago University. I 
also put up posters advertising the study at various locations around the Kelburn 
campus of Victoria University.       
Depending on the format of the advert (e.g., print/email newsletter or online), 
participants were either invited to type the survey address into their browser or click 
on the link within the advertisement to be directed to the survey. Online surveys 
were completed through Surveymonkey. Participants were not individually 
reimbursed for taking part but could opt into a draw to win one of two iPod Shuffles 
(2GB).  
 
 
                                               
25 Prezzy cards are gift cards which can be used at most stores that accept VISA.   
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2.1.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
People were invited to participate in the study if they were 16 years of age or 
older, lived in Aotearoa New Zealand, and if they had injured themselves on 
purpose without suicidal intent, at least once in the past 12 months. They were 
excluded if they reported that their most recent episode of NSSI had occurred while 
they were experiencing psychosis (i.e., delusions or hallucinations) or mania. 
2.1.3 General ethical considerations 
 Ethics approval for the current study was granted by the School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington. 
Arguably, the most pressing ethical issue for the current study was the risk of 
participants becoming distressed as a result of survey completion and the potential 
for this distress to lead to self-injury. This risk was acknowledged in the information 
page that preceded the survey: 
Non-suicidal self-injury can be a very difficult topic to answer questions about and there is a 
risk that some of the questions asked may bring up past memories or feelings that are 
unpleasant or distressing. If you do become distressed while completing the survey, you can 
stop filling it in at any time. Also, there will be a list of options for further support at the end 
of the survey. 
 
Additional steps were taken to ensure the survey content was made explicit to 
participants so that they could make an informed choice as to whether to take part. 
For example, participants were informed that the survey contained lots of questions 
about NSSI and were given the following example: ‚You will be asked to think back 
to the time when you most recently injured yourself on purpose, without intending to 
kill yourself, and to answer questions about how you felt before and after that 
episode‛ (see Appendix H). 
2.1.4 Ethical issues specific to Internet Mediated Research 
Given that participation in the study involved completing an online survey, 
concerns specific to Internet Mediated Research (IMR; British Psychological Society, 
2007) had to be addressed. The following three IMR issues were identified as 
pertinent to this research: ensuring that participants met the inclusion criteria, 
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debriefing participants who exited the survey before finishing it, and potential 
breaches of confidentiality (British Psychological Society, 2007; Kraut et al., 2004).    
2.1.4.1 Meeting the inclusion criteria 
One of the risks associated with IMR is the inability to verify that participants 
meet the designated inclusion criteria (Kraut et al., 2004). To minimise the risk of 
people, who did not meet the inclusion criteria, participating in this study, question 
skip logic was used to direct respondents to specific pages based on their answers. 
When potential participants clicked on the survey link, they initially were directed to 
an information page about the study, which listed the inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
After clicking ‘next’, they were then directed to a second page which relisted the four 
inclusion/exclusion criteria and asked: ‚Are ALL FOUR of these statements true for 
you?‛ If respondents clicked yes, they were directed to the next page of the survey, 
but if they clicked no they were directed to a page that contained the following 
information: ‚Thank you for your time. Unfortunately, you do not meet the criteria 
to participate in this survey. Please close your browser (e.g., Internet Explorer, 
Firefox) to exit this survey.‛ 
2.1.4.2 Exiting the survey before being debriefed 
Another risk of IMR is that respondents may choose not to finish the survey, 
preventing them from accessing any debriefing information because it is typically 
presented at the end of research participation (Kraut et al., 2004). To address this 
concern, when people confirmed that they met the inclusion criteria for the study 
they were required to enter their email address before being allowed to proceed to 
the survey questions. Participants were informed that their email addresses were 
compulsory in order to send them a copy of the debriefing information (see 
Appendix J).  
This was not a sophisticated solution but survey functionality precluded the 
use of a pop-up debriefing window, which is a recommended safety strategy to 
ensure participants who close the survey early are adequately debriefed (British 
Psychological Society, 2007). Unfortunately, this method was not full-proof as one 
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person entered an incorrect email address and another person simply typed in a 
series of letters. 
2.1.4.3 Protecting anonymity 
Participants were assured on the information page that their survey responses 
would remain anonymous and would not be linked to their email addresses. To 
ensure anonymity, once participants entered their email addresses and clicked ‘next’, 
they were directed to a separate survey where they were not required to enter any 
identifying information. Additionally, to protect participants’ anonymity and 
privacy, their Internet Protocol addresses were not recorded. 
2.2 Participants   
2.2.1 Flow of participants through the study 
Figure 5 depicts the flow of participants through the online version of the 
study. Some people (N = 45) indicated that they met the inclusion criteria but chose 
not to complete the survey. There are a number of reasons why people may have 
decided against proceeding to the survey questions. After reading the information 
sheet, they may have decided that filling in the survey would be upsetting or 
perhaps that they simply were not interested in taking part. Alternatively, the time 
required for survey completion, which was listed as being no more than 45 minutes, 
may have deterred people from participating. However, it is also possible that 
people may have revisited the site later when they did have the time available to 
complete the survey.  
Requiring people to type in their email address before being directed to the 
survey questions may have been another deterrent. Although people were informed 
that their email addresses would not be linked to their survey answers, this may not 
have been sufficient to reassure some people that their responses would be 
anonymous. Given that self-injury is usually a secretive behaviour, other people may 
not have wanted their email addresses to be connected to a study about NSSI. 
As is evident in Figure 5, the number of people (N = 197) who consented to 
participate in the survey by providing their email address was one less than the  
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Figure 5. Flow of participants through the online survey.   
Self-excluded: did not meet criteria (N = 12) 
 
 
Self-assessed: met inclusion criteria (N = 246) 
 
 
Excluded (N = 49)  
 Did not enter email address (N = 45) 
 Repeat entries (N = 4) 
 
 
Implied consent: entered email address for 
debriefing (N = 197) 
 
 
Excluded (N = 36)  
 Spoiled survey (N = 1) 
 ≥ 75% of survey incomplete (N = 9) 
 Did not meet study definition of NSSI  
(N = 3) 
 Had not self-injured within past 12 
months (N = 22) 
 Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
diagnosis (N = 1)  
 
 
Included in general NSSI dataset (N = 162) 
 
 
Excluded (N = 10) 
 Did not meet study definition of NSSI 
for most recent episode (N = 7) 
 100% of most recent episode sections 
incomplete (N = 3) 
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number of people (N = 198) who actually started the survey. Although this could be 
a repeat entry which I have not detected, this is unlikely because I thoroughly 
compared entries using demographic data (e.g., gender, age, and region) to ensure I 
removed multiple entries completed by the same people. Rather, it is possible that 
the question skip logic malfunctioned and directed one person through to the survey 
even though they had not entered their email address. 
People were also informed that they could have a paper version of the survey 
if they preferred to fill in a hard copy. Only three people requested a paper copy of 
the survey and only one of these surveys was returned to me. This response was 
added to the dataset, which resulted in a total of 163 participants. All of the 
quantitative data analyses reported in this chapter were conducted using SPSS 
PASW Statistics (v. 18).   
2.2.2 Demographics and descriptive characteristics of the sample 
  The participants ranged in age from 16 to 62 years (M = 24.64, SD = 8.48) and 
were predominantly female (81.6%), with 27 (16.6%) male and 3 (1.8%) transgender 
participants. Participants belonged to the following ethnic group(s): 134 (82.2%) New 
Zealand European, 13 (8.0%) Māori, 1 (0.6%) Samoan, 3 (1.8%) Chinese, 4 (2.5%) 
Indian, and 28 (17.2%) other ethnicities. People from every region in Aotearoa New 
Zealand participated in the study: 54 (33.1%) from Auckland, 42 (25.8%) from 
Wellington, 23 (14.1%) from Canterbury, 18 (11.0%) from Waikato, 10 (6.1%) from 
Manawatu-Wanganui, 2 (1.2%) from the Bay of Plenty, 9 (5.5%) from Otago, and 1 
(0.6%) person each from Northland, the East Cape, Hawke’s Bay, Marlborough, and 
Southland. 
  Over half of the sample (60.7%) reported their current occupation as tertiary 
student, but there were a range of other occupations as well: 5 (3.1%) were secondary 
school students, 13 (8.0%) were in part-time employment, 21 (12.9%) were in full-
time employment, 20 (12.3%) were unemployed, 4 (2.5%) were stay-at-home parents 
and 1 (0.6%) person identified their occupation as other. The high number of tertiary 
students in the sample was reflected in the levels of education attained by 
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participants: 9 (5.5%) had no qualifications, 90 (55.2%) had a high school 
qualification, 4 (2.5%) had a trade/technical qualification, 38 (23.3%) had a degree or 
diploma, 13 (8.0%) had a postgraduate qualification, and 9 (5.5%) had other 
qualifications.  
  Participants’ sexual orientation, which was measured as a single-item variable 
based on Savin-Williams and Ream’s (2007) conceptualisation, was as follows: 90 
(55.2%) heterosexual, 38 (23.3%) mostly heterosexual, 15 (9.2%) bisexual, 10 (6.1%) 
mostly homosexual, 5 (3.1%) homosexual, and 5 (3.1%) asexual. Two thirds of the 
sample (66.3%) reported receiving at least one mental health diagnosis, with the 
following diagnoses listed in order of highest frequency: 95 (58.3%) Depression, 41 
(25.2%) Anxiety, 32 (19.6%) PTSD, 24 (14.7%) BPD, 16 (9.8%) Bipolar Disorder, 15 
(9.2%) Anorexia, 14 (8.6%) Bulimia, 9 (5.5%) OCD, 5 (3.1%) Substance Use Disorders, 
1 (0.6%) Schizophrenia, and 8 (4.9%) other diagnoses.  
  Among those who endorsed being diagnosed with one or more mental health 
disorders, the number of diagnoses reported ranged from one to six, with an average 
of 2.41 (SD = 1.28) diagnoses per person. This average may be slightly inflated due to 
the inclusion of PTSD and OCD as separate categories to anxiety disorders. The 
rationale for this demarcation was to ensure that people did not underreport these 
diagnoses if they were unaware that they qualify as anxiety disorders.  
 Finally, I used the first item of the Suicidal Behaviors Questionnaire-Revised 
(Osman et al., 2001) to assess lifetime suicidality (i.e., ideation and attempts). 
Participants were asked to choose one statement out of six that best applied to their 
experiences of suicidality. The majority of the participants had a history of suicidal 
ideation or behaviours; only 9 (5.5%) had never thought about or attempted to kill 
themselves. Twenty-three (14.1%) participants had experienced fleeting suicidal 
thoughts, 26 (16.0%) had made a plan at least once to complete suicide but had not 
tried to kill themselves, 36 (22.1%) had made a plan at least once and had really 
wanted to die, 25 (15.3%) had attempted to kill themselves but did not want to die, 
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while 44 (27.0%) of the participants had attempted suicide and had really hoped to 
die. 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 The Deliberate Self-harm Inventory 
 A modified 15-item version of the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) was used to assess 
participants’ lifetime prevalence of different types of NSSI. Modifications were made 
to shorten the measure and to address the issues that I discussed in the previous 
chapter (see pp. 101-105). Instead of asking about the age of onset, frequency, 
recency, and medical severity of each type of behaviour, I simply asked participants 
to endorse whether they had engaged in a particular behaviour, and, if yes, to then 
report the number of times they had engaged in that behaviour. Furthermore, after 
asking people how many times they had engaged in each type of self-injury I added: 
‚If you can’t remember, please estimate the number of times (e.g., 5, 10, 100) you 
have done this‛ (see Appendix H).  
Other modifications included collapsing some of the questions into single 
items (Lundh et al., 2007). Specifically, questions two (which asks about burning 
yourself with a cigarette) and three (which asks about burning yourself with a 
lighter or match) were collapsed into a single question, which read as follows: ‚Have 
you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) burned yourself with a cigarette, lighter, or a 
match?‛ Similarly, questions four (which asks about carving words into your skin) 
and five (which asks about carving pictures, designs, or other marks into your skin) 
were collapsed into the following single question: ‚Have you ever intentionally (i.e., 
on purpose) carved words, pictures, designs, or other marks into your skin?‛ The 
word ‚comet‛ (item 10) was once again excluded.  
2.3.2 Inventory of Statements About Self-injury 
The ISAS (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) was chosen to assess the functions of 
participants’ NSSI because it is the most comprehensive functional assessment 
measure of self-injury available. It consists of two sections, each of which can be 
used independently. Section one assesses the frequency of different types of NSSI 
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and contextual factors surrounding these behaviours, while section two assesses the 
functions of non-suicidal self-injurious behaviours. Only section two was used in 
this study.  
Section two of the ISAS is comprised of an index question (i.e., ‚When I self-
harm, I am<‛) followed by 39 reasons for NSSI. Participants are invited to respond 
to each statement on a 3-point likert scale according to how relevant it is to their 
experience of NSSI (i.e., not relevant, somewhat relevant, or very relevant). The 
statements are grouped into the following 13 functions subscales (3 items per 
subscale): affect regulation (e.g., ‚<calming myself down‛), interpersonal boundaries 
(e.g., ‚<creating a boundary between myself and others‛), self-punishment (e.g., 
‚<punishing myself‛), self-care (e.g., ‚<giving myself a way to care for myself by 
attending to the wound‛), anti-dissociation/feeling generation (e.g., ‚<causing pain so I 
will stop feeling numb‛), anti-suicide (e.g., ‚<avoiding the impulse to attempt 
suicide‛), sensation-seeking (e.g., ‚<doing something to generate excitement or 
exhilaration‛), peer-bonding (e.g., ‚<bonding  with peers‛), interpersonal influence 
(e.g., ‚<letting others know the extent of my emotional pain‛), toughness (e.g., 
‚<seeing if I can stand the pain‛), marking distress (e.g., ‚<creating a physical sign 
that I feel awful‛), revenge (e.g., ‚<getting back at someone‛), and autonomy (e.g., 
‚<ensuring that I am self-sufficient‛).  
For the purposes of this study, I changed the words ‚self-harm‛ to ‚self-
injury‛ in both the instructions for section two and the index question. The 
instructions thus read as follows: ‚This inventory was written to help us better 
understand the experience of non-suicidal self-injury. Below is a list of statements 
that may or may not be relevant to your experience of self-injury‛. The index 
question read as, ‚‚When I self-injure, I am<‛. These modifications were made to 
ensure that the terminology (i.e., NSSI) that I used remained consistent throughout 
my survey. Given that the word self-harm typically refers to all self-injurious 
behaviours, regardless of suicide intent, using self-harm interchangeably with self-
injury may have confused participants and confounded these two phenomena.   
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Although the ISAS was developed to measure the general functions of NSSI, I 
also wanted to examine the frequency and type of functions endorsed by 
participants for a single episode of NSSI. To achieve this, I invited participants to 
complete the ISAS twice at different points in the survey; once in relation to their 
general experiences of NSSI and once in relation to their most recent episode of 
NSSI. The instructions for the latter version were amended to reflect the requirement 
that participants answer only in relation to their most recent episode (see Appendix 
H).  
2.3.3 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
The expanded form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; 
Watson & Clark, 1994) was used to investigate whether participants reported 
changes in emotions following self-injury. The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a 
60-item measure, with 13 scales that assess positive, negative, and other affect states. 
Items are rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
There are two general dimension scales with 10 items in each: negative affect 
(afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, and 
distressed) and positive affect (active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, 
excited, inspired, interested, proud, and strong). The four basic negative emotion 
scales include: fear (afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery, and shaky), hostility 
(angry, hostile, irritable, scornful, disgusted, and loathing), guilt (guilty, ashamed, 
blameworthy, angry at self, disgusted with self, and dissatisfied with self) and 
sadness (sad, blue, downhearted, alone, and lonely).  
The three basic positive emotion scales are: joviality (happy, joyful, delighted, 
cheerful, excited, enthusiastic, lively, and energetic), self-assurance (proud, strong, 
confident, bold, daring, and fearless), and attentiveness (alert, attentive, 
concentrating, and determined). Finally, the other affective states included are: 
shyness (shy, bashful, sheepish, and timid), fatigue (sleepy, tired, sluggish, and 
drowsy), serenity (calm, relaxed, and at ease), and surprise (amazed, surprised, and 
astonished). As one of the most widely used measures of affect, the PANAS-X has 
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been extensively tested and consistently demonstrates excellent psychometric 
properties (Watson & Clark, 1994).   
Although the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) can be applied to multiple 
time-frames (e.g., past week, in general), it is not typically used to evaluate the 
affective experience associated with a particular behaviour. However, as I discussed 
in Chapter 2, one of the limitations of self-injury research is the tendency for 
researchers to use unvalidated measures. It was therefore deemed preferable to use 
the PANAS-X and amend the instructions (see Appendix H), rather than create a 
new affect measure specifically for this study, especially in light of the observation 
by Watson and Clark (1994) that varying the time instructions does not appear to 
influence the scales’ reliabilities. For the purposes of this study, I also modified the 
anchor point 1 to read not at all rather than very slightly or not at all as I wanted the 
lowest rating to reflect an absence of the emotion being measured. 
2.3.4 Revised Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
 The revised Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-R; Kendall, Howard, & 
Hays, 1989) is a 40-item measure that contains 30 negative self-statements (e.g., ‚I 
wish I were a better person‛) and 10 positive/neutral self-statements (e.g., ‚I’m 
proud of myself‛). I included the ATQ-R in the survey because the role of negative 
thoughts in precipitating self-injurious behaviour is seldom investigated and such 
thoughts were identified as self-injury antecedents in the first study of this thesis.  
The ATQ-R is designed to assess the frequency of automatic thoughts within 
the past week and, as such, using this measure to retrospectively identify thoughts 
before and after episodes of self-injury is unorthodox. However, in the absence of 
measures designed specifically for this purpose, I chose to use the ATQ-R for a series 
of exploratory analyses. Participants were asked to identify whether or not specific 
thoughts had occurred before and/or after their most recent episode of NSSI by 
simply responding yes or no. 
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2.4 Open-ended questions 
 Participants were also asked a series of open-ended questions to enable them 
to describe the antecedents and consequences of their most recent episode of NSSI in 
their own words. This qualitative component was incorporated to add depth and 
scope to my understanding of the events that may establish the conditions for self-
injury and the consequences that may subsequently reinforce NSSI. To determine 
whether a specific event had led to their self-injury, they were asked: ‚Did 
something specific happen that led to this most recent episode of self-injury?‛ If they 
answered yes, then they were asked to describe what had happened, when it 
happened, and how it made them feel. 
 At the end of the survey, participants were asked to describe up to five 
consequences of their most recent episode of NSSI and to evaluate whether they had 
experienced these consequences as positive, negative, or neutral. Consequences were 
defined within the question as anything that had happened after the person injured 
themselves that was caused by the self-injury. That is, the consequences would not 
have occurred in the absence of the self-injurious episode. This definition is 
consistent with operant principles, which define behavioural consequences 
according to their impact on the environment (Sturmey et al., 2007a).  
3. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
3.1 Characteristics of participants’ self-injurious behaviour 
 Despite simplifying the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) and explicitly stating that 
participants could provide estimates, some of the responses about the frequency and 
other types of NSSI were still challenging to interpret. Once again, I chose to err on 
the side of caution by including the lowest frequencies provided. For example, non-
numeric frequencies (e.g., countless) that were too difficult to quantify were treated 
as missing data; 10?, 10’ish, or 10+ were included in the data set as 10; 100-200 as 100; 
less than 10 as 9; a few times as 2; and hundreds of times as 100.  
I also adhered as closely as possible to Gratz’s (2001) definition of NSSI, 
which specifies that the behaviour results in tissue damage, when deciphering what 
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qualified as a form of other NSSI. This was difficult because what ‘counts’ as NSSI 
varies considerably between studies, particularly in relation to self-poisoning (e.g., 
drinking toxic substances or overdosing) and hair-pulling. I chose to exclude both of 
these forms of self-injury; self-poisoning because of its ambiguous relationship to 
suicide (Brown et al., 2004; Freedenthal, 2007) and hair-pulling because it is currently 
classified within the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) as 
trichotillomania. Furthermore, people did not always state the severity of their self-
poisoning or hair-pulling behaviours and, as a result, it was unclear whether tissue 
damage resulted from these behaviours.  
When reporting types of NSSI within the other category, some participants 
disclosed that tissue damage had occurred (e.g., ‚rubbed a key over my skin – 
forming large graze‛, ‚slammed hand in a door repeatedly, intending to break it but 
only soft tissue injury‛), while others listed behaviours where tissue damage was 
implied but not directly stated (e.g., ‚dislocated my fingers/thumbs‛, ‚poured cup of 
boiling water onto arms‛), or highly probable because of the type of injury (e.g., 
‚threw myself down the stairs‛, ‚swallowed glass‛) . 
All behaviours where tissue damage was directly stated, implied, or highly 
probable were included. Behaviours where the occurrence of tissue damage was 
ambiguous (e.g., slapping oneself) were excluded. Finally, some participants 
reported other self-injury where the form, but not the implement used to carry out 
the injury, was listed in the DSHI. For example, the DSHI specifies burning oneself 
with a cigarette, lighter, or match. Some participants thus reported burning 
themselves with petrol, an iron, or hair straighteners in the other self-injury 
question. These responses were included in the dataset, which may have resulted in 
a slight inflation in the types of NSSI reported by participants. 
3.1.1 Global NSSI episodes 
The mean age of onset for NSSI was 14.45 years (SD = 4.42) and ranged from 4 
to 41 years of age. Participants reported having engaged in an average of 5.75 (SD = 
2.66) different types of NSSI, although this ranged from one to 14 types. As can be 
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Table 4  
 
Frequencies of different types of NSSI 
 
NSSI type 
N (%) reporting 
NSSI type 
 
Frequency of participants’ engagement in NSSI types 
Never 1 time 2-10 times 11-50 times >50 times 
Cutting wrists, arms, or other areas of body 144 (88.3%)  19 (11.7%) 0 (0.0%) 39 (23.9%) 42 (25.8%) 62 (38.0%) 
Severe scratching to extent of bleeding/scarring 116 (71.2%)  46 (28.2%) 3 (1.8%) 59 (36.2%) 31 (19.0%) 20 (12.3%) 
Sticking sharp objects into skin 102 (62.6%)  60 (36.8%) 1 (0.6%) 64 (39.3%) 27 (16.6%) 7 (4.3%) 
Carving words/pictures/designs/marks into skin 97 (59.5%)  64 (39.3%) 13 (8.0%) 65 (39.9%) 16 (9.8%) 3 (1.8%) 
Preventing wounds from healing 98 (60.1%)  65 (39.9%) 1 (0.6%) 27 (16.6%) 36 (22.1%) 25 (15.3%) 
Punching to extent of bruising 86 (52.8%)  78 (47.9%) 9 (5.5%) 42 (25.8%) 21 (12.9%) 8 (4.9%) 
Banging head to extent of bruising 72 (44.2%)  90 (55.2%) 8 (4.9%) 42 (25.8%) 17 (10.4%) 2 (1.2%) 
Burning with cigarette/lighter/match 71 (43.6%)  92 (56.4%) 4 (2.5%) 46 (28.2%) 16 (9.8%) 3 (1.8%) 
Biting to extent of breaking skin 57 (35.0%)  105 (64.4%) 13 (8.0%) 30 (18.4%) 13 (8.0%) 1 (0.6%) 
Rubbing glass into skin 29 (17.8%)  133 (81.6%) 6 (3.7%) 15 (9.2%) 6 (3.7%) 2 (1.2%) 
Rubbing sandpaper on body 12 (7.4%)  149 (91.4%) 3 (1.8%) 7 (4.3%) 1 (0.6%) 1 (0.6%) 
Dripping acid onto skin 6 (3.7%)  155 (95.1%) 4 (2.5%) 1 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Breaking own bones 5 (3.1%)  156 (95.7%) 4 (2.5%) 1 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Using bleach/ oven cleaner to scrub skin 6 (3.7%)  157 (96.3%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (2.5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.6%) 
 
Note. N reporting NSSI type may not equal frequencies of engagement as some participants endorsed type of NSSI but did not report frequency. Frequencies may not add up 
to 100% because of missing data.  
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seen in Table 4, the most common form of self-injury was cutting, which was 
endorsed by 88.3% of the participants, followed by severe scratching to the extent of 
bleeding or scarring (71.2%); sticking sharp objects into one’s skin (62.6%); and 
carving words, pictures, designs, or other marks into one’s skin (59.5%). The least 
common forms of self-injury were dripping acid onto one’s skin, breaking one’s own 
bones, and using bleach or oven cleaner to scrub one’s skin; only 3% of the 
participants endorsed engaging in these types of NSSI one or more times. 
Additionally, 37 (22.7%) of the participants reported having engaged in at 
least one other form of self-injury, such as swallowing glass, punching walls, and 
dislocating fingers. Similarly to the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) data presented in Chapter 4, 
the frequencies of NSSI behaviours in the current study were grouped into five 
categories (see Table 4).  
3.1.2 Most recent NSSI episode 
To assess how participants had self-injured most recently, they were 
presented with a list of self-injurious behaviours identical to those in the modified 
version of the DSHI (Gratz, 2001), which was described in section 2.4.1, and asked to 
endorse any behaviours that applied to their episode. They were asked to identify 
whether the injury had been severe enough to require medical treatment, if they told 
anyone that they had self-injured, and whether they had used drugs or alcohol prior 
to self-injuring. The frequencies of NSSI types for participants’ most recent episode 
of self-injury are presented in Table 5.  
Participants reported engaging in a range of NSSI types for their most recent 
episode of self-injury, with the most common type being cutting (65.6%), followed 
by severe scratching (21.5%) and carving words, pictures, designs, or other marks 
into the skin (16.0%). The least commonly endorsed types of NSSI were biting (4.3%), 
rubbing sandpaper on the body (1.2%), and scrubbing the skin with bleach or oven 
cleaner (0.6%). A further six (3.7%) people reported engaging in other forms of NSSI 
(e.g., punching walls) for their most recent episode. No-one endorsed injuring 
187 
 
 
themselves most recently by rubbing glass into, or dripping acid onto, their skin or 
by breaking their own bones. 
Table 5 
 
Frequencies of different types of NSSI for participants’ most recent episode  
 
NSSI type  N (%) 
Cutting wrists, arms, or other areas of body  107 (65.6%) 
Severe scratching to extent of bleeding/scarring  35 (21.5%) 
Carving words/pictures/designs/marks into skin  26 (16.0%) 
Punching to extent of bruising  20 (12.3%) 
Sticking sharp objects into skin  16 (9.8%) 
Preventing wounds from healing  16 (9.8%) 
Banging head to extent of bruising  13 (8.0%) 
Burning with cigarette/lighter/match  10 (6.1%) 
Biting to extent of breaking skin  7 (4.3%) 
Rubbing sandpaper on body  2 (1.2%) 
Using bleach/oven cleaner to scrub skin  1 (0.6%) 
Rubbing glass into skin  0 (0.0%) 
Dripping acid onto skin  0 (0.0%) 
Breaking own bones  0 (0.0%) 
 
Note. Frequencies total more than 100% because some participants reported using multiple types of NSSI during 
their most recent episode.  
 
On average, people reported using 1.69 (SD = 1.04) types of self-injury during 
their most recent episode; this ranged from one to six types. The mean number of 
days that had elapsed between participants completing the survey and their most 
recent episode of NSSI was 81.06 (SD = 85.20) with a range of zero to 359 days. 
Approximately 15% of participants reported that their injury was severe enough to 
require medical treatment but it is unknown whether they actually received 
treatment. 
  Almost a third of the participants (30.1%) told someone that they had hurt 
themselves on purpose; 20 (12.3%) participants told their mental health clinician 
(e.g., psychologist, social worker), 19 (11.7%) told a friend, and seven (4.3%) told 
their partner or spouse. A few participants told their health professional (3.7%), 
boyfriend/girlfriend (2.5%), others such as an online friend (2.5%), a co-worker 
(1.8%), parent (1.8%), sibling (1.2%), or another relative, teacher/lecturer, or 
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acquaintance (all 0.6%). The majority of participants did not consume more than two 
standard drinks of alcohol (74.8%), take in excess of a recommended dosage of 
medication (85.9%), or use illegal drugs (91.4%) before injuring themselves.  
3.2 Is affect regulation the primary function of NSSI? 
Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for the ISAS (Klonsky & 
Glenn, 2009) in reference to participants’ global and most recent NSSI episodes are 
presented in Table 6. I have tabulated these results side-by-side to allow for ease of 
comparison, but will discuss the results for the global and most recent episodes of 
NSSI separately.    
3.2.1 Self-reported functions of participants’ global NSSI episodes 
As is evident from the skewness and kurtosis values presented in Table 6, 
visual inspection of the histograms and Q-Q plots of each of the 13 ISAS subscales 
indicated that none of the data was normally distributed. Rather, the majority of the 
subscales were skewed to the right. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with Lilliefor’s 
correction (Field, 2009) confirmed that all subscales were significantly non-normal, 
D’s(162-163) ≥ .13 (p’s < .001). Given that the assumption of normality was violated 
for all subscales, non-parametric statistics were used.  
Prior to beginning the non-parametric analyses, I calculated the means and 
standard deviations of each of the subscales to allow for comparisons with other 
studies. Affect regulation (M = 4.65, SD = 1.61), self-punishment (M = 4.17, SD = 1.90), 
and marking distress (M = 2.80, SD = 1.97) were the most highly endorsed functions, 
while sensation-seeking (M = 0.75, SD = 1.17), revenge (M = 0.66, SD = 1.22), and 
peer-bonding (M = 0.15, SD = 0.57) were the least endorsed functions.  
Comparable results were obtained through other measures of central 
tendency—the median and mean rank—that do not rely on the assumption of 
normality. For example, affect regulation and self-punishment both had the highest 
median of 5 with mean ranks of 11.43 and 10.94 respectively. The third most 
endorsed item, marking distress, had a median of 3 and a mean rank of 8.98.
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Table 6 
 
Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for the ISAS in reference to participants’ global and most recent episodes of NSSI 
 
 Global episodes (N = 163)* 
 
Most recent episode (N = 140) 
ISAS subscale  
(score range 0-6) Mean (SD) Median 
Cronbach’s 
α Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean 
Rank  Mean (SD) Median 
Cronbach’s 
α Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean 
Rank 
Affect regulation 4.65 (1.61) 5.00 .73 -1.23** 0.72 11.43a  4.61 (1.72) 5.00 .74 -1.22*** 0.60 11.48g 
Self-punishment 4.17 (1.90) 5.00 .82 -.08** -0.56 10.94a  3.94 (2.13) 5.00 .88 -0.72*** -0.87 10.51g 
Marking distress 2.80 (1.97) 3.00 .78 0.14** -1.12 8.98b  2.68 (1.96) 2.00 .73 0.28*** -1.05 9.31h 
Anti-dissociation/ 
feeling generation 
2.70 (2.17) 3.00 .86 0.20** -1.34 8.56b  2.10 (2.27) 1.00 .91 0.62*** -1.12 7.70h 
Anti-suicide 2.23 (1.97) 2.00 .84 0.47** -0.83 7.71b  2.03 (2.27) 1.00 .93 0.67*** -1.01 7.50h,i 
Self-care 1.50 (1.48) 1.00 .60 0.81** -0.26 6.69c  1.36 (1.53) 1.00 .65 1.07*** 0.54 6.92i,j 
Toughness 1.28 (1.54) 1.00 .73 1.13** 0.42 6.21c  1.06 (1.55) 0.00 .85 1.51*** 1.68 6.30j 
Interpersonal 
influence 
1.17 (1.46) 0.00 .68 1.06** 0.24 6.00c,d  0.90 (1.32) 0.00 .70 1.59*** 2.20 6.02j,k,l 
Interpersonal 
boundaries 
1.16 (1.51) 1.00 .77 1.40** 1.51 6.02c,d  0.88 (1.47) 0.00 .80 1.81*** 2.66 5.79j,k,l 
Autonomy 0.77 (1.17) 0.00 .68 1.50** 1.42 5.06d,e  0.62 (1.20) 0.00 .79 2.41*** 6.21 5.40k,l 
Sensation-seeking 0.75 (1.17) 0.00 .59 1.78** 3.37 5.12d,e  0.53 (1.20) 0.00 .79 2.75*** 7.88 4.97lk,l 
Revenge 0.66 (1.22) 0.00 .82 2.02** 3.94 4.77e  0.60 (1.36) 0.00 .91 2.50*** 5.76 5.04k,l 
Peer-bonding 0.15 (0.57) 0.00 .63 4.90** 27.00 3.52  0.16 (0.84) 0.00 .92 5.97*** 36.90 4.07 
 
Note. * All the data in the global episodes section of the table was based on 163 participants apart from the Autonomy subscale which was based on 162 participants.  
** All D’s(162-163) >.13, p’s < .001; *** All D’s(140) >.15, p’s < .001. 
a-l   Mean ranks with the same superscripts indicate subscales that do not differ significantly from one another. All other subscales were significantly different. 189 
190 
 
 
Sensation-seeking, revenge, and peer-bonding all had medians of 0 and low 
mean ranks. The subscales demonstrated questionable to good internal consistency 
(α ranged from .60 for self-care to .86 for anti-dissociation/feeling generation), with 
the exception of sensation-seeking which demonstrated poor internal consistency (α 
= .59). 
To determine whether there were any significant differences between the 
ISAS subscales, I conducted analyses using the Friedman Test (N = 162) and post-hoc 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (i.e., non-parametric alternatives to ANOVA and t-tests). 
Results indicated that at least one of the subscales was significantly different from at 
least one other subscale, χ2(12) = 855.36, p < .001. Given the number of post-hoc 
comparisons, a Bonferroni corrected alpha of p < .001 was used to control for family-
wise error. The results of these comparisons are reported in Table 6.  
Affect regulation and self-punishment, although not different to each other, 
differed significantly from all of the other subscales. Marking distress, anti-suicide, 
and anti-dissociation/feeling generation did not differ, but were all significantly 
different to the other 10 subscales. Self-care was not significantly different to 
toughness, interpersonal influence, and interpersonal boundaries, while autonomy 
was not significantly different to interpersonal influence, interpersonal boundaries, 
sensation-seeking, and revenge. Peer-bonding was the only subscale that was 
significantly different to all of the other subscales. Effect sizes were calculated by 
dividing Z by the square root of the number of observations (Field, 2009). For 
significantly different subscales, the effect sizes ranged from r = .21 (anti-suicide 
compared with self-care) to r = .61 (affect regulation compared with peer-bonding).     
3.2.2 Self-reported functions of participants’ most recent NSSI episode 
Visual inspection of the data (i.e., histograms and Q-Q plots), along with the 
means and standard deviations of the ISAS subscales for participants’ most recent 
episode of NSSI, showed that it was predominantly skewed to the right. The 
skewness and kurtosis values for each of the subscales are presented in Table 6; the 
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distributions of all of these subscales were significantly non-normal, D’s(140) ≥ .15 
(p’s < .001). While the means and mean ranks for the functions of participants’ most 
recent episode were similar to those of the global functions they endorsed, the 
medians tended to be slightly lower. Lower medians are to be expected given that 
the participants were rating the functions of one specific episode of NSSI as opposed 
to their general experience of self-injury.  
The most highly endorsed functions for global episodes of NSSI—affect 
regulation, self-punishment, and marking distress—were also the most highly 
endorsed functions for participants’ most recent episode. Mean ranks for affect 
regulation and self-punishment were 11.48 and 10.51 respectively, and they both had 
medians of five. Marking distress, the third most endorsed function, had a mean 
rank of 9.31 and a substantially lower median of 2. Peer bonding was once again the 
least endorsed function with a mean rank of 4.07 and a median of 0. Sensation-
seeking (mean rank = 4.97, median = 0) and revenge (mean rank = 5.04, median = 0) 
followed peer-bonding as the second and third least endorsed functions.  
This pattern of results differed only slightly from that obtained in relation to 
participants’ global episodes of NSSI, where sensation-seeking was the third, not the 
second, least endorsed item. Apart from this discrepancy, the order in which the 
functions were endorsed was identical for participants’ global and most recent 
episodes of NSSI. The internal consistencies of the ISAS subscales for participants’ 
most recent episode of self-injury tended to be higher than for global episodes, and 
ranged from questionable (α = .65 for self-care) to excellent (α = .93 for anti-suicide). 
The Friedman Test was used to determine whether there were any significant 
differences between the functions endorsed for participants’ most recent NSSI 
episode. Results showed a significant difference in participants’ (N = 140) 
endorsement of the subscales, χ2(12) = 697.74, p < .001. Post-hoc Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests with a Bonferroni corrected alpha of p < .001 revealed a similar pattern of 
results to that obtained for global episodes of NSSI (see Table 6). 
192 
 
 
Peer-bonding was once again the only subscale that differed significantly 
from all of the other subscales. Affect regulation and self-punishment did not differ 
from each other, but differed significantly from the other eleven subscales. Marking 
distress, anti-suicide, and anti-dissociation/feeling generation were not significantly 
different to one another but did differ from the other subscales. Although self-care 
once again was not significantly different to toughness, interpersonal influence, or 
interpersonal boundaries, it also did not differ from anti-suicide, which contrasted 
with the difference observed between self-care and anti-suicide when the 
participants completed the ISAS in reference to their global episodes of NSSI. The 
lack of differences between autonomy, interpersonal influence, interpersonal 
boundaries, sensation-seeking, and revenge was also observed for participants’ most 
recent episode of NSSI. Effect sizes for the significant differences between functions 
ranged from r = .21 (autonomy compared with toughness) to r = .62 (revenge 
compared with self-punishment).     
3.3 Are intrapersonal functions more highly endorsed than interpersonal? 
 Self-reported functions of NSSI have been found to load onto two 
superordinate factors that reflect intrapersonal and interpersonal reasons for self-
injury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004). Grouping the single-
function models on the basis of intrapersonal and interpersonal functions is 
theoretically consistent with multi-function models such as the FFM (Nock & 
Prinstein, 2004, 2005) and the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006), and allows researchers to 
test these models. Unfortunately, conducting a confirmatory factor analysis with 
data that is significantly non-normal, such as the functions data collected in this 
study, is not recommended (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
 Instead, I conducted cluster analyses, which do not require data to be 
normally distributed (Norusis, 2010), to determine whether the single function 
subscales clustered into intrapersonal and interpersonal categories. The purpose of 
conducting a cluster analysis is: 
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to group entities on the basis of their similarity with respect to selected variables, so that 
members of the resulting groups are as similar as possible to others within their group (high 
within-group homogeneity) and as different as possible to those in other groups (low 
between-group homogeneity). (Clatworthy, Buick, Hankins, Weinman, & Horne, 2005, p. 330)  
 
For the current study, I conducted two hierarchical agglomerative cluster analyses 
using Ward’s method. Squared Euclidean distance was used as the distance measure 
in both analyses (Norusis, 2010). 
3.3.1 Cluster analyses  
3.3.1.1 Cluster analysis of global NSSI functions 
 Inspection of the agglomeration schedule (presented in Table 7) and 
dendrogram (see Figure 6) for the global functions of NSSI provided evidence of a 
two cluster solution. The first cluster (agglomeration coefficient = 2095.13, stage 8 of 
Table 7) contained the following eight subscales: peer-bonding, revenge, sensation-
seeking, interpersonal influence, autonomy, interpersonal boundaries, toughness, 
and self-care.  
 
Table 7 
 
Agglomeration schedule, Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance for global NSSI 
functions 
 
Agglomeration schedule 
 Cluster combined  Stage cluster first appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next stage 
1 8 9 127.00  0 0 2 
2 8 12 294.67  1 0 5 
3 1 5 478.17  0 0 4 
4 1 13 727.33  3 0 6 
5 6 8 982.17  0 2 8 
6 1 10 1326.25  4 0 8 
7 3 11 1695.75  0 0 11 
8 1 6 2095.13  6 5 12 
9 2 4 2521.13  0 0 10 
10 2 7 3115.13  9 0 11 
11 2 3 4234.03  10 7 12 
12 1 2 7871.85  8 11 0 
 
194 
 
 
The second cluster (agglomeration coefficient = 4234.03, stage 11 of Table 7) 
contained the following five subscales: affect regulation, self-punishment, anti-
dissociation/feeling generation, anti-suicide, and marking distress. Combining these 
two clusters into one cluster increased the squared agglomeration coefficient from 
4234.03 to 7871.85 (see stage 12 of Table 7); the size of this increase supports a two 
cluster solution. 
 
 
Figure 6. Dendrogram using Ward linkage for functions of participants’ global 
episodes of NSSI. 
 
The grouping of variables in the two clusters is consistent with previous 
research (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004) in that the first cluster 
contains subscales that reflect interpersonal functions, while the second cluster 
contains subscales that reflect intrapersonal functions. The only subscale that does 
not fit neatly into this intrapersonal/interpersonal dichotomy is self-care, which 
should theoretically cluster with the intrapersonal functions, but instead has 
clustered with the interpersonal functions.  
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3.3.1.2 Cluster analysis of participants’ most recent NSSI episode  
 The ISAS subscales for the functions of participants’ most recent episode of 
self-injury demonstrated an identical two cluster solution to that found for the global 
NSSI functions, with the exception of self-care, which moved from the first to the 
second cluster. Evidence for the two cluster solution is presented in Table 8 and 
Figure 7. The first cluster (agglomeration coefficient = 981.43, stage 6 of Table 8) 
contained the following seven subscales: peer bonding, sensation-seeking, 
autonomy, interpersonal boundaries, toughness, interpersonal influence, and 
revenge.  
 
Table 8  
 
Agglomeration schedule, Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance for functions of 
participants’ most recent NSSI episode 
 
Agglomeration schedule 
 Cluster combined  Stage cluster first appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next stage 
1 8 12 86.50  0 0 2 
2 1 8 198.00  0 1 4 
3 6 9 331.00  0 0 6 
4 1 5 517.25  2 0 5 
5 1 13 717.40  4 0 6 
6 1 6 981.43  5 3 12 
7 7 10 1314.43  0 0 10 
8 3 11 1704.43  0 0 11 
9 2 4 2116.43  0 0 10 
10 2 7 2676.93  9 7 11 
11 2 3 4063.76  10 8 12 
12 1 2 6970.15  6 11 0 
 
The second cluster (agglomeration coefficient = 4063.76, stage 11 of Table 8) 
contained the following six subscales: affect regulation, self-punishment, marking 
distress, self-care, anti-dissociation/feeling generation, and anti-suicide. Combining 
these two clusters into one cluster results in a substantial increase in the 
agglomeration coefficient from 4063.76 to 6970.15 (see stage 12 of Table 8), which 
supports a two cluster solution. These two clusters are once again consistent with 
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previous research on the distinction between the intrapersonal and interpersonal 
functions of NSSI.  
 
 
Figure 7. Dendrogram using Ward linkage for functions of participants’ most recent 
NSSI episode. 
 
3.3.2 Comparing intrapersonal and interpersonal functions 
 Guided by previous research (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004) 
and based on the results of the cluster analyses, four new variables were created. 
Participants’ responses for the subscales within each of the four clusters (i.e., the two 
clusters from each cluster solution) were summed and then averaged to derive the 
following four scores: global intrapersonal functions (affect regulation, self-
punishment, anti-dissociation/feeling generation, anti-suicide, and marking distress), 
global interpersonal functions (peer bonding, revenge, sensation-seeking, interpersonal 
influence, autonomy, interpersonal boundaries, toughness, and self-care), most recent 
episode intrapersonal functions (affect regulation, self-punishment, marking distress, 
self-care, anti-dissociation/feeling generation, and anti-suicide), and most recent 
episode interpersonal functions (peer bonding, sensation-seeking, autonomy, 
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interpersonal boundaries, toughness, interpersonal influence, and revenge). Internal 
consistency was questionable for the global intrapersonal (α = .63) and global 
interpersonal (α = .68) functions, and acceptable for the most recent episode 
intrapersonal functions (α = .70) and most recent episode interpersonal functions (α = 
.79). 
Before beginning the analyses to determine whether there were significant 
differences between the intrapersonal and interpersonal functions for global and 
most recent episodes, I once again examined the histograms and Q-Q plots of the 
data to check whether the distributions were normal. Both the global intrapersonal 
functions variable (M = 3.31, SD = 1.23, Median = 3.40) and most recent intrapersonal 
functions variable (M = 2.79, SD = 1.26, Median = 2.67) were normally distributed. 
However, both global interpersonal functions variable (M = 0.94, SD = 0.72, Median = 
0.75) and most recent interpersonal functions variable (M = 0.68, SD = 0.85, Median = 
0.43) were positively skewed. Normality tests confirmed that these variables were 
significantly non-normal; for the global interpersonal functions variable, D(163) = 
.14, p < .001, and for the most recent interpersonal functions variable, D(140) = .22,  
p < .001. 
Given that two out of the four variables of interest were significantly non-
normal, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to analyse whether there was a 
significant difference between the global intrapersonal and interpersonal functions, 
and the intrapersonal and interpersonal functions for participants’ most recent 
episode. Participants’ endorsement of intrapersonal versus interpersonal functions 
for their global experiences of NSSI was significantly different, T = 118.00, p < .001,     
r = .60. More specifically, 152 participants endorsed intrapersonal functions more 
highly than interpersonal functions, nine participants endorsed interpersonal 
functions more highly than intrapersonal functions, and two participants did not 
demonstrate any difference in their endorsement of either intrapersonal or 
interpersonal functions.  
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There was also a significant difference in participants’ endorsement of 
intrapersonal versus interpersonal functions for their most recent experience of 
NSSI, T = 263.50, p < .001, r = .58. Out of 140 participants, 130 participants endorsed 
intrapersonal functions more highly than interpersonal functions, nine participants 
endorsed interpersonal functions more highly than intrapersonal functions, and one 
participant did not demonstrate any difference in their endorsement of either 
intrapersonal or interpersonal functions. 
Although intrapersonal functions were more commonly endorsed, 111 
participants (79.3%) out of the 140 participants reported self-injuring most recently 
for both intrapersonal and interpersonal reasons. Only 28 participants (20.0%) 
reported engaging in their most recent episode of NSSI for exclusively intrapersonal 
reasons and one participant (0.7%) reported self-injuring most recently for 
exclusively interpersonal reasons.  
3.4 Do people report a decrease in negative affect and an increase in positive affect 
following NSSI? 
To assess whether participants would retrospectively report decreased 
negative affect and increased positive affect following self-injury, they were asked to 
complete the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) twice; once in relation to how they 
felt before their most recent episode of NSSI and once in relation to how they felt after 
their most recent episode of NSSI. Responses were averaged to create composite 
scores for each participant for the following 13 PANAS-X subscales: negative affect, 
positive affect, fear, hostility, guilt, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, 
shyness, fatigue, serenity, and surprise (Watson & Clark, 1994). Since participants 
completed the PANAS-X twice, they each had a total of 26 scores. 
Visual inspection of the histograms and Q-Q plots showed that, apart from 
negative affect before the episode, all of the scales appeared to violate the normality 
assumption. Specifically, most of the scales were positively skewed. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests with Lilliefors correction confirmed that the distributions of all of the 
scales were significantly non-normal, D’s(142-149) ≥ .08 (p’s < .05), with the exception  
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Table 9  
 
Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for the PANAS-X subscale responses before and after participants’ most recent episode of NSSI 
 
 
 
Before the most recent episode  
 
After the most recent episode  
PANAS-X 
subscale  N Mean (SD) Median 
Cronbach’s 
α Skewness Kurtosis  N Mean (SD) Median 
Cronbach’s 
α Skewness Kurtosis 
Sadness 149 3.49 (1.18) 3.80 .89 -0.52* -0.84  142 3.03 (1.18) 3.20 .90 -0.08* -1.15 
Guilt 149 3.14 (1.21) 3.17 .89 -0.22* -1.01  143 3.05 (1.23) 3.00 .92 0.12* -1.12 
Hostility 149 2.75 (0.98) 2.67 .78 0.29* -0.61  143 2.27 (0.90) 2.00 .78 0.55* -0.56 
Negative affect 149 2.71 (0.87) 2.60 .83 0.12 -0.69  143 2.36 (0.96) 2.20 .90 0.64* -0.48 
Fear 149 2.32 (1.08) 2.00 .88 0.59* -0.72  143 2.10 (1.12) 1.67 .92 0.90* -0.22 
Fatigue 149 2.13 (0.99) 2.00 .79 0.97* 0.33  142 2.04 (1.10) 1.75 .87 0.99* -0.03 
Attentiveness 149 1.76 (0.80) 1.50 .74 1.13* 0.74  142 1.70 (0.76) 1.50 .68 1.07* 0.38 
Positive affect 149 1.46 (0.59) 1.20 .86 2.23* 6.39  142 1.47 (0.55) 1.25 .83 1.38* 1.03 
Serenity 149 1.43 (0.78) 1.00 .84 2.37* 5.71  142 2.50 (1.15) 2.33 .85 0.39* -0.81 
Self-assurance 149 1.43 (0.71) 1.17 .86 2.46* 6.76  142 1.49 (0.70) 1.17 .83 1.65* 1.90 
Shyness 149 1.45 (0.65) 1.00 .74 1.46* 1.31  142 1.57 (0.87) 1.00 .83 1.77* 2.49 
Joviality 149 1.25 (0.64) 1.00 .95 3.67* 14.31  142 1.30 (0.51) 1.00 .89 2.19* 4.45 
Surprise 149 1.25 (0.56) 1.00 .73 2.86* 8.60  142 1.35 (0.64) 1.00 .77 2.09* 4.01 
 
Note. *All D’s(142-149) > .08, p’s < .05. 199 
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of negative affect before the episode. Descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients 
for the PANAS-X scales are presented in Table 9. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed that negative affect (T = 2433.00, p < .001,  
r = .30), hostility (T = 1750.00, p < .001, r = .35), sadness (T = 1625.50, p < .001, r = .33), 
and fear (T = 2113.50, p < .001, r = .21) decreased significantly after participants had 
self-injured, whereas there was no significant change in feelings of guilt (T = 4021.50, 
p=.17, r = .06). In comparison, serenity (T = 715.50, p < .001, r = .45) and joviality (T = 
1045.00, p < .05, r = .14) increased significantly after self-injury, but there was no 
significant change in general positive affect (T = 2755.00, p = .34, r = .02).  
 The results for the remaining five subscales of the PANAS-X should be 
considered exploratory given that I had no a priori hypotheses as to whether these 
emotions would change following NSSI. Shyness (T = 765.00, p < .01, r = .16) 
increased significantly and surprise (T = 388.50, p < .01, r = .16) decreased 
significantly following NSSI, but there was no significant changes in fatigue  
(T = 2405.50, p = .17, r = .08), attentiveness (T = 2386.00, p = .42, r = .05), or self-
assurance (T = 1507.00, p = .28, r = .06). 
 Although it is useful to know which affect states changed significantly 
following participants’ engagement in NSSI, these statistics do not provide an 
indication of how many people experienced such changes. However, the positive, 
negative, and tie ranks for each of the subscales are in effect change scores, which 
can be used to determine how many participants experienced increases, decreases, 
or no change in particular emotional states following their episode of self-injury. The 
ranks for each of the PANAS-X subscales are presented in Table 10. 
Although the majority of participants experienced decreased negative affect 
(69.32%), hostility (68.53%), sadness (62.69%), and fear (54.55%) following NSSI, 
there were a number of participants whose negative emotions increased and others 
who experienced no change. For example, 23.08% of people reported feeling more 
hostile following self-injury and 8.39% reported no change in their levels of hostility.  
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Variable rates of endorsement were also observed for what can be considered 
neutral or positive affect states. An overwhelming majority of participants (75.35%) 
reported an increase in serenity after they had self-injured, but some participants’ 
(9.15%) experience of serenity decreased, while others (15.49%) experienced no 
change. In contrast, more participants (45.77%) reported that their experience of 
joviality did not change after self-injuring, than those who reported an increase 
(37.32%) or decrease (16.90%) in joviality.   
 
Table 10 
 
Ranks for PANAS-X subscales before and after participants’ most recent episode of NSSI 
 
  Ranks  
PANAS-X subscale 
Negative - decrease 
after NSSI (% of N) 
Positive - increase 
after NSSI (% of N) 
Tie - no change 
after NSSI (% of N) 
Negative Affect  99 (69.23) 40 (27.97) 4 (2.80) 
Hostility 98 (68.53) 33 (23.08) 12 (8.39) 
Sadness 89 (62.68) 34 (23.94) 19 (13.38) 
Fear 78 (54.55) 38 (26.57) 27 (18.88) 
Guilt 71 (49.65) 62 (43.36) 10 (6.99) 
Fatigue  66 (46.48) 40 (28.17) 36 (25.35) 
Attentiveness 56 (39.44) 46 (32.39) 40 (28.17) 
Positive Affect 52 (36.62) 55 (38.73) 35 (24.65) 
Self-assurance 37 (26.06) 46 (32.39) 59 (41.55) 
Joviality 24 (16.90) 53 (37.32) 65 (45.77) 
Shyness 24 (16.90) 45 (31.69) 73 (51.41) 
Surprise 17 (11.97) 35 (24.65) 90 (63.38) 
Serenity  13 (9.15) 107 (75.35) 22 (15.49) 
 
Note. All N = 142-143. Modal findings are in bold. 
 
3.5 Does the content of people’s cognitions change following NSSI? 
 To examine whether there was any change in participants’ self-reported 
cognitions following a NSSI episode, I summed and then averaged participants’ 
scores on the negative and positive/neutral items from the ATQ-R (Kendall et al., 
1989). This resulted in four new variables for each participant: negative cognitions 
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before most recent episode, negative cognitions after most recent episode, 
positive/neutral cognitions before most recent episode, and positive/neutral 
cognitions after most recent episode. Internal consistency for negative cognitions 
before (α = .94) and after (α = .95) self-injury was excellent, while internal consistency 
for positive/neutral cognitions before (α = .80) and after (α = .74) self-injury was 
acceptable to good. 
Visual inspection of histograms and Q-Q plots showed that the negative 
cognitions data was skewed to the left, while the positive/neutral cognitions data 
was skewed to the right. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with Lilliefor’s correction 
(D’s(140-142) > .12, all p’s < .001) confirmed that all of the subscales were 
significantly non-normal, necessitating the use of non-parametric tests to determine 
whether there were significant changes in participants’ self-reported negative or 
positive/neutral cognitions following engagement in self-injury.  
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed that negative cognitions (T = 1906.00, p <. 
001, r = .31) decreased significantly and positive cognitions (T = 777.00, p < .001, r = .31) 
increased significantly following NSSI. More specifically, 91 (64.54%) participants 
reported a decrease in negative cognitions following NSSI, 36 (25.53%) reported an 
increase in negative cognitions, and 14 (9.93%) reported no change. Less conclusive 
findings were evident with positive cognitions as although 74 (52.86%) participants 
reported that they experienced an increase and 16 (11.43%) experienced a decrease in 
positive/neutral cognitions following NSSI, 50 (35.71%) participants reported no 
change in their positive/neutral cognitions.  
3.6 Summary of quantitative findings 
The results supported the hypotheses in that affect regulation was the most 
highly endorsed function of both participants’ global and most recent episodes of 
NSSI; however, there was no significant differences in the level of participants’ 
endorsement for affect regulation or self-punishment. Consistent with the high 
endorsement of affect regulation and self-punishment, intrapersonal functions were 
more highly endorsed than interpersonal functions for both global and most recent 
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episodes of NSSI. Specific negative affect states were reported to decrease 
significantly following NSSI, but only one positive affect state (i.e., joviality) 
increased. Although serenity increased significantly, this is classified by Watson & 
Clark (1994) under the rubric of other affective states. Participants similarly reported 
a significant decrease in negative cognitions and a significant increase in positive 
cognitions after they had self-injured most recently. Before discussing the 
implications of these findings, I present the qualitative analyses of participants’ 
descriptions of the antecedents and consequences of their most recent episode of 
self-injury.  
4. OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES 
  To add depth and scope to my understanding of the events that establish the 
conditions for, and potentially reinforce, self-injurious behaviours, participants were 
given the opportunity to describe, in their own words, what had led to their most 
recent episode of NSSI and the consequences of that episode. To code the 
antecedents of the NSSI episodes, a coding system for aversive events, based on the 
stressful event categories listed in the Unpleasant Events Schedule (Lewinsohn, 
Mermelstein, Alexander, & MacPhillamy, 1983), was developed for the purposes of 
this study (see Appendix I). The consequences described by participants were 
analysed using Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
4.1 Antecedents of NSSI 
 Out of 153 participants, 96 (58.9%) reported that something specific had led to 
their most recent episode of self-injury. These events were coded within the 
following 10 categories: health and wellbeing (focused on physical health); 
achievement-academic-job; domestic, day-to-day inconveniences; interpersonal 
relationships; legal; material-financial; death-related; other; no specific event; and 
insufficient information to code the event. Events could be coded in multiple 
categories. A Clinical Psychologist and I coded all the events; interrater agreement 
was 82.86% and the final ratings for any discrepant items were determined following 
discussion. Table 11 shows the number of participants who reported events in each  
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Table 11 
 
Antecedent event categories with percentage endorsement and qualitative examples  
 
Event category N (%) Examples of event descriptions 
   
Health and well-being 7 (6.60) 
 I had a lot to drink and was sick of not feeling loved and wanted and a guy was being nice to me for once in my life. 
Next thing you know me and him are in the parking lot down the road from a club and he completely uses me and it 
hurt really bad and then ran off afterwards with me bawling my eyes out. (Female, 19)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 Binging. (Female, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
   
Achievement-academic-job 12 (11.32) 
 Being pressured at work so when I got home I went out for a smoke and burned myself with it. (Female, 28)  
 Occurred during exam period. Was punishing myself because I wasn’t studying and because I hoped the adrenaline 
would keep me awake. (Female, 19)            
   
Interpersonal relationships 59 (55.66) 
 I had had an argument with my mother, and left my parental house very distressed. I wanted to drive to my husband's 
work so I could talk to him (it was near the end of his shift), but was too upset to drive properly. So I drove to the 
nearest parking lot and cut my left arm repeatedly with a razor blade that I keep in my car. (Female, 23)    
 After a messy break up caused by a cheating girlfriend, the (now) ex girlfriend told me that she had power over me, and 
that she could hurt me more than anything or anyone else could. (Male, 19)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
   
Material-financial  2 (1.89)  In debt rang study link who won’t pay any more. (Female, 50) 
   
Death-related 3 (2.83) 
 Close friend died in June. (Female, 19) 
 It was the around the time of my mother’s death. (Female, 19)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
   
Other 2 (1.89) 
 Had a shower and hated the sight of myself. (Female, 42)     
 Had a discussion on religion, and I came to realise that I have not been a good believer. (Female, 21)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
   
No specific event 14 (13.21) 
 Built up negative emotions that had come to a point of not being able to deal with them anymore. (Female, 19)               
 I just felt very misunderstood. (Female, 27)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   
Insufficient information to 
code the event 
7 (6.60) 
 Abandonment. (Female, 32)    
 Memories of traumatic events that happened on that date years before. (Female, 17)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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category, with accompanying examples. No-one reported that their most recent 
episode of NSSI was precipitated by domestic, day-to-day inconveniences or legal 
events. As a result, these two categories are excluded from Table 11. 
The majority of the antecedents (55.66%) described by participants were 
categorised as interpersonal relationship events, which typically included fights or 
arguments with friends or family, relationship break-ups, or being mistreated by 
others. The second highest category of events was concerned with failure to achieve 
goals, academic struggles, or job stress. 
4.2 Thematic Analysis of the consequences of NSSI 
 When participants were asked to describe up to five consequences of their 
most recent episode, 122 people identified experiencing at least one consequence, 
with an average number of 2.59 (SD = 1.38) consequences per person.26 Three people 
identified consequences but did not evaluate whether these were positive, negative, 
or neutral; as a result, these responses could not be further analysed. Of the 313 
consequences that were included in the thematic analysis, 101 (32.27%) were 
evaluated by participants as positive, 170 (54.31%) as negative, and 42 (13.42%) as 
neutral.  
For the thematic analysis, I analysed the consequences that were positively or 
negatively evaluated, rather than consequences that were rated as neutral. Two 
distinct themes were identified within this data—self becomes transgressor and self 
becomes helper—each of which had a number of sub-themes (see Figure 8). 
Becoming a transgressor necessitated concealing the transgressions from others, 
being judged by others for the transgressions, and causing others to suffer, while 
becoming a helper was enacted through regulating emotions, accessing support 
and/or treatment, and the physical wound.   
 
 
                                               
26 Three responses were discarded because participants had typed in ‚none‛ or ‚nothing at all‛ and 
then rated these responses as neutral.  
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Figure 8. Thematic Map. 
 
4.2.1 Self becomes transgressor 
  Self-injury is an anathema to many people, who struggle to understand why 
someone would purposefully cut, burn, or otherwise damage their own skin (Strong, 
2000). As identified by two participants27, injuring oneself in such a way contravenes 
pervasive Western cultural discourses of protecting, preserving, and extending the 
life of one’s body and clearly transgresses social mores:  
I felt guilty at what I had done because I had damaged my body. (Female, 18) 
 
I felt disgusted with myself, that I was harming my body which should be something 
precious, was burdened with this guilt for quite some time. (Female, 19) 
 
In contrast to non-Western cultures where self-injury can signify socially desirable 
psychological and physical transitions (e.g., initiation rites) (Favazza, 1996), amongst 
Pākehā living in Aotearoa New Zealand self-injury typically signifies 
psychopathology and an attendant inability to cope with problems, in the words of 
one participant, ‚like a ‘normal’ person‛.   
  Participants readily judged themselves as abnormal—that is, as transgressors 
of social norms—because they had self-injured:  
  I felt like everyone would notice and think I was crazy. (Female, 18) 
                                               
27 Any spelling or major grammatical errors within responses have been corrected to facilitate 
readability. Furthermore, the way in which the quotes are presented differs from how I presented the 
interview quotes (see Chapter 4) as the responses in this study were anonymous. 
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What's wrong with me<why did I slip? It had been awhile since I self harmed, what does it 
mean that I have done this again? (Female, 22)                                            
 
That such judgements occurred in the context of particular self-referential emotions 
(e.g., guilt, shame) is unsurprising given that experiencing these emotions 
necessitates processes of self-representation and -evaluation, both of which are 
strongly influenced by prevailing community norms (Zinck, 2008): 
These emotions specifically contribute to highlighting the difference between one’s own and 
another’s perspective, coordinate the subject’s behavior in a social environment, promote her 
integration with the social group and support the mediation between specific individual and 
social goals. They further promote an adjustment of the self-concept in relation to the 
feedback of a social environment and to an internal evaluation of behavior and thoughts 
according to the subject’s own standard. (Zinck, 2008, p. 498)   
 
In this way, self-referential emotions function to communicate and regulate 
individuals’ identities and self-concepts (Zinck, 2008).   
  Given that self-referential emotions cannot occur in the absence of self-
evaluation, the reporting of these emotions as negative consequences of self-injury 
demonstrates that participants have judged themselves as transgressors. However, 
for those participants who simply listed negative emotions—guilt, shame, 
embarrassment—as consequences, it is impossible to determine why the act of self-
injury had made them feel guilty or ashamed, or more specifically, exactly what 
personal and social values they believed they had broken.  
  Other people, however, did provide explanations that revealed the self-
evaluative component of these emotions in more detail. For several participants, the 
feelings of guilt and shame stemmed from the fact that they had hurt themselves 
again: 
  I felt bad that I could not resist the compulsion to do it. (Female, 29) 
 
Guilt for self-injuring when I told myself I wouldn't. (Female, 18) 
 
I felt like a failure for a long time because I let myself down by relapsing into self harming 
again. (Female, 19) 
 
Incredible amount of shame at resorting to old coping strategies to cope. (Female, 44) 
Feeling extremely disappointed in myself because I was supposed to have stopped  
SI-ing. (Female, 17) 
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The inability to resist self-injury and utilise healthier coping strategies was evaluated 
by these participants as a personal failing, which impacted on the way that they 
perceived themselves and had the potential to impact on the way that they were 
perceived by others.   
  Indeed, having others find out about the self-injury was explicitly identified 
by some participants as a source of shame: 
  Shame in having my flatmates see the cuts on my arms. (Female, 22) 
    
I had to mention it to two of my friends, which was hard. I felt embarrassed because I had not 
cut myself in at least a year. (Transgender, 26)        
 
  The shame of my parents finding out what I had done. (Female, 41)      
 
Given that self-injury is perceived as shameful, having to prevent others from 
finding out about their transgressions was one of the most commonly reported 
negative consequences of self-injury.  
4.2.1.1 Concealing transgressions from others 
 Many people described that having to hide the physical evidence of their self-
injury from others was a negative consequence of their behaviour: 
More scars to hide. (Female, 39)   
       
Having to hide new cuts. (Female, 17) 
 
Had to cover it up. (Female, 17) 
 
Having to hide wounds from my boyfriend. (Female, 24) 
 
I had to be sure not to let the wound/scar show. (Female, 27) 
   
Ensuring those around them did not find out that they had self-injured had both 
practical and psychological implications. On a practical level, participants’ clothing 
choices were restricted because they had to keep their wounds or scars covered:  
The wound was on a place on my arm which could be seen by others if I wore a T-shirt. I had 
to wear long sleeves while it healed even when it was hot to cover it up. I don't want my flat-
mates or friends to know I've been struggling. I now have to continue wearing long sleeves or 
use concealer if I want to wear short sleeves. (Female, 27) 
 
My arm had to be covered at all times to hide what I had done while it healed. (Female, 20)                   
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Couldn't wear short sleeves so I was boiling hot all summer. (Female, 21) 
 
I couldn't wear shorts. (Female, 35)        
 
  On a psychological level, having to guard against being found out impacted 
negatively on participants: 
The constant fear of it being seen or someone realising what it was. Puts you more on edge 
than you were beforehand. (Female, 19)    
 
I didn't talk to anyone the next few days because I stressed that people might somehow notice 
I was hurt and ask why. (Transgender, 19)               
 
  Nervous that someone would find out. (Female, 18)   
 
Jeans stuck to my leg, had to be pried off, slight paranoia that people would notice the slight 
off-colour of them. (Female, 20) 
 
One person was unable to hide his wounds in his work environment, which led him 
to resign:  
Quit my job as a preschool-school age swimming teacher. Because I was too depressed and 
embarrassed of my cuts especially in front of little children who I am a role model to. (Male, 
20)   
    
The psychological toll of hiding the evidence of self-injury to maintain a facade of 
success and well-being was particularly well-articulated by one woman who wrote: 
I felt detached from everyone around me, like I was fake and no one knew the real me. It was 
as though there was another side to me that no one knew and they could never know. On the 
outside I was picture perfect, or should have been, to them I had everything going for me. 
(Female, 19)        
 
  While it is understandable that participants hid their scars to prevent others 
from finding out about their self-injury, it is unclear from most of the responses what 
type of reactions these participants expected to receive. However, a few participants 
did specify that they hid their wounds or scars to avoid being judged:  
Having to hide what I have done because it embarrasses me and I don’t want anyone to see 
how pathetic I am. (Female, 33)   
 
Having to deal with the scars that takes a very long time to heal, and having to hide them 
from others so I don't get judged. (Female, 19)                  
 
For one adolescent, being found out would have resulted in the loss of a position of 
responsibility: ‚I am a school leader, and one of the reasons I got in was because I 
210 
 
 
had stopped self harming, and if it was found out that I did slip up my role would 
be taken from me‛(Female, 16). 
 It is apparent from the majority of examples within this sub-theme that the 
anticipation, rather than the actual experience, of being judged for transgressing 
social norms through self-injuring drove participants to conceal the evidence of their 
self-injurious behaviours. Some participants, however, did report actually being 
judged by others for engaging in NSSI.  
4.2.1.2 Being judged by others for transgressions 
  Despite the considerable effort undertaken by people to protect themselves 
from being found out as transgressors, at times the scars or wounds were seen by 
others. Some participants lied to avoid being judged, although this was not always 
sufficient: 
Embarrassment when someone saw the wounds and I had to lie about them to avoid being 
judged negatively. (Female, 24)           
 
Having to lie to people that are close to you, particularly the ones that know you self-injure. 
Often they won't believe you anyway and you feel like you have angered or disappointed 
them yet again. (Female, 19)              
     
Indeed, several participants mentioned being judged by others as a negative 
consequence of their self-injury: 
Made to feel even worse at ED by their judgements and treatment. (Female, 33)       
 
The internet friend I told scolded me and got very upset about it. (Female, 16)  
 
People telling me I overreacted (not understanding). (Female, 24)        
              
My parents and friends were disappointed in me. (Female, 16)    
       
One woman stated that her self-injury had resulted in her girlfriend leaving her and 
her family sending her to therapy, thus providing evidence that self-injurious 
behaviour within her social network is perceived as an unacceptable manifestation 
of psychopathology, which needs to be fixed.  
 Although people tended to report being judged for failing to live up to 
familial, peer, and societal expectations because they had self-injured, one woman 
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described a situation where the opposite occurred and her self-injury was 
normalised:  
Made it more likely that Student Health people might actually bloody well take seriously 
when I said I was depressed and needed help. Therefore made me feel ten million times more 
unloved when they still didn't. Apparently self-harm is a 'perfectly natural coping 
mechanism' and means nothing. What a load of bollocks. Did these people even go to med 
school? (Female, 18) 
 
In this instance, she had tried to use self-injury—which she perceived as an 
abnormal coping mechanism—to signal her need for mental health support. Other 
participants’ self-injurious behaviours were viewed as pathological, but her 
behaviour was dismissed as an acceptable coping strategy, leading her to feel 
rejected and frustrated.     
4.2.1.3 Transgressions cause others to suffer 
  The effect of self-injury on family and friends was another sub-theme 
identified in the overarching theme of the self becoming a transgressor:  
It upset the person closest to me to see me in that state. (Female, 19) 
       
Hurting my husband by him knowing the extent of my emotional distress was so much that I 
hurt myself. (Female, 26)      
 
I frightened those I love. (Female, 30)                         
 
My family and people found out and got really scared and hurt. I felt so guilty and even 
worse for making them feel that way. (Female, 16) 
 
This may have been an emotional release to me, but it seems that it was an uncomfortable 
display to other people around me; this distressed them deeply. (Female, 20)              
 
In one case, the participant’s episode of self-injury actually led to the her boyfriend 
relapsing himself: ‚My boyfriend got upset with me self harming as he had issues 
with it also and we were trying to stop together and then he was upset and self 
harmed also‛ (Female, 18).      
4.2.2 Self becomes helper 
 The second theme—self becomes a helper—was identified from the positive 
consequences reported by the participants. This theme comprised of ways in which 
participants had succeeded in helping themselves; in particular, three sub-themes of 
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emotion regulation, accessing support/treatment, and the presence of physical 
wounds were identified.   
4.2.2.1 Regulating emotions 
 The most common positive emotional experiences reported by participants 
following their most recent episode of NSSI were calmness, relief, and release:  
Calming down, stilling my emotions which had been in turmoil. (Female, 26) 
 
I gained some relief from the overwhelming feelings of despair I was experiencing. (Female, 
52)          
 
I felt a break from all the pain I was feeling. It was a huge release. Almost euphoric. (Female, 
18) 
 
Calm, more relaxed, almost a meditation. (Female, 35) 
 
Felt calmer, more grounded and in control. (Female, 42) 
 
By regulating their overwhelming emotions, people were able to move forward, 
whether this involved getting some sleep, going to work, or generally managing the 
situation they were in: 
Felt calmer, released 'stuck' emotions so I could cry, sleep, soothe myself, care for myself. 
(Female, 24).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
It worked to calm me down and get me out of the house and to work on time. (Female, 23)          
 
I calmed down enough to finish my day without too much trouble or time spent stressing. 
(Female, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
I felt like I had released all the built up internal emotion and better able to cope with the 
situation without my feelings getting the best of me. (Female, 20)       
 
I sat down and was able to get on with my study without feeling stressed or anxious. (Male, 
18)           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Some participants commented on the temporary nature of the relief noting 
that it was ‚momentary‛, ‚lasted for a few hours‛, or that they felt ‚better in the 
short term‛. However, for one person, the memory of self-injury continued to induce 
a calming effect: ‚It was a special secret that only I knew about. The memory creates 
a small feeling of calm‛ (Female, 27).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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 Self-injury not only allowed people to reduce particular negative emotions, 
such as despair and anxiety, but also to induce positive emotions, such as pride, 
hope, and happiness: 
Feeling stronger, feeling happier. (Female, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Discover hope. (Female, 21)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
I felt proud because I felt like injuring myself was a good way of dealing with my emotions 
because I could think of nothing else to do to make it better - as if I had found an effective 
solution. (Female, 17)                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Furthermore, successfully regulating their emotions appeared to engender a sense of 
agency for people, allowing them to feel more in control. In this way, self-injury was 
an active solution to feeling emotionally overwhelmed: ‚I felt calmer, and that I had 
achieved something‛ (Female, 17).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
  Importantly, a few participants reported decreased suicidality following 
NSSI, which they evaluated as a positive consequence: 
Overwhelming impulse to die was reduced. (Female, 42)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Decrease of suicidal thoughts. (Male, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Easing of stress and the feeling of wanting to die. (Female, 21)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
I didn't try and kill myself. (Female, 39)      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
It is worth noting that any reductions in suicidal ideation would have involved 
cognitive as well as emotion regulation, as one of the above responses explains. 
Aside from decreased suicidal thoughts, only a couple of participants 
identified positive cognitive consequences following their most recent episode of 
self-injury:  
Able to think more clearly. (Female, 18)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Increased cognitive clarity. (Male, 32)                                         
 
However, the lack of cognitive consequences reported may have resulted from the 
open-ended structure of the questions, particularly if emotional consequences are 
more salient.   
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4.2.2.2 Accessing support and/or treatment 
 Several participants received help or support from others as a positive 
consequence of their self-injury: 
My husband looked after me and was very gentle with me after I hurt myself. (Female, 23)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
That my friend was made aware of how I was feeling and there for me. (Female, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
I had a discussion with my flatmate as he noticed the wounds a few days later - I discovered 
that he had been through similar things and we were able to talk about it openly - he has 
since been very supportive. (Female, 27)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
People attended to me with more interest and put in genuine effort to help me. (Female, 20)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
My boyfriend and I had a long talk about my inability to cope with stress and anger and self 
loathing. I agreed whenever I was feeling in too deep or like I wanted to hurt myself again 
that I would call him any time. (Female, 20)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
For these participants, self-injury facilitated access to support by signalling the 
intensity of their distress to concerned friends and family members.  
 Some people were prompted to actively seek treatment or support from 
others following their self-injury: 
I eventually got help from a counsellor. (Female, 19)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
I spoke to my counsellor who referred me to mental health services after hurting myself 3 
times in a month. (Female, 28)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Allowed me to realise just how badly I was distressed, meaning I went to ask for help from 
others. (Female, 27)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Finding a great new GP who described the process going on and who identified what I had 
experienced ever since I can remember. (Female, 35)       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Even when actively seeking support from friends proved to be ineffective for one 
woman, she felt compelled to continue to search for the support she needed:   
Realised how serious the situation was, that I absolutely didn't have the strength to deal with 
this by myself. Had already asked for help from friends/ex-boyfriend, but now realised that 
since they wouldn't help, MUST get help by other means. (Female, 18)  
 
For her, this realisation was a positive consequence of her self-injury episode.  
Two people reported being hospitalised as a positive consequence of their 
self-injury with one participant stating: ‚Got a bed in psych unit quicker and 
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therefore felt safer and cared for‛ (Female, 41). Another woman went back on mood 
stabilisers as a result of her self-injury and also began taking sleeping pills, which 
she found helpful.  
Although help-seeking typically resulted in some form of attention from 
others, only three people specifically identified receiving attention or sympathy from 
others as a positive consequence of self-injury:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Attention from others. (Female, 19)   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Opportunity for attention. (Female, 18)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
Felt like now that I have a deepish cut, people who may happen to see it -even though I try to 
hide it- will feel sympathy for me and like me more. (Female, 19)           
 
The last response is particularly intriguing as this woman’s expectation of how 
people will react to her cut is antithetical to the responses given by other participants 
within the self becomes transgressor theme. However, at the same time, she 
acknowledges trying to hide the injury, implying that she is aware of the status of 
self-injury as a socially transgressive behaviour. It may be that people within this 
woman’s community judge those who attempt to conceal self-inflicted wounds more 
favourably than those who display them openly. 
4.2.2.3 The physical wound 
 Contrary to the negative evaluation of wounds or scarring in the self becomes 
transgressor theme, the physical evidence of self-injury within the self becomes 
helper theme was identified as a positive consequence. It is worth noting, however, 
that many more people evaluated wounds and scarring as a negative consequence 
than as a positive consequence. 
 It was not readily apparent from the quotes why people reported blood, scars, 
and bruises as positive consequences. It is likely that these physical manifestations of 
self-injury were interpreted positively for different reasons, as is evident from the 
following responses:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
I had a large burn mark on my arm. It looked pretty flash, eh. (Male, 19)         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
I saw blood. (Female, 27)        
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Needing to attend to the cut on my leg. Stop the bleeding, apply a plaster and anti-septic. 
(Female, 35)            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Unfortunately, there is not enough detail provided in these responses to determine 
why participants experienced the sight of their blood or wounds as positive.  
4.3 Summary of the findings from the open-ended responses 
  The open-ended responses highlight the important influence of negative 
social interactions (especially interpersonal conflict) and community norms on the 
incidence and maintenance of NSSI. The paradox inherent in self-injury functioning 
simultaneously as an act of transgression and an act of self-help was evident in the 
consequences reported by participants. Negotiating the dissonance that results from 
this paradox has the potential to maintain NSSI if people attempt to avoid, or escape 
from, the painful, self-referent emotions that occur following self-injury through 
further self-injurious behaviours. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In this study, I was primarily interested in examining three hypotheses 
informed by the EAM (Gratz et al., 2006), extant literature on why people engage in 
NSSI, and the results of the Interpretative Functional Analysis that I presented in the 
previous chapter. Specifically, I hypothesised that (1) affect regulation would be 
endorsed as the primary function of NSSI, (2) intrapersonal functions would be more 
highly endorsed than interpersonal functions, and (3) negative affect would decrease 
following self-injury but positive affect would increase. Finally, I was also interested 
in exploring whether people reported shifts in negative, self-referent thoughts 
following episodes of NSSI.   
5.1 Affect regulation and self-punishment are the primary functions of NSSI  
 Although the average ratings and mean ranks for affect regulation were 
slightly higher than self-punishment for participants’ global and most recent 
episodes of NSSI, these functions had the same median and were not significantly 
different from one another. However, for both global and most recent episodes, 
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affect regulation and self-punishment were rated significantly higher than any of the 
other functions. This is consistent with Klonsky and Glenn’s (2009) finding that 
affect regulation and self-punishment respectively were the first and second most 
commonly reported functions of NSSI among university students. 
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, it is likely that punishing oneself through self-
injury is a specific form of affect regulation because in such instances the self-
injurious act is carried out to regulate self-directed anger and self-hatred (Chapman 
et al., 2006; Klonsky, 2007, 2009). Other functions (i.e., marking distress, anti-
dissociation/feeling generation, and anti-suicide) that could conceivably be 
incorporated within a broader conceptualisation of affect regulation than that which 
is represented in the ISAS (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009) were also highly endorsed by the 
participants in this study. Although these three functions differed significantly to 
affect regulation, self-punishment, and all the other subscales, they did not differ 
significantly from one another. 
 The five most highly endorsed functions across both the global and most 
recent episodes of NSSI—affect regulation, self-punishment, marking distress, anti-
dissociation/feeling generation, and anti-suicide—can all be understood as forms of 
experiential avoidance, thus supporting the EAM’s premise, which is that self-injury 
primarily functions as an experientially avoidant behaviour (Chapman et al., 2006). 
Although people did endorse access functions (e.g., interpersonal influence, revenge, 
peer-bonding) of self-injury along with the avoidant functions, these were rated 
significantly lower.   
 Furthermore, the role of self-injury in facilitating affect regulation was 
exemplified in the open-ended responses from participants about the consequences 
of their self-injury. Most notably, self-injury functioned to calm participants down 
and to help them relax. However, it was also evident that transgressing social norms 
through self-injury led participants to feel ashamed, guilty, and fearful of being 
judged by others. These responses provide some insight into how the cycle of self-
injury may be maintained through self-punishment.    
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 Given that self-injury functions as a way to avoid or escape negative affect, 
painful self-referential emotions, such as shame and guilt, may be particularly 
powerful antecedents for future NSSI. The experience of these emotions could lead 
people to conclude that they deserve to be punished for their transgressive 
behaviour, which in turn may result in further self-injury. Indeed, women with BPD 
who demonstrated greater non-verbal shame behaviours were more likely to self-
injure than women who did not show these behaviours (Brown, Linehan, Comtois, 
Murray, & Chapman, 2009).  
5.2 Intrapersonal functions are more highly endorsed than interpersonal functions 
It is apparent from the ISAS results that people endorsed items from across all 
of the single-function subscales. This range of responses calls into question the 
clinical utility and validity of single-function models and emphasises the importance 
of multi-function conceptualisations of NSSI, such as the EAM (Chapman et al., 
2006) and the FFM (Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). 
For participants’ global and most recent episodes of NSSI, the most 
appropriate solution in both cases comprised of two clusters, which was consistent 
with previous theoretical and empirical demarcations between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal motivations for self-injury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 
2004). The only anomaly in the cluster solution for participants’ general episodes 
was the inclusion of self-care within the interpersonal cluster when theoretically it 
should have clustered with intrapersonal functions. 
On inspection, the self-care items demonstrated good face validity (e.g., 
‚creating a physical injury that is easier to care for than my emotional distress‛) 
making it unlikely that these items actually reflect interpersonal motivations for self-
injury. In Klonsky and Glenn’s (2009) study, self-care also was more closely aligned 
with interpersonal, rather than intrapersonal, functions, but the loadings of this 
subscale on the intrapersonal and interpersonal factors were very similar. In the 
current study, self-care was the last function from the interpersonal group to enter 
the solution, which is comparable to Klonsky and Glenn’s (2009) self-care factor 
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loadings. The status of self-care as a liminal function is supported by the cluster 
solution that was identified for participants’ most recent episode. In this analysis, 
self-care moved from the interpersonal into the intrapersonal cluster.       
Comparisons of the intrapersonal versus interpersonal functions 
demonstrated that participants were significantly more likely to report self-injuring 
for intrapersonal than interpersonal reasons, in relation to both a single episode of 
self-injury and their global episodes of NSSI. Indeed, only nine people endorsed 
interpersonal functions more highly than intrapersonal functions. This is consistent 
with the EAM’s (Gratz et al., 2006) exclusion of interpersonal reasons as primary to 
the maintenance of NSSI. 
Considering that difficulties in interpersonal relationships were the most 
commonly reported events to occur prior to participants’ most recent episode of self-
injury, it is noteworthy that self-injuring for interpersonal functions was infrequently 
endorsed. One possibility for this incongruence is that people who self-injure may 
blame themselves for interpersonal conflict, leading them to consider themselves 
unworthy of the support or care of others. As such, they may be more likely to self-
injure as a form of punishment rather than as a way to access support from others.  
5.3 Negative affect decreased and positive affect increased following NSSI 
Self-reported negative affect, hostility, sadness, and fear all decreased 
significantly following self-injury, but there were no significant changes in guilt. This 
is surprising in light of my qualitative analysis where I proposed that people become 
transgressors because of their self-injurious behaviour, which would seem to suggest 
that participants’ self-reported guilt should increase following NSSI. Individual 
ranks show that 71 people experienced a decrease in guilt following self-injury but 
62 people experienced an increase. It may be that the qualitative findings are 
predominantly reflecting the latter group of participants.    
Although there was no significant difference in participants’ ratings of 
general positive affect before and after the episode, there was a significant increase 
in joviality (e.g., happy, joyful, energetic). Furthermore, while not identified by 
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Watson and Clark (1994) as a positive emotion, serenity (i.e., calm, relaxed, at ease) 
also increased significantly. More specifically, three quarters of the participants 
reported experiencing increased serenity after they self-injured. This aligns with the 
positive, open-ended consequences described by participants as one of the most 
frequently recalled emotion words within the self becomes helper theme was calm.  
The effectiveness of self-injury as an emotion regulation strategy is supported 
by other research (e.g., Klonsky, 2007) and forms the basis of the EAM (Chapman et 
al., 2006). However, it is important to keep in mind that not all participants managed 
to regulate their emotions through self-injury; indeed, several participants reported 
feeling worse following their most recent episode. However, it should be noted that 
participants were not asked to refer to a specific timeframe when reporting the 
emotions that followed their episode of NSSI. As a result, participants who endorsed 
improved affect may have been reflecting on how they felt immediately after self-
injuring, whereas participants who endorsed worse affect may have been focusing 
on a more temporally distant time period (i.e., days after having self-injured).  
5.4 Negative cognitions decrease following NSSI 
Studying shifts in cognitions following self-injury is a recent development in 
the NSSI literature (see Nock et al., 2009), but research suggests that attempts to 
regulate unwanted thoughts may play an important role in the maintenance of self-
injury (Najmi et al., 2007). In the current study, negative automatic thoughts 
reportedly decreased significantly following self-injury, while positive/neutral 
thoughts increased significantly. However, caution is required when interpreting 
these results given that the ATQ-R (Kendall et al., 1989) has not been validated for 
use in reference to a particular episode of behaviour. The high internal consistency 
scores obtained in the current study for this measure, however, provide some 
reassurance that the scale is a reliable measure of self-referent thoughts in this 
context. 
 Similarly to the reports of affect changes following self-injury, there was 
variability in the number of participants who experienced shifts in cognitions. Some 
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people reported that their negative cognitions increased following NSSI, while 
others experienced no change in their negative thoughts. A substantial number of 
people also reported that their positive/neutral cognitions did not change after they 
self-injured. Although cognitive regulation is minimised within the EAM (Chapman 
et al., 2006), experiential avoidance theory more generally (cf., Hayes et al., 1996) 
does not privilege emotion escape/avoidance over cognitive escape/avoidance. 
It is unclear from this study whether aversive emotions are triggered by 
unwanted thoughts or whether these thoughts occur in the context of aversive 
emotions. It is likely a combination of both, although some people’s experience of 
self-injury may be primarily driven by either cognitive or emotional avoidance. For 
example, someone with OCD may self-injure specifically as a strategy to cope with 
intrusive thoughts. Furthermore, the relative absence of cognitive consequences in 
the open-ended survey responses suggests that self-injury is primarily used for 
emotion, rather than cognitive, regulation, or that emotional consequences are much 
more salient and therefore easier to recall.  
5.5 Strengths 
 Given that it is somewhat atypical for phenomenological studies of self-injury 
to include previously validated and reliable measures, one of the strengths of this 
study was the measures chosen to assess the frequency, functions, and emotional 
antecedents and consequences of NSSI. Additionally, comparing the behavioural 
trajectories of participants’ general and most recent episodes of self-injury provided 
further insight into the functional complexity of individual episodes of NSSI. 
Another strength of the current study and a novel approach to testing whether self-
injury functions primarily as a form of experiential avoidance was examining 
whether the content of participants’ automatic thoughts shifted following self-injury. 
Finally, the diversity of the sample was also a strength as much of the self-injury 
research with community populations has focused exclusively on university 
students. Although the majority of participants in this study were at university, 
approximately 40% were engaged in other occupations.  
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 5.6 Limitations 
The data collected in this study focused on historical episodes of self-injury 
and therefore is subject to limitations associated with retrospective self-report 
(Tourangeau, 2000). By restricting inclusion to people who had self-injured within 
the past 12 months, I attempted to minimise the impact of retrospection on the data. 
However, the average amount of time that had lapsed between participants’ most 
recent episode of self-injury and their participation in the survey was 81 days and 
this length of time varied considerably between participants. Sophisticated 
ecological momentary assessment studies are needed to examine the functions of 
NSSI in more depth without retrospective bias. 
Another limitation of this study was that I was unable to explicitly assess the 
role of positive or negative reinforcement in participants’ episodes of self-injury 
because the ISAS does not categorise the function subscales according to 
reinforcement value. However, it is possible to deduce from the items whether they 
reflect escape/avoidance or access motivations. For example, the affect regulation 
subscale contains items about reducing aversive emotion and it is therefore likely 
that people who endorse these items engage in NSSI to escape or avoid emotional 
experiences.  
5.7 Conclusion 
The behavioural trajectory of self-injury described in EAM (Chapman et al., 
2006) is broadly consistent with the results of this study, which suggests that the 
EAM can be usefully applied to New Zealanders’ experiences of self-injury. While 
this model is not representative of every episode of self-injury, experiential 
avoidance did appear to be the primary function of NSSI in this sample. Given that 
self-injury is commonly used to escape or avoid negative emotions and/or thoughts, 
in the next chapter I focus on assessing whether people who self-injure can be 
differentiated from people who do not hurt themselves on purpose on the basis of 
their general intrapersonal experiences and coping styles.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Comparing the intrapersonal experiences and coping styles of 
people with and without a history of NSSI 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the interview and survey studies I presented in Chapters 4 and 5, I focused 
on clarifying the antecedents and consequences of NSSI episodes to determine 
whether self-injury functions primarily as a form of experiential avoidance within 
Aotearoa New Zealand. In the current chapter, I take a step back from the immediate 
behavioural contingencies of self-injury to compare the global intrapersonal 
experiences (i.e., thoughts and emotions) and coping styles of people who have self-
injured with those who have never self-injured.  
Research on the emotional and cognitive experiences and coping styles of 
people who self-injure complements functional analyses of NSSI in a number of 
ways. First, a wealth of studies support the affect-regulation function of NSSI 
(Klonsky, 2007), making it important to understand more about the general affective 
experiences of people who self-injure. Given that the complex relationship between 
affect and cognition is difficult to disentangle (Hayes et al., 1996), it is equally 
important to consider whether specific types of thoughts differentiate people with a 
history of NSSI from those without such a history.  
Indeed, experiencing negative thoughts and feelings about oneself has been 
found to predict engagement in NSSI among university students (Armey & 
Crowther, 2008), while the temperament dimension of negative affectivity was 
shown to predict NSSI among community-based adolescents (Baetens et al., 2011). 
People with a history of NSSI have also been shown to experience higher levels of 
negative emotion than people who have never hurt themselves on purpose 
(Andover et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2007). These findings are useful because they 
advance our understanding of the broader emotional and cognitive context in which 
individual episodes of NSSI are situated. 
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Second, although NSSI is frequently referred to as a coping strategy in the 
literature (e.g., Claes & Vandereycken, 2007; Nock, 2010; Swenson et al., 2008) and 
functional analyses highlight that self-injury is an adaptive process for managing 
distress, the taxonomic parameters of this coping response and its relationship to 
other ways of coping are seldom addressed. One of the few exceptions is the EAM 
(Chapman et al., 2006) because it proposes that self-injury is an avoidant coping 
strategy, which belongs in a functional response class with other avoidant 
behaviours. Support for this contention comes from studies showing that people 
with a history of NSSI use more avoidant coping strategies to deal with stressful 
events than people who have never self-injured (Andover et al., 2007; Brown et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the use of avoidant coping by people who have self-injured has 
been shown to vary as a function of self-injury severity (Hasking et al., 2008).  
Given that the intrapersonal experiences of people who self-injure appear to 
be more negative in general than people who do not self-injure (Brown et al., 2007; 
Hasking et al., 2008), it seems hardly surprising that they are more likely to utilise 
avoidant coping strategies (including self-injury) to escape from their distressing 
emotions and thoughts. Such an assertion, however, assumes a causal direction from 
negative affect and cognitions to self-injury. It is possible, of course, that self-injury 
causes negative affect and cognitions. In one of the few prospective studies of NSSI, 
Hankin and Abela (2011) identified that having a more negative cognitive style 
predicted future self-injury among adolescents. However, this research is an 
exception as most of the studies examining the relationships between global 
intrapersonal experiences, avoidant coping strategies, and NSSI have been cross-
sectional, which precludes causal inferences in either direction.  
Although additional over-time studies are necessary to determine whether 
negative affect and cognitions cause NSSI, research on the mechanisms underlying 
NSSI is also sorely needed. To this end, researchers have begun to investigate 
whether people with a history of NSSI have a general tendency towards avoidant 
coping. Certainly, it makes intuitive sense that a propensity towards avoidance may 
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underlie people’s continued use of NSSI and evidence in support of this hypothesis 
would add weight to the contention that self-injury functions as an avoidant coping 
strategy.  
 A tendency towards thought suppression, the process of attempting to 
prevent oneself from thinking about certain topics (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), is a 
specific form of experiential avoidance that has been implicated as a causal 
mechanism underlying NSSI (Najmi et al., 2007). In one cross-sectional study, the 
relationship between adolescents’ self-reported reactivity to emotions and the 
frequency of NSSI was mediated by thought suppression (Najmi et al., 2007); in 
another study, the relationship between past experience of childhood sexual abuse 
and NSSI frequency was mediated by avoidance symptoms of PTSD (Weierich & 
Nock, 2008). While these findings suggest that the desire to avoid unwanted 
thoughts may play a key role in perpetuating self-injurious behaviours, these results 
need to be replicated longitudinally to confirm the hypothesised causal pathways 
(Najmi et al., 2007; Weierich & Nock, 2008).   
In the current study, I attempted to expand on my previous findings—that 
NSSI functions as both emotional and cognitive avoidance—by examining how 
people who have self-injured think, feel, and cope, compared with people who have 
never self-injured. More specifically, I hypothesised that people with a history of 
self-injury would report experiencing higher levels of general negative affect (Brown 
et al., 2007; Hasking et al., 2008), more negative automatic thoughts (Hankin & 
Abela, 2011), and have a greater tendency towards avoidant coping (Andover et al., 
2007; Brown et al., 2007) than people without a history of self-injury. If people do use 
NSSI as a strategy to avoid experiencing negative emotions and thoughts, it seems 
probable that they would report higher levels of general negative affect and aversive 
thoughts than people who do not self-injure.  
Furthermore, in light of the dearth of over-time studies, I chose to survey 
participants  about their affect, cognitions, and coping styles at two time-points, two 
months apart, to test whether negative affect and cognitions would predict new 
226 
 
 
incidents of NSSI. Certainly, the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) and previous empirical 
findings (Hankin & Abela, 2011) suggest that negative intrapersonal experiences 
should place people at risk of engaging in future episodes of self-injury. 
Consequently, I hypothesised that negative intrapersonal experiences reported at 
Time 1 (T1) would be causally related to new episodes of NSSI reported at Time 2 
(T2). Finally, if a predictive relationship between negative intrapersonal experiences 
and NSSI was identified, I hypothesised that this relationship would be mediated by 
a tendency towards experiential avoidance (Najmi et al., 2007).   
2. METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
 A total of 443 (excluding repeat entries) first year Psychology students from 
Victoria University of Wellington consented to participate in the T1 phase of this 
study, but only 408 (92%) surveys were retained for analysis (see Figure 9 for 
rationale). Almost three quarters of the participants were female (72.1%); 113 (27.7%) 
were male, and 1 (0.2%) was male-to-female transsexual. The average age of 
participants was 19.46 years (SD = 3.43), with a range of 17 to 44 years. Although the 
majority of participants identified as New Zealand European (83.3%), a variety of 
ethnicities were reported: 34 (8.3%) Māori, 14 (3.4%) Chinese, 9 (2.2%) Indian, 7 
(1.7%) Samoan, 4 (1.0%) Cook Islands Maori, and 43 (10.5%) other (e.g., South 
African, Japanese). 
 One or more mental health diagnoses were reported by 67 (16.4%) of the 
participants, with an average of 1.46 (SD = 0.75) diagnoses per person (range: 1-5). 
Out of the participants who reported receiving a mental health diagnosis in their 
lifetimes, 58 (87.9%) had been diagnosed with Depression, 24 (36.4%) with Anxiety, 6 
(9.1%) with Anorexia, 4 (6.1%) with BPD, 3 (4.5%) with Bulimia, and 1 (1.5%) each 
with Bipolar Disorder, Substance Use Disorder and Drug-induced Psychosis. More 
than one third of the participants (37.5%) had received therapy or counselling in the 
past, but only 19 (4.7%) were currently engaged in therapy or counselling. 
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Figure 9. Flow of participants through the study at Times 1 and 2. 
 
 Out of the 262 (excluding repeat entries) surveys completed at T2, 224 were 
retained for analysis (see Figure 9 for rationale). Prior to deleting cases, the response 
rate for T2 was 59.1%. Chi-square tests of independence at an alpha level of .05 were 
used to determine whether there were any significant differences between the 
participants who only completed the T1 survey and those who completed both 
surveys. Although participants who completed the T1, but not the T2 survey, were 
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significantly more like to be male28 (Χ2(1, N = 407) = 17.30, p < .001), they were just as 
likely to report a history of mental illness (Χ2(1, N = 405) = 1.65, p = .20) and/or self-
injury (Χ2(1, N = 408) = .107, p = .74). 
2.2 Procedure 
 First year Psychology students at Victoria University of Wellington are 
required to participate in four hours of research each trimester to fulfill their course 
requirements. The current study was listed on the Psychology Department’s 
Experimetrix.com website, where students are presented with a range of study 
choices. Students who do not want to take part in research studies are able to 
summarise published journal articles instead. Prospective participants were advised 
prior to sign-up that participation would involve completing two online surveys, 
both of which included questions about NSSI. Students who had a history of NSSI 
and those who had never self-injured were invited to participate. Once they had 
signed up, they were required to click ‚yes‛ at the end of the information page to 
indicate that they consented to participate in the study before they were directed 
through to the first survey. Those who did not consent to participate were directed 
to a page that contained the following message: ‚You did not consent to participate 
in this survey. Please close your browser window to exit‛.   
The study was conducted across two time-points: (1) participants completed 
an online survey (see Appendix K) via Surveymonkey and (2) two months later, they 
were emailed a link to the same survey (excluding the demographic questions) and 
invited to complete it a second time. Each participant was given two weeks to 
complete the second survey29 and was sent up to two reminders. Surveys were 
matched using the student ID numbers that participants provided at each time point. 
The two-month time period between survey completions was chosen for pragmatic 
reasons to ensure that the study could be completed within one university trimester.  
                                               
28 The one transsexual student was omitted from this analysis. 
29 One student completed the second survey three weeks after the initial reminder was sent. This 
survey was included in the analyses. 
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As with the online survey described in the previous chapter, anyone who 
started either of the surveys for the current study was emailed a copy of the contact 
details for various support organisations (see Appendix L). This was done to ensure 
that any participants who did not finish the survey would still have access to 
relevant debriefing information. The options for support were also presented on the 
final pages of both the T1 and T2 surveys. Finally, it was suggested to participants 
on the survey information page that they ask a support person to be available while 
they complete the survey if appropriate. Each student received half an hour of 
research credits for completing the T1 survey and a $10 Motor Trade Association 
voucher for completing the T2 survey. The study30 was approved by the Multi-
region Ethics Committee, a New Zealand Health and Disability Ethics Committee 
administered by the Ministry of Health.  
2.3 Measures  
2.3.1 The Deliberate Self-harm Inventory 
 The modified version of the DSHI (Gratz, 2001) used in the second study to 
measure the prevalence and frequency of 14 different types of NSSI was also used in 
the current study. These modifications are described in detail in Chapter 5 (see p. 
179) and the psychometric properties of this measure are described in Chapter 4 (see 
p. 101).  
2.3.2 The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire  
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) is a 9-
item, self-report questionnaire designed to measure experiential avoidance. Each 
item (e.g., ‚If I could magically remove all the painful experiences I've had in my life, 
I would do so‛) is rated on a seven point likert scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true); four items are reverse scored. Responses are summed to give a maximum score 
                                               
30 I intended to complete an ecological momentary assessment study, but a change in ethics policy at 
Victoria University meant that the ethics committee could no longer consider my application. As a 
result of the significant delays I experienced following this policy change, I was unable to follow 
through with my original study and had to amend my research design.   
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of 63 with higher scores indicating a stronger tendency towards experiential 
avoidance.  
The AAQ has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (α = .70) and test-
retest reliability (r = .65); fairly low test-retest reliability is to be expected given that 
experiential avoidance is conceptualised as a behavioural process, which in all 
likelihood is amenable to contextual influences (Hayes et al., 2004). Convergent 
validity with thought suppression and psychopathology measures has also been 
established (Hayes et al., 2004). The only time this measure has been used in a self-
injury study, the authors did not report any study-specific psychometric statistics 
(Chapman, Specht, & Cellucci, 2005). 
2.3.3 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
 The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a 60-item, self-report measure that 
contains the following 13 scales: negative affect, positive affect, fear, hostility, guilt, 
sadness, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, shyness, fatigue, serenity, and 
surprise. The emotions included in each of these scales are listed in Chapter 5 (see p. 
181). Each emotion word (e.g., angry, joyful) is rated on a five point scale from 1 
(very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Mean scores are calculated for each of the 13 
scales.  
In the current study, the PANAS-X was used to measure affect experienced by 
participants in general; accordingly, the general timeframe instructions were chosen 
(i.e., ‚Indicate to what extent you feel this way in general, that is, on the average‛). 
As stated in Chapter 5, the excellent psychometric properties of the PANAS-X are 
well-established (Watson & Clark, 1994). For example, internal consistency rates 
across six samples for the negative affect scale when completed according to the 
general timeframe instructions ranged from .85 to .93 (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
2.3.4 The White Bear Suppression Inventory  
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is a 
15-item, self-report measure of people’s propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts. 
Each item (e.g., ‚There are things that I try not to think about‛) is rated from 1 
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Responses are summed to give a maximum 
score of 75; higher scores indicate a greater tendency towards thought suppression. 
The WBSI has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .85 - .89) across a number 
of studies (Blumberg, 2000; Rassin, 2003; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).  Scores on the 
WBSI have been found to converge with scores on well-validated depression and 
anxiety measures (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), and NSSI frequency (Chapman et al., 
2005; Najmi et al., 2007).  
2.3.5 The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales  
The short version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item, self-report measure developed to test the occurrence 
of three connected constructs—depression, anxiety, and tension/stress—within the 
past week. Each construct is operationalised in a 7-item subscale; item examples 
include: ‚I felt that I had nothing to look forward to‛ (depression), ‚I felt scared 
without any good reason‛ (anxiety), and ‚I found it hard to wind down‛ 
(tension/stress). Items are rated on a four point scale from 0 (did not apply to me at all) 
to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). Scores are summed to give a 
maximum of 21 for each subscale and 63 for the total score. Cronbach alphas for the 
DASS-21 subscales range from .82 to .94, which suggest it is a highly reliable 
measure (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005). It 
has also demonstrated adequate construct validity (Henry & Crawford, 2005). 
2.3.6 The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire – short version  
Netemeyer and colleagues (2002) constructed a 15-item version of the original 
30-item Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) by 
factor-analysing the ATQ and inspecting the content of individual items. Although 
the psychometric properties of the shortened version have not been extensively 
tested, it demonstrated excellent internal consistencies (α = .92 - .96) across three 
samples (Netemeyer et al., 2002). The frequencies of specific, negative automatic 
thoughts (e.g., ‚I’m no good‛, ‚It’s just not worth it‛) experienced within the past 
week are rated on a five point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (all the time). Scores are 
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summed to total a maximum of 75, with higher scores signifying more pervasive 
negative thoughts. 
2.3.7 The Brief COPE  
 The Brief COPE was developed by Carver (1997) to reduce the participant 
response burden associated with the 60-item COPE inventory (Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989).  Coping styles, rather than situational responses, were assessed in 
the current study and, as such, the instructions and items were presented in a 
dispositional format (Carver et al., 1989). All but two of the COPE scales are present 
in the Brief COPE, but there are only two, rather than four, items per scale. Carver 
(1997) also added a new two item scale, self-blame, to the Brief COPE.  
In total, the Brief COPE is comprised of the following 14 scales: self-
distraction (e.g., ‚I turn to work or other activities to take my mind off things‛), 
active coping (e.g., ‚I take action to try to make the situation better‛), denial (e.g., ‚I 
refuse to believe that it has happened‛), substance use (e.g., ‚I use alcohol or other 
drugs to make myself feel better‛), use of emotional support (e.g., ‚I get emotional 
support from others‛), use of instrumental support (e.g., ‚I get help and advice from 
other people‛), behavioural disengagement (e.g., ‚I give up trying to deal with it‛), 
venting (e.g., ‚I express my negative feelings‛), positive reframing ( e.g., ‚I look for 
something good in what is happening‛), planning (e.g., ‚I think hard about what 
steps to take‛), humour (e.g., ‚I make jokes about it‛), acceptance (e.g., ‚I learn to 
live with it‛), religion (e.g., ‚I pray or meditate‛), and self-blame (e.g., ‚I blame 
myself for things that happened‛).  
Each item is rated on a four point scale from 1 (I usually don’t do this at all) to 4 
(I usually do this a lot). Item responses are summed to give a maximum score of eight 
per scale. Averaged scale reliabilities have been found to vary considerably from .50 
(venting) to .90 (substance use) but caution is required when interpreting internal 
consistency values in measures with only two items per scale (Carver, 1997).   
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Prevalence and frequencies of self-injury types 
 The prevalence and frequencies of NSSI types for both time-points are 
presented in Table 12. At T1, almost half the participants (46.8%) reported having 
engaged in NSSI in their lifetimes. The average age of onset for NSSI was 13.17 years 
(SD = 2.84; range: 3-19), with cutting (24.8%), severe scratching (21.8%), and sticking 
sharp objects into the skin (19.9%) the most commonly reported types of self-injury. 
The least common types of NSSI were rubbing sandpaper on the body (2.7%), 
dripping acid onto the skin (2.0%), and using bleach or oven cleaner to scrub the skin 
(0.2%). No participants reported breaking their own bones. Additionally, 16 (3.9%) 
participants endorsed engaging in at least one other type of NSSI that was not listed 
in the DSHI (e.g., ‚rubbed steel wool against skin‛, ‚scalded self with boiling 
water‛). The 191 participants who reported self-injuring had engaged in an average 
of 3.12 (SD = 2.26) types of NSSI, with a range of 1 to 13.    
Despite the high lifetime prevalence of self-injury at T1, only 56 (32.0%) of the 
participants who endorsed a history of NSSI reported having injured themselves on 
purpose within the past 12 months. In the two months prior to T1 survey 
completion, a total of 42 participants had injured themselves on average 7.26 times 
(SD = 17.76; range: 1-100). A more detailed breakdown of self-injury recency for both 
time points is presented in Table 13.  
As is to be expected given the prevalence of NSSI at T1, almost half (47.8%) of 
the participants endorsed a lifetime history of NSSI at T2. The most frequently 
endorsed types of NSSI at T2 were the same as T1: cutting (29.5%), severe scratching 
(20.5%), and sticking sharp objects into the skin (20.5%). The least frequently 
endorsed types of NSSI at T2 were also the same as T1: rubbing sandpaper on the 
body (2.2%), dripping acid (2.2%) onto the skin, and using bleach or oven cleaner 
(0.9%) to scrub the skin. Once again, no participants reported breaking bones. 
Comparable to T1 reports of NSSI, the participants who reported a history of NSSI at  
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Table 12 
 
Frequencies of NSSI types reported at Times 1 and 2 
 
NSSI type 
Time 1 (N = 408)  Time 2 (N = 224) 
N (%) 
endorsing 
NSSI type 
 Frequency of NSSI types  N (%) 
endorsing 
NSSI type 
 
Frequency of NSSI types 
Never 1 time 2-10 times 
11-50 
times 
>50 
times 
Never 1 time 
2-10 
times 
11-50 
times 
>50 
times 
Cutting wrists, arms, or 
other areas of body 
101 (24.8)  307 (75.2) 14 (3.4) 50 (12.3) 25 (6.1) 11 (2.7)  66 (29.5)  157 (70.1) 8 (3.6) 34 (15.2) 15 (6.7) 6 (2.7) 
Severe scratching to extent 
of bleeding/ scarring 
89 (21.8)  315 (77.2) 16 (3.9) 44 (10.8) 20 (4.9) 5 (1.2)  46 (20.5)  172 (76.8) 4 (1.8) 26 (11.6) 8 (3.6) 3 (1.3) 
Sticking sharp objects into 
skin 
81 (19.9)  325 (79.7) 12 (2.9) 54 (13.2) 9 (2.2) 0 (0.0)  46 (20.5)  175 (78.1) 2 (0.9) 33 (14.7) 5 (2.2) 0 (0.0) 
Carving words/pictures/ 
designs/marks into skin 
70 (17.2)  337 (82.6) 33 (8.1) 30 (7.4) 3 (0.7) 1 (0.2)  44 (19.6)  180 (80.4) 16 (7.1) 23 (10.3) 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 
Burning with cigarette/ 
lighter/match 
54 (13.2)  350 (85.8) 15 (3.7) 33 (8.1) 5 (1.2) 0 (0.0)  31 (13.8)  192 (85.7) 6 (2.7) 22 (9.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Preventing wounds from 
healing 
50 (12.3)  355 (87.0) 2 (0.5) 23 (5.6) 15 (3.7) 8 (2.0)  34 (15.2)  189 (84.4) 4 (1.8) 14 (6.3) 4 (1.8) 6 (2.7) 
Banging head to extent of 
bruising 
50 (12.3)  357 (87.5) 10 (2.5) 27 (6.6) 7 (1.7) 1 (0.2)  23 (10.3)  195 (87.1) 1 (0.4) 16 (7.1) 1 (0.4) 1 (0.4) 
Punching to extent of 
bruising 
40 (9.8)  367 (90.0) 9 (2.2) 28 (6.9) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0)  19 (8.5)  203 (90.6) 1 (0.4) 11 (4.9) 3 (1.3) 0 (0.0) 
Biting to extent of breaking 
skin 
24 (5.9)  384 (94.1) 6 (1.5) 15 (3.7) 3 (0.7) 0 (0.0)  16 (7.1)  201 (89.7) 5 (2.2) 8 (3.6) 1 (0.4) 1 (0.4) 
Rubbing glass into skin 16 (3.9)  386 (94.6) 6 (1.5) 9 (2.2) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0)  7 (3.1)  212 (94.6) 2 (0.9) 4 (1.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Rubbing sandpaper on body 11 (2.7)  396 (97.1) 9 (2.2) 2 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  5 (2.2)  216 (96.4) 4 (1.8) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Dripping acid onto skin 8 (2.0)  395 (96.8) 3 (0.7) 5 (1.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  5 (2.2)  214 (95.5) 4 (1.8) 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Using bleach/oven cleaner to 
scrub skin 
1 (0.2)  406 (99.5) 1 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  2 (0.9)  221 (98.7) 0 (0.0) 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Breaking own bones 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Note. N endorsing NSSI type may not equal frequencies of engagement as some participants endorsed type of NSSI but did not report frequency. Frequencies may not add up 
to 100% because of missing data.  234 
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T2 had engaged in an average of 3.27 (SD = 2.27) types of self-injury with a range of 1 
to 10. 
 
Table 13  
 
NSSI recency at Times 1 and 2   
 
Recency of last NSSI episode  
Time 1 (N = 172)  Time 2 (N = 106) 
N (%)  N (%) 
< 1 week 13 (3.2)  7 (6.6) 
1 week > 1 month 11 (2.7)  6 (5.7) 
1 month > 6 months  21 (5.1)  16 (15.1) 
6 months > 1 year  11 (2.7)  16 (15.1) 
1 year > 2 years  18 (15.1)  9 (14.8) 
2 years > 3 years  19 (16.0)  10 (16.4) 
3 years > 4 years 26 (21.8)  12 (19.7) 
4 year > 5 years  15 (12.6)  10 (16.4) 
>  5 years  38 (31.9)  20 (32.8) 
 
The order of frequency for the different types of NSSI was identical at T2 to 
T1, with one exception; burning oneself with a cigarette, lighter, or match was more 
frequently endorsed than preventing wounds from healing at T1 than T2. At T2, 
other forms of NSSI (e.g., ‚hit myself on the head with a rock’, ‚flagellation‛) were 
endorsed by 9 (4.0%) participants. A total of 23 people reported self-injuring on 
average 6.43 times (SD = 12.72; range: 1-60) in the two months between completing 
the T1 and T2 surveys. Out of the 23 people who reported self-injuring between T1 
and T2, a total of 11 also reported self-injuring in the two months prior to T1.  
3.2 Do people who have self-injured experience more negative emotions and 
thoughts? 
 To examine whether people who have self-injured generally experience 
higher levels of negative emotions and thoughts than people who have never self-
injured, I planned to conduct a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using 
the T1 negative affect and emotion (i.e., fear, hostility, guilt, and sadness) scores 
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from the PANAS-X, the T1 depression, anxiety, and stress scores from the DASS-21, 
and the T1 ATQ-R total scores. All of these scales demonstrated good to excellent 
internal consistency (α = .82 - .96) as is evident in Table 14.  
Prior to running the MANOVA, visual inspection of the histograms and Q-Q 
plots for these nine variables showed that their distributions were positively skewed 
with varying degrees of kurtosis (see Table 14). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with 
Lilliefors Correction (Field, 2009) confirmed that the distributions for all of the 
variables for both groups were significantly non-normal, D’s(185-217) ≥.10 (all p’s < 
.001). To test for univariate outliers, I converted all of the scores for these nine 
variables into z-scores to check whether any were less than -3.29 or greater than 3.29 
as recommended by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007). In total, seven scores31 from 
different participants were identified as possible outliers. Removing these scores did 
not alter the significance of subsequent normality tests and, as a result, they were 
retained in the analyses.  
 Despite the significantly non-normal distributions of these and other variables 
analysed for this chapter, I chose to continue with MANOVA tests for the following 
reasons. First, the sample size was large enough to reduce the impact of skewness 
and kurtosis on the analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Although positive and 
negative kurtosis can lead to underestimates of variance, this typically only applies 
to samples that consist of less than 100 or 200 cases respectively (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007; Waternaux, 1976). Second, MANOVAs are thought to be robust to 
deviations from normality when Pillai’s trace is used (Olson, 1974). Transforming the 
data was considered unnecessary given these guidelines and undesirable since 
transformation alters the constructs under investigation (Grayson, 2004). Finally, the 
most pragmatic reason to use MANOVA is simply that there are no commonly used 
non-parametric alternatives (Field, 2009).  
                                               
31 Two of the scores were from the ATQ and DASS anxiety scales, while three scores were from the 
DASS stress scale. 
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Table 14 
 
Time 1 reliability coefficients, descriptive statistics, and ANOVAs for the No NSSI versus Lifetime NSSI groups  
 
    No history of NSSI1  Lifetime history of NSSI2  ANOVAs 
Variable  Cronbach’s α  M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis  M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis  F ηp2 
PANAS-X              
Negative affect  .89  2.00 (0.61) 0.51 -0.45  2.39 (0.72) 0.52 -0.40  35.40* .08 
Fear  .86  1.97 (0.67) 0.54 -0.51  2.27 (0.76) 0.65 -0.26  17.80* .04 
Hostility  .83  1.87 (0.62) 0.74 0.21  2.25 (0.72) 0.47 -0.40  32.00* .08 
Guilt  .91  1.78 (0.73) 0.83 -0.09  2.32 (0.96) 0.78 -0.10  37.66* .09 
Sadness  .90  2.09 (0.79) 0.73 -0.22  2.57 (0.95) 0.38 -0.70  29.50* .07 
ATQ-R  .96  22.70 (9.61) 1.94 4.20  28.70 (13.78) 1.28 0.79  22.05* .05 
DASS-21              
Depression  .89  3.16 (3.43) 1.44 1.80  5.28 (4.73) 0.95 -0.06  23.72* .06 
Anxiety  .82  3.21 (3.23) 1.22 1.09  4.68 (4.21) 1.01 0.16  13.79* .04 
Stress  .85  4.74 (3.70) 0.70 -0.16  6.68 (4.66) 0.77 -0.13  18.71* .05 
WBSI  .92  45.60 (11.92) -0.35 -0.18  51.59 (11.61) -0.45 0.05  15.14* .04 
AAQ  .73  32.92 (7.26) 0.18 -0.29  35.65 (7.44) 0.28 -0.22  29.30* .07 
COPE              
Self-distraction  .57  4.88 (1.43) 0.21 -0.14  5.25 (1.60) 0.03 -0.73  5.35 .01 
Denial  .69  2.71 (1.10) 1.69 2.53  2.67 (1.14) 1.98 6.57  0.10 .00 
Substance use  .91  2.79 (1.30) 1.85 3.33  3.49 (1.90) 1.16 0.27  19.97* .05 
Behavioural 
disengagement  
 .70  2.71 (1.03) 1.44 1.33  3.13 (1.33) 1.27 1.16  13.33* .03 
 
Note. 1 N’s range from 213 to 217, 2 N’s range from 185 to 191 due to missing values. 
*p < .001 
All df’s = 1, 384-406. 237 
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Non-parametric bivariate correlations revealed that significant positive 
relationships existed between all of the variables under investigation. Given that 
multicollinearity can reduce the power of MANOVA tests, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) recommend carefully considering the inclusion of any variables that are 
correlated at or above .70, and excluding those at or above .90. As to be expected, the 
highest correlations (rs = .78 - .90, all p’s ≥ .001) were observed between the negative 
affect and four negative emotion scales (fear, hostility, sadness, and guilt) from the 
PANAS-X. To avoid multicollinearity, the negative affect scale was excluded from 
the MANOVA; instead, the impact of self-injury history on global negative affect 
was tested using a one-way independent analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
A MANOVA32 using Pillai’s trace showed a significant effect of NSSI history 
on the intensity and/or frequency of negative emotions and thoughts experienced by 
participants, V = 0.11, F(8, 377) = 5.58, p < .001, partial eta squared = .11. The 
possibility of Type I error was inflated for this and all other MANOVAs presented in 
this chapter because the covariance matrices were significantly different (Box’s M = 
124.74, F (36, 472353) = 3.39, p < .001). However, Box’s M needs to be interpreted with 
caution given that it is a sensitive test (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007) and Type I error is 
less likely if the test statistic is still significant at a reduced alpha of .001.  
Follow-up ANOVAs33, using a Bonferroni corrected alpha of .006 (Field, 2009), 
showed that participants who had self-injured reported significantly higher levels of 
fear, hostility, guilt, sadness, depression, anxiety, and stress, as well as significantly 
more negative automatic thoughts than participants who had never self-injured (see 
Table 13). An ANOVA conducted to test whether global negative affect varied as a 
function of self-injury history also showed a significant effect, F(1,406) = 35.40, p < 
.001, partial eta squared = .08, with participants who had self-injured reporting 
higher negative affect.  
                                               
32 Removing three multivariate outliers (p-values of Mahalanobis D2 < .001) increased the value of the F-statistic 
to 6.09. Since the test was significant regardless of whether these cases were included or not, they were retained 
in the analysis.  
33 Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests yielded comparable significance values to the ANOVAs. 
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Given that the extent and/or intensity of negative emotions and thoughts 
varied significantly as a function of self-injury history, further analyses were carried 
out to determine whether recency of self-injurious behaviours would impact on 
these differences. To achieve this, participants with a history of self-injury were 
divided into two groups on the basis of whether or not they reported self-injuring in 
the previous 12 months. This resulted in a total of three groups for the subsequent 
analyses: No NSSI, Lifetime NSSI (i.e., had self-injured but not in the past 12 months), 
and 12-month NSSI (i.e., had self-injured in the past 12 months). 
 Exploratory analyses (i.e., histograms and Q-Q plots) showed that although 
all of the variables in the three groups exhibited skewness and kurtosis, not all of 
these distributions were significantly non-normal. As presented in Table 14, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with Lilliefors correction indicated that the distributions 
for all the variables in the No NSSI and Lifetime NSSI groups were significantly non-
normal (D’s(115-217) ≥ .10, p’s < .001), but that only the ATQR and DASS subscales in 
the 12-month NSSI group were significantly non-normal D’s(54-56) ≥ .15, p’s ≤ .002.  
Multivariate tests34 using Pillai’s trace showed that there was a significant 
effect of recency of NSSI on the intensity of negative emotions and thoughts 
experienced by participants, V = .19, F(16, 724) = 4.63, p < .001, partial eta squared = 
.09. The covariance matrices were significantly different (Box’s M = 175.55, F(72, 
76924) = 2.33, p < .001). Follow-up ANOVAs35 with Bonferroni corrected alpha of .006 
demonstrated that all of the variables of interest varied significantly as a function of 
NSSI recency (see Table 14). Furthermore, negative affect was also found to vary 
significantly as a function of NSSI recency, F(2, 389) = 22.62, p < .001, partial eta 
squared = .10.  
                                               
34 Removing three multivariate outliers (p-values of Mahalanobis D2 < .001) increased the value of the F-statistic 
to 4.91. Since the test was significant regardless of whether these cases were included or not, they were retained 
in the analysis. 
35 Kruskal-Wallis tests yielded comparable significance values to the ANOVAs.  
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Table 14 
 
Time 1 descriptive statistics and ANOVAs for the No NSSI, Lifetime NSSI, and 12-month NSSI groups 
 
  No NSSI1 a  Lifetime NSSI2 b   12-month NSSI3 c  ANOVAs 
Variable  M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis  M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis  M (SD) Skewness Kurtosis  F ηp2 
PANAS-X                
Negative affect  2.00 (0.61) b, c 0.51 -0.45  2.26 (0.65) a, c 0.68 -0.01  2.63 (0.79) a, b 0.12 -0.90  22.62* .10 
Fear  1.97 (0.67) c 0.54 -0.51  2.15 (0.70) c 0.94 0.59  2.50 (0.85) a, b 0.22 -0.79  13.53* .07 
Hostility  1.87 (0.62) b, c 0.74 0.21  2.13 (0.70) a, c 0.89 0.46  2.46 (0.69) a, b -0.15 -0.41  20.31* .10 
Guilt  1.78 (0.73) b, c 0.83 -0.09  2.12 (0.87) a, c 1.05 0.80  2.77 (1.04) a, b 0.13 -0.96  30.34* .14 
Sadness  2.09 (0.79) b, c 0.73 -0.22  2.40 (0.90) a, c 0.78 -0.03  2.98 (0.93) a, b -0.38 -0.47  26.87* .13 
ATQ-R  22.70 (9.61) c 1.94 4.20  25.91 (11.78) c 1.66 2.79  35.44 (15.21) a, b 0.74 -0.75  26.19* .13 
DASS-21                
Depression  3.16 (3.43) c 1.44 1.80  4.30 (4.09) c 1.31 1.38  7.57 (5.07) a, b 0.33 -1.21  28.31* .13 
Anxiety  3.21 (3.23) c 1.22 1.09  4.10 (3.93) c 1.25 0.79  6.07 (4.50) a, b 0.69 -0.36  12.41* .06 
Stress  4.74 (3.70) c 0.70 -0.16  5.88 (4.31) c 0.69 -0.46  8.28 (4.67) a, b 0.80 -0.11  15.25* .08 
WBSI #  45.60 (11.92) b, c -0.35 -0.18  49.64 (11.43) a, c -0.41 0.12  55.64 (11.25) a, b -0.93 0.85  18.12* .09 
AAQ #  32.92 (7.26) c 0.18 -0.29  34.13 (6.91) c 0.26 -0.26  39.29 (7.19) a, b 0.17 -0.43  18.87* .09 
COPE #                
Self-distraction   4.88 (1.43) c 0.21 -0.14  5.12 (1.61) 0.16 -0.71  5.54 (1.54) a -0.04 -0.88  4.19 .02 
Denial  2.71 (1.10) 1.69 2.53  2.61 (1.13) 2.15 4.27  2.75(1.18) 1.82 3.17  0.36 .00 
Substance use  2.79 (1.30) c 1.85 3.33  3.14 (1.65) c 1.43 1.26  3.98 (2.00) a, b 0.87 -0.33  14.07* .07 
Behavioural 
disengagement  
 2.71 (1.03) c 1.44 1.33  2.99 (1.26) 1.52 2.32  3.39 (1.40) a 0.96 0.16  8.69* .04 
 
Note. 1 N’s range from 213-217, 2 N’s range from 115-119 and 3 N’s range from 54-56 due to missing values. 
* p < .001 
All df’s = 2, 368 except # df’s = 2, 379.  
a, b, c Means with superscripts are significantly different to other group means. 
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Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons conducted at an alpha level of .05 
revealed several significant differences in the intensity and/or presence of negative 
emotions and thoughts between groups. Participants who had self-injured in the 
past 12 months reported significantly higher mean levels of negative affect, hostility, 
guilt, and sadness than participants who had self-injured more than 12 months ago 
and those who had never self-injured. Participants who had self-injured more than 
12 months ago in turn reported significantly higher mean levels of negative affect, 
hostility, guilt, and sadness than participants who had never self-injured.  
 Self-reported mean levels of stress, depression, anxiety, fear, and frequency of 
negative automatic thoughts were significantly greater for participants who had self-
injured in the past 12 months compared to those who had self-injured in their 
lifetimes or who had never engaged in NSSI. Participants who had self-injured more 
than 12 months ago did not differ significantly from participants who had never self-
injured on stress, depression, anxiety, fear, and frequency of negative automatic 
thoughts. In sum, the intensity of aversive emotions and frequency of negative 
thoughts experienced by participants varied significantly as a function of how 
recently they had self-injured. 
3.3 Do people who have self-injured have a greater tendency towards avoidant 
coping? 
The WBSI and AAQ were used in the current study to measure participants’ 
propensities towards avoidant coping, along with four subscales from the Brief 
COPE (self-distraction, denial, substance use, and behavioural disengagement) that 
are thought to tap into avoidant coping (Chapman, Specht, & Cellucci, 2005). 
Histograms and Q-Q plots for each of the variables were inspected prior to 
conducting the planned multivariate analyses.  All of the frequency distributions, 
with the exception of the AAQ for participants who had never self-injured, were 
significantly non-normal, D’s(190-217) ≥ .07, p’s ≤ .008). After converting the scores 
for the six coping variables into z-scores, a total of 10 scores (five each from the 
COPE denial and behavioural disengagement scales) were identified as possible 
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outliers because they were greater than 3.29. Since removing these cases did not alter 
the normality distributions, they were retained for subsequent analyses. 
Prior to conducting a MANOVA, a series of non-parametric bivariate 
correlations were carried out to check for multicollinearity. Although there were 
significant, positive relationships between all six coping variables, the strongest 
correlation—between the WBSI and the AAQ (rs = .58, p = 0.01)—was not high 
enough to warrant concern (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).  
Multivariate analyses of variance36 using Pillai’s trace showed that 
participants’ tendencies towards avoidant coping varied as a function of NSSI 
history, V = .11, F(6, 39) = 8.26, p < .001, partial eta squared = .11. The covariance 
matrices were significantly different (Box’s M = 111.50, F(21, 564687) = 5.22, p < .001). 
Follow-up ANOVAs37 with a Bonferroni corrected alpha of .008 indicated that 
participants who had self-injured reported significantly higher levels of thought 
suppression, experiential avoidance, substance use, and behavioural disengagement 
compared to participants who had never self-injured.  
 To examine whether avoidant coping varies as a function of NSSI recency, 
participants who reported a lifetime history of NSSI were once again split into two 
groups; those who had self-injured in the past 12 months and those who had self-
injured more than 12 months ago. This resulted in three levels of the group variable: 
No NSSI, Lifetime NSSI, and 12-month NSSI. All of the frequency distributions of 
variables at each level demonstrated some skewness and kurtosis. Normality tests 
confirmed that all but two of these distributions (the AAQ scores for No NSSI and 
12-month NSSI) were significantly non-normal (D’s(56-217) ≥ .07, p’s ≤ .03). 
                                               
36 Removing three multivariate outliers (p-values of Mahalanobis D2 < .001) increased the value of the F- statistic 
to 8.97. Since the test was significant regardless of whether these cases were included or not, they were retained 
in the analysis. 
37 Kruskall-Wallis tests resulted in comparable significance levels for the AAQ, WBSI, and substance use scale (p 
< .001), but significance levels for the behavioural disengagement scale decreased slightly to p = .001. Denial was 
still non-significant (p = .46) but self-distraction (p = .02) was significant at an alpha level of .05.  
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 A MANOVA38 using Pillai’s trace showed a significant effect of recency of 
NSSI on avoidant coping by participants, V = 0.18, F(12, 750) = 6.10, p < .001, partial 
eta squared = .09. The covariance matrices were significantly different (Box’s M = 
128.82, F(42,95396) = 2.97, p < .001). Follow-up ANOVAs39 using a Bonferroni 
corrected alpha of .008 demonstrated the same pattern of results observed for the 
two-group comparison. The propensity towards thought suppression and 
experiential avoidance, as well as substance use and behavioural disengagement 
varied significantly as a function of NSSI recency (see Table 14). NSSI recency, 
however, did not have a significant effect on self-distraction or denial.  
 Post-hoc Games-Howell comparisons indicated that participants who had 
self-injured in the past 12 months reported significantly higher levels of thought 
suppression than those who had self-injured more than 12 months ago or those who 
had never self-injured. Participants who had self-injured more than 12 months ago 
also reported significantly higher levels of thought suppression than those who had 
never self-injured. 
Self-reported experiential avoidance and using substances to cope was 
significantly higher for participants who had self-injured in the past 12 months, 
when compared to participants who had self-injured more than 12 months ago or 
those who had never self-injured. However, there were no significant differences in 
experiential avoidance or substance use for participants who had self-injured more 
than 12 months ago when compared to participants who had never self-injured.  
 Finally, participants who had self-injured in the past 12 months reported 
significantly higher behavioural disengagement scores than those who had never 
self-injured, but not those who had self-injured more than 12 months ago. 
Participants who had self-injured more than 12 months ago did not report 
                                               
38 Removing four multivariate outliers (p-values of Mahalanobis D2 < .001) increased the value of the F-statistic to 
6.51. Since the test was significant regardless of whether these cases were included or not, they were retained in 
the analysis. 
39 Kruskal-Wallis tests comparing the three groups yielded comparable significance levels to the ANOVAs with 
one exception; denial decreased from p = .70 to p = .39. 
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significantly higher behavioural disengagement than participants who had never 
self-injured.   
3.4 Is NSSI predicted by negative emotions and thoughts? 
To determine whether negative emotions and thoughts predicted NSSI, the 
224 participants who completed both the T1 and T2 surveys were divided into two 
groups: (1) participants (N = 201) who had not self-injured in the two months 
between T1 and T2 (No NSSI group), and (2) participants (N = 23) who had self-
injured in the two months between T1 and T2 (NSSI group). Two binary logistic 
regressions40 using the forced entry method were conducted to test whether negative 
emotions and thoughts at T1 predicted group membership at T2. These models are 
presented in Table 15.   
Although both of the regression models were significant, none of the 
predictors added significant predictive value to the respective models. With only 23 
participants reporting self-injury in the two months between survey completions, 
there was insufficient power to predict self-injury group membership. Consequently, 
both models correctly predicted group membership for the No NSSI group 100% of 
the time, but correctly predicted group membership for the NSSI group 0% of the 
time.  
Given that the sample size of participants who had self-injured between 
survey completions was too small to detect meaningful differences through logistic 
regression, cross-lagged panel correlations using maximum likelihood estimates 
were tested in AMOS to determine the causal direction of the relationships between 
negative intrapersonal experiences at T1 and new episodes of self-injury reported at 
T2. By excluding possible third variable effects, cross-lagged panel correlations 
permit causal inferences from correlational data (Kenny, 1975).   
 
                                               
40 Participants were asked how many times they had self-injured in the previous two months, but given the 
extremely skewed frequency distribution (skewness = 11.35), I chose to create and subsequently utilise a 
categorical variable of self-injury versus no self-injury in the analyses.  
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Table 15  
Two binary logistic regression models for NSSI versus No NSSI  
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 B (SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
Model 1: NSSI (N = 23) vs No NSSI (N = 194)  
Included      
Constant  -4.03 (0.78)*    
Negative affect 0.48 (0.41) 0.72 1.62 3.63 
Automatic Thoughts 0.03 (0.02) 0.99 1.03 1.07 
Model 2: NSSI (N = 23) vs No NSSI (N = 201) 
Included     
Constant -4.37 (0.87)**    
Fear 0.15 (0.43) 0.51 1.16 2.68 
Hostility 0.36 (0.45) 0.59 1.44 3.47 
Guilt 0.52 (0.37) 0.81 1.68 3.48 
Sadness -0.06 (0.38) 0.45 0.94 1.98 
 
Note. Model 1: R2 = .20 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .04 (Cox & Snell), .09 (Nagelkerke). Model Χ2(2) = 9.36, p < .01. * p < .05. 
Model 2: R2 = .46 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .05 (Cox & Snell), .11 (Nagelkerke). Model Χ2(4) = 11.95, p < .05. ** p < .001.   
 
As is evident from Figures 10 to 15, all of the autoregressive paths were 
significant (p < .001) showing stability in negative emotions and thoughts over time 
(Martens & Haase, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.001 
 
Figure 10. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and global negative affect.  
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Note.  *p < .05, **p<.001 
 
Figure 11. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and negative automatic thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. *p<.01, **p<.001 
 
Figure 12. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and hostility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note.  *p < .05, **p<.001 
 
Figure 13. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and guilt. 
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Note. *p < .05, **p<.001 
 
Figure 14. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and fear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. *p < .05, **p<.001 
 
Figure 15. Cross-lagged panel model of NSSI and sadness. 
 
Two of the cross-lag paths were significant at an alpha level of .05. The path from 
negative automatic thoughts at T1 to self-injury at T2 was significant (β = .13, p = 
.048), but the path from self-injury at T1 to negative automatic thoughts at T2 was 
non-significant (β = .13, p = .06). The path from guilt at T1 to self-injury at T2 was 
significant (β = .14, p = .03), but the path from self-injury at T1 to guilt at T2 was non-
significant (β = -.04, p = .31). These results suggest that dispositional automatic 
negative thoughts and guilt may be causal factors for later self-injury, but that self-
injury is not a causal factor for automatic negative thoughts and guilt.       
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3.5 Does avoidance mediate relationships between negative intrapersonal 
experiences and NSSI? 
 The sample size of people who had self-injured between survey completions 
was too small to test mediation over time; instead, I used the T1 data to determine 
whether a dispositional tendency towards avoidance (i.e., experiential avoidance 
and thought suppression) mediated relationships between negative intrapersonal 
experiences (i.e., emotions and thoughts) and NSSI. Given that lifetime prevalence of 
NSSI was a dichotomous variable and standard mediation analyses are conducted 
with continuous variables, I used SPSS syntax41 written by Nathaniel Herr 
(www.nrhpsych.com/mediation/logmed.html) specifically for mediation analyses 
with dichotomous variables.  
Mediation was determined using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria: 
mediation is observed if the predictor (X) correlates with both the outcome (Y) and 
the mediator (M), and M then predicts Y while controlling for X. Full mediation is 
observed when the relationship between X and Y while controlling for M is reduced 
to zero (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Partial mediation is observed when there is a 
reduction in the significance level of the relationship between X and Y when 
including M. Each mediation analysis was followed up with a Sobel test.   
 Experiential avoidance did not mediate the relationships between NSSI and 
negative affect (see Figure 16), fear (see Figure 18), hostility (see Figure 20), guilt (see 
Figure 22), sadness (see Figure 24), or negative automatic thoughts (see Figure 26). 
Thought suppression, however, was identified as a partial mediator in five models. 
As is evident from the figures, thought suppression partially mediated the 
relationships between NSSI and negative affect (see Figure 17), fear (see Figure 19), 
hostility (see Figure 21), sadness (see Figure 23), and automatic thoughts (see Figure 
27). This suggests that specific forms of experiential avoidance (i.e., thought 
suppression) may underlie engagement in NSSI.  
                                               
41 Herr’s syntax is based on equations presented by Mackinnon and Dwyer (1993).  
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*** p < .001 * p < .05, ** p < .001 
Figure 16. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between negative affect and NSSI which is not 
mediated by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between negative 
affect and NSSI controlling for experiential avoidance is in 
parentheses. Sobel’s test = 0.11, SE = 0.07, p = .91. 
Figure 17. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between negative affect and NSSI which is 
partially mediated by thought suppression. The 
unstandardised regression coefficient for the relationship 
between negative affect and NSSI controlling for thought 
suppression is in parentheses. Sobel’s test = 1.98, SE = 0.07, p 
= .048. 
 
 
        
 
 
 
       
 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Figure 18. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between fear and NSSI which is not mediated 
by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised regression 
coefficient for the relationship between fear and NSSI 
controlling for experiential avoidance is in parentheses. 
Sobel’s test = 1.64, SE = 0.06, p = .10. 
Figure 19. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between fear and NSSI which is partially 
mediated by thought suppression. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between fear and 
NSSI controlling for thought suppression is in parentheses. 
Sobel’s test = 3.17, SE = 0.06, p = .002. 
 
 
        
 
 
 
       
 
*** p < .001 ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Figure 20. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between hostility and NSSI which is not 
mediated by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between hostility 
and NSSI controlling for experiential avoidance is in 
parentheses. Sobel’s test = 1.36, SE = 0.06, p = .17. 
Figure 21. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between hostility and NSSI which is partially 
mediated by thought suppression. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between hostility 
and NSSI controlling for experiential avoidance is in 
parentheses. Sobel’s test = 2.69, SE = 0.06, p = .01. 
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*** p < .001 *** p < .001 
Figure 22. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between guilt and NSSI which is not mediated 
by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised regression 
coefficient for the relationship between guilt and NSSI 
controlling for experiential avoidance is in parentheses. 
Sobel’s test = 0, SE = 0.06, p = 1. 
Figure 23. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between guilt and NSSI which is not mediated 
by thought suppression. The unstandardised regression 
coefficient for the relationship between guilt and NSSI 
controlling for thought suppression is in parentheses. Sobel’s 
test = 1.80, SE = 0.07, p = .07. 
 
 
        
 
 
 
       
 
*** p < .001 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Figure 24. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between sadness and NSSI which is not 
mediated by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between sadness 
and NSSI controlling for experiential avoidance is in 
parentheses. Sobel’s test = 0.64, SE = 0.06, p = .52. 
Figure 25. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between sadness and NSSI which is partially 
mediated by thought suppression. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between sadness 
and NSSI controlling for thought suppression is in 
parentheses. Sobel’s test = 2.33, SE = 0.07, p = .02. 
 
 
        
 
 
 
       
 
*** p < .001 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Figure 26. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between automatic thoughts and NSSI which is 
not mediated by experiential avoidance. The unstandardised 
regression coefficient for the relationship between automatic 
thoughts and NSSI controlling for experiential avoidance is 
in parentheses. Sobel’s test = 0.88, SE = 0.06, p = .38. 
Figure 27. Unstandardised regression coefficients for the 
relationship between automatic thoughts and NSSI which is 
partially mediated by thought suppression. The 
unstandardised regression coefficient for the relationship 
between automatic thoughts and NSSI controlling for 
thought suppression is in parentheses. Sobel’s test = 2.91, SE 
= 0.06, p = .004. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 Non-suicidal self-injury was highly prevalent in this self-selected sample of 
first year Psychology students, with almost half of the participants reporting a 
lifetime history of NSSI. These rates are generally higher than those identified in 
studies of American university students using the same self-injury measure (25%-
38%; Brown, 2009; Gratz et al., 2002), but of course cannot be used to infer true 
prevalence rates among this population. For instance, a random sample of university 
students found that only 17% reported self-injuring in their lifetimes (Whitlock et al., 
2006). The participants with a history of NSSI in the current study had typically 
engaged in more than one type of self-injury; the most common types (i.e., cutting, 
severe scratching, and sticking sharp objects into one’s skin) were generally 
consistent with what has been reported in other research (Gratz et al., 2002; Hoff & 
Muehlenkamp, 2009). 
 Comparisons between the participants who had, and had not, self-injured 
revealed several significant differences. To briefly review, it was proposed that 
people who had self-injured would report experiencing more negative intrapersonal 
experiences in general than people who had never self-injured and would use more 
avoidant coping methods. Furthermore, I anticipated that negative emotions and 
thoughts at T1 would predict engagement in self-injury at T2, and that these 
relationships may be mediated by dispositional tendencies towards avoidant coping.    
4.1 Experience of negative emotions and thoughts 
The intensity and frequency of negative intrapersonal experiences reported by 
participants not only differed according to whether or not they had self-injured, but 
also according to how recently they had self-injured. Participants who had self-
injured in the last 12 months consistently reported the highest levels of general 
negative affect, emotions (i.e., fear, hostility, guilt, and sadness), and automatic 
thoughts compared to those who had self-injured more than 12 months ago or never 
self-injured.  
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The same pattern of results was observed for negative emotional experiences 
that had occurred in the past week. Symptoms of depression, stress, and anxiety 
were significantly more common among participants who had self-injured within 
the past 12 months than those who had a lifetime or no history of NSSI. In contrast, 
participants who had self-injured more than 12 months ago did not differ on 
symptoms of depression, anxiety, or stress from participants who had never self-
injured. Moreover, participants with a lifetime history of NSSI did not report 
experiencing more negative automatic thoughts than participants who had never 
self-injured.  
However, these participants did endorse higher negative affect, hostility, 
guilt, and sadness than those without a history of self-injury, providing evidence 
that there are some significant differences in the general emotional experiences of 
people who have self-injured more than a year ago compared to people who have 
never self-injured. Taken together, these results show that people who have self-
injured report significantly more intense, aversive emotions and a higher frequency 
of negative automatic thoughts than people who have not self-injured, and that these 
negative emotional and cognitive experiences are heightened for those with a more 
recent history of NSSI.  
 These results are consistent with studies that show NSSI is associated with 
depression and anxiety disorders (Hintikka et al., 2009; Hoff & Muehlenkamp, 2009), 
and with the wealth of evidence that self-injury is primarily used as a strategy to 
deal with intense, negative affect (Klonsky, 2007). Given that negative cognitions 
feature prominently in both depression and anxiety (Dozois, Seeds, & Collins, 2009), 
it is unsurprising that the people who self-injured most recently also reported 
experiencing the highest frequency of negative automatic thoughts.  
4.2 Tendencies towards avoidant coping 
 As hypothesised, participants who had self-injured were significantly more 
likely to show a propensity towards avoidant coping strategies than participants 
who had never self-injured. However, this difference was only apparent with four 
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out of the six coping styles examined. Experiential avoidance, thought suppression, 
substance use, and behavioural disengagement were more commonly endorsed by 
participants who had self-injured and varied as a function of self-injury recency. This 
lends further support to the contention outlined within the EAM that self-injury is 
best understood as one of several avoidant behaviours in a functional response class 
(Chapman et al., 2006).  
In contrast, the use of self-distraction and denial did not differ between the 
groups. The absence of a significant difference for coping through self-distraction 
was particularly surprising in light of the evidence that suggests NSSI is an effective 
form of distraction (Brown et al., 2002; Polk & Liss, 2009). It may be that self-
distraction is a commonly used coping strategy for people with and without a 
history of self-injury, but that the difference lies in the behaviours that people 
engage in to successfully distract themselves. For example, people without a history 
of NSSI may routinely distract themselves through watching TV or exercising, 
whereas people who self-injure may routinely distract themselves through cutting or 
burning. 
4.3 Do negative emotions and thoughts cause self-injury?  
 It is clear from the results that participants who had self-injured within the 
past 12 months were the most likely to endorse experiencing negative emotions and 
unwanted thoughts, and to report a tendency towards avoidant coping, but the 
causal direction between these variables cannot be established with cross-sectional 
data. To allow for causal inferences, two time-points were included in the current 
study. However, only a few people reported self-injuring between surveys which 
necessitated revising the data analysis plan.  
Although experimental methods are traditionally employed to test causal 
relationships, these methods are not ethically appropriate for self-injury research. 
Instead, cross-lagged panel correlations (Kenny, 1975) were used to test causality. 
Simple cross-lagged panel models of over-time data revealed that both guilt and 
negative automatic thoughts predicted subsequent self-injury. The self-referential 
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characteristics that define guilt and negative automatic thoughts also underpin the 
self-punishment function of NSSI, which has been consistently identified as one of 
the most commonly endorsed motivations for self-injury (Briere & Gil, 1998; Brown 
et al., 2002; Swannell et al., 2008). Therefore it is possible that guilt and automatic 
thoughts predict NSSI because these negative intrapersonal experiences are 
alleviated through self-punishing acts such as self-injury.  
4.4 Specific types of avoidance may underlie self-injury  
Experiential avoidance is conceptualised as a process that involves avoiding 
emotions, thoughts, or physical sensations (Hayes et al., 1996), and yet it did not act 
as a mediator in any of the analyses. In contrast, thought suppression, which has 
been identified as a specific form of experiential avoidance (Chapman et al., 2006; 
Hayes et al., 1996), partially mediated the relationships between lifetime NSSI and 
all of the negative intrapersonal experiences assessed, with the exception of guilt. It 
is intuitive that thought suppression, rather than general experiential avoidance, 
would mediate the relationship between negative automatic thoughts and NSSI, but 
it is less intuitive that thought suppression rather than general experiential 
avoidance would mediate the relationships between negative emotions and NSSI. 
It may be that the AAQ as a measure of experiential avoidance fails to fully 
capture the defining characteristics of this behavioural process. Indeed, Hayes and 
colleagues (1996) comment on the limitations associated with reducing generalised 
avoidant tendencies, which have the potential to manifest in a myriad of specific 
actions, to a nine item measure. Alternatively, unsuccessful attempts at cognitive 
regulation through thought suppression (Najmi et al., 2007), rather than general 
avoidance, may be one of the key mechanisms through which negative emotions 
lead to self-injurious behaviour. Negative emotions may trigger, or be triggered by, 
negative cognitions, which in turn could lead to thought suppression. However, 
given that thought suppression is more likely to increase than decrease unwanted 
thoughts, self-injury may be subsequently utilised as a more effective avoidant 
coping strategy (Najmi et al., 2007).  
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4.5 Strengths 
 Given the paucity of longitudinal studies on NSSI, conducting this study 
across two time points was a methodological strength. As predictors of new 
incidents of NSSI, negative automatic thoughts and guilt likely functioned as EOs or 
SD’s for self-injurious episodes. Future studies should further examine the role of 
self-referential thoughts and emotions in predicting NSSI. Certainly, the inclusion of 
the short version of the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Netemeyer et al., 2002) 
in the survey was a strength of the current study as few researchers have examined 
the role of cognitions in precipitating NSSI and none, to my knowledge, have 
investigated the predictive value of negative automatic thoughts. This is clearly an 
important area for future research.  
4.6 Limitations 
Given that I have discussed the analytic limitations imposed by the small 
sample of people who reported new episodes of NSSI at T2 several times in this 
chapter, I will not dwell on these here. Suffice it to say that future research studies 
designed to test similar hypotheses should take into account the need for larger 
samples or longer time periods between survey completions. Indeed, two months 
was an arbitrary time limit, chosen for pragmatic rather than theoretical reasons.  
Another pragmatic choice—conducting this study with only university 
students—is a limitation in that these results may not generalise to other 
populations. However, this is not necessarily a flaw given the atypically high rates of 
self-injurious behaviours and psychopathology among university students 
compared with other community groups (Briere & Gil, 1998; Stallman, 2010; 
Whitlock et al., 2006). This suggests that researchers studying NSSI should pay 
particular attention to university students.  
4.7 Conclusions 
Negative intrapersonal experiences and avoidant coping styles were shown to 
vary not only as a function of NSSI history, but also as a function of NSSI recency. 
Particular negative intrapersonal experiences (i.e., automatic thoughts and guilt) also 
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predicted new episodes of self-injury. Finally, thought suppression was identified as 
a partial mediator of relationships between negative intrapersonal experiences and 
NSSI, although these results need to be replicated using over-time data. These 
results have a number of clinical implications. 
Students with a history of NSSI appear to be contending with significantly 
higher levels of general negative affect, aversive emotions, and cognitions than 
students who have never self-injured. Although these levels are not necessarily 
clinically significant in all cases, these students may be at a heightened risk of future 
self-injury episodes given their higher baseline rate of negative intrapersonal 
experiences (Brown et al., 2007). Clinicians should be mindful that even those 
students who have not self-injured in a year or more may still be struggling to 
regulate their emotions and cognitions. Other avoidant coping strategies, such as 
substance use, should also be assessed in students who have self-injured as these 
may be substituting for NSSI (Chapman et al., 2006). 
257 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
General discussion 
 
‚All of us tend to use the behavior that was effective in the past at getting the outcome we desire.‛ 
(Cipani & Schock, 2007, p. 72) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Does NSSI function primarily as an experientially avoidant behaviour within 
Aotearoa New Zealand? Based on the three empirical studies I conducted for this 
thesis, the answer is yes; for many people, on a majority of occasions, self-injury 
provided an escape from unwanted, negative emotions and thoughts. Of course, as 
is to be expected, one functional model does not fit all episodes of self-injury. 
Intrapersonal escape/avoidance did predominate across studies, but some 
participants’ self-injurious behaviours also functioned as an adrenalin rush 
reminiscent of a drug high (i.e., intrapersonal access), a visceral form of 
communicating to others when support was needed (i.e., interpersonal access), and 
an escape from taxing demands or personal responsibilities (i.e., interpersonal 
escape/avoidance). 
Interviewing people for my first study about their experiences of NSSI 
provided a rich, detailed, and highly nuanced foundation for the subsequent studies 
in this thesis. Indeed, it was impossible to do justice to the complexity inherent in 
each person’s most recent episode of self-injury, let alone the learning histories that 
preceded those episodes. Nonetheless, functionally assessing specific episodes of 
self-injurious behaviour did give me an understanding of why participants were 
motivated to injure themselves, and allowed me to hypothesise about the ways in 
which their behaviours were being reinforced and maintained over time.  
It was apparent from my analysis that complex and, in many cases, 
concurrent reinforcement schedules were operating for participants. This 
reinforcement, for the most part, was intrapersonally mediated; interpersonal 
functions were atypical. A minority of participants did report accessing attention or 
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support subsequent to their self-injury, which may have reinforced their behaviour. 
However, this support or attention was often temporally delayed and seldom 
identified as a motivating factor behind their self-injury, making it less likely that 
these behaviours served an interpersonal function.  
Intrapersonal functions once again predominated over interpersonal 
functions in my second study, a survey of people from across Aotearoa New 
Zealand, who had all self-injured within the past 12 months. Participants endorsed 
intrapersonal functions, for both their most recent and global self-injury episodes, 
significantly more often than interpersonal functions. More specifically, they most 
often reported self-injuring to regulate affect, punish themselves, and mark their 
distress; motivations for NSSI that were similarly reported in my interview study. 
Participants also retrospectively reported decreased negative affect and cognitions 
following their most recent episode of self-injury, which supports Chapman and 
colleagues’ (2006) proposal that NSSI is primarily maintained through negative 
reinforcement and thus functions as a form of experiential avoidance.   
Consistent with prior conceptualisations of self-injury as a self-help strategy 
(Favazza & Conterio, 1988), one of the two themes identified from a thematic 
analysis of the open-ended, survey responses detailing the consequences of NSSI 
was self becomes helper. These positive consequences of NSSI appeared to be both 
intrapersonally and interpersonally mediated. Participants utilised self-injury to 
regulate emotions, as well as access support and/or treatment. Furthermore, a few 
participants identified the presence of a physical wound as a positive consequence of 
self-injury. However, participants also identified a number of aversive consequences 
of their most recent episode of NSSI, which were captured in the second theme, self 
becomes transgressor. Self-injury was perceived by many participants as a 
transgression of socio-cultural norms and following their NSSI episode, people 
reported needing to conceal evidence of their self-injury from others, being judged 
by others for self-injuring, and feeling concerned that their behaviour had caused 
others to suffer.    
259 
 
 
The paradox of self-injury as a behaviour that diminishes and provokes 
distress was apparent in both my interview and survey studies. Although the 
aversive consequences engendered by self-injury could have functioned to suppress 
the behaviour, this seemed unlikely in the majority of cases since they typically 
followed reinforcing consequences. Instead, it is probable that many of the 
participants would have self-injured again, especially in light of the powerful 
intrapersonal functions served by their self-injury.   
My first two studies provided compelling evidence of the utility of NSSI as a 
coping strategy for negative emotions and cognitions, leading me to question 
whether people who self-injure could be differentiated from those who do not self-
injure on the basis of their general intrapersonal experiences and coping styles. For 
my final study, I compared the emotional, cognitive, and coping experiences of 
people with a history of NSSI to those who have never self-injured to determine 
whether there were any significant differences between these two groups. Building 
on the results of my interview and survey analyses, my third study focused on 
investigating the broader emotional and cognitive experiences of people who self-
injure, and whether these experiences would predict engagement in NSSI over time. 
People with a history of self-injury did report experiencing significantly 
higher levels of negative emotions and thoughts on a general basis than people who 
did not have a history of NSSI, and they were also significantly more likely to use 
avoidant coping strategies, such as substance use and thought suppression. The 
strength of these differences varied according to NSSI recency. Furthermore, 
negative automatic thoughts and guilt predicted new episodes of self-injury, lending 
weight to the key premise of the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) that people self-injure 
to decrease or eliminate negative affect, but also emphasising the importance of 
negative cognitions in precipitating self-injury. Finally, cross-sectional analyses 
demonstrated that thought suppression acted as a partial mediator of the 
relationship between negative intrapersonal experiences and NSSI.   
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Taken together, the findings from my three studies help to support and 
further clarify the extant literature on the functions of self-injury (Klonsky, 2009; 
Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2005), as well as provide insight into the 
cognitive antecedents and consequences of self-injurious behaviours, which have 
been largely neglected in the NSSI literature. Although this preliminary research into 
the functions of NSSI in Aotearoa New Zealand is a useful starting point, several 
questions remain open to debate. In particular, I will discuss what the self-injury 
mindset may tell us about the interrelationship between emotions and thoughts, 
where NSSI ‘fits’ in relation to other coping strategies, whether certain coping 
strategies (such as NSSI) qualify as disorders, and the clinical implications of 
conceptualising self-injury as an experientially avoidant behaviour. Finally, the 
strengths and limitations of my studies will be considered within the context of 
directions for future research.  
2. THE SELF-INJURY MINDSET 
The difficulty of understanding how the complex interrelationship between 
emotions and cognitions impacts on the initiation, reinforcement, and maintenance 
of self-injurious behaviours is an issue which has surfaced repeatedly throughout 
this thesis. As identified by Nock (2008), few studies examine the cognitive 
precipitants of self-injury, with many researchers focusing almost exclusively on 
how self-injury functions as an emotion regulation strategy. However, my research 
demonstrates that ruling out, or downplaying, the role of cognitions in self-injury is 
premature. Certainly, the current evidence base about why people self-injure is too 
limited to conclude, as proposed by Chapman et al. (2006) in the EAM, that self-
injury functions primarily as a form of emotional avoidance. 
Instead, it was apparent across my three studies that specific types of 
cognitions play a significant role in motivating people to engage in self-injury and 
also allow people to discriminate that reinforcement will be available following self-
injury. Negative automatic thoughts featured prominently in people’s narrative 
descriptions of the antecedents of self-injury and were identified as being 
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significantly higher before, than after, self-injury in the cross-sectional, survey study. 
Furthermore, negative automatic thoughts predicted new episodes of NSSI over 
time.  
These studies suggest that negative automatic thoughts function as EOs for 
self-injurious behaviours; in other words, they motivate people to injure themselves 
on purpose. As I discussed in Chapter 4 (see p. 116), EOs have a value-altering effect 
through determining how potent a specific reinforcer will be in a particular situation 
and a behaviour-altering effect by increasing the likelihood of a person engaging in 
behaviours that are typically followed by that reinforcer (Laraway et al., 2003; 
Michael, 1993; Miltenberger, 2004). 
As EOs, negative automatic thoughts therefore not only influence the strength 
of reinforcement following self-injury, but also how frequently people engage in self-
injurious behaviours. Of course, aversive emotions also appeared to function as EOs 
in all three of my studies, which highlights the importance of learning more about 
how emotional and cognitive EOs interact to reinforce NSSI. In the interview study, 
many people acknowledged that they made a decision to self-injure once they had 
surpassed a particular threshold of distress. Although they most easily identified the 
emotional components of this distress, it was clear that negative cognitions were also 
present. 
Part of people’s struggle to identify cognitive antecedents seemed to stem 
from their use of emotion language (e.g., ‚I felt<‛) to describe cognitive processes, 
which is customary for English speakers (Westbrook, Kennerley, & Kirk, 2007). Two 
examples from the interview study were provided by Owen and Natalie 
respectively: ‚I felt like I was yeah useless‛ and ‚I kind of felt like everyone had 
abandoned me‛.  When couched as feelings, these thoughts appear to be more 
authoritative and immutable than they actually are which may have exacerbated 
participants’ negative emotional experience prior to self-injuring. This is one way in 
which negative emotions and thoughts may interact to motivate people to self-
injure. 
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Another way in which negative cognitions precipitated self-injury was in 
their role as SD’s. The evidence for this contention is drawn from the interview study 
where several participants described how once they had surpassed a particular 
threshold of distress, their perspective became constricted to the point where they 
were unable to problem-solve alternative solutions to NSSI. Once in this mindset, 
they became convinced that self-injuring was the only way they could effectively 
alleviate their suffering.  
The presence of constricted cognition as a precipitant of self-injury supports 
Chapman et al.’s (2006) hypothesis that people who self-injure may tend towards 
experiential avoidance because they are unable to generate more helpful coping 
strategies when emotionally aroused. In these situations, particular thresholds or 
combinations of emotional and cognitive EOs appeared to activate, or at least occur 
alongside, verbal rules about the utility of self-injury. Such rules were evidence of 
the cognitive constriction experienced by some participants prior to self-injury and 
allowed them to discriminate that relief would be available following NSSI. 
Chapman et al. (2006) do briefly suggest that the interaction between verbal rules 
and emotional distress may play a role in maintaining self-injurious behaviour, but 
they do not address the complexities of this interaction within the EAM, preferring 
instead to focus on emotional precipitants and the process of emotional avoidance. 
However, the interrelationships between emotions and cognitions (both 
negative, automatic thoughts and verbal rules) evident in my research suggests that 
it is prudent at this point in time to adopt the more inclusive term of experiential 
avoidance, which implicates both emotions and thoughts in the reinforcement and 
maintenance of NSSI, until further research on the role of cognitive processes in self-
injury has been conducted. Given that NSSI does appear to function primarily as a 
form of experiential avoidance, it may be both clinically and theoretically useful to 
refer to NSSI as an experientially avoidant coping strategy.    
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3. IS IT USEFUL TO CONCEPTUALISE NSSI AS A COPING STRATEGY? 
 Before defining self-injury as a form of avoidant coping, it is first necessary to 
determine what constitutes a coping strategy and how, if conceptualised as such, 
NSSI fits with other ways of coping. Unfortunately, the extant coping literature, 
which is beset with contradictions, provides little clarification about the parameters 
of different coping mechanisms (see Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). In 
an effort to organise this literature to better inform future research on coping, 
Skinner et al. (2003) comprehensively reviewed the convergences and divergences 
among 100 measures of coping. Within their conception of coping as ‚an 
organizational construct used to encompass the myriad actions individuals use to deal 
with stressful experiences‛ (p. 217), Skinner et al. (2003) contend that coping is best 
viewed as a four-level hierarchy. Adaptive processes are at the top level of the 
hierarchy; these encompass families of coping, which in turn incorporate ways of 
coping, which are made up of coping instances. Classifying NSSI within this system 
(see Figure 28) may prove to be a useful way of organising the different functions of 
NSSI in relation to other coping behaviours. 
At the lowest level, the instances of coping reflect the infinite variations of 
self-injurious behaviours that people could use to hurt themselves on purpose. These 
instances of coping are then grouped into ways of coping (e.g., cognitive and 
emotional avoidance) at the second level of the hierarchy. Other ways of coping 
identified by Skinner et al. (2003) under the rubric of escape include behavioural 
avoidance, denial, and wishful thinking. Escape is the third level in the hierarchy 
and is classified as a family of coping. Families of coping serve particular functions 
for people, which in turn are linked to adaptive processes (i.e., level four of the 
hierarchy). Problem-solving, helplessness, and support-seeking are examples of 
other families of coping, while another adaptive process is gathering and ensuring 
the availability of social resources (Skinner et al., 2003). For example, the 
interpersonal access function of NSSI could be classified as gathering social support. 
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Figure 28. NSSI within an adaptive coping hierarchy. Adapted from ‚Searching for 
the structure of coping: A review and critique of category systems for classifying 
ways of coping,‛ by E.A. Skinner, K. Edge, J. Altman and H. Sherwood, 2003, 
Psychological Bulletin, 129, p. 218.  
 
Applying Skinner et al.’s (2003) hierarchy to NSSI raises several questions 
about the ways in which self-injury has been conceptualised to date. For example, 
Skinner and colleagues categorise emotion regulation within the coping family of 
self-reliance. They propose that self-reliance is adaptive because it allows people to 
protect their social resources. Within this taxonomy, it is not clear how NSSI could 
be described as form of emotion regulation and avoidance at the same time as they 
are distinct ways of coping. It is possible that instances of NSSI could function to 
regulate emotions, but those episodes would be separate from instances of NSSI that 
function as avoidance. However, in the NSSI literature, affect regulation reasons for 
self-injury are typically subsumed under the function of intrapersonal 
escape/avoidance (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 2004), which implies 
that self-injury is an emotion regulation strategy because it allows people to 
successfully escape or avoid their negative emotions. 
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Although such a fastidious approach to understanding why people self-injure 
may seem excessive, it is possible that isolating the mechanisms that underlie NSSI 
will necessitate clarifying the relationships between specific ways of coping (i.e., 
cognitive avoidance versus emotional regulation). Undoubtedly, clarification would 
further develop our understanding of how each of the single-function models (see 
pp. 68-76) relate to one another. Conceptualising particular self-injury behaviours as 
instances of coping that serve an adaptive function is also consistent with 
behavioural models of self-injury.   
4. SHOULD COPING STRATEGIES BE CLASSIFIED AS DISORDERS? 
 At the start of this thesis, I discussed the current proposal for an NSSI 
Disorder to be included in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2010). My 
understanding of NSSI as a coping behaviour, as stated in Chapter 1 (see p. 26), 
conflicts with the argument that self-injury should be categorised as a disorder. 
Certainly, as instances of coping, specific episodes of self-injury do not count as 
disordered in and of themselves; rather, what could be considered to be maladaptive 
is the sustained use of self-injury as a form of avoidance. As such, continuously 
avoiding or escaping distress by self-injuring may qualify as a disorder.      
However, if it is the use of avoidance that is deemed unhelpful, then it seems 
more practical to adopt a functional perspective and view avoidance as a functional 
diagnostic dimension (cf. Hayes et al., 1996). This is consistent with the argument 
that NSSI belongs in a functional response class with other avoidant behaviours 
(Chapman et al., 2006). The alternative structural approach could potentially result 
in a long list of comorbid disorders, which on the surface may appear to have little in 
common, but ultimately serve the same function (Dougher & Hayes, 2000). 
Furthermore, a diagnosis of NSSI may encourage clinicians to assess and treat self-
injury as a prescribed list of symptoms, rather than as a complex, dynamic way of 
coping that shifts in response to particular environmental contexts.  
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5. CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The conspicuous lack of empirically supported treatments for NSSI has been 
commented on by a number of authors (Klonsky & Muehlenkamp, 2007; Nock, 
2010); indeed, the need for research into effective treatments for self-injury has been 
cited as a reason to classify NSSI as a disorder (Muehlenkamp, 2005). If, as my 
findings suggest, NSSI does function primarily as an experientially avoidant coping 
behaviour within Aotearoa New Zealand, it may be advisable for clinicians working 
here to employ interventions that aim to decrease intrapersonal avoidance. 
Two particularly promising interventions for people who utilise self-injury to 
avoid, or escape from, negative intrapersonal experiences are DBT (Linehan, 1993a, 
1993b) and ACT (Hayes et al., 2006). As third-wave cognitive behavioural therapies, 
DBT and ACT both target experiential avoidance, but the way in which specific skills 
are conceptualised and taught to clients can differ (Lynch et al., 2006). The 
philosophy of dialectics lies at the heart of DBT and is concerned with 
interrelatedness, opposing forces, and the inevitability of change (Linehan, 1993a). 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy has been identified as an effective treatment for self-
injury among people diagnosed with BPD (Bohus et al., 2004; Kliem, Kröger, & 
Kosfelder, 2010; Stanley, Brodsky, Nelson, & Dulit, 2007), but no research has been 
conducted to determine whether it is a similarly efficacious treatment for people, 
without BPD, who self-injure.  
Turning to ACT, a protocol has been developed for treating adolescents who 
self-injure (Rowland, 2011) but, to my knowledge, the use of ACT to treat NSSI has 
never been empirically tested. Despite this lack of research, ACT appears to be a 
highly appropriate treatment for NSSI because it aims to decrease experiential 
avoidance through promoting psychological flexibility (Hayes et al., 2006). 
Experiential avoidance, within an ACT framework, is conceptualised as a barrier to 
acceptance; for someone who routinely escapes negative intrapersonal experiences 
through self-injury, acceptance would entail remaining in contact with their 
unwanted feelings or thoughts (Hayes et al., 2006). Psychologically flexible people 
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are able to consciously connect with the present moment, and choose to engage in 
behaviours that enable them to live according their values (Hayes et al., 2006).    
Since it is beyond the purpose of this thesis to engage in an in-depth 
comparison of the potential for these two therapies to reduce self-injurious 
behaviours, I have instead chosen to discuss how particular strategies, which are 
routinely used in DBT and ACT protocols, could be used to prevent people from 
becoming overwhelmed by their negative emotions and thoughts to the point where 
their cognition constricts and they become trapped in the self-injury mindset. More 
specifically, I will focus on how teaching people mindfulness, cognitive defusion,   
and distress tolerance skills may help them to successfully regulate their emotions 
without resorting to NSSI.   
Mindfulness-based approaches to psychopathology, which involve teaching 
clients to focus their awareness on the present moment, appear to be growing in 
number and popularity (Chiesa & Malinowski, 2011). A fundamental element of 
mindfulness as defined by Kabat-Zinn is the absence of judgement (Elliston, 2002); 
that is, people are encouraged to develop the ability to simply notice what they are 
experiencing without judging those experiences as inherently good or bad (Hayes et 
al., 2006).  
Practising mindfulness may reduce the distress associated with particular 
emotions and thoughts for people who self-injure, which, in turn, could alleviate the 
sense, as described by participants in my interview study, of mounting pressure. 
Certainly, if thoughts and emotions are simply noticed, rather than judged as 
aversive and overwhelming, it is less likely that people will experience the same 
sense of urgency to escape from these intrapersonal events. 
Within a DBT framework, distress tolerance skills evolve out of, and build on, 
mindfulness training (Linehan, 1993a). Distress tolerance is defined as:  
the ability to perceive one’s environment without putting demands on it to be different, to 
experience your current emotional state without attempting to change it, and to observe your 
own thoughts and action patterns without attempting to stop or control them. (Linehan, 
1993a, p. 96) 
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It is not difficult to see how distress tolerance may prove to be an essential 
component of self-injury prevention and intervention efforts in light of my findings 
that the interaction between intense, negative emotions and self-referential 
cognitions dominated as NSSI precipitants in studies one and two, and guilt and 
negative, automatic thoughts actually predicted new episodes of NSSI in study 
three. Distress tolerance would require people to perceive, observe, and experience 
their aversive emotions and thoughts instead of engaging in self-injurious 
behaviours, and is closely related to the notion of acceptance within ACT (Hofman & 
Asmundson, 2008).  
Cultivating a willingness to remain in contact with distressing thoughts and 
emotions may not only help people tolerate such experiences, but over time may 
reduce the likelihood that they reach the threshold of distress where self-injury, in 
the words of Lucy, becomes inevitable (see p. 130). Certainly, ACT contends that 
struggling to control unwanted, intrapersonal experiences is futile and counter-
productive; such struggles may exacerbate these experiences and, in all likelihood, 
will heighten distress (Harris, 2006). For instance, as discussed earlier in this thesis 
(see p. 85), thought suppression usually increases the frequency of unwanted 
thoughts (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).  
Cognitive defusion is another skill that may facilitate a reduction in distress 
over time through decreasing the believability of negative thoughts about oneself, 
others, and the world (Hayes et al., 2006). When people are fused with their 
cognitions, these thoughts are interpreted as literal truths or rules, and thus wield 
immense power over people’s behaviour (Harris, 2006). Therefore, the aim of 
cognitive defusion is to change the relationship that people have with their thoughts, 
rather than the content or frequency of those thoughts (Hayes et al., 2006).  
Teaching cognitive defusion to people who self-injure is likely to be helpful 
not only in reducing the believability of self-referential thoughts such as, ‚I am 
worthless‛, and thus the distress evoked by such thoughts, but also in challenging 
the literality and believability of verbal rules such as, ‚If I want to feel better, then I 
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need to hurt myself‛ (see pp. 131-133). For example, someone could defuse from this 
verbal rule by labelling it as a thought: ‚I am having the thought that if I want to feel 
better, then I need to hurt myself‛ (Hayes et al., 2006). In sum, ACT and DBT show 
considerable promise as treatment methods for a wide range of people who self-
injure, but studies in support of this contention are urgently needed.   
6. WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
Research on NSSI can be considered to be in its infancy; sophisticated study 
designs are needed to further develop our knowledge of why people start self-
injuring and how these behaviours are maintained over time. One of the most critical 
areas for future research is how to effectively treat people who habitually self-injure, 
given the dearth of studies on NSSI interventions. In the following sections, I 
consider how the findings of my studies could be used to inform new research on 
self-injury and discuss limitations that need to be addressed in the future. 
Specifically, improved methods, a continued focus on the EAM and the functions of 
self-injury, an enhanced understanding of the interrelationship between emotions 
and cognitions, and more diverse samples are needed in order to develop a robust 
evidence base of NSSI research.   
6.1 More sophisticated methods are necessary 
In Psychological research, as in literature, unreliable narrators (Booth, 1983) 
are to be expected. Memories of past events are fallible and the findings of my 
empirical studies, all of which relied exclusively on self-report methodologies, are 
undoubtedly influenced to some extent by retrospective bias. Such criticism, 
however, can be levelled at the majority of research conducted on NSSI to date and 
is typically an inescapable reality of studies designed to investigate what people 
think about and how they feel.   
Understanding the phenomenology of self-injury is essential to effectively 
prevent and treat these behaviours and, as such, self-report will always feature 
within NSSI research. However, the use of increasingly sophisticated methods, such 
as ecological momentary assessment (see Muehlenkamp et al., 2009; Nock et al., 
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2009) will not only help researchers reduce the error associated with retrospective 
bias, but will also facilitate a deeper understanding of the emotional, cognitive, and 
situational antecedents and consequences of NSSI. This understanding, in turn, will 
improve our knowledge of how self-injurious behaviours are reinforced and 
maintained over time.  
One of the limitations of the cross-sectional design of my first two studies is 
that I was unable to determine whether people’s self-injurious behaviours were 
actually reinforced as I do not know whether they self-injured again. Instead, I could 
only hypothesise that the majority of the episodes reported by participants were 
negatively reinforced and, as such, they were likely to engage in further NSSI. 
Including two time points in my third study was a strength because I was able to test 
whether specific intrapersonal experiences and coping styles predicted new 
incidents of self-injury. 
Certainly, over-time and longitudinal studies are desperately needed as the 
majority of work conducted on NSSI to date has been cross-sectional. As a result, we 
know very little about what factors are causally implicated in the initiation and 
maintenance of self-injurious behaviours. Preliminary evidence suggests well-
established NSSI correlates, which have been hypothesised as risk factors for self-
injury, do not actually predict new incidents of self-injury (Glenn & Klonsky, 2011), 
making longitudinal studies even more imperative. 
6.2 How do emotions and cognitions interact to precipitate NSSI?  
Although my findings support the utility of conceptualising NSSI primarily 
as an experientially avoidant behaviour within the context of Aotearoa New 
Zealand, they also highlight the importance of developing a more sophisticated 
understanding of how cognitions and emotions interact to precipitate and reinforce 
self-injurious behaviours. Certainly, the EAM’s (Chapman et al., 2006) focus on 
emotional precipitants appears, in light of my findings about the self-injury mindset, 
to be overly simplistic.   
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Rather, it is clear from my research that the interaction between negative 
emotions and thoughts led participants to become overwhelmed, and, in some cases, 
once they surpassed a threshold of emotional intensity, they found it difficult to 
generate possible coping strategies other then self-injury. An important area of 
investigation for future research is to examine in greater depth how and why this 
process of cognitive constriction occurs, as well as the predictive power of verbal 
rules in this context. More specifically, it would be important to examine within-
individual and between-group differences in how this threshold is reached and then 
surpassed. For instance, is the tipping point for self-injury completely idiosyncratic, 
based on individual learning histories and skill deficits, or do gendered, diagnostic, 
or culture-specific patterns in tipping points exist?  
Additionally, it should be noted that the relatively simplistic distinction made 
between emotions and cognitions when researching NSSI (including my studies) is 
becoming increasingly outdated when situated within the broader context of the 
emotion literature (cf. Barrett, 2009; Duncan & Barrett, 2007). For instance, Duncan 
and Barrett (2007) argue that at a neurobiological level, affect is a cognitive process 
and, as such, distinguishing between affect and cognition reflects an epistemological 
alignment with phenomenology, not ontology. They propose investigating why this 
distinction holds functional value for people is necessary to better understand the 
experience of emotions and cognitions. Such investigations within the emotion 
literature may usefully inform future research on how emotional and cognitive 
processes interact to precipitate, reinforce, and maintain self-injurious behaviour.  
6.3 Further research on the EAM is warranted 
Despite what is arguably an overly simplistic preoccupation with emotional 
avoidance, I contend nonetheless that the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) is a useful 
framework for both research and clinical practice. However, it is the broader, more 
inclusive notion of experiential, rather than emotional, avoidance that should be 
utilised both empirically and clinically. Certainly, specific components of the model, 
such as why people who self-injure gravitate towards experientially avoidant coping 
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strategies in the first place, remain largely untested and would benefit from further 
research. Understanding why people utilise avoidance over and above other coping 
strategies provides information for clinicians about what skill deficits could be 
targeted in treatment.   
As I discussed in Chapter 3 (see pp. 82-83), Chapman and colleagues (2006) 
provide several suggestions as to why people who self-injure may evidence a 
heightened propensity towards experiential avoidance. It is possible that people who 
begin self-injuring experience emotions more intensely than people who do not ever 
self-injure (Chapman et al., 2006). A recent study showed that adolescents who had 
self-injured were more physiologically reactive when distressed than adolescents 
who had never self-injured (Nock & Mendes, 2008). Additionally, I identified in my 
over-time, survey study that students who had self-injured did report experiencing 
more intense, negative emotions in general than those who had never self-injured. 
However, neither of these studies was designed to determine whether these 
differences in emotional intensity existed prior to the onset of NSSI. Cohort studies 
with children and young adolescents are needed to examine whether emotional 
intensity predicts whether people begin engaging in NSSI. 
Linked to the notion of emotional intensity is the suggestion that people may 
be predisposed to NSSI because they are unable to tolerate emotional distress 
(Chapman et al., 2006). Low distress tolerance has been empirically associated with 
NSSI (Nock & Mendes, 2008) and is a target for therapeutic change among people 
diagnosed with BPD (Linehan, 1993a). Further research needs to be conducted to 
determine whether low distress tolerance is a risk factor for NSSI. 
Finally, it is possible that people who self-injure have a propensity for 
experientially avoidant coping strategies because they lack access to alternative 
coping mechanisms or they may possess such skills but find it too difficult to employ 
them when emotionally overwhelmed (Chapman et al., 2006).The latter hypothesis is 
more consistent with the findings in my research where people found it difficult to 
think of alternative coping strategies when they reached specific tipping points. 
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Examining these questions within a research context will undoubtedly develop our 
understanding of why people begin self-injuring and what types of interventions are 
most appropriate when attempting to reduce self-injurious behaviours.  
6.4 What are the similarities and differences between NSSI and other forms of 
experiential avoidance?  
Given that NSSI is conceptualised as one of many behaviours within the 
functional response class of experiential avoidance (Chapman et al., 2006), the 
similarities and differences between self-injury and functionally equivalent 
behaviours should be investigated in future research. In particular, understanding 
why people choose self-injury instead of, or in conjunction with, other experientially 
avoidant behaviours may have important implications for prevention and treatment 
efforts. Furthermore, such investigations are necessary to further test the specificity 
of the EAM (Chapman et al., 2006) to NSSI.  
 For example, substance use is routinely conceptualised as an experientially 
avoidant behaviour (see pp. 80, 82, 84-86) and preliminary evidence suggests that 
people may replace self-injury with substance use (Brown et al., 2007). It is possible 
that this occurs within the context of developmental shifts; certainly, substance use is 
a more socially acceptable, avoidant behaviour to engage in as one grows older. 
However, it is likely that there are other variables, aside from social acceptability, 
that distinguish self-injury from substance use. Future studies could focus on 
identifying the factors (i.e., intrapersonal, interpersonal, and situational) that place 
people at risk of engaging in different forms of experiential avoidance.  
6.5 How do functions of self-injury change over time? 
 Applying behavioural theory to the study of NSSI among typically 
developing populations (Chapman et al., 2006; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Linehan, 
1993a, 1993b; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005) has significantly advanced our 
understanding of why people self-injure. Longitudinal studies are needed to further 
develop this evidence base, particularly with regards to how functions of self-injury 
change within people over time (Nock & Prinstein, 2004). Given the functions of a 
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behaviour are context dependent (Anderson, 2007), it seems probable that the 
within-person functions of NSSI will be influenced by factors that govern the 
parameters of people’s environments, such as developmental stage.     
 Ecological momentary assessment techniques will also undoubtedly refine 
our current understanding of the functions of NSSI as retrospective functional 
assessments are likely to be subject to memory biases. For example, it is possible that 
retrospective self-reports may be tapping into the verbal rules people hold about 
NSSI rather than the behavioural functions. Preliminary results from one of the few 
ecological momentary assessment studies of NSSI show that the functions of self-
injury are largely consistent with those endorsed in retrospective studies (Nock et 
al., 2009), but further research is needed to replicate these results. 
6.6 What does NSSI communicate to others?  
Although NSSI does appear to function primarily as an experientially 
avoidant behaviour both within Aotearoa New Zealand and in international samples 
(Klonsky, 2007, 2011; Nock & Prinstein, 2004), interpersonal functions can play an 
important role in the initiation and maintenance of self-injury. In both my interview 
and cross-sectional survey studies, there were a number of participants who 
described utilising self-injury as a means of avoiding interpersonal responsibilities or 
seeking support.  
To better understand the complexity of how interpersonal functions of NSSI 
are reinforced, maintained, or punished, it would be useful to conduct further 
research on how and why NSSI functions as a form of communication to others. 
Additionally, it would be valuable to compare the semiotics of self-injury (i.e., what 
the behaviours signify to others) across cultures, sub-cultures, genders, and age 
groups, and how often messages conveyed through NSSI are received as intended. 
Certainly, several participants in my interview study provided examples of 
how the reasons behind their self-injurious behaviour had been misinterpreted by 
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others. Angela described being labelled as emo42 by people who saw evidence of her 
self-injury, a judgement she found ‚very offensive‛. She described self-injury, when 
associated with this subculture, as a public, group activity that was discussed 
‚almost boastfully‛. For Angela, emo self-injury appeared to be distasteful because it 
primarily fulfilled an attention-seeking function. This directly contrasted with her 
use of NSSI as a self-help strategy. 
The belief that some groups use NSSI as a status symbol was echoed in 
Emily’s observation that the popularity of self-injury at her all-girls’ secondary 
school was evidence of a ‚glamorisation of dysfunction‛. While self-injury contagion 
has been studied among clinical populations (Matthews, 1968; Rosen & Walsh, 1989), 
the normalisation of self-injury within particular peer groups in community-based 
samples remains largely unexamined. Certainly, if such normalisation is prevalent, 
identifying what factors place young people at risk of succumbing to peer pressure 
to self-injure would be an important area for future research. 
6.7 Diverse samples are needed 
As commented on earlier in this thesis, much of the research on NSSI has been 
conducted with female Caucasians (Shaw, 2002); my studies are no exception. The 
majority of the participants in all three of the studies I conducted were female and 
the samples lacked ethnic diversity. Furthermore, in my third study, participants 
who did not complete the Time 2 survey were significantly more likely to be male, 
perhaps suggesting that males are less willing to participate in research on NSSI. 
Unwillingness to participate could stem from perceptions that self-injury is a 
predominantly female problem or a reluctance to disclose self-injury.   
 Although Pākehā are in the majority in Aotearoa New Zealand, they are 
overrepresented in my research compared to general population statistics (Bascand, 
2007). As such, the lack of ethnic diversity observed across my three studies does not 
                                               
42 The word emo signifies a disparaging stereotype of someone who is overly sensitive or emotional 
(Emo, n.d.). 
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reflect the current social demographics of Aotearoa New Zealand. This limitation 
should be addressed in future research especially given that definitions of NSSI are 
socio-culturally bound, as discussed in Chapter 1. Within Aotearoa New Zealand, 
researchers have an obligation to conduct themselves in accordance with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and particular attention thus needs to be paid to 
understanding Māori conceptualisations of NSSI and how these behaviours may 
manifest among Māori. Certainly, researching and treating self-injury as an 
experientially avoidant behaviour may not be appropriate for Māori or other ethnic 
groups, particularly if avoidant behaviours are considered socially acceptable or 
culturally adaptive in such communities.  
7. CONCLUSION 
Non-suicidal self-injury is an important topic for future research as it appears 
to be a highly prevalent behaviour among certain groups and our understanding of 
why people begin, and continue, to self-injure is limited. However, I believe that it is 
equally important not to sensationalise the prevalence of NSSI in our communities; 
although many researchers unproblematically assert that the incidence of NSSI is 
rising, there is little evidence to confirm this suspicion. Alarmist statements such as 
that contained in one journal article title which referred to adolescent NSSI as ‚the 
latest epidemic [emphasis added] to assess and treat‛ (Miller & Smith, 2008, p. 178) 
misrepresent the current state of knowledge in this area.   
Certainly, I am cognisant that the explosion of research interest in NSSI may 
have helped to establish self-injury as one of the behaviours in the symptom pool of 
Western cultures, thus legitimising it as a signifier of distress (Shorter, 1987) and 
possibly fuelling an increase in the prevalence of these behaviours. Researchers have 
a responsibility to reflect on how they present NSSI in scientific discourse as these 
forms of knowledge have the potential to exert a significant influence over the way 
in which people behave (Watters, 2010). In spite of these concerns, further research 
into NSSI is warranted to try to prevent people from choosing it as a coping strategy 
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and to ensure that people who do engage in repeated self-injury have access to 
effective, evidence-based treatments.  
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Introduction 
 
You are invited to take part in the following study. The study will involve the following three phases: 
 
1) Completing a questionnaire about the different types of non-suicidal deliberate self-harm 
behaviours you may have engaged in, as well as how often and severe these behaviours have 
been. 
2) Potentially participating in one or two interviews to discuss deliberate self-harm behaviours, 
depending on the results of your questionnaire. The interview(s) will last approximately one to 
two hours.  
3) Completing a questionnaire (if you have taken part in the interview(s)) about participating in 
this research study. This questionnaire will include the opportunity to provide suggestions for 
future research on the topic of deliberate self-harm. 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary (your choice). You do not have to take part in this study, and if 
you do choose not to take part, this will not affect any future care or treatment. If you do agree to take 
part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason and this will 
in no way affect your continuing health care. If you do withdraw from the study before completing the 
questionnaire(s) or interview(s), all the data that has been collected in relation to you (e.g. completed 
questionnaires or interview transcripts) will be immediately destroyed. You do not have to answer all 
the questions, and you may stop the interview at any time. Participation in this study will be stopped 
should the Principal Investigator feel it is not in your best interest to continue. You may have support 
from a friend, family or whanau member to help you understand the risks and/or benefits of this study 
and any other explanation you may require. This study has received ethical approval from the Multi-
region Ethics Committee which reviews National and Multi-regional studies. 
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What are the aims of the study? 
 
Deliberate self-harm is a seldom investigated topic in New Zealand and as a result, very little is known 
about New Zealanders’ experiences of self-harm. The purpose of this study is to explore what kinds of 
thoughts, feelings and events may lead adolescents and young adults to engage in deliberate self-harm, 
and the purpose(s) that self-harm fulfils for them. This study is being conducted as part of a PhD thesis. 
The Principal Investigator is interested in learning about your experiences of deliberate self-harm from 
your perspective. The study will not involve you participating in any form of therapy. The ultimate 
goal of the thesis is to identify factors that trigger and maintain non-suicidal self-harm behaviours in 
order to improve mental health treatments for people who self-harm. 
  
Who is being asked to participate in this study? 
 
Individuals will be asked to participate in the study if they are between the ages of 16 and 34, can speak 
English fluently, and have engaged in deliberate self-harm within the past 12 months. Individuals will 
be excluded if they have an intellectual disability, have only engaged in deliberate self-harm during 
episodes of mania or psychosis, or if they are currently experiencing a manic or psychotic episode. 
 
How were participants selected for this study, and who selected them? 
 
There are two groups of participants involved in this study—individuals who are engaged in public 
mental health and counselling services, and individuals recruited from the community. In regards to 
individuals from mental health and counselling services, the Principal Investigator approached mental 
health clinicians to inform them about the study. These clinicians were asked to pass on information 
about the study to any of their clients, between the ages of 16 to 34 years old, who have engaged in 
deliberate self-harm behaviour(s) within the past 12 months and who may be interested in participating 
in the study. To recruit participants from the community, the Principal Investigator placed 
advertisements about the study in community newspapers, newsletters, and venues inviting 
individuals who have engaged in deliberate self-harm behaviour(s) to contact her if they would like to 
participate in the study. 
 
How many participants will be involved? 
 
The Principal Investigator intends to interview at least 12-15 participants.  
 
Where will the interviews be conducted? 
 
The interviews will take place either at the mental health clinic or counselling service that the 
participant attends (if appropriate), or at the School of Psychology at Victoria University’s Kelburn 
Campus. 
 
What will happen during the study? 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, the following will take place: 
 
1. Robyn Langlands, the Principal Investigator, will send you a questionnaire to complete about 
deliberate self-harm behaviour(s).  
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2. Depending on the results of your questionnaire, you may be asked to participate in an interview 
to discuss deliberate self-harm behaviours. You will be given a list of questions that will be asked 
during the interview to enable you to decide whether you will be comfortable discussing such 
topics.  
3. If you decide you would like to participate in the interview, Robyn will arrange a suitable time 
and place to meet you for the interview. You are welcome to bring a support person with you to 
the interview. 
4. You will be asked to sign a consent form to show that you understand what the study is about 
and that you agree to participate. If you have a mental health clinician, by giving your consent 
you will also be giving permission for Robyn to contact your mental health clinician to inform 
them that you are taking part in the study and to confirm what particular mental health 
diagnoses you have been given. The information that you share with Robyn during the interview 
will not be discussed with your clinician unless she believes that you are danger of harming 
yourself or someone else, in which case she is legally required to break confidentiality. 
5. During the interview, Robyn will ask you a number of questions about your self-harm 
behaviour(s). This interview will take approximately 1-2 hours and will be audio-taped for later 
transcription. If you or Robyn does not believe that you have covered all the necessary 
information within the interview, you will be given the opportunity to participate in a second 
interview. The tapes and transcripts from the interview(s) will be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
following the study. 
6. Robyn will contact you a day or two after the interview(s) to ask whether the study has raised 
any questions for you that you would like answered. 
7. Within 2 weeks of completing the interview(s), you will receive a questionnaire to fill in about 
your experiences of participating in a research study on deliberate self-harm. This questionnaire 
will give you the opportunity to provide suggestions about how this type of research can be 
improved.  
 
What about privacy? 
 
No material which could personally identify you will be used in any reports on this study. The 
information will be used as part of the researcher’s PhD thesis and may be published in an academic 
journal or presented at conferences. In any publication or presentation, information will be provided in 
such a way that you cannot be identified. Some publications require that the data described is made 
available to competent professionals. If the data is requested by other professionals, it will be provided 
in such a way that no-one will be able to identify individual participants.  
 
Are there any risks? 
 
Deliberate self-harm can be a very difficult topic to talk about and there is a risk that some of the 
questions asked may bring up past memories or feelings that are unpleasant or distressing. If you do 
become distressed during the interview, you can stop the interview at any time. If you find that you 
feel upset after the interview, you are welcome to contact Robyn Langlands. Robyn will also explore 
options for further support with you at the end of the interview. 
  
What are the benefits? 
 
There is no guarantee that you will receive any benefits from this project. However, this project does 
have the potential to lead to better mental health care and support for people who engage in deliberate 
self-harm. 
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Will I be paid to participate in this project? 
 
You will be given a movie voucher to the value of one movie ticket for completing the initial 
questionnaire. If you participate in the interview, you will be given the choice of a petrol voucher, 
Farmer’s voucher or The Warehouse voucher to the value of $30 to reimburse you for your time and 
travel expenses. Finally, if you complete the questionnaire on research participation, you will be given 
a movie voucher to the value of one movie ticket. 
 
What will happen at the end of the study? 
 
You will be asked whether you would like to be sent a transcript of your interview(s) once the data has 
been transcribed. You will also be given the option of receiving a brief summary of the common themes 
that arose from the interviews once the data has been transcribed and analysed. 
 
Where can I get more information about the study? 
 
If you would like further information about this project, please contact Robyn Langlands, email: 
robyn.langlands@vuw.ac.nz, phone: (04) 463 5233 extension 8605. If you do phone Robyn and you are 
directed through to an answer phone, please leave your name and number, and she will call you back 
as soon as possible. The answer phone is private and Robyn will be the only person who has access to 
the messages left on the phone. 
 
What if I have concerns about the project? 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you can 
contact an independent health and disability advocate.  
 
This is a free service provided under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act.  
 
Telephone (NZwide):  0800 555 050  
Free Fax (NZ wide):  0800 2787 7678 (0800 2 SUPPORT)  
Email (NZ wide):  advocacy@hdc.org.nz 
 
Compensation 
 
In the unlikely event of a physical injury as a result of your participation in this study, you may be 
covered by ACC under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. ACC cover is not 
automatic and your case will need to be assessed by ACC according to the provisions of the 2002 Injury 
Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. If your claim is accepted by ACC, you still might not 
get any compensation. This depends on a number of factors such as whether you are an earner or non-
earner. ACC usually provides only partial reimbursement of costs and expenses and there may be no 
lump sum compensation payable.  There is no cover for mental injury unless it is a result of physical 
injury.  If you have ACC cover, generally this will affect your right to sue the investigators. If you have 
any questions about ACC, contact your nearest ACC office or the Principal Investigator. 
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General Information and Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory (Gratz, 2001) 
 
Name: _____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Date of birth: _______________________________________________________________________ 
    
Gender (circle one): Female   Male 
 
Nationality: ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Ethnicity: __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Have you ever received a mental health diagnosis or diagnoses? (circle one): 
 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, what was the diagnosis or diagnoses? ___________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
How old were you when received the diagnosis or diagnoses? ___________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Phone number: _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Postal Address: _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Email Address: _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
This questionnaire asks about a number of different things that people sometimes do to hurt 
themselves. Please be sure to read each question carefully and respond honestly. Often, people 
who do these kinds of things to themselves keep it a secret, for a variety of reasons. However, 
honest responses to these questions will provide us with greater understanding and 
knowledge about these behaviours and the best way to help people. Please answer yes to a 
question only if you did the behaviour intentionally, or on purpose, to hurt yourself. Do not 
respond yes if you did something accidentally (e.g., you tripped and banged your head on 
accident). Also, please be assured that your responses are completely confidential. This 
questionnaire should take you approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
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1. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) cut your wrist, arms, or other area(s) of 
your body (without intending to kill yourself)? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 
 How old were you when you first did this?     _________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      _________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      _________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  _________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
2. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) burned yourself with a cigarette (circle 
one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?) __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
3. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) burned yourself with a lighter or a match? 
(circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  _________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
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4. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) carved words into your skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
5. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) carved pictures, designs, or other marks 
into your skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
6. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) severely scratched yourself, to the extent 
that scarring or bleeding occurred? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________  
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
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7. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) bitten yourself, to the extent that you broke 
the skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
8. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) rubbed sandpaper on your body? (circle 
one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
9. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) dropped acid onto your skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
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10. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) used bleach or oven cleaner to scrub your 
skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe    
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
11. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) stuck sharp objects such as needles, pins, 
staples, etc. into your skin, not including tattoos, ear piercing, needles used for drug use, 
or body piercing? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________  
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe    
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
12. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) rubbed glass into your skin? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer   
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
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13. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) broken your own bones? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
14. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) banged your head against something, to 
the extent that you caused a bruise to appear? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
15. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) punched yourself, to the extent that you 
caused a bruise to appear? (circle one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe  
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
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16. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) prevented wounds from healing? (circle 
one): 
 
Yes   No 
 
If yes:  
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe    
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
17. Have you ever intentionally (i.e., on purpose) done anything else to hurt yourself that 
was not asked about in this questionnaire? If yes, what did you do to hurt yourself? 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 How old were you when you first did this?     __________________ 
 How many times have you done this?      __________________ 
 When was the last time you did this?      __________________ 
 How many years have you been doing this? (If you are no longer  
doing this, how many years did you do this before you stopped?)  __________________ 
 Has this behaviour ever resulted in hospitalisation or injury severe   
enough to require medical treatment?      __________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Your time and contribution to this research is much appreciated. 
 
Support Organisations 
 
Deliberate self-harm can be a very difficult topic to talk about and as a result, some of 
the questions you have been asked about today may have brought up past memories or 
feelings that are unpleasant or distressing. If this is the case, please feel free to contact 
me on (04) 463 5233 extension 8605 or at robyn.langlands@vuw.ac.nz. Alternatively, you 
may wish to call, email or check out the website of one of the following support 
organisations: 
 
LifeLine 
 
Free telephone counselling 
Available 24 hours a day, 7days a week 
Ph: 0800 111 777 
Website: http://www.lifeline.org.nz/ 
 
Free email counselling 
Email: chris@lifeline.co.nz 
Website: http://www.elifeline.co.nz/ 
Youthline  
 
Free telephone counselling 
Available 24 hours a day, 7days a week 
Ph: 0800 376 633 
Website: http://www.youthline.co.nz/ 
 
Email or Text Support 
Email: talk@youthline.co.nz  
TXT: 027 4 YOUTHS (027 4968 847) 
 
Mensline  
 
Free telephone Counselling 
Available 5:30pm-11pm, 7 nights a week 
Ph: 0800 MENSLINE (636 754) 
Website: http://www.mensline.org.nz/ 
Alcohol and Drug Helpline  
 
Available 10am-10pm daily  
Ph: 0800 787 797 
Website: 
http://www.adanz.org.nz/ADANZ/Home 
 
Warmline 
Free phone support service staffed by 
volunteers specifically for people who use 
mental health services. Volunteers are people 
who have used mental health services 
themselves.  
Available 7.00pm-1.00am, Tuesday-Sunday 
Ph: 0800 200 207 
 
Buddies 
 
Buddies offers peer support to people who 
self identify as experiencing a mental illness 
or who have used mental health services.  
 
Ph: (04) 385 2104 or (021) 960 060 
Email: buddies.wn@paradise.net.nz  
Visit: Level 6 NZEI House 178 Willis   
Street, Wellington 
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Interview Questions 
 
Please read the following questions carefully. The purpose of this study is to understand how you 
experience self-harm from your perspective, while at the same time addressing the research 
questions listed below. As a result, Robyn cannot guarantee that she will ask you all of these 
questions or that these will be the only questions she will ask you during the interview(s).  The 
questions do, however, provide you with an idea about what kinds of topics will be discussed 
during the interview. Please consider carefully if you would be comfortable answering these 
questions before you decide whether you would like to participate in an interview. 
 
 Can you tell me about the last time that you deliberately harmed yourself without intending to 
kill yourself? 
 
 Can you tell me as much as you can remember about what led up to this episode of self-harm? 
 
 Can you describe for me how you were feeling prior to harming yourself? 
 
 How did you feel during this particular episode of self-harm? 
 
 How did you feel afterwards? 
 
 Can you tell me what you were thinking about prior to harming yourself? 
 
 What were you thinking about during this particular episode of self-harm? 
 
 Did those thoughts change in any way after the episode of self-harm? [If yes…] What were you 
thinking about after you had harmed yourself? 
 
 Did you have to deal with any particular consequences from that episode of self-harm? [If 
yes…] Can you tell me about them? 
 
 Thinking about what we’ve talked about in relation to this particular episode of self-harm, 
would you consider this a typical episode of self-harm for you? [If no…] What was different 
about this episode compared to other times in the past when you’ve harmed yourself? 
 
 Is there anything that you’d like to tell me about in relation to your self-harm that we haven’t 
discussed? 
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Consent to Contact Clinician 
 
 
I give permission for the Principal Investigator to inform my mental health clinician that I 
am participating in this study. 
 
 
I give permission for the Principal Investigator to confirm with my clinician any mental 
health diagnoses that I have if this is necessary. 
 
 
Full name: 
 
Signature 
 
Date: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
Exploring the experiences of adolescents and young adults who engage in  
non-suicidal deliberate self-harm behaviours 
 
Consent Form 
 
 I have read and I understand the information sheet dated June 2008 for volunteers taking part in 
the study designed to explore the deliberate self-harm experiences of adolescents and young 
adults. 
 
 I have read the list of interview questions for the study. 
 
 I have had the opportunity to discuss this study. I am satisfied with the answers I have been given. 
 
 I have had the opportunity to use whanau support or a friend to help me ask questions and 
understand the study. 
 
 I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and that I may withdraw from 
the study at any time and this will in no way affect my continuing health care. 
 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no material which could 
identify me will be used in any reports on this study. 
 
 I understand that my interview will be audio-taped. 
 
 I understand the compensation provisions for this study. 
 
 I have had time to consider whether to take part. 
 
 I know who to contact if the study distresses me in any way. 
 
 I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study. 
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Please complete the following: 
 
I would like to receive a copy of my interview transcript.  Yes  No 
 
I would like to receive a summary of the research results.  Yes  No 
 
I would like to be contacted by Robyn Langlands in the future with regards to  Yes  No 
other studies she is conducting on deliberate self-harm behaviours for her PhD. 
 
 
Please write your contact details below.  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the best time of day to contact you?  
(please circle one):  
 
 
Morning 
 
Afternoon 
 
Evening 
 
 
Is the form of contact you’ve chosen (please circle one): Private   Shared  
  
(e.g. personal 
email address 
or cell 
number) 
  
  
(e.g. your 
family’s 
home phone 
number) 
 
I_________________________________________ (full name) hereby consent to take part in this study. 
 
Date:  
Signature:     
 
 
Full names of Principal Investigator:     
Contact Phone Number for Principal Investigator:  
Project explained by: 
Project role: 
Date: 
Signature: 
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Evaluation of Research Participation 
 
DATE: …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
This questionnaire should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Please note that 
when a question refers to ‘the study’, this includes both the first questionnaire you 
completed and the interview(s) you participated in. Please circle the response that best 
describes your experiences of taking part in this study: 
 
1) The study was explained thoroughly to me before I took part. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
2) It was my choice to take part in the study (i.e., I could have said no even if other people 
wanted me to say yes). 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
3) I knew I could skip questions or parts of the study if I wanted to. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
4) I knew I could stop being in the study at any time. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
5) During the interview, I knew that I could ask to take a break whenever I wanted.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
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 6) The interviewer made me feel comfortable during the interview. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
7) The interviewer showed respect for my feelings and experiences during the interview.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
8) I am glad that I took part in this study. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
9) Being in this study made me feel distressed. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
10) Being in this study made me feel upset. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
11) Being in this study made me feel good about myself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
12) I regret participating in this study. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
13) Being in this study made me feel sad. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
14) I believe that by being in the study I am helping other people who self-harm.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
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 15) Knowing what I know now about participating in the study, I would still choose to take 
part in this research. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree 
 
 
16) Do you have any suggestions as to how to improve research studies about deliberate 
self-harm? If yes, please write them below. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17) Do you have any other comments about your experiences of participating in this study? 
If yes, please write them below. 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 ____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. Your feedback and suggestions 
will be used to improve future studies about deliberate self-harm. 
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Coding scheme1 
“Unpleasant events” are defined as members of a set of events (e.g., death of a close relative, 
losing one’s job), stimuli (e.g., strong electric shock), and behaviours (e.g., cleaning a mess) which 
are experienced by the individual to whom they occur as unpleasant, painful, noxious, or distressing.  
1) First, code each response according to the following categories (responses may be given more 
than one code): 
Code Category Definition 
01 Health and well-being Events that involve injury, physical pain, and danger to the 
self or to important others. These can be specific 
psychopathological events (e.g., a binge) but do not include 
ongoing mental health problems (e.g., bulimia).  
02 Achievement-Academic-Job Events that involve work, school, and other competitive 
situations; achievement related failures, disappointments, 
and difficulties.  
03 Domestic, day-to-day 
inconveniences 
Events that involve noise, crowding, minor physical 
discomforts, mishaps, delays, and accidents. 
04 Interpersonal Relationships 
(e.g., sexual, marital, 
friendships, family, collegial) 
Events concerning rejection, separation, loss, and other 
disappointing and painful interpersonal experiences. These 
events can include memories of negative interpersonal 
experiences. 
05 Legal Events involving encounters with the police, courts of law, 
lawsuits, incarceration, and other legal problems.  
06 Material-Financial Events involving financial losses and problems. 
07 Death Related The actual or remembered death of an important other or 
events which remind the individual of the reality of death 
(e.g., seeing a corpse). 
08 Other Events that could not be coded in any of the above 
categories. 
88 No specific event General response that did not refer to a specific event 
(e.g., I was feeling overwhelmed). 
99 Insufficient Information Response did not contain enough information about the 
event to be coded. 
 
2) Second, code each response again according to the following categories: 
Code Category Definition 
13 Self Self-related events that involve only the individual. These 
can include memories of past events that involved others.  
14 Other Events which involve interacting with other people at the 
time (i.e., not memories of past interactions). 
 
                                                             
1 Adapted from the Unpleasant Events Schedule (Lewinsohn, Mermelstein, Alexander, & MacPhillamy, 1983). 
  
Debriefing information 
 
Thank you for completing this survey. In this study, we were interested in the thoughts, 
feelings, and events that lead people to engage in non-suicidal self-injury. Researchers 
have identified that one of the main reasons why people injure themselves on purpose is 
to manage overwhelming, negative feelings such as sadness or anger. Other reasons 
people give for self-injury include: to punish themselves, to feel more in control, and to 
stop feeling numb. Understanding why people self-injure is essential in order to 
effectively treat this behaviour. Very little research has been conducted in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand to explore non-suicidal self-injury. This research will help us to learn more 
about why people in Aotearoa/New Zealand injure themselves on purpose and, 
ultimately, may help us to identify the most effective treatments for non-suicidal self-
injury.  
 
Thank you once again for taking the time to participate in this study. If you know of 
anyone else who has injured themselves on purpose in the past 12 months, is at least 16 
years of age, lives in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and you think they may be interested in 
completing this survey, please pass on the study details to them. 
 
Need to talk to someone? 
 
If you have found completing this survey distressing in any way, it may be helpful for you to 
talk to a friend, relative, or other support person (e.g., teacher, minister, counsellor) about how 
you are feeling. You could also call, email, or check out the websites of one of the following 
support organisations: 
 
LifeLine 
Free telephone counselling available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
Ph: (09) 5222 999 (within Auckland)  
0800 543 354 (outside Auckland) 
Website: http://www.lifeline.org.nz 
Free email counselling 
Email: chris@elifeline.co.nz 
Website: http://www.elifeline.co.nz 
 
Youthline  
Free telephone counselling available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 
Ph: 0800 376 633 
  Website: http://www.youthline.co.nz 
Email: talk@youthline.co.nz 
Free TXT using your mobile phone to 234 
 
 
  2 
Warmline 
Warmline is a peer-run service, staffed by people who have all experienced mental illness 
in a real way. Warmline’s service is free, and open to anyone who feels affected in some 
way by mental illness. Available 7.00pm-1.00am, Tuesday-Sunday  
Ph: 0800 200 207 
  Website: http://www.wellink.org.nz/services/warmline.htm 
 
Rainbow Youth 
Rainbow Youth is an Auckland-based organisation providing support, information, 
advocacy and education for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, fa'afafine, and 
takataapui young people (aged between 13 and 28) and their friends, family and whanau. 
Phone: (09) 376 4155 
Email: info@rainbowyouth.org.nz 
Website: http://www.rainbowyouth.org.nz 
 
Alcohol Drug Association of New Zealand  
Helpline available 10am-10pm daily, 7 days a week  
Ph: 0800 787 797 
Website: http://www.alcoholdrughelp.org.nz 
 






































Options for Support 
 
Do you need support? 
If you are feeling distressed or upset, it may be helpful for you to talk to a friend, 
relative, or other support person (e.g., teacher, minister, counsellor) about how you 
are feeling. Alternatively, you could contact one of the following.  
 
In crisis? 
If you need urgent mental health support, please phone 111 or one of the following 
Crisis and Assessment Treatment Teams (CATT): 
 If you live in the greater Wellington region (i.e., Wellington, Porirua, or 
Kapiti) phone 494 9169. 
 If you live in the Hutt Valley, phone 566 6999 and ask for the CAT team.  
 
Need to talk to someone? 
If you need to talk to someone, please contact one of the following: 
 Lifeline 0800 543 354 
 Depression Helpline 0800 111 757 
 Youthline 0800 376 633 
 Warmline 0800 200 207  
 
Need a referral or counselling? 
Angelique O'Connell is a registered Clinical Psychologist who works in the Victoria 
Psychology Clinic, located on the 5th floor of the Easterfield Building. Phone  
463 6400 or email: psychclinic@vuw.ac.nz to book an appointment.  
 
Victoria University has a free, confidential Counselling Service for students. Phone 
463 5310 or email: counselling-service@vuw.ac.nz to book an appointment.  
 
